


















The Informal as a Project: Self-Help Housing in Peru, 1954–1986 
 



















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
under the Executive Committee 























































Helen Elizabeth Gyger 
All Rights Reserved 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Informal as a Project: Self-Help Housing in Peru, 1954–1986 
 




This dissertation examines the history of aided self-help housing through the case study 
of Peru, which was the site of significant experiments in this field, and pioneering in its efforts to 
enact a large-scale policy of land tenure regularization in unplanned settlements. As the sheer 
scale of the housing deficit tested the limits of conventional modernist housing reform, aided 
self-help presented itself as a response to the constraints and apparent opportunities of this 
situation; its essential premise was to bring together the benefits of “formal” architecture (an 
expertise in design and construction) with those of “informal” building (substantial cost savings, 
because residents themselves furnished the labour). 
The analysis focuses on three key spheres: the circumstances which made Peru a fertile 
site for innovation in low-cost housing under a succession of very different political regimes; the 
influences on, and movements within, architectural culture which prompted architects to 
consider aided self-help housing as an alternative mode of practice; and the context in which 
international development agencies came to embrace these projects as part of their larger goals 
during the Cold War and beyond.  
Aided self-help housing in Peru took a variety of forms, ranging from highly co-ordinated 
projects constructed using communal labour, with on-site technical assistance from architects, 
to sites-and-services developments, which included the provision of basic services (water, 
sewerage, electricity, roadways), on the expectation that residents would eventually consolidate 
their neighbourhoods into more-or-less conventional urban areas. These projects generally 
offered a very basic core house, which residents were expected to expand and complete over 
time following standard plans set out by an architect. Housing on this progressive-development 
model (also called the “growing house”) could be built incrementally as the family’s needs 
demanded and its budget allowed. At the other end of the spectrum was the UN-sponsored 
Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda (PREVI), an international design competition which 
endeavoured to draw upon the experience of prominent avant-garde architects to devise new 
approaches to low-cost housing; foregrounding innovations in building technologies, 
construction systems, and urban design theories, this experiment ultimately brought the latent 
conflicts between high architecture and affordable housing into high-relief. 
This research reveals that although aided self-help housing promised a means of 
resolving a housing crisis that conventional architectural techniques had failed to meet, it quickly 
encountered the seeds of its own failure—at the political level, the organizational level, the 
implementation level, and perhaps most crucially, the funding level. Despite the promises of 
technical assistance to self-builders, in practice the needed resources and trained staff often 
failed to appear, suggesting that the rhetoric of self-help could simply become a mask to 
validate the state’s disengagement from housing provision. While this withdrawal of the state 
(and as a result, of the architects it employs) from the provision of low-cost housing has seemed 
inevitable, the dissertation aims to reexamine the effectiveness of these experiments in aided 
self-help, in order to open the way to reassessing their potential and reframing their strategies 
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1. Introduction: The Informal as a Project 
 
The narrative of this dissertation turns on the limits (and limitations) of architecture as a 
means to provide housing under conditions of crisis: it examines the challenges to the 
universalist claims of architectural modernism in the postwar period when it was faced with a 
foreign world of rapid demographic increase, very low-income populations, emerging economic 
modernization, and large-scale unplanned urban development. The prototypes first devised in 
Europe in the 1920s to provide affordable reform housing, which by this period had already 
gained a canonical status for architects, needed to be radically rethought—not just in terms of 
the regional inflections of aesthetic forms, or in technical adaptations to different climates, 
building materials, and technologies, but also in the conceptual recalibrations required to 
respond to unfamiliar economic and social conditions. As the sheer scale of the housing deficit 
and the immense scarcity of resources (or more precisely, unevenness of access to resources) 
tested the limits of modernist housing reform, aided self-help housing presented itself as a 
response to the constraints and apparent opportunities of this situation; its essential premise 
was to bring together the benefits of “formal” architecture (an expertise in design and 
construction) with those of “informal” building (substantial cost savings, because residents 
themselves furnished the labour).  
The “informal” housing considered here covers different phenomena, which are often 
merged together in architectural discourse, but in practice do not always overlap. On the one 
hand, “informal” or unauthorized settlements: these are established by occupying land that does 
not belong to the residents; in addition, at least initially they do not conform to prevailing legal 
standards for the development of urban subdivisions (lacking basic amenities such as water and 
sewerage lines, electricity, or graded roadways). On the other hand, “informal” or improvised 
construction: in addition to being the primary method of building housing in unauthorized 
settlements, in Peru as elsewhere this may also be employed in legally established housing 
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settlements. In unauthorized settlements, dwellings are likely to be entirely self-built or 
improvised; in authorized settlements, they will often begin with conventional construction, but 
develop on an ad hoc basis without architects, engineers, building permits, or inspections.  
Self-help practices provoke the question: what kind of contribution could architectural 
thinking make to housing in this context—that is, housing understood as low-cost, 
Existenzminimum dwellings provided with basic urban amenities? Following its disciplinary split, 
architecture’s loss of expertise and experience in this field to urban planning has been notable; 
while there is certainly a need for architecture to understand housing in the ways that planning 
does—not as an isolated design object, but integrated into larger urban systems—it is also 
worthwhile re-thinking how the knowledge specific to architecture could contribute to the 
effective provision of low-cost housing, which remains as urgent as ever globally. Furthermore, 
architecture’s loss of its own history in relation to aided self-help housing needs to be redressed 
before contemporary practice can mobilize the requisite knowledge to propose viable new 
solutions. 
This research examines the history of aided self-help housing, or technical assistance to 
self-builders, through the case study of Peru, focusing on the period 1954 to 1986. While the 
postwar period saw a number of trial projects in aided self-help housing throughout the 
developing world—notably, US-sponsored projects in Puerto Rico, as well as various proposals 
by Charles Abrams and his collaborators in Ghana, Pakistan, and the Philippines—Peru was 
the site of significant (albeit sporadic) experiments in this field. Furthermore, as Julio Calderón 
Cockburn has pointed out, Peru was pioneering in its efforts to enact a large-scale policy of land 
tenure regularization in unplanned urban settlements, passing legislation to enable these efforts 
in 1961. Mexico passed similar legislation in 1971, and a handful of other countries in Latin 
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America (Chile, Brazil, and Argentina) followed suit after the United Nations Habitat conference 
in Vancouver in 1976.1 
Efforts to make aided self-help housing work—technically, administratively, financially—
took a variety of forms in Peru over these decades. Primarily, “aided” or “directed” self-help 
housing projects were intended to be carried out with active, on-site technical assistance from 
architects, harnessing the energy of informal building and directing it towards more 
accomplished outcomes in terms of design and construction. The contribution of the architect 
could encompass improvements to the planning of urban layouts, the design and production of 
building components and construction methods, and the structural engineering and spatial 
performance of the house (including the separation of functional zones, maximizing light and air, 
minimizing wasted space). More broadly, professional expertise could be deployed to produce 
efficiencies in the management of resources (usage of time, labour, materials, money) and to 
shape the social dimensions of the project (training, organization of work groups, community 
development). Finally, the housing agencies sponsoring such projects often facilitated the 
participants’ access to subsidized loans, in an effort to speed up the protracted process of self-
help construction.   
While many projects were aimed at coordinating the remediation and upgrading of 
existing squatter settlements, construction ex nihilo was regarded as far preferable, because 
with the advantage of a well-planned skeleton any subsequent installation of amenities would be 
more straightforward and therefore more affordable than working around improvised structures. 
Planned urban settlements took a variety of forms. They generally included the provision of an 
urban layout, graded roadways, and basic services—water, sewerage, electricity—but 
sometimes only on a shared basis at the outset, with standpipes and latrines but no residential 
plumbing connections, with street lighting but no residential electricity. At times these sites-and-
                                                
1 Julio Calderón Cockburn, La ciudad ilegal: Lima en el siglo XX (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de 
San Marcos, Fondo Editorial de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, 2005), 42. 
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services projects stretched the Existenzminimum to its extreme: in their most reduced form, 
known as lotes tizados (chalk-drawn lots), they offered residents only shared amenities and the 
outline of a lot, on the expectation that they would eventually consolidate themselves into more-
or-less conventional urban areas. 
Other architect-planned projects went beyond the sites-and-services minimum, including 
a basic dwelling unit or core house, which was intended to be expanded and completed over 
time by the residents, following the architect’s plans. Housing on this progressive-development 
model (also called the “growing house”) was appealing not just to low-income households, but 
also lower middle-income families, since it could provide an alternative path to achieving a 
standard modern dwelling, built incrementally as the family’s needs demanded and its budget 
allowed. In another variant of the “growing house” model, known as supervised credit, financing 
was disbursed in stages, with the architect inspecting and approving each stage of construction 
before the next installment was paid out. This offered technical assistance at a remove—a more 
cost-effective use of the architect’s time—not managing or directing the entire process, but 
providing quality control by intervening at key junctures to ensure that the work was proceeding 
in the right direction.  
Significantly, the terms used to designate “self-help housing” vary considerably in 
Spanish. The first key study on the methodology, published in 1953 by the Centro 
Interamericano de Vivienda (CINVA, or Inter-American Housing Center) in Bogotá, based on 
trial projects in Puerto Rico, used two terms: “ayuda propia” (self-help) and “ayuda mútua” 
(mutual help, or mutual aid)2—underscoring the collaborative nature of the projects, that they 
were not realized by a single builder working in isolation, but a coordinated group mobilized to 
construct a neighbourhood of houses. Similarly, in Peru architect Eduardo Neira wrote a report 
in 1954 on measures to address unauthorized settlements in the city of Arequipa, in which he 
                                                
2 Luis Rivera Santos et al, Manual para la organización de proyectos piloto de ayuda propia y ayuda 
mútua en vivienda (Bogotá: Centro Interamericano de Vivienda, Servicio de Intercambio Científico, 1953). 
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proposed housing construction using “ayuda mútua” (mutual aid)3; in his somewhat later study 
on Arequipa, English architect and theorist John F. C. Turner employed the term “ayuda mútua 
dirigida” (managed mutual aid).4 The designation “autoconstrucción” (self-building) first 
appeared in a government housing agency document from 1961, referring to two modes of self-
help operation—collaborative and individualized: “ayuda mútua” (mutual aid) and “esfuerzo 
propio” (one’s own effort).5 In more recent publications, “autoconstrucción” appears alone—
object-centred rather than process-centred in its connotations, and entirely detached from the 
abstract values of personal and community development. Of course, all these terms serve to 
mask the difficulties of participating in the capitalist labour market while simultaneously using 
one’s labour to build one’s own house, obscuring the extent to which self-built housing requires 
drafting the labour of the entire family, including children, or is subcontracted to professional (or 
semi-professional) builders. 
Self-help housing is a new area of study for architectural history; the half-dozen articles 
(in particular by urban geographer Richard Harris) published on the work of John Turner and 
others in developing aided self-help programs provide valuable background, but tend to view 
them from a global policy standpoint rather than situating them within a specific social and 
cultural context, as my research aims to achieve.6 Beyond these articles, the literature on self-
help housing is dominated by practice-oriented handbooks, and evaluation reports on individual 
                                                
3 Eduardo Neira, “Anexo No. 4: El problema de las Urbanizaciones Populares en la ciudad de Arequipa,” 
February 27, 1954, 5; in Eduardo Neira and José Dulanto Pinillos, “Informe acerca de las Urbanizaciones 
Populares de Arequipa,” May 5, 1954, JFCT-UW. 
4
 John F. C. Turner, The Housing and Planning Problems of Arequipa, Peru: A Case Study with Particular 
Reference to the Application of Self-Help Methods in Relation to the Squatter Settlements, n.d., ca. 1959-
1960, JFCT-UW. 
5
 INVI, Plan de Vivienda, 1962–1971 (Lima: INVI, 1961), 29.  
6 One exception to this is Ray Bromley’s “Peru 1957-1977: How Time and Place Influenced John Turner's 
Ideas on Housing Policy,” Habitat International 27, no. 2 (2003): 271-292. See also Richard Harris, “‘A 
Burp in Church’: Jacob L. Crane's Vision of Aided Self-Help Housing,” Planning History Studies 11, no. 1 
(1997): 3-16; Richard Harris, “A Double Irony: The Originality and Influence of John F.C. Turner,” Habitat 
International 27, no. 2 (2003): 245-269. 
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projects produced by sociologists and planners. However, there are two collections of essays 
that provide a useful overview of key debates at different junctures in the evolution of thinking 
about these programs: Self-Help Housing: A Critique, edited by Peter M. Ward (1982), and 
Beyond Self-Help Housing, edited by Kosta Mathéy (1992). These offer a starting point for the 
formulation of an intellectual history of the field, but their conclusions clearly need to be revisited 
after this period of time. Ijlal Muzaffar’s 2007 dissertation “The Periphery Within: Modern 
Architecture and the Making of the Third World” provides an account of the deployment of self-
help housing methodologies as a tool of development in the postwar Third World, making the 
case for the centrality of these practices to the discipline of architecture over these decades. In 
contrast to this necessarily deterritorialized history, my research explores the complex and 
shifting social construction of “informal” urbanism and of self-help building as embedded in one 
particular site.  
In the relatively few histories of modern architecture in Peru—such as Elio Martuccelli’s 
Arquitectura para una ciudad fragmentada: ideas, proyectos y edificios en la Lima del siglo XX 
(2000), Wiley Ludeña Urquizo’s Tres buenos tigres: vanguardia y urbanismo en el Perú del siglo 
XX (2004), and Sharif S. Kahatt’s “Agrupación Espacio and the CIAM Peru Group: Architecture 
and the City in the Peruvian Modern Project” (2011)—writers have presented unplanned urban 
development as a challenge to Peru’s investment in achieving a certain modernity (its “modern 
project”), and have not considered the pragmatic work of aided self-help housing an appropriate 
object of study. Nonetheless, Ludeña Urquizo’s methodical Lima: Historia y urbanismo en cifras, 
1821–1970 (2004) includes a useful tabulation of housing projects in the Peruvian capital 
(divided into three broad categories: produced by the state, private developers, or the residents 
themselves), which complements the earlier nationwide survey of state-sponsored housing 
projects compiled by the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano, Estudio de evaluación integral 
de los programas de vivienda ejecutados y/o promovidos por el Estado (1991). In another vein, 
the Master’s thesis by Carlos Valladares and Eleodoro Ventocilla, “Para una concepción de la 
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vivienda de interés social” (1973), contains an invaluable resource of interview transcripts with 
architects involved in housing from the 1940s onwards, including those who worked on the 
design and implementation of self-help projects.  
Studies that illuminate the socio-political context informing unplanned urbanism in Peru 
can be found across disciplinary boundaries. In addition to the ground-breaking anthropological 
research carried out by José Matos Mar in Lima—fieldwork conducted in the mid-1950s, and 
published within different conceptual frameworks as Estudio de las Barriadas Limeñas: Informe 
presentado a Naciones Unidas en diciembre de 1955 (1966) and Las barriadas de Lima, 1957 
(1977)—a number of ethnographic studies have explored the histories of emerging urban 
neighbourhoods, notably Carlos Iván Degregori et al, Conquistadores de un Nuevo Mundo: de 
invasores a ciudadanos en San Martín de Porres (1986), as well as Jürgen Golte and Norma 
Adams, Los caballos de Troya de los invasores: estrategias campesinas en la conquista de la 
Gran Lima (1987). Studies from sociological and political science perspectives provide detailed 
analyses of the evolution of housing policy embedded in its domestic political considerations, 
including David Collier’s Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru 
(1976), Henry A. Dietz’s Poverty and Problem-Solving under Military Rule: The Urban Poor in 
Lima, Peru (1980), Abelardo Sánchez-León and Julio Calderón Cockburn’s El laberinto de la 
ciudad: Políticas urbanas del Estado 1950–1979 (1980), Susan Lobo’s A House of my Own: 
Social Organization in the Squatter Settlements of Lima, Peru (1982), Julio Calderón Cockburn 
and Paul  Maquet’s Las ideas urbanas en el Peru, 1958–1989 (1990), and Jean-Claude Driant’s 
Las barriadas de Lima: Historia e interpretación (1991). However, this earlier research does not 
consider the architectural objects and urban interventions produced as a result of these policy 
shifts, still less of unrealized projects, which can be revealing of how design professionals 
framed this problem in material, constructional, and spatial terms. This very rich field of projects, 
both realized and unrealized, forms the basis of my research. 
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Over the decades covered by this research, the phenomenon of “informal” urban 
settlement has been described by a number of different terms within Peru. By using the 
linguistic denomination of the original documents throughout the text, the aim is to trace this 
shifting conceptual and ideological construction. For example, in the tradition of regarding 
unauthorized urban development as a form of “cancer” or another similar disease, one 
government document from 1956 uses the term “‘barrios hongos’ (insalubres)”7 (insalubrious, 
mushrooming or fungal neighourhoods). However, more generally the terminology employed 
throughout the 1950s is less colourful, selecting more neutral descriptive modifiers: “barrio 
clandestino” (clandestine neighbourhood), “barrio espontáneo” (sponanteous neighbourhood), 
“barrio marginal” (marginal neighbourhood, being “structured at the margins of the law”8), or 
“barriada” more colloquially. John Turner tends to use barriada, and also “squatter settlement”—
a term that underscores the extra-legal status of the occupation of the underlying land. After 
1968, the term “pueblo joven” (young town) was officially introduced to overcome the pejorative 
connotations of barriada,9 emphasizing their emerging economic and social potential, and 
anticipated future development. After 1980, the official term was changed again—in reaction to 
the political connotations that had developed around “pueblo joven”—to “asentamiento humano” 
(human settlement), this more technocratic denomination having been popularized by UN-
Habitat in 1976. The usage “asentamiento informal” (informal settlement) seems to have been 
introduced by economist Hernando de Soto in his 1986 book El otro sendero. As Nezar 
                                                
7
 “La escasez de viviendas económicas ha dado por resultado el haci[na]miento de las existentes y la 
formación de los llamados ‘barrios hongos’ (insalubres) en los alrededores de los centros poblados.” 
CNV, “Planteamientos generales sobre el problema de la vivienda social” (Lima: CNV, August 1956). 
8
 FNSBS, La asistencia técnica a la vivienda y el problema de barriadas marginales (Lima: FNSBS, 
November 13, 1958), 8.  
9
 Anecdotally, the term still seems to have pejorative connotations: in the Peruvian television subtitling for 
police procedurals set in the United States, “the projects” is rendered as barriada. 
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AlSayyad has pointed out, the term “informal” in this sense originated in economic discourse,10 
thus de Soto’s employment of it underscores his broader arguments concerning the potential of 
(so-called) spontaneous and free markets in housing (and other sectors) to contribute to the 
development of the Peruvian economy.11 As “informal” settlements have increasingly been 
formalized through the granting of legal property title, alternative terms such as “barrio popular” 
(working-class neighbourhood), and “ciudad emergente” (emerging city) have appeared. 
Perhaps these neighbourhoods—legally titled, but below established planning standards, and 
with improvised dwellings—could be best described as “non-conforming” settlements. Finally, 
while in English the recently revived and problematic term “slum” is frequently used to designate 
informal settlements,12 in Peru, both in popular usage and professional discourse, these are two 
very distinct urban phenomena: “tugurio” (slum) typically refers to degraded tenement housing 
in inner-urban areas, occupied on a rental basis,13 while barriadas et al. are self-built housing 
owned by residents—ownership in this case being “a matter of fact rather than law.”14  
The dissertation focuses on debates and proposals in three key spheres: the 
circumstances which made Peru a fertile site for innovation in low-cost housing under a 
                                                
10
 AlSayyad argues that the “informal sector” emerged “as a concept in the early 1970s”—he traces the 
term to a 1973 article by economist Keith Hart—and that the term was not applied to urban development 
until the 1970s. Nezar AlSayyad, “Urban Informality as a 'New' Way of Life,” in Urban Informality: 
Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia, ed. Ananya  Roy and 
Nezar AlSayyad (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), 10.  
11 This is one of the many aspects of de Soto’s approach that raised objections from sociologist Gustavo 
Riofrío: “El texto … asume que sólo existe un actor social (los informales) (¿por qué no llamarlos 
marginales?) y no percibe el rol jugado por el estado.” Gustavo Riofrío, Producir la ciudad (popular) de 
los '90: Entre el mercado y el Estado (Lima: DESCO, 1991), 134. 
12 For an insightful discussion of this issue, see Alan Gilbert, “The Return of the Slum: Does Language 
Matter?” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 31, no. 4 (December 2007): 697-713. 
13
 A study produced as part of the 1967–1980 Plan of Urban Development for Lima very precisely 
established a “typology” of six kinds of tugurios, defined in terms of their urban form, construction, and 
materiality. These were: casa subdividida, quinta deteriorada, callejón, corralón, tugurio de azotea, and 
solar. José Muñoz and Diego Robles Rivas, Estudio de tugurios en los distritos de Jésus María y La 
Victoria (Lima: ONPU, 1968).   
14
 JNV and Fabricio Negromonte, Análisis de la información organizada existente sobre las barriadas de 
Lima (Lima: JNV, January 1968), 15. 
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succession of very different political regimes; the influences on, and movements within, 
architectural culture which prompted architects to consider self-help housing as an alternative 
mode of practice; and the context in which international development agencies came to 
embrace these projects as part of their larger goals. A number of figures recur throughout this 
narrative—including economist Pedro G. Beltrán, and architects Fernando Belaúnde Terry, 
Adolfo Córdova, Federico Mevius, and Diego Robles—but the most prominent is the architect 
and theorist John F. C. Turner. Turner’s prominence in the narrative is partly due to his position 
as an influential writer on self-help housing, widely published and well-known internationally; 
partly it is due to the chance survivals of archival material. The breadth and richness of Turner’s 
own archives allows for a close analysis of an early trial project in aided self-help housing that 
he managed, for example, and provides insights into the evolution of his ideas over many 
decades. Similarly, a self-help housing project that Turner worked on for the US-based 
company Hogares Peruanos (Peruvian Homes) is amply documented in the comprehensive 
archives of the parent company, World Homes. By contrast, the records of Peruvian housing 
agencies have suffered from uneven custodianship, and as a result are fragmentary and partial. 
In particular, there are no internal papers tracking debates about policy development, and the 
documentation of projects—whether proposed or realized—is scarce and often unreliable. 
Furthermore, these projects are presented in the standardized format of official reports which do 
not allow for the voices of individual architects. To a certain extent some of the policy issues can 
be traced through newspaper reports, particuarly those in La Prensa, published by economist 
Pedro G. Beltrán, who was greatly concerned with the issue of affordable housing; however, 
since La Prensa’s reportage faithfully reiterated Beltrán’s political and policy positions, this is by 
no means a neutral account. 
Turner’s writings about self-help housing, which had a widespread impact in the late 
1960s and 1970s, were grounded in his experiences working in Peru (1957–1965). Despite the 
importance of this period on his subsequent development as a theorist of self-help housing, the 
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details of his working life as an architect in Peru have not been previously explored in any 
depth, and his own references to Peru tend to be framed as anthropological analyses of the 
squatter settlement phenomenon rather than describing his contributions to specific projects. 
The exception is Turner’s essay “The Reeducation of a Professional” (included in an anthology 
he edited in 1972, Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process), which is a 
selective, self-conscious account outlining how a handful of key experiences in the field 
transformed his understanding of architecture as a practice and as a process. This dissertation 
takes a wider view, explicating the influences on Turner’s approach to architecture, outlining his 
contributions to developing the techniques of aided self-help housing, and situating his work 
within the Peruvian context and in relation to his Peruvian colleagues. Turner provides a point of 
connection between the practices of aided self-help housing in Peru and the discourses of 
modernist architecture, urban planning, and international development theory beyond Peru. 
Turner’s shifting perceptions of the barriada phenonemon and of potential approaches to 
addressing it could be seen as emblematic of broader realignments in the architectural 
profession as it attempted to come to terms with emerging patterns of unplanned urbanization in 
the developing world, and with the complex and ambiguous relationship between architect and 
self-builder in this context. A prolific writer, Turner’s ideas around the topic shifted considerably 
over the decades, and the unfolding of these ideas delineates one chronology running through 
the text, providing a counterpoint to the primary narrative arc which is framed around the shifting 
politics, policies, and programs concerning low-cost housing and unauthorized urban 
development within Peru. 
This arc begins with Chapter 2, “The Challenge of the Affordable House” which 
examines debates on housing reform within Peru in the mid-1950s. Three positions on how to 
address the housing crisis—New Deal-inspired developmentalism to stimulate growth, market 
liberalization to promote homeownership, and structural reform to raise living standards—are 
seen through the writings of three key figures, respectively architect-politician Fernando 
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Belaúnde Terry, economist Pedro G. Beltrán, and architect Adolfo Córdova. The issue of how to 
balance the competing demands of maintaining minimum standards while achieving affordability 
is crucial throughout these discussions, and is explored through specific projects such as the 
unidad vecinal (neighbourhood unit) housing developments devised by Belaúnde, and the “casa 
que crece” (growing house) designed by architect Santiago Agurto. 
Chapter 3, “The Barriada under the Microscope” takes as its starting point the 
establishment of the “Ciudad de Dios” (City of God) squatter settlement on Lima’s southern 
edge on Christmas Eve 1954, an event that dramatized the capital’s shortage of affordable 
housing and prompted the government to introduce unprecedented legislative measures in an 
effort to solve the crisis. In addition, it considers the importance of anthropological research 
(particularly that of José Matos Mar) as a tool for understanding, and thereby managing, the 
dense cultural context of the barriadas into which aided self-help housing projects would be 
inserted beginning in the late 1950s, following the establishment of the first state-run “technical 
assistance offices” offering guidance to self-builders. 
Chapter 4, “A Profession in Development” focuses on architectural culture through the 
lens of an individual career, exploring John F. C. Turner’s intellectual formation in England and 
his development of an architectural practice focused on aided self-help in Peru. As Turner 
arrived in Peru in mid-1957, he was entering an intellectual landscape closely informed by the 
ideas of José Matos Mar, and his immersion into this unfamiliar context was facilitated by 
Peruvian colleagues, initially Eduardo Neira, and subsequently Federico Mevius and Diego 
Robles. Turner’s work in Peru began in the southern city of Arequipa, where he organized an 
early trial project in aided self-help housing, and continued in Lima, where he worked initially as 
an administrator within—and subsequently an independent advisor to—state housing agencies 
charged with devising a response to the barriada problem on the national level. In this role his 
focus moved from on-the-ground projects to theoretical work, in particular studying efforts to 
systematize techniques of aided self-help housing. In addition, the richness of the materials in 
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Turner’s archive grants some insights into the perspective of participants in these programs, as 
relayed primarily through newspaper articles and Turner’s accounts and, more rarely, their own 
direct statements. 
Chapter 5, “Mediating Informality” returns to the policy sphere, with a review of 
innovations in planning law that were deployed as a mechanism to manage unauthorized 
settlements and re-establish control over the development of urban land. Specifically, it 
analyses Law 13517 (enacted in 1961) which was conceived as a comprehensive effort to meet 
the challenge of the barriadas, envisaging large-scale organized self-help building programs to 
rehabilitate and remodel existing unplanned neighbourhoods, and to construct new planned 
neighbourhoods for low-income residents, thereby providing them with a viable alternative to 
improvised settlements. The discussion includes an analysis of a number of trial projects where 
this approach was implemented, and reviews their outcomes. 
Chapter 6, “World Investments, Productive Homes” shifts to the international sphere, 
analyzing the political appeal of self-help housing during the Cold War, deployed as a tool both 
of development programs and of capitalist market-expansion. It concentrates on two projects, 
both of which were funded by US government aid agencies under the umbrella of the Alliance 
for Progress, and also involved the participation of John Turner. First, it examines the efforts of 
Wichita-based real estate developer World Homes to organize and finance the Villa Los 
Angeles project in Lima, which was to be built by the members of a housing cooperative 
employing aided self-help labour and the “growing house” model, which borrowed and 
formalized the incremental construction of barriada housing to lower upfront costs. The 
development of this project was closely tied to Pedro G. Beltrán’s endeavours to institute a 
mortgage financing system in Peru, promoting individual homeownership by facilitating access 
to credit. Second, it considers the Plan Bienal 1962–1963 Perú-BID, a government initiative to 
implement a nationwide program of self-help housing. The focus is on projects in the city of 
Chimbote, which were led in part by Turner’s colleague Diego Robles. The chapter concludes 
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with an assessment of these two approaches to housing provision as presented in evaluation 
reports commisioned by US funders in the mid-1960s.  
Chapter 7, “Building a Better Barriada” returns to architectural culture, closely examining 
the PREVI (Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, or Experimental Housing Project) PP1 
international design competition held in 1969, which endeavoured to draw upon the experience 
of prominent avant-garde architects to address the provision of affordable housing in Peru. 
Organized in large part by English architect Peter Land, PREVI PP1 particularly foregrounded 
innovations in building technologies, construction systems, and urban planning theories. Once 
again the dwellings were to follow the “growing house” model: each architect was to present a 
two-fold design—a core housing unit to be constructed by professional contractors and taking 
advantage of the economies of mass-production, and a blueprint for gradual horizontal and/or 
vertical extension of the house over time to be carried out by self-help. While this hybrid 
“growing house” model had been previously employed in Peru, PREVI PP1’s innovation was to 
transfer these techniques into the realm of high architecture—an experiment that ultimately 
brought the conflicts between affordable housing and “Architecture” into high-relief. The 
discussion also covers an associated project, PREVI PP3, conceived and organized by Turner’s 
collaborator Federico Mevius. Planned as an entirely self-build project, PREVI PP3 would begin 
with the provision of a sites-and-services lot, and subsequently offer assistance in the 
construction of a modest dwelling. Challenges in the implementation of these projects 
suggested that a workable, affordable form was yet to be found for aided self-help housing. 
Chapter 8, “Revolutions in Self-Help” reflects on how the self-help housing model was 
pushed to its limits under contrasting political and economic systems, as a period of leftist, 
revolutionary experimentation within Peru (roughly 1968–1980) was followed closely by the 
emergence of neoliberalism in the 1980s. The extreme malleability of self-help in theoretical and 
ideological terms is demonstrated by the contrasting values and significance attributed to it in 
materials produced by state agencies working with barriada residents in the early 1970s (one of 
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which was coordinated by Diego Robles), as well as two key texts, John F. C. Turner’s 
anarchist-inflected Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environments (1976), 
and Hernando de Soto’s neoliberal manifesto El otro sendero: La revolución informal (1986).15 
The rippling influence of these debates becomes evident in the shifts in the discourse and 
philosophies of international development agencies—specifically the United Nations and the 
World Bank—which then played out in the ebb and flow of their support for differing approaches 
to the provision of low-cost housing. 
Although aided self-help housing initially offered a means to solve a problem that could 
not be resolved via conventional architectural techniques, it quickly faced the spectre of failure 
at many levels: at the political level, shifting and unreliable support; at the organizational level, 
the complex social dynamics of intra-communal local politics; at the implementation level, the 
challenges of translating policies and regulations into design practice; and perhaps most 
crucially, at the funding level, the demand that programs be self-sufficient—the costs entirely 
reimbursed by their participants—belied the underlying economic reality, placing the 
sustainability of self-help housing programs into doubt. With the realization that those most in 
need of assistance were also the most difficult to incorporate into successful programs, funding 
tended to drift upwards to the higher end of the low-income spectrum—that is, to more 
manageable target populations.  
Despite the promises of technical assistance to self-builders, in practice the needed 
resources and trained staff often failed to appear, suggesting that the rhetoric of self-help was 
frequently simply an effort to validate the state’s disengagement from housing provision (as 
Jean-Claude Driant has argued, in Peru the glorification of self-help building “has long served as 
                                                
15  The book was first published in English in 1989 under the title The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution 
in the Third World (New York: Harper & Row, 1989). 
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a pretext for the inaction of the state”16). This withdrawal of the state (and as a result, of the 
architects it employs) from the provision of low-cost housing has seemed inevitable, as trial 
projects were overwhelmed by the demand for affordable shelter and the rapidity of unplanned 
urban development. Returning to examine the effectiveness of these experiments may open the 
way to reassess their potential and reframe their strategies for contemporary practice. 
As much as self-help housing represented a challenge to modernist architecture, it also 
appealed to its imagination, suggesting the opportunity for a more grounded practice: direct 
collaboration with the end-user, direct engagement with the physical work of construction, and 
the promised mutuality of coordinated building—aspirations embedded in architecture at least 
since Schinkel’s Project for a Cathedral to the Wars of Liberation (1814), imagined as an act of 
collaborative community construction, citizens bringing their own bricks to contribute to the site. 
Self-help housing has often been more powerful as an idea than as a practice, since the 
realities have rarely met the hopes placed in it. The challenge remains for architecture to 
address its limitations, in order to reimagine its practices and strategies. 
 
                                                
16 Jean-Claude Driant, Las barriadas de Lima: historia e interpretación (Lima: DESCO, Centro de 




2. The Challenge of the Affordable House 
 
In 1949, Lima’s modernist apotheosis appeared imminent [2.1]: the Plan Piloto, the city’s 
first master plan, had applied the techniques of scientific planning to analyze the city at its 
various scales—from the historic core to the agricultural areas supplying it with food—and to 
establish a logical course for the “channelling [encauzamiento] of its urban development.”1 But 
by the end of 1954, a follow-up study warned that “the overflowing vitality of the metropolis in its 
blind force of expansion” was setting in train problems which would only intensify over time, 
necessitating decisive action: “the traffic congestion endlessly increases; the number of 
accidents multiplies; delinquency grows; the city is choking itself in a dreadful ring of clandestine 
dwellings; the food situation is causing a crisis; a drop in the standard of living threatens.”2 All 
this was the result of an unprecedented rate of population growth due to rural-urban migration: 
established planning processes were being overtaken by the rapid emergence of barriadas 
(squatter settlements), as authorized housing could not be built quickly and cheaply enough to 
meet demand. Reluctantly, the study confessed: “An economical system of urbanization and 
construction that would allow us to avoid the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions that appear 
in the ‘clandestine urbanizaciones’ has not yet been devised.”3  
Two of the most influential figures in the development of housing policy in Peru differed 
sharply in their responses to the challenge of the barriadas and their proliferation of self-built 
housing. For Fernando Belaúnde Terry—architect, publisher of El Arquitecto Peruano, and 
politician, twice elected president of the republic (1963–1968, 1980–1985)—the barriada was an 
                                                
1 Oficina Nacional de Planeamiento y Urbanismo, Lima: Plan Piloto (Lima: ONPU, April 1949). The study 
was produced under the direction of Luis Dorich, who was the first Peruvian architect to formally study 
urban planning, completing his Masters in City Planning at MIT in 1944. Josep Lluís Sert and Paul Lester 
Wiener’s unrealized project for a new civic centre for Lima was one component of the Plan Piloto. 
2 ONPU, Lima Metropolitana: Algunos aspectos de su expediente urbano y soluciones parciales y varias 
(Lima: ONPU, December 1954), 5. This and all subsequent translations are by the author. 




anathema that should be eliminated and replaced by planned, regulated urban development. 
For Pedro G. Beltrán—economist, ultraconservative owner/publisher of the national newspaper 
La Prensa, and (briefly) prime minister (1959–1961)—the primary goal was to promote home 
ownership, and the form of the dwelling was a secondary issue: low-cost conventional housing 
within planned neighbourhoods would be the ideal solution, but the individual initiative of 
barriada settlers, made concrete in their self-built housing, should not be dismissed out of hand. 
For Belaúnde, an “economical system” to solve the crisis must necessarily be provided by 
modernist architecture, in the form of large-scale state-backed housing projects in the service of 
a developmentalist agenda; for Beltrán, an ideal “system” would emerge more indirectly, 
through reforms to mortgage finance that would encourage the flow of private capital into 
housing. From one perspective, the crisis called for a public sector powerful enough to drive the 
country’s economic and social modernization, implementing a coordinated developmentalist 
program in the spirit of the New Deal; from the other, it underscored the need to strengthen the 
operations of the free market—a debate that would foreshadow the discussions provoked by 
neoliberalism decades later. 
A third position, advocating comprehensive structural reform, was articulated by 
architects associated with the Movimiento Social Progresista: formed in 1956, this progressive 
political movement involved figures such as anthropologist José Matos Mar, and architect 
Adolfo Córdova. Córdova is a pivotal figure here: he was a student of Belaúnde’s, but also 
carried out research for a national commission on housing organized by Beltrán in 1956. For 
Córdova—and the Movimiento Social Progresista in general—the reduced economic capacity of 
most Peruvians was the major cause of the housing crisis. In this view, rather than providing a 
solution, increasingly unregulated capital flows would only exacerbate existing inequalities; 
instead, the Movimiento Social Progresista argued for planificación (central planning) and wide-
ranging structural reform—envisaging a powerful state with a redistributive role that was quite 




These three positions—New Deal-inspired developmentalism to stimulate growth, 
market liberalization to promote homeownership, and structural reform to raise living 
standards—begin to outline the politics of the affordable, modern house in this period, 
establishing the conceptual parameters for devising theoretical solutions and developing 
concrete policies towards housing provision. Negotiating the challenges of keeping costs low 
while maintaining acceptable standards would generate a range of contrasting proposals, which 
were at different moments in the ascendancy, reflecting the changing political fortunes of their 
various advocates. 
  
2.1 A School to Form Citizens 
Fernando Belaúnde Terry spent much of his youth outside of Peru, after his family was 
forced into exile in 1924; in 1935 he received his architecture degree from the University of 
Texas, and returned to Peru shortly thereafter to practice and teach architecture. At this time 
there was little government involvement in housing provision; instead, philanthropic 
organizations filled the gap at the lower-end of the market by sponsoring reform versions of 
traditional working-class housing,4 while government agencies oversaw the construction of a 
small number of model neighbourhoods [2.2-2.3].5 Belaúnde quickly became an influential figure 
in the area of housing policy, due less to his work as an architect, than as an educator, a writer, 
a politician, and a publisher. He taught classes on housing at the Escuela Nacional de 
Ingenieros (National Engineering School), and publicized the poor state of inner-city tenement 
housing through denunciations in his magazine El Arquitecto Peruano [2.4]; in 1946 as a 
representative in the Peruvian congress he was responsible for introducing the founding 
                                                
4 See in particular the work of Rafael Marquina, as discussed by Luis Jimenez and Miguel Santiváñez, 
Rafael Marquina, arquitecto (Lima: Arquitectos Peruanos, 2005). 
5 For examples of these projects see Alfredo Dammert and Wilfredo Pflucker, “La vivienda obrera en el 




legislation for the new state housing agency, the Corporación Nacional de Vivienda (CNV, 
National Housing Corporation), and he subsequently vigorously promoted its work through El 
Arquitecto Peruano.6   
With a handful of exceptions, the CNV did not operate as a public housing authority per 
se, leasing and managing housing projects, but used the resources of the state to (in effect) 
construct subsidized housing for those with sufficient resources to purchase it through the  
system of “alquiler-venta” (rental-sale). The units were kept affordable by building on state land, 
and using state-backed loans to finance construction.7 Nonetheless, they were clearly aimed at 
the upper-end of the low-income population—“the middle-class and specialized blue-collar 
workers [clase media y obreros especializados]”8—and thus effectively excluded many 
categories of workers.  
In contrast to the tenements, the CNV promised multi-family housing that conformed to 
the universal standards established by modernist reformers, reducing overcrowding, improving 
light and ventilation to combat tuberculosis, providing “excellent sanitary services” in each 
apartment, and maximizing the separation of bedrooms and minimizing shared entryways to the 
dwellings in order to end both “internal and external promiscuity.”9 In the Peruvian context, 
another major innovation of the CNV was to consider housing as an element of coordinated 
urban development, framed within master plans that balanced residential, industrial, and 
agricultural zones in an effort to produce ordered and holistic growth. The primary model for the 
CNV’s initial projects was the unidad vecinal (neighbourhood unit) [2.5]—a self-sufficient city in 
                                                
6 Belaúnde was also instrumental in establishing the Oficina Nacional de Planeamiento y Urbanismo 
(ONPU) and the Oficina del Plan Regulador de Lima (responsible for devising the Plan Piloto), both 
agencies founded in 1946, the same year as the CNV. 
7 Miguel Cruchaga, interview with the author, November 2008. 
8
 Fernando Belaúnde Terry, “La incultura de las ciudades,” El Arquitecto Peruano 17, no. 192-193 
(August 1953): unpaginated.  




miniature, circumscribed by green space and containing all necessary community facilities. The 
concept was introduced into Peru by Belaúnde. Wiley Ludeña has explored his key influences 
leading back to Clarence Perry, and to projects such as Radburn and the New Deal Greenbelt 
towns. In the latter case, Belaúnde was particularly impressed by the New Deal’s demonstration 
of the state’s ability to implement large-scale projects, and to deploy such projects to effect 
economic and social development.10 As Ludeña demonstrates, the immediate point of influence 
was a project for Wayland, outside Boston, developed by students of Walter Gropius and Martin 
Wagner at Harvard, and discussed in detail by Belaúnde in an article published in El Arquitecto 
Peruano in 1944 [2.6].11 For Belaúnde, in contrast to the chronic imbalance of the contemporary 
city, with its dysfunctional polarities of overcrowding in the centre and ever-more diffused fringes 
pushed outwards by population growth, this project for a rationally-planned, mid-sized 
community presented a model for controlled urbanization through decentralization. The initial 
unidad vecinal program in Lima was conceived precisely along these lines [2.7-2.8]. The CNV 
selected a series of greenfield sites running parallel to the main industrial corridor connecting 
central Lima and its port at Callao, where it would construct modern neighbourhoods for workers 
drawn to these job sites. It anticipated that these new “neighbourhood units” would develop into 
self-sufficient nodes of economic activity, in the process drawing population away from the 
historic centre, relieving it from congestion in preparation for rehabilitation.12 This 
decentralization strategy was in keeping with the 1949 Plan Piloto, but like much of the master 
                                                
10 Wiley Ludeña Urquizo, “Fernando Belaúnde Terry o los inicios del urbanismo moderno en el Perú,” in 
Tres buenos tigres: vanguardia y urbanismo en el Perú del siglo XX (Huancayo; Lima: Colegio de 
Arquitectos del Perú Regional Junín; Ur[b]es, 2004), 131. According to Ludeña, Belaúnde first mentioned 
Perry and Radburn as points of reference for the unidad vecinal in articles published in the mid-1950s. 
11 Ludeña, “Fernando Belaúnde Terry,” 122; Fernando Belaúnde Terry, “El barrio unidad: Intento de 
decentralización urbana,” El Arquitecto Peruano 8, no. 83 (June 1944): unpaginated. The magazine 
reprinted the Wayland site plan when it announced the initial unidad vecinal program: “Lo que decíamos 
en 1944 ...,” El Arquitecto Peruano 9, no. 98 (September 1945): unpaginated. The project had earlier 
appeared in José Luis Sert’s Can Our Cities Survive? An ABC of Urban Problems, Their Analysis, Their 
Solutions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1942), 
213. Thanks to David Smiley for pointing this out. 




plan for the city, it remained incomplete, as only four of the seven unidad vecinal projects were 
realized. Belaúnde acted as consultant designer on the first of these, Unidad Vecinal No. 3 
(1949), which included a characteristic mix of walk-up blocks and single-family houses (high-rise 
construction being too expensive to consider as a solution).13 
Belaúnde’s 1944 article argued that although the unidad vecinal model was developed in 
the United States, its strategy of decentralized development, making use of inexpensive sites 
beyond the urban periphery, made it widely suitable:  
for countries of great culture and wealth, but above all for those which have to 
measure out their resources and which find themselves, like Peru, with the 
unavoidable duty of educating their popular masses and raising their degrading  
level of present-day life.  
The full significance of the unidad vecinal was explored more fully in a document emerging from 
the VI Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos, held in Peru in 1947. At Belaúnde’s instigation, 
the congress endorsed it as a quasi-canonical urban model, passing a resolution that “all the 
countries of the Americas should formulate master plans for their cities that establish unidades 
vecinales as basic elements for their structuring.”14 As an organizational device for the urban 
territory, it could also be applied retroactively in renewal projects: “planning in the form of 
unidades vecinales refers not only to new areas to be urbanized, but furthermore involves the 
transformation of parts of the city already built.”15 In both contexts, its model of spatial 
                                                
13 See Oficina Nacional de Planeamiento y Urbanismo, Construcciones efectuadas por particulares y por 
entidades estatales en Lima Metropolitana, durante el período 1949–1956 (Lima: ONPU, March 1957), 
and Victor Smirnoff, “25 años de vivienda en el Perú,” El Arquitecto Peruano, no. 306-308 (January-
March 1963): 47. Smirnoff lists the designers of Unidad Vecinal No. 3 as Fernando Belaúnde Terry, 
Alfredo Dammert Muelle, Carlos Morales Macchiavello, Manuel Valega, Juan Benites, and Luis Dorich. 
The completed projects were (according to Smirnoff): Unidad Vecinal No. 3. (1949, 1,112 units), Unidad 
Vecinal Matute (in the approximate location of project No. 7 on the September 1945 plan; 1952, 484 
units), Unidad Vecinal Rimac (No. 4 on the 1945 plan; 1952–1953, 430 units) and Unidad Vecinal 
Mirones (No. 1; 1952–1953, 436 units).  
14 “Conclusiones aprobadas por el VI Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos,” El Arquitecto Peruano 11, 
no. 123 (October 1947): unpaginated. Even if not written by Belaúnde himself, this text certainly reflects 
his views since he helped to promote the resolution and the text was published in his magazine. 
15 Similarly, Gabrielle Esperdy has documented discussions in the United States around the employment 
of the neighbourhood unit in the context of urban redevelopment projects in the 1930s. For example, in 




organization had social implications that resonated far beyond the technics of functional zoning 
and rational planning. With humanism under threat in modern industrial society, the resolution 
argued, a weakened sense of individuality had led to an impoverished culture of citizenship, 
where “mass spectators” had taken the place of active participants in collective life. The antidote 
for this urban alienation was to foster civic engagement and “cooperation based in individual 
responsibility”—qualities which would provide the foundations for achieving “a high level of 
Democracy and social well-being, ultimate objective of the republican system common to all 
American countries.”  In this context, the special promise of the unidad vecinal was its potential 
to rebuild community life. Deliberately self-contained—its scale determined by the distance that 
could be comfortably walked in carrying out daily tasks—the unidad vecinal shaped opportunites 
for the citizenry to interact, moving through their micro-urban enclave focused around the 
elementary school, close to but separated from centres of work, shielded from through traffic, 
and furnished with sufficient communal facilities to satisfy immediate needs. The unidad vecinal 
was anti-urban in order to be pro-community.16  
The influences of Perry and Radburn notwithstanding, these characterizations of the 
unidad vecinal suggest Lewis Mumford as a major point of inspiration,17 reflecting a deeply-held 
                                                                                                                                                       
argued that redeveloping sections of the inner city, already well-provided with urban services, as “large 
neighbourhood units” would be more cost-effective than constructing new housing on distant greenfield 
sites. Platzker, “Replanning Old Areas for New Housing,” Architectural Record 75 (February 1934), 103, 
quoted in Esperdy, “Defying the Grid: A Retroactive Manifesto for the Culture of Decongestion,” 
Perspecta 30 (1999): 20. 
16
 In his later writing Belaúnde instead emphasizes the “Peruvian” nature of the unidad vecinal, drawing 
parallels between Inca territorial planning, the theories of Gaston Bardet, and of Ebenezer Howard. In the 
latter case, Belaúnde views the Inca system of collective land ownership and of “minka” (the ritual/festive 
exchange of labour, often characterized as an Inca “mutual self-help”) as analogous to the cooperative 
principles of the garden city, which in fact, he claims, “seems to have been inspired by ancient Peru.” He 
is careful to clarify that “the ancient Peruvians were not communists but cooperativists,” reclaiming the 
Inca heritage from José Carlos Mariátegui’s Marxist reading. Fernando Belaúnde Terry, “El planeamiento 
en el antiguo y moderno Perú,” El Arquitecto Peruano 18, no. 202 (May-June 1954): unpaginated. For 
resonances between Bardet’s urban theories (especially “a size of community adapted to the scale of 
man”) and those of Geddes and Mumford, see Nicholas Bullock, “Gaston Bardet: Postwar Champion of 
the Mainstream Tradition of French urbanisme,” Planning Perspectives 25, no. 3 (July 2010): 354.  
17 See in particular the later sections of “Social Basis of the New Urban Order”: Lewis Mumford, The 




belief in the potential of architecture to reconstitute a modern communal life.18 Belaúnde’s 
references to Mumford are rare but telling. In particular, in a 1953 article on barriadas (which 
Belaúnde labels “a plague” and “an obstacle to urban expansion”) Mumford’s research on cities 
is evoked to condemn the current situation in Lima, where rural migrants unable to find 
affordable housing were occupying vacant sites to create their own improvised, self-built 
neighbourhoods; for Belaúnde, this demonstrated that “the advances derived from urbanism are 
now threatened by what we could call LA INCULTURA de las ciudades”—the lack of culture, or 
the uncultured-ness of cities. This “incultura” is revealed both in the actions of those building 
these chaotic and illegal settlements (which for Belaúnde, only replicated the horrors of the 
tenement slum), and the inaction of “those who tolerate such agglomerations, … the entire 
community that sees this public danger with indifference.” For his part, Belaúnde proposed the 
demolition of substandard neighbourhoods in order to facilitate urban renewal, synchronized 
with a resettlement program involving “the construction, on a vast scale, of Unidades de 
Emergencia [Emergency Units].”19 Here Belaúnde revealed himself to be a somewhat 
authoritarian and technocratic New Deal true believer, whose sincere committment to the 
shared social responsibility of providing decent housing for all materialized in interventions very 
definitely directed from above. 
Nonetheless, the rhetoric of the unidad vecinal as training ground for democracy 
reappeared more than once. As characterized in 1945 with the announcement of the CNV’s first 
building program, the unidad vecinal was a “cradle for the new generations which must build a 
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 Thanks to Luis Castañeda for his thoughts on this issue, particularly concerning the role of Josep Lluís 
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better Peru”20; in 1948, Belaúnde announced that Unidad Vecinal No. 3 “is and will be a school 
to form citizens”21—a quality it would maintain even if its architectural style came to be 
outmoded. Further, a CNV report from 1958 noted that in each of its Unidad Vecinal projects it 
had established “una Superintendencia” (an office of supervision); at Unidad Vecinal No. 3 
(which had the most complete services) this functioned as arbiter and enforcer of civility, with a 
range of responsibilities:  
Watches over the good use of the dwellings, and the observance of the Internal 
Regulations ...; Promotes and encourages cultural, social, educational, and 
sporting activities, and those of mutual aid [de auxilios mutuos] within the 
community, and of social assistance and social hygiene in coordination with the 
Sanitary Post.22  
Here the general modernist article of faith that an improved living environment would transform 
residents’ lives met the particular conditions of postwar Peru: on one side, an urban elite of 
técnicos having the “unavoidable duty of educating their popular masses,” and on the other, 
waves of rural migrants bringing a radical shift in the class, racial, and cultural identity of coastal 
cities—a transformation felt most acutely in Lima. In this era of mushrooming squatter 
settlements, the unidad vecinal’s civilizing mission was clear: “educating” those recently arrived 
in the behaviours appropriate to urban life, and in the civic responsibilities of modern 
citizenship23—in the terms of the archetypal dichotomy of Peruvian national identity, remaking 
                                                
20 “¿Qué es una unidad vecinal?” El Arquitecto Peruano 9, no. 98 (September 1945): unpaginated. 
21 Fernando Belaúnde Terry, “La ciudad risueña: Significado y misión de la Unidad Vecinal No. 3,” 
Turismo (October 1948); reprinted in El Arquitecto Peruano 13, no. 146 (September 1949): unpaginated. 
22 CNV, Experiencias relativas de la vivienda de interés social en el Perú (Lima: CNV, December 1958), 
22. The qualification process for residency in CNV properties was based on a detailed points-system, 
awarded both for the degree of awfulness of the applicant’s existing housing as well as their potential to 
perform as a model tenant. Under the category “Cultural level of the family estimated by the care and 
order of the house they inhabit,” the applicant presenting a “High cultural standard (upkeep, cleanliness, 
order, arrangement, habits)” could earn 150 points, equivalent to the score for “Total lack of sanitary 
facilities” (individual or communal), or overcrowding Level 5 (five people per room) without “promiscuity”—
i.e. mixing of genders—or overcrowding Level 3 (three people per room) with promiscuity. CNV, 
“Qualification Table,” Experiencias relativas, 20-21. 
23 Strikingly, while evaluation reports on the unidad vecinal program would subsequently critique the 
“paternalistic” approach of the Superintendencia, they did not dismiss the “training” concept in principle, 




the paisano (peasant, primarily of indigenous descent) as criollo (urbanite, of European 
descent). 
While Belaúnde’s proselytizing efforts on behalf of the unidad vecinal may not have had 
much impact outside Peru (despite his international ambitions for the 1947 resolution), it would 
be difficult to overestimate its influence, particularly in theoretical terms, on planning 
professionals within Peru, largely due to Belaúnde’s prominence as an educator and a writer on 
housing and urban issues. Indeed the concept of the unidad vecinal recurs throughout urban 
planning discourse at least until the mid-1960s, even in contexts where its application would 
initially seem unlikely. 
On the other hand, Belaúnde’s only realized housing project was relatively modest in 
scale and influence alike, although it was significant in being the first urban renewal project 
carried out by the CNV [2.9-2.10]. Too small to function as a unidad vecinal, Agrupamiento 
Alberto Alexander (1950) included 112 apartments, as well as sixteen shops: the CNV intended 
to take advantage of the project’s central city location by charging high commercial rents in 
order to subsidize the rent on the housing itself. Belaúnde had first proposed this solution in a 
conceptual scheme published in 1948, arguing that under this principle “the problem of 
reconstruction in Lima can be resolved on a commercial basis.”24 Agrupamiento Alberto 
Alexander was particularly focused on cost reduction, acknowledging that the CNV’s previous 
projects had “prices a little high for the economic capacities of the labouring classes.”25 In 
addition to the rent subsidy, costs were to be kept low by reducing the size of the apartments (in 
comparison to the standards employed at Unidad Vecinal No. 3), and making a small alteration 
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to simplify the layout: “the elimination of garbage via ducts, without having to leave the 
apartment, which makes the service door unnecessary.” This technological fix obviated the 
traditional middle-class requirement for two entrances—an innovation of doubtful value for the 
project’s future working-class residents. Changes of this nature appeared to be the limit of 
Belaúnde's willingness to compromise on standards in the search for an “economical system” 
for low-cost housing. Characteristically, in a “Charter of the Home” Belaúnde published in 1949, 
which was to be presented for discussion at the upcoming CIAM 7 meeting in Bergamo, the lack 
of affordable, decent housing was framed as a global issue, which required the establishment of 
“definite global standards for the solution of a problem that affects the entire face of the earth.”26 
From a position on the margins of modern architecture, Belaúnde insisted on the importance of 
universal standards, which the CNV would presumably be expected to apply in all its projects, 
thus proving Peru’s adherence to a shared vision of modernity. As with Lima’s Plan Piloto—also 
published in 1949—the realization could not meet the aspirations. 
 
2.2 A House that Grows 
Pedro Beltrán graduated from the London School of Economics in 1918. Through his 
connections at this institution he cultivated personal and professional relationships with a 
number of prominent free-market economists, most notably Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, 
Milton Friedman, Wilhelm Röpke, and Ludwig Erhard; Beltrán popularized their thought through 
his newspaper La Prensa, and in some cases, facilitated their visits to Peru.27 In June 1954 
                                                
26 The “Charter of the Home” advocated “ATTAINABLE HOUSING FOR ALL who contribute to the 
economic life of the universe,” assisting households that “the free market in housing cannot satisfactorily 
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Pedro Beltrán launched a major campaign to address the intensifying housing crisis via La 
Prensa.28 Following Beltrán’s pro-market views, the newspaper argued that the government 
could not solve the problem single-handedly through the direct construction of low-cost housing. 
While the private rental market could make a valuable contribution (if given sufficient incentives 
to invest in the low-income sector), an alternative solution warranted greater support: the 
promotion of individual home ownership. Arguing that “the desire to have one’s own home is 
very natural, human, … understandable, and socially beneficial,”29 La Prensa proposed a series 
of reforms to the mortgage financing system. The Banco Central Hipotecario (Central Mortgage 
Bank) had a monopoly on mortgage financing, but was unable to meet a wider demand because 
it had insufficient funds to lend, and its policy of financing no more than 50 percent of the 
property’s value placed its terms beyond the capacity of most low-income households. 
Meanwhile, the Fondo Nacional de Salud y Bienestar Social (FNSBS, National Fund for Health 
and Social Welfare), one of the main government agencies charged with the provision of low-
cost housing, could make better use of its funds by diverting them away from construction 
programs and into “the mobilization of private capital towards mortgage loans.” Specifically: if 
the Banco Central Hipotecario lowered its minimum downpayment to 10 percent, the loans 
would be subject to a considerably higher interest rate, making them more attractive to private 
investors; with additional capital at its disposal, the bank could increase its lending to low-
income households—however, the higher interest rate need not be passed on to the 
prospective homebuyer, because FNSBS funds could be used to subsidize the mortgage 
repayments. Under this new policy—“favourable to investors as well as to those ... interested in 
having their own house”—a “decent but not lavish dwelling” costing S/.20,000 could be had for a 
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S/.2,000 downpayment and S/.150 per month from the homeowner, with the balance of the 
monthly payment (roughly 35 percent) being paid by the FNSBS. In short, public funds would 
facilitate the purchase of housing built by private contractors and subsidize loan repayments to 
the ultimate benefit of the bank’s private bond-holders. La Prensa argued that this proposal 
would facilitate the construction of thousands of additional low-cost dwellings per year, and 
“[w]ith a monthly payment equivalent to rent, anyone could become the owner of an economical, 
healthy, and well-built house.”30  
In its extensive coverage of the housing crisis, La Prensa hosted commentary that was 
hostile to the barriadas—notably, the opinions of the Asociación Nacional de Propietarios (ANP, 
National Association of Property Owners) which variously condemned them as presenting 
“deplorable conditions”; providing “the preferred hideout and residence of thugs pursued by the 
law”; constituting “a centre of infection” and “a danger to society”; which moreover had in no way 
“managed to solve the housing shortage.”31 Touching on every anxiety the barriadas could 
possibly evoke—fiflth, lawlessness, disease, chaos—these articles reinforced the belief that 
squatters were beseiging the city on all sides. Elsewhere La Prensa offered a far more 
sympathetic viewpoint. In a July 1964 article on the prominent Cerro San Cosme barriada, one 
of Lima’s oldest, the language of invasion was redeployed to describe the challenges faced by 
“the invaders, the conquistadors of the hill” in their assault—“armed with sticks, iron, pieces of 
matting, cartons, spades, and courage”—on the unforgiving terrain where they fought “to repair 
and improve their dwellings ... in an indescribable battle against the hill and against adversity.”32 
Regrettably, these dogged efforts were undermined by “their limited economic means and 
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technical ability.” However, the account concluded with some optimism, noting that La Prensa 
had already identified a solution to the nation’s housing problem, which had been endorsed on 
all sides and only awaited implementation. In this way Beltrán appealed directly to low-income 
families by articulating moral support for self-help builders, framed as noble warriors who 
struggled to improve their housing situation, rather than the destroyers of urban culture depicted 
by Belaúnde, along with the ANP. 
In relentless coverage in support of its plan, La Prensa published numerous articles over 
the succeeding weeks, presenting the testimony of various experts vouching for its economic 
viability and social necessity in curtailing the spread of the barriadas. Photographs of simple, 
low-cost dwellings were also published, allowing readers to envisage in concrete terms what 
could be achieved. These included a group of experimental patio houses built by the CNV, 
using “a revolutionary construction system”33 that promised to cut construction costs by 20 
percent: a series of free-standing columns would each support a six-by-six metre roof slab, 
raised into position using small jacks, thereby eliminating the need for formwork [2.11]. An 
article on recent projects in Puerto Rico presented a contrasting approach: in addition to 
conventional large-scale housing projects, the newspaper described the construction of more 
than 1,000 “rural and working-class” houses by means of a “cooperative system”—that is, 
mutual aided self-help—with “the technical and economic assistance” of the state providing the 
resources of architects, machinery, “directing technicians” (técnicos dirigentes), and loans 
[2.12].34 
                                                
33 “La casa propia puede dejar de ser en sueño: Es posible construir viviendas a baja precio: Construyen 
en Lima casa de S/.17,000,” La Prensa, June 7, 1954; “Un nuevo sistema de construcción baja los 
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Fernando Belaúnde Terry also contributed an article to the newspaper’s campaign. In a 
rare moment of collaboration between the two men, he endorsed Beltrán’s call for public-private 
partnership in solving the housing problem, and confirmed that La Prensa’s projected budgets 
were realistic for building low-cost housing. However Belaúnde’s article focused on the model of 
the unidad vecinal, translating Beltrán’s campaign into his own terms. Emphasizing the 
achievements of the CNV—the state agency closest to his heart—he nonetheless accepted the 
need to multiply its achievements, and agreed that FNSBS resources could be usefully 
employed in subsidizing mortgages. A map accompanying his article illustrated the many sites 
in the greater Lima area where housing development could be carried out economically 
because the land was of little value, being distant from the city centre, unsuitable for farming, or 
crossed with significant ravines [2.13].35 The large-scale development of planned settlements 
would make the installation of infrastructure on these peripheral sites affordable, and their 
relative isolation would facilitate their evolution into “self-sufficient satellite nuclei,” in line with 
the decentralization policy established in the 1949 Plan Piloto. These urban “nuclei” would take 
the form of “unidades and sub-unidades vecinales” which, he argued in an echo of the 1947 
resolution, offered “a splendid opportunity for an urban structuring with a view to reestablishing 
communal life, which our era tends to destroy.”36 Despite his careful determination of the most 
rational solution, the technical rationality of Belaúnde’s decentralizing policy was completely at 
odds with the practical logic of barriada settlers, who preferred to establish their neighbourhoods 
closer to the city centre, accessible to jobs and urban amenities, without the challenges (and 
time and money) required to arrange daily transit back and forth to “satellite nuclei” in the urban 
hinterland. 
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Concluding his article, Belaúnde proposed a design competition for “la casa elemental” 
(the basic house), which he believed would both encourage industry to develop cheaper 
building materials, and provide architects with the opportunity to devise a range of different 
housing prototypes, which could be deployed in combination to reduce the monotony of mass 
housing projects. Two weeks later, as the grand finale to its housing campaign, La Prensa 
adopted Belaúnde’s proposal and announced that it would sponsor a competition for “La casa 
barata” (the low-cost house). Although Beltrán’s and Belaúnde’s interests coincided here, their 
motivations did not: while Beltrán saw a further opportunity to publicize his drive to expand the 
market for private home ownership, Belaúnde aimed to demonstrate that architects could meet 
the challenge of creating an “economical system” of minimum standard modern housing, even 
(or especially) within the constraints of a developing economy.  
The competition brief called for an ensemble of four houses, comprising two examples of 
two different models—a two-bedroom house (costing S/.15,000) and a three-bedroom house 
(costing S/.20,000). The Asociación Nacional de Propietarios—already allied with Beltrán’s call 
for reform—offered to finance the construction of the winning project. In order to demonstrate 
the viability of the design, construction was to begin immediately after the selection of the 
winner, to be completed within sixty days and within the specificed budget. To this end, all 
competing architects were to name a contractor willing to undertake the work on these terms.37  
On August 12, Mario Bernuy Ledesma was announced as the winner out of a field of 
twenty-one entries, with Santiago Agurto Calvo as runner-up. Twelve days later the newspaper 
reported that construction had begun on Bernuy’s project, making use of a site on the campus 
of the Escuela Nacional de Ingenieros. The plan was based on the division of the lot into three-
by-three metre grid squares [2.14]: eight squares for the two-bedroom house (two wide, four 
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deep), and ten squares for the three-bedroom house (two wide, five deep); the floorplans of the 
two houses were identical but for the additional bedroom at the back of the larger house; in 
each case, part of the backyard area could be appropriated for additional extensions. Although 
the houses were small, maximum use was made of built space by eliminating corridors in favour 
of providing access to all rooms from the living-dining area.38 Seeing virtue in its simplicity of 
expression, the jury praised the design for its “frankness” and lack of “false ostentation” in the 
use of unfinished cement block, and for its attention to construction details, which promised to 
streamline and lower the cost of production.39 Once construction was underway, the newspaper 
closely covered its progress, featuring front-page photographs of the growing walls and the 
raising of the roof, and reporting on the interest sparked by the project among La Prensa’s 
readers [2.15]. In the end, the houses were finished in thirty days, half the estimated time, and 
on October 17 they were handed over to the Director of the Escuela de Ingenieros. It is not clear 
what happened to the houses afterwards.40   
One week later, La Prensa announced the details of a new undertaking emerging from 
the competition: the construction of a second set of low-cost houses using the design by runner-
up Santiago Agurto [2.17]. This time, the five houses would be given away to readers in a 
lottery. Agurto studied civil engineering and architecture in Lima, completing his postgraduate 
studies in architecture at Cornell University with a thesis project proposing a housing 
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de La Prensa,” La Prensa, August 14, 1954. 
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development for Lima.41  When he returned to Peru in 1947 he immediately started work as the 
lead architect on many of the CNV housing projects, beginning with Agrupamientos Angamos 
and Miraflores (1948–1950) and Unidades Vecinales Matute [2.16], Rímac, and Mirones (1952–
1953).42 He was also a partner in the architectural firm Agurto-Cayo-Neira with Javier Cayo 
Campos (who likewise enjoyed a long career within the CNV) and Eduardo Neira (a close 
colleague of John F. C. Turner, discussed in chapter four). Agurto was active in progressive 
politics for many years, serving as secretary general of the Movimiento Social Progresista, and 
was discussed as a possible presidential candidate for the Frente de Unidad de Izquierda 
(United Leftist Front) in the 1962 elections.43  
Agurto’s design, entitled “La casa que crece” (the growing house) [2.18] was conceived 
as a “célula habitacional flexible”44 (flexible dwelling unit) that could be developed over time as 
the familiy’s needs and available resources changed. Stage one comprised a compact dwelling 
with a small kitchen and bathroom, a bedroom for a couple with young a child, and a living-
dining room that could be transformed into an extra bedroom at night (a pragmatic move that 
contravened the strict functional separation essential to modernist reform housing, but reflected 
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 Santiago Agurto Calvo, “Vivienda en gran escala para Lima,” El Arquitecto Peruano 11, no. 116 (March 
1947): unpaginated. 
42 Agurto recalled that he had first met Belaúnde to discuss the possibility of working with the CNV in 
1946, but decided to continue his studies by going to the United States. Rafael Marquina, then head of 
the architecture school in Lima and Agurto’s teacher, had studied at Cornell fifty years earlier, so 
recommended that school to him. When Agurto returned to Peru, the architecture profession was still very 
small, with only fifty or so architects in practice; since none had specialized or been trained in social 
housing, Agurto immediately assumed a key role with the CNV. Santiago Agurto Calvo, interview with the 
author, October 2008. According to Henry Russell Hitchcock’s assessment, Unidad Vecinal Matute was 
“perhaps the best” of the CNV’s housing projects: “The open layout with moderately tall walk-up blocks  
alternating with groups of one-storey houses is orderly and yet pleasantly varied.… Without the 
somewhat aggressive monumentality of [Mario] Pani’s Mexican housing projects or the lyrical delicacy of 
[Affonso] Reidy’s work at Pedregulho, Agurto’s competent and straightforward housing is about the best 
new architecture in Peru.” Hitchcock, Latin American Architecture since 1945 (New York: Museum of 
Modern Art, 1955), 133. Thanks to Patricio del Real for pointing out this reference. 
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 Other candidates for the presidency that year included Belaúnde (representing the Acción Popular 
party), and Beltrán, who quickly ended his campaign after attracting little support. 
44 “Arq. Augurto expone su plan ‘La casa que crece’: Nuestro concurso La casa barata abre nuevos 




actual practice in low-income Lima households). The 130-square-metre lot provided space to 
store a vehicle, and ample room to extend the house over three successive stages, adding one 
or two bedrooms, followed by a second, separate living space, a second bathroom, an 
expanded kitchen, and finally an all-purpose room at the front that could be used as bedroom, 
study, workshop, or even a shop, depending on the location of the lot. Agurto’s design 
maintained a sense of spaciousness throughout its evolution: with the L-shaped core of the 
dwelling placed in the centre of the lot, additional rooms were aggregated around three sides 
while preserving space for a small garden framing the front door and a rear patio [2.19]. In this 
way, Agurto argued, the house would follow a pattern of “organic growth”45—not simply 
increasing the number of bedrooms but enhancing the service and living areas that supported 
its overall functioning as it evolved. Agurto believed that this flexibility was especially important 
for low-income families, since they did not have the resources to sell and move when they 
outgrew their house, and as a result would be forced into overcrowding. Agurto claimed the 
Cerro San Cosme barriada as the point of inspiration [2.23]; in familiar terms, he praised the 
innate architectural abilities of self-builders (like mutual aid, this was frequently invoked as en 
essentially Peruvian trait and point of connection to the Inca heritage). As Agurto observed: 
There one appreciates, as in no other place, the obstinate constructive instinct of 
Peruvians. There they have built painstakingly, without having any technical 
knowledge, erecting houses on the rugged and steep foothills, making 
extraordinary works of engineering. And there’s no Peruvian worker—driver, 
sweeper, labourer, or baker—who doesn’t know how to handle a trowel, to place 
bricks one on top of another, to raise the walls of a house. And it’s exactly this 
that must be made use of in the solution to the housing problem.46 
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 “Arq. Augurto expone su plan.”  It is worth noting here that only a few months earlier, in February 1954, 
Agurto’s office-partner Eduardo Neira had completed his first report on the barriadas in the southern city 
of Arequipa for the Ministerio de Fomento y Obras Públicas (Ministry of Development and Public Works). 




Accordingly, “La casa que crece” was “able to be extended and improved by its own 
occupants”47—a measure that would further contribute to the house’s affordability. If this 
principle of actively engaging self-help labour were applied to the problem of housing provision 
at the national level, Agurto argued, the average 30 percent of construction budgets that 
covered labour costs could be eliminated; further, the 10 percent dedicated to “technical 
direction” could also be saved, provided that the self-builders were “under the supervision of a 
competent organization.”48   
Although probably unrealistic about the potential cost savings, and in his assessment of 
the willingness, ability, and sheer physical stamina of Peruvians in contributing to the 
construction of their own dwellings, Agurto’s project was nonetheless a genuine effort to 
understand the economic necessities driving the protracted construction in barriadas, and to 
devise a model house that responded to this reality. At the same time, the sketches present a 
strange disjunction between the unabashed austerity of the house’s exterior and the interior’s 
studied minimalism [2.20]—sparsely appointed in tasteful fashion, it evokes urbane modern 
living rather than the busy, well-populated spaces of a low-income household, as if Agurto had 
not quite succeeded in imagining the lives of the inhabitants of the modest house. 
A precedent of sorts for this employment of progressive construction can be found in 
early 1930s Germany: in the midst of the acute postwar housing shortage and concurrent 
economic crisis, Martin Wagner’s concept of “Das wachsende Haus” (the growing house) was 
developed explicitly in opposition to the Existenzminimum, so enthusiastically promoted by his 
colleague Ernst May in the housing program for Frankfurt. Wagner, head of Berlin’s municipal 
housing program, argued that these minimum standards—which were continually being revised 
downwards due to the deteriorating economic situation—would permanently tie residents to 
                                                
47
 Santiago Agurto, “¿Por qué debe crecer la casa?” La Prensa, October 24, 1954.  
48 “Arq. Augurto expone su plan.” According to Agurto’s estimate, with S/.200,000,000 invested annually 




barely livable conditions imposed in the throes of a national crisis. Instead, he proposed a 
simple Kernhaus (nucleus or core-house), built around a Wohnungskern (dwelling-core) which 
would evolve into a complete dwelling over time [2.21],49 thereby surpassing the constraints of 
the “minimum” as the family’s financial circumstances improved. Wagner’s conception of the 
“growing house” showed the influence of the Laubenkolonien (summerhouse colonies) found on 
the outskirts of many German cities: these were allotment gardens with very basic, part-time 
summerhouses (often little more than a toolshed) which in cases of extreme need were 
converted into full-time residences. Just as Agurto claimed the inspiration of San Cosme, 
Wagner adopted the prevailing form of emergency housing as a model, promising to offer 
Laubenkolonien-inspired dwellings with enough design integrity to function as decent permanent 
housing. However, while they shared this general approach to the problem, as well as the 
language of cellular structures and organic growth, in contrast to Agurto, Wagner’s “growing 
house” assumed a technological solution—prefabricated, modular design rather than self-help 
construction. In fact, Wagner’s proposal offered a vigorous critique of self-help housing: citing 
one of his earlier writings, he characterized it as “construction industry dilettantism, which would 
make each settler into his own entrepreneur and his own fabricator of raw materials.”50   
Ironically—but almost inevitably, in an eloquent demonstration of the complications of 
acquiring land for housing in Lima—the day after La Prensa announced that the construction of 
                                                
49 Wagner publicized the concept through a conference and design competition, culminating in a 
presentation of prototype dwellings as part of the 1932 Deutsche Bauaustellung Berlin. From over 1,000 
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accompanying catalogue. These included projects by a number of prominent modernist architects, 
including Hans Poelzig, Otto Bartning, Walter Gropius, Hugo Häring, Ludwig Hilberseimer, Erich 
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Migge. Martin Wagner, Das wachsende Haus: ein Beitrag zur Lösung der städtischen Wohnungsfrage 
(Berlin: Bong & Co., 1932). 
50 Wagner, “New Paths to the Construction of the Smallest Dwelling” (1924), quoted in Wagner, Das 
wachsende Haus, 4. Wagner’s (socialist) critique is that self-help does not in fact produce any savings, 
and is destructive to the building economy as a whole: do-it-yourself builders make it more difficult for 
trained construction workers to find employment, they produce poor-quality work which lowers the overall 
standards of the dwelling; furthermore, the sophistication of modern construction systems is “incompatible 




“La casa que crece” had begun, efforts to start work on the selected site were obstructed by the 
arrival of a crowd of women and children armed with sticks and stones, claiming that the land 
was theirs. The 900 or so families had been there for over twenty-five years, and for the last ten 
they had been fighting to prove their legal claims. Court proceedings to determine the ownership 
of the site were still in process, but as far the the residents were concerned the legitimacy of 
their claim was clear: “we have been property holders [poseedores] of this land for a long time, 
before anyone bought it.”51 In this conflict of de facto and legal ownership, the residents claimed 
a moral right to the land not just by precedence, but by virtue of having made something out of 
nothing by “urbanizing” a site that was initially little more than farmland. No doubt wary of 
engaging in a prolonged legal dispute with a group of people who represented the core 
constituency of its low-cost housing promotion campaign, La Prensa swiftly moved to purchase 
an alternative site (while complaining in print about the expense).  
Once construction was underway at the new site, progress was again closely followed in 
La Prensa, along with the drama leading up to the drawing of each of the five lottery winners. 
Although it took only twenty-two days to build the houses, the lottery to give them away was 
staged over nine months—excellent publicity for Beltrán’s plan to solve the housing crisis, and 
good business for his newspaper, since entry into the lottery required cut-out coupons from La 
Prensa. The winners included a twenty-five-year old bachelor from Lima (“a poor and dignified 
person .... a young worker, studious and without vices”); a provincial police officer and father of 
three, ready to move to the capital to further his career; and a woman who had spent the last 
ten years of her “exemplary life” in the El Agustino barriada, gamely brightening up her 
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surroundings with a flower garden, her assiduous domesticity now rewarded with a fully 
furnished residence for her mother and four other relatives [2.22].52  
With the success of the lottery in material terms (for the winners) and in propaganda 
terms (for the newspaper), Beltrán’s campaign had proved its point, but for the time being the 
experiment remained an isolated achievement. His focus now turned to the policy sphere. 
 
 
2.3  Affording a House, or Not 
In the 1956 presidential elections that marked the end of the dictatorship of General 
Manuel Odría (1948–1956), Fernando Belaúnde Terry expanded his political ambitions by 
running as a strong candidate for the reformist Acción Popular party, but ultimately lost to 
Manuel Prado, a centrist and political ally of Pedro Beltrán. Inaugurated as president in July, 
within weeks Prado responded to the intensifying concern over the barriadas by establishing a 
high-profile Comisión para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda (CRAV, Commission for Agrarian 
Reform and Housing), appointing Beltrán as its head [2.23]. Architect Adolfo Córdova (as 
already noted, a member of the Movimiento Social Progresista) compiled a comprehensive 
study on the nationwide housing deficit on behalf of CRAV,53 while a fellow member of the MSP, 
anthropologist José Matos Mar, contributed a brief summary of his current research on the 
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barriadas54—an indication of the influence of his 1955 barriada study (discussed in chapter 
three) on subsequent policy development.55 
In its initial report opening the commission, CRAV identified its fundamental objective as 
promoting small and medium property ownership—both in the form of rural landholdings and the 
single-family home—arguing that this would foster initiative and personal responsibility, in turn 
increasing productivity, improving the standard of living, and stimulating the country’s economic 
development. It articulated the links between urban housing and agrarian reform, arguing that 
the best means of controlling unauthorized urban settlements was to address their main 
cause—the rapidly increasing rate of rural-urban migration—by improving conditions in the 
provinces, establishing strong regional centres and facilitating access to cultivable land.56  
On this last point, however, CRAV revealed the limitations of its vision: while the 
commission’s final recommendations on housing included some important and far-reaching 
innovations, its approach to agrarian reform is widely regarded as having been retrograde—
slow-moving, limited, and cautious, reflecting the conservative interests of large landowners 
among the Peruvian elite (such as Beltrán himself). Thus, according to CRAV, increasing 
access to cultivable land was to be achieved through irrigation, internal colonization, and 
reallocating unproductive public and private lands, rather than via the redistribution of existing 
cultivated land. Just as the poblador (settler, or barriada resident) was welcome to “invade” 
around the urban fringe but not in the city centre, the promise of colonization in remote areas of 
the Peruvian Amazon was expected to provide sufficient land for all, on the premise that the 
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problem of access to land (both rural and urban) could be solved without significant disruption to 
the existing socio-economic order.  
In a memo accompanying the commission’s final report on housing, delivered in January 
1958 (its report on agrarian reform appeared in 1960), Beltrán emphasized that no extraordinary 
government funding would be needed to solve the housing problem; rather, the Peruvian 
people’s “ordinary powers, duly channeled and protected” could more than meet the challenge, 
once given a “systematic orientation” in technical and financial matters.57 Likewise, the problem 
of the barriadas could be solved through “technical assistance and financial cooperation”—
taking care that these initiatives were framed in such a way that allowed barriada residents “to 
acquire their own dwellings through their own efforts [su propio esfuerzo] and with their own 
means, which is what they desire.”58  
To promote “financial cooperation” CRAV advocated establishing a system of savings 
and loans institutions to provide small-scale housing finance: this resulted in the Asociaciones 
Mutuales de Crédito para Vivienda (Savings and Loan Associations for Housing, 1957) and the 
Banco de la Vivienda (Housing Bank, 1962). On the other hand, systematizing the provision of 
technical assistance was to be achieved through the creation of a national system of Oficinas de 
Asistencia Técnica (OATs, Technical Assistance Offices, 1957). According to the CRAV report, 
barriadas were a prime example of the potential of individual effort, at once providing effective 
shelter, creating the foundations for economic development, and cultivating the moral 
improvement of the individual character. However a lack of competent direction had led to 
wasted efforts, with the selection of  
unsuitable sites, materials, systems, and designs from the point of view of 
urbanism, architecture, and engineering. As a consequence of such errors this 
valiant collective contribution which could be translated into decent dwellings has 
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produced a large part of the slums and of the barrios marginales that are found in 
the country.59  
In CRAV’s view, the barriada problem was technical, not socio-economic, in nature; self-built 
housing was deficient due to inept production, and could therefore benefit from professional 
expertise. To this end, the OATs would advise barriada residents on the construction and 
financing of their housing, as well as urban design and infrastructure provision, property law, 
and the management of collective improvement projects. OATs were immediately established in 
Lima as well as the rapidly growing cities of Chimbote and Arequipa. The latter office, 
coordinated from mid-1957 by the English architect John Turner, produced the earliest tangible 
successes of this new approach, while also encountering considerable resistance from 
pobladores (as discussed in chapter four).  
According to CRAV’s conception, the technical assistance programs would offer job 
training and contribute to improving Peruvians’ “systems of communal life [vida en comunida]”; 
in practical terms, it particularly recommended the employment of ayuda mútua dirigida 
(managed mutual aid), through which, it was hoped, Peru’s ancient tradition of communal 
building practices would compensate for its lack of capital and savings. The assistance came 
with the expectation that residents would work towards the “regularization” of their residential 
situation, and to this end the program established a process for eventual ownership of the lot, 
contingent upon timely construction of “at least a minimal dwelling” which should have sufficient 
bedrooms to adequately house the family, as well as a kitchen and a lavatory, with the entire 
structure covering at least 30 sq. m., and construction “in a stable and permanent manner with 
suitable materials.”60 Property title would only be granted once “the dwelling is totally finished 
and ready for occupation.”61 Despite the fact that Peru is highly prone to earthquakes, nowhere 
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was seismic engineering—creating safer houses and minimizing likely damage to property and 
person—advanced as a rationale for technical assistance.62 Instead, particular emphasis was 
given to the “social aspects” to be addressed by the OATs:  
It will be of little use to put at people’s disposal suitable housing and the 
corresponding communal services if they do not know how to use them as they 
should be, and if these don’t form hygienic and orderly habits, and stimulate 
human improvement [superación humana].63   
This rhetoric recalled that of the unidad vecinal program, intensified to a higher degree: 
managed self-help housing would serve as a training ground to prepare residents for their 
responsibilities as independent citizens, and as actors in the private market—fostering a certain 
self-sufficiency, creating “aware and progressive communities ... utilizing the many or few 
resources at their disposal, without expecting everything from the government and the 
authorities.”64 In order to achieve this ideal self-sufficiency, residents would be required to buy 
their properties at a price covering the original value of the land plus any improvements 
undertaken by the government, such as re-drawing the urban layout, grading roadways, or 
installing services. As the commission’s initial report had noted: “‘Helping them to help 
themselves’ should be the principal idea and the constant practice of this work”—offering 
everyone, no matter their situation, “the possibility of creating their well-being with their own 
effort [esfuerzo propio].65 
Adolfo Córdova’s study for CRAV presented a very different perspective on the housing 
crisis, which in large part reflected the views of the Movimiento Social Progresista.66 Córdova 
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argued that the most serious problem facing Peru was not housing, but poverty: raising the 
economic capacity of low-income families as part of a comprehensive program for the economic 
development of the country was the only path to a sustainable solution. Córdova’s detailed 
assessment established that in order to meet the current housing deficit (both quantitative and 
qualitative), it would be necessary to build a total of 728,700 new dwellings, and repair around 
1,011,500 deficient dwellings—the latter figure representing over half of the country’s existing 
housing stock. While the most acute housing shortage was in the largest metropolitan areas 
(Lima and Arequipa), overall the housing situation in rural areas was far worse, with 60 percent 
of housing needing repair and only 5 percent in good condition.67  
Córdova’s approach to meeting the housing deficit envisaged a construction program to 
be carried out over thirty years. Taking into account the continued deterioration of existing 
housing stock as well as projected population growth (Córdova estimated the population in 1986 
at 18,225,000, not far from the actual number, which was just under 20,000,000) he argued that 
to meet the total housing deficit would require the annual construction of 81,570 new dwellings, 
and the rehabilitation of 33,720. Given that total housing production in Lima over the previous 
eight years averaged less than 6,000 units per year, the most optimistic estimate for housing 
construction nationally was 9,000 units per year—only a fraction of that needed. Only a nine-fold 
increase in housing production would meet the target of 81,570 dwellings, and—as Córdova 
noted—the investment required to carry out this task would absorb around half of the national 
budget. Nonetheless he expressed the extraordinarily optimistic hope that if addressed as part 
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of a “radical transformation” of the Peruvian economy through a long-term, wide-ranging 
development program, the housing deficit could certainly be reduced, although not eliminated. 
However, in an oblique reference to Beltrán and the enticing headlines of La Prensa, Córdova 
warned that there were no quick and simple solutions to this problem:   
the offers of a “home of one’s own for each Peruvian family” that are made from 
time to time are fallacious and dangerous, evidently with obscure political aims 
or, in the best-case scenario, are due to complete ignorance of the situation. 
As appealing as this slogan may be, “it is not honest to play with it, because the economic 
capacity of the Peruvian family precludes it.”68 Córdova also observed that the housing crisis 
had been aggravated by unrealistic expectations on the part of the authorities concerning what 
kind of housing should be provided—insisting on “high standards of construction and 
urbanización,” which needlessly inflated costs—an apparent reference to Belaúnde. It would be 
far better, he suggested, “to establish a balance between the cost of these dwellings and the 
economic capacity of the population”—adopting a more flexible approach to minimum 
standards.69 
A contemporaneous study assessing the state of housing construction in Lima 
underscored why a reappraisal of policy was justified: while the city’s population had increased 
by 76,000 families over the period 1949–1956, fewer than 46,000 new dwellings had been built 
in this time, and only 5,476 by public agencies such as the CNV which targeted lower-income 
residents.70 Meanwhile, over 26,000 families were now in the process of building their own 
                                                
68 Córdova, La vivienda, 13, 148.  
69 Córdova, La vivienda, 13. 
70 ONPU, Construcciones efectuadas por particulares y por entidades estatales en Lima Metropolitana, 
durante el período 1949–1956 (Lima: ONPU, March 1957), 5. In a follow-up report the statistics were 
slightly less discouraging: in the period 1949–1960, 78,037 dwellings had been constructed, 7,906 by the 
public sector. With a total population increase in the period of 465,000, or 93,000 families, this meant the 
running deficit had decreased to 15,000. (However it should be noted that this figure does not include 
families without housing prior to 1949; nor does it address the “qualitative” housing deficit identified by 
Adolfo Córdova in La vivienda en el Perú.) ONPU, Construcciones efectuadas por particulares y por 




housing in barriadas71—leaving the unidades vecinales as isolated outposts in an increasingly 
improvised city [2.24]. An evaluation report on the unidad vecinal program further illustrated the 
limits of conventional construction: the small number of units available through the CNV led to a 
highly selective screening process for residents. In addition to income benchmarks and home 
visits to assess domestic habits, all prospective residents were required to submit certified x-ray 
and blood tests, in an effort to keep tuberculosis at bay. As one consequence, many of the 
workers actually building the unidad vecinal projects were unable to meet the requirements to 
live in them. Instead, the CNV “provided the most suitable [acertada] solution, giving them land 
to build their houses”—in this way, the state housing agency enabled the construction of their 
un-aided self-help dwellings “in a clandestine manner in the areas next to where they work.”72 
This account suggests that by the early 1950s the CNV had already reconciled itself to shanty 
towns for its low-income workers adjacent to its showcase projects as the best it could achieve 
for these households. Finally, the unidad vecinal projects themselves quickly showed signs of 
strain, particularly due to overcrowding: by 1954 Unidad Vecinal No. 3, designed for 5,000 
residents, had a population of around 6,196, an excess of  24 percent; by 1966, the population 
was 7,151, an excess of 43 percent.73 Partly this overcrowding was due to the demise of the 
“superintendencia” which had been responsible for the regular inspection of apartments and 
                                                
71 Córdova, La vivienda, 78. Córdova also noted that 132,500 families in Lima were living in dwellings that 
were so substandard they needed to be replaced (54 percent of families), while an additional 62,000 
families required significant repairs to their homes (25 percent of families). The report continued: “Only 21 
percent of the population, equivalent to around 52,000 families, live in adequate lodgings.” Córdova, La 
vivienda, 77. 
72 CINVA, Unidad Vecinal No. 3 Lima-Callao de la Corporación Nacional de Vivienda del Perú (Bogotá: 
CINVA, 1958), 104-105. Regarding the class conflicts that could emerge in such situations, the report 
added that while in some cases, the siting of model neighbourhoods next to low-income settlements had 
created tensions, at Unidad Vecinal No. 3 “the neighbouring rancherías [shanty settlements] … use all 
their community services but do not attend the dances in the Community Hall organized by the residents’ 
associations, maintaining a respectful reserve towards them and they have never presented problems.” 
Unidad Vecinal No. 3, 104. 
73 Carlos Delgado, La Unidad Vecinal No. 3 y Matute: estudio social comparativo referido a problemas de 
planeamiento fisico (Lima: Oficina de Planificación Sectorial de Vivienda y Equipamiento Urbano, July 




organizing the transfer of families to larger units as they grew. In addition, residents’ 
modifications to the dwellings—transforming the patio and terrace areas into additional living 
space was widespread—effectively overrode the CNV’s efforts at housing reform, and 
reproduced the confined spaces of inner-city tenements. 
 
Efforts to devise an “economical system of urbanization and construction” for Peru’s 
cities had resulted in contrasting responses: Belaúnde’s conventional modernist reform housing, 
achieving some cost reductions through mild modifications to the Existenzminimum, but failing 
to cut costs sufficiently to match the reality of low incomes; Agurto’s “house that grows” hybrid, 
revolutionizing the issue of standards by cutting the house to its core, but remaining at the level 
of an experiment with an uncertain fate in the wider housing marketplace, without the financial 
support of its sponsor, La Prensa; and the OAT’s aided self-help approach, promising to uphold 
the principle of the “minimum” dwelling, but as yet untested. Short of raising overall incomes, or 
the major structural reforms advocated by Córdova as the foundation for any lasting solution, 
the widespread provision of the affordable, modern house remained elusive. Meanwhile, the 





3. The Barriada under the Microscope 
 
While squatter settlements had been part of Lima’s urban fabric since at least the 
1920s,1 the scale of these settlements changed dramatically in the 1950s, making them a more 
prominent—and unsettling—aspect of the city. Political scientist David Collier has observed that 
the formation of barriadas in Peru has followed three distinct patterns. First [3.1], through the 
gradual occupation of a site, often as provisional or temporary housing comes to be used for 
full-time shelter. Second [3.2], through invasion—an organized mass occupation involving 
hundreds and occasionally thousands of people, generally dues-paying members of a residents’ 
association, who are armed in advance with a site survey and trace out a basic urban layout 
immediately following the invasion.2 Prior to the regime of General Manuel Odría (1948–1956), 
the vast majority of barriadas were formed through gradual occupation. Invasion became more 
prevalent in the late 1940s, and increased dramatically in the 1950s, along with a third means of 
formation: government authorization, which was especially prevalent in the capital, Lima [3.3].3 
Courting the loyalty of low-income urban dwellers (an increasingly important constituency), and 
in any case lacking the resources to implement an effective slum clearance policy, Odría acted 
as patron to numerous groups seeking land for housing in anticipation of earning their electoral 
                                                
1
 According to José Matos Mar, the small settlement of Armatambo, formed on Lima’s southern edge in 
1924, “perhaps constitutes the first antecedent of what we call barriadas.” José Matos Mar, Las barriadas 
de Lima, 1957 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1977), 57. 
2 As Eric Hobsbawm has noted, Peru has a long tradition of rural land invasions, impelled by various 
motivations, the most germane in this context being the perception that unused land belongs to nobody. 
Technically, it may belong to the state, but in practical terms the logic—inherited from the Spanish 
colonial imperative to expand settlement—is that “the land belongs to him who cultivates it by means of 
his labour.” Eric Hobsbawm, “Peasant Land Occupations,” Past and Present 62 (February 1974): 121. 
3 David Collier, Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), 151, Table 11.9. Analysing 136 barriadas in existence in Lima in 1972, 
with a combined population of 759,000, Collier determined that only thirteen of them had been formed 
before 1940, with twenty-nine formed from 1940–1948 (i.e. following the devastating 1940 earthquake), 
and thirty formed under Odría. Prior to Odría the vast majority of barriadas were formed by gradual 
occupation (25/42), with a quarter formed through invasion (11/42), and only three by government 





support. These settlements were therefore fully authorized, but nonetheless extra-legal, founded 
on little more than the strategic benevolence of Odría as political sponsor. The largest of these 
settlements, the 27 de Octubre in Lima, commemorated the date he seized power in a military 
coup;4 later renamed Urbanización San Martín de Porres, by 1960 it had a population of over 
57,000 people. Other settlements were named in honour of Odría’s wife.5  
This chapter takes as its starting point the establishment of the improvised “Ciudad de 
Dios” (City of God) on Lima’s southern periphery, achieved through a large-scale invasion on 
Christmas Eve 1954. Although this method of establishing new settlements had been 
normalized under Odría, the Ciudad de Dios invasion was by far the largest to date, and as 
such tested the limits of the state’s tolerance for extra-legal urban development. The chapter 
begins with a narration of the events as outlined in the (far from disinterested) account of Pedro 
Beltrán’s newspaper, La Prensa. It then shifts to the perspective of anthopologist José Matos 
Mar, whose ground-breaking research on the barriadas brought insights into their structure and 
dynamics that would influence government policy and architectural and planning practice alike. 
Finally, it examines the unprecedented legislative measures—and the resulting, tentative urban 
projects—that were devised in response to the Ciudad de Dios invasion, as experts and 
officials, policy-makers and politicians were forced to come to terms with the realities of this new 
urban landscape.  
 
3.1   A City Overnight 
While the front page of the Christmas Day 1954 edition of La Prensa featured the latest 
image of Pedro Beltrán’s “growing house” initiative (discussed in chapter two), the previous 
                                                
4 Collier, Squatters and Oligarchs, 64. 
5 This practice was so widespread that on August 2, 1963 the government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry 
issued Resolución Suprema No. 82 banning it: “Using the name of the head of state and those of his 
family members to name associations, barriadas, or other entities is prohibited.” Compilación legal de 




evening had seen 8,000 people occupy state-owned land on the pampas (treeless plains) 
sixteen kilometres from Lima to found the new squatter settlement of Ciudad de Dios6—so-
named, according to the settlers, because “it was born on the same night the Lord was born.”7 
The date was no doubt carefully selected: land invasions frequently took place on religious or 
national holidays in order to emphasize the pious and patriotic sentiments of the citizen-settlers 
in mitigation for the threat raised by their mass law-breaking; it also provided the invaders with a 
tactical advantage, since it took longer for the police or armed forces to organize an effective 
response on a public holiday.  
La Prensa’s first mention of the event came on December 28, with a description of the 
would-be settlers of the new “pueblo clandestino” (clandestine town) arriving by night carrying 
all their belongings, “like a group of refugees from some war, or a strange caravan of twentieth-
century nomads.” As soon as they arrived at the determined location, they selected their lots 
and set up shelters made of straw mats [3.4]; those lacking even these basic materials simply 
“traced the boundaries of their lots with rows of small stones and lines made with chalk.” The 
                                                
6 The following account has been assembled from a series of articles published in La Prensa between 
December 28, 1954 and January 23, 1955: Pedro F. Cortázar, “Otro pueblo clandestino a 16 km. de 
Lima,” December 28, 1954; Cortázar, “Minuto a minuto crece sin cesar la Ciudad de Dios en Atocongo,” 
December 29, 1954; “Ordenan desalojar la Ciudad de Dios,” December 30, 1954; Cortázar, “Declara el 
presidente de los 10 mil invasores: Pobladores de la Ciudad de Dios piden donación o venta de tierras,” 
December 31, 1954; “Ya tiene su capilla la rústica Ciudad de Dios,” January 2, 1955; Cortázar, “Odria 
pasó delante de la Ciudad de Dios,” January 3, 1955; “No fueron desalojdos al cumplirse el plazo,” and 
“Inician trabajos en “La Ciudad de Dios,’” January 4, 1955; “Otorgarán en venta simbólica terrenos de 
Ciudad de Dios,” and “‘La casa barata es lo que necesitamos’ dicen los dirigentes de la Ciudad de Dios,” 
January 5, 1955; “Levantarán modernas viviendas donde ahora hay chozas,” January 6, 1955; 
“Urbanización popular será pronto realidad en la Ciudad de Dios,” January 9, 1955; “Arreglan disputa 
ente los invasores,” January 11, 1955; “En el más perfecto orden sigue el empadronamiento de la Ciudad 
de Dios,” January 12, 1955; “El Gobierno da un gran paso para solucionar la crisis de vivienda,” January 
22, 1955; “Se aplaude la actitud del Gobierno,” January 23, 1955.   
7 Further auspicious resonances for the settlement’s name and foundation date: when Francisco Pizarro 
founded Lima in January 1535, he gave it the name “Lima, La Ciudad de los Reyes” (City of Kings) in 
reference to the three Magi who visited Bethlehem on Christmas Eve, saying that “the beginning of any 
town or city must be both in God and for God.” Richard L. Kagan, Urban Images of the Hispanic World, 
1493–1793 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 169. Most likely not coincidently, La Prensa’s 
early coverage of Ciudad de Dios drew parallels between the settlers and the conquistadors more than 
once: “As in the time of the conquest, each one who traced his lot raised his hut and planted his flag” 




settlers told the newspaper that the invasion had been organized by a registered association of 
some 5,000 would-be home-owners, who had been petitioning the authorities for the right to 
occupy this site for some time. With their attempts to follow the lawful procedure frustrated by an 
unresponsive bureaucracy, they had been forced to take dramatic action and decided to invade 
on Christmas Eve, “assisted by God.” According to an association official, they would soon 
begin looking for an engineer to trace out “the streets, the park, the market, and the church” of 
the new city, intending to carry out the physical work themselves in order “not to cause the state 
any expense.”8  
The newspaper’s coverage continued daily until mid-January, in sympathetic accounts 
that appeared to give tacit support to the invasion. (By contrast, the only mention of the events 
in La Prensa’s main rival, El Comercio, was a brief two-paragraph description of a meeting 
between the President and association leaders in early January.9) On December 29 La Prensa 
reported that two government officials from the Ministerio de Trabajo (Ministry of Labour) and 
the Ministerio de Fomento y Obras Públicas (Ministry of Development and Public Works), whom 
the settlers wouldn’t name, had “authorized them to occupy nine hectares of the pampas”—
however they had decided to take possession of substantially more land than this in order to 
accommodate all the association’s members; they acknowledged that they had no written proof 
to back up this claim. Meanwhile, on the previous day some of the association leaders had been 
detained by the police for several hours, suspected of having ties to the outlawed Communist 
Party or the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana whose formidable organizing skills 
among the popular classes made it a significant threat to the government. On the other hand, 
the settlers had already started digging to secure a water supply, and the orderliness of the 
                                                
8 On the ritual nature of these claims about not looking for hand-outs see José Matos Mar, Estudio de las 
barriadas limeñas: Informe presentado a Naciones Unidas en diciembre de 1955 (Lima: Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos, 1966), 49. 
9 “El Presidente de la República recibió a dirigentes de tres Asociaciones de Pobladores,” El Comercio, 




whole process impressed La Prensa’s reporters, as the community effectively policed itself: “Up 
until now the law of the fittest has not prevailed, since wrangles to snatch up the ‘lots’ have been 
warded off by the members of the association.” On December 30 the newspaper disclosed that 
the settlers had been ordered to leave the site by January 3—however the association leaders 
had already acted to circumvent this by writing directly to President Odría and his wife (frequent 
patrons of such enterprises) asking for the land to be granted to them. In the meantime, the 
population had risen to 10,000, and armed police were preventing trucks carrying construction 
materials from entering the site. Still, people continued walking towards the “promised city”; La 
Prensa helpfully published a map showing its readers how to reach the site. 
December 31 featured an extended interview with Alejandro López Agreda, president of 
the settlers’ association (later dubbed by La Prensa “the leader of the 10,000”). Described as 
“affable” and sparing but affecting with his words, López emphasized that they were ordinary 
people, essentially law-abiding and hard-working. Fed up with living in the inner-city slums, they 
had simply run out of options and elected to take action on their own rather than waiting for the 
state to solve their problems: 
Should we have continued waiting? We decided no. We have strong arms and 
we can build our houses with our own effort [nuestro propio esfuerzo]. The 
people are no longer how they were before. The people now understand and 
assess and know a lot of things. The people now know how to make sacrifices 
and to save for a better life. The people understand unity, brotherhood, mutual 
aid [ayuda mútua], and that with this they can achieve a lot to improve their 
circumstances. 
López reiterated that all they wanted from the state was access to the land—they were even 
willing to purchase it, “provided that the prices are reasonable” and that the state establish some 
kind of loan system to facilitate payment, “since we gave up trying to obtain any credit, because 
they don’t lend money to us poor people.” Beltrán’s campaign for mortgage-financing reform, 
launched via La Prensa six months previously, could hardly have found a better advocate. 
On January 3, the newspaper duly reported on the visit of Odría and his wife to the 




Escuela Nacional de Ingenieros (one of whom, Luis Felipe Calle, later worked with John Turner 
in Arequipa) had completed their first sketch for the future “ciudad tipo popular” (working-class 
city). Estimating that the 300-hectare site would be suitable for a population of 30,000, the city 
would feature a civic and commercial centre ringed by a residential zone, sustaining its own 
industrial sector on an adjacent site. According to the student architects, this constituted “a 
useful large-scale trial” that would demonstrate the viability of establishing “autonomous satellite 
cities of the unidad vecinal type” in various locations around Lima. In conclusion they endorsed 
La Prensa’s “casa barata” (low-cost house) as “ideal” for this kind of city, “because they have 
been planned by the técnicos especially for cases like this”—that is, for working-class 
neighbourhoods. Furthermore, in this location, with the land cheap or even free, the cost of the 
housing would certainly be manageable. That their planning concepts and arguments echoed 
those of Fernando Belaúnde Terry was no coincidence, since he was head of the architecture 
department at the Escuela Nacional de Ingenieros and led classes on housing and urbanism.  
By January 4 the eviction deadline had passed with no attempt to enforce the order; 
instead, the association leaders had been invited to meet President Odría at the Palacio de 
Gobierno. The students were now overseeing the preparatory works for the construction of a 
small market, as the settlers made good on their promise to build the city themselves, “raising 
clouds of sand in the desert” [3.5]. Meanwhile a new set of invaders had arrived, an association 
of residents recently dislodged from their neighbourhood, because—the newspaper noted—they 
had “invaded private property right in the urban centre of Lima”: clearly, from La Prensa’s 
viewpoint, the seizure of unused state land beyond the urban fringes could be sanctioned, even 
encouraged, but taking possession of privately owned, prime real estate in the central city could 
not. 
On January 5 the newspaper announced a significant development: the meeting with 
Odría had resulted in the promise of a “symbolic sale” of the Ciudad de Dios site to the settlers, 




an office on the site; its first task would be to carry out an empadronamiento (official registration) 
creating a record of all those hoping to be granted a lot.10 At this point, the government was 
effectively commiting its resources and its técnicos to the process of developing the new 
settlement, taking over official responsibility for its administration from the association leaders. 
Two photographs flanking the main story sought to illustrate the newspaper’s key role in the 
happy resolution of the affair [3.6]: one documented the leaders’ meeting with Beltrán in the 
offices of La Prensa, expressing their gratitude for “the objective information” the newspaper 
had published about their settlement, while the other showed their visit to the “growing house” 
building site, bestowing their seal of approval via “their enthusiasm for the layout of the houses 
and for their form of construction.” In the accompanying interview, the settlement leaders 
claimed La Prensa’s campaign to promote low-cost housing as the point of inspiration for their 
invasion; it had demonstrated that “raising a ciudad popular with their own effort and with the 
help of the state and of private capital … was not impossible.” The leaders claimed high 
ambitions for their project: disassociating themselves from the negative connotations of squatter 
housing, they were determined to build “a city with hygienic houses and perfectly organized, and 
not simply one more clandestine barriada, unhygienic, without electricity, water, or sewerage.” 
Over the next few days, coverage focused on the empadronamiento. A report on a 
disturbance between earlier groups of settlers and more than 2,000 new arrivals fearful of being 
excluded from the registration process emphasized the quick resolution of the conflict in 
“rejoicing” and “perfect order” and “a great desire to collaborate in any possible way with the 
authorities.” The threat of chaos (the spectre of lawlessness raised by the invasion, the latent 
fear of massed crowds of urban poor) was set to rest with images of long queues of people 
“waiting patiently for their turn for hours and hours” in weary resignation. 
                                                
10 According to El Comercio’s account on January 2, 1955, two other associations were also involved in 
the meeting: the Asociación de Pobladores de Mendocita y Matute (who had come from the inner city to 
join the invasion) and Asociación de Padres de Familia Arenales de San Juan de Miraflores, a third group 




Gradually more details emerged of the government’s intentions concerning what it now 
termed “the authorized occupation of state land in the Pampas de Atocongo.” In an effort to 
confront Lima’s growing housing deficit, the government would develop a comprehensive “Plan 
General de Urbanizaciones de Tipo Popular”: this master plan for “working-class subdivisions” 
would make use of state land “in selected zones bordering the city” to site the new 
settlements—a plan apparently inspired by Belaúnde’s 1954 proposal for the establishment of 
“self-sufficient satellite nuclei.”11 The reformulation of Ciudad de Dios as an urbanización 
popular would act as a pilot project: the state would replace the squatters’ improvised efforts 
with considered solutions developed by its técnicos; this would be supplemented by a program 
of “technical assistance for the construction of houses” (presumably on the aided self-help 
model).  
La Prensa’s view, the state had devised a series of reforms that would effectively re-
regulate improvised and unauthorized urban development, allowing it to guide the city’s further 
evolution with a minimum outlay of public resources. Promises of state assistance to the new 
urbanizaciones populares would attract law-abiding and hard-working settlers. As an 
enforcement mechanism, “those who invade land in the future—even if it is state property” 
would be excluded from the official programs and face the full force of the law. La Prensa 
confidently predicted that “scenes such as Ciudad de Dios will not be repeated”: after the steady 
drip of unauthorized occupations and mushrooming barriadas that had brought the housing 
issue to the forefront of public concern, it seemed to believe that the drama of Ciudad de Dios 
literally marked the invasion to end all invasions. Underscoring the newspaper’s key role in 
resolving the crisis, the following day La Prensa’s front page featured residents of Ciudad de 
Dios learning details of the government’s plans in the pages of La Prensa, neatly tying up the 
story’s narrative arc [3.7].  
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3.2  The Anthropology of Improvement 
A more complex account emerges in José Matos Mar’s Estudio de las barriadas 
limeñas, which drew upon the research and analytical methods of anthropology to produce the 
first comprehensive survey of the barriada phenomenon. 
Anthropology was recognized as an academic discipline in Peru in 1946 with the 
establishment of the Instituto de Etnología y Arqueología at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de 
San Marcos in Lima under influential indigenísta Luis Valcárcel, and the launching of a similar 
program in Cuzco in the same year. Matos Mar was one of the first graduates of the Instituto, 
and during his time there he had the opportunity to study with art historian George Kubler, who 
was in Lima in 1948–1949 as a representative of the Smithsonian’s Institute of Social 
Anthropology.12 Valcárcel’s ambition for the Instituto was to promote anthropology as a scientific 
discipline whose specialist knowledge and techniques could be deployed beyond the academic 
enclave, specifically by policy-makers concerned with the “development and integration” of the 
indigenous population—that is, their re-formation as productive citizens of a modern Peru.13 To 
the same end, Valcárcel also became director of the Instituto Indigenista Peruana (IIP), a 
research and advisory body within the Ministerio de Justicia y Trabajo (Ministry of Justice and 
Labour) that had been modelled on a Mexican prececent.14 Despite Valcárcel’s enthusiasm for 
                                                
12 John V. Murra, “Andean Societies,” Annual Review of Anthropology 13 (1984): 133. According to Murra, 
during his time in Peru Kubler “encouraged many new approaches to the study of Andean societies and 
initiated the students into a variety of scholarly techniques.” Murra, “Andean Societies,” 132. 
13 The importance of this project had been recognized and discussed for decades, but was not 
institutionalized until 1966 with the establishment of the Proyecto de Desarrollo e Integración de la 
Población Indígena (superceding the 1959 Plan Nacional de Integración de la Población Aborigen, which 
had been funded with a US $20,000,000 loan from the Inter-American Development Bank). See Jorge P. 
Osterling and Héctor Martínez, “Notes for a History of Peruvian Social Anthropology, 1940-1980,” Current 
Anthropology 24, no. 3 (June 1983): 343-360, and Carlos Iván Degregori and Pablo Sandoval, “Peru: 
From Otherness to a Shared Diversity,” in A Companion to Latin American Anthropology, ed. Deborah 
Poole (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 150-173. 
14 The first Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, held in Mexico in 1940, had endeavoured to coordinate 
and promote “indigenist policies” throughout the region; to this end, the signatory states would be 
required to set up their own associated national offices, creating a network of agencies focused on 




the project, the IIP never achieved the same level of influence in national affairs as its 
counterpart in Mexico.15 Nonetheless, many of the first wave of San Marcos graduates were 
active in producing reports for the Ministerio de Justicia y Trabajo, and on its own account the 
Instituto de Etnología y Arqueología developed “more than forty research papers on indigenous 
communities and three projects of technical assistance and cultural promotion” in its first 
decade.16 This work included the Huarochirí Project, led by Matos Mar while he was still in his 
early twenties and had yet to complete his doctorate.  
The Huarochirí Project was focused on a group of villages in the province of Huarochirí, 
involving multiple research visits beginning in 1952. As described by Matos Mar, the project 
shifted from its initial “purely ethnological character” into a planned “ improvement project”17 in 
mid-1953 when a number of técnicos—professionals with specialized technical knowledge, a 
category that in this case included psychologists, doctors, and engineers as well as architects 
and urban planners—became interested in the work. (This group included Adolfo Córdova, 
whose housing study was discussed in chapter two, and Eduardo Neira, colleague of John F. C. 
Turner, discussed in chapter four.) Now framed as an experiment in “applied ethnology,”18 a 
complete plan of action would be developed, drawing upon information gathered by the 
anthropologists in census and cadastral surveys, which included proposals to establish a health 
                                                
15 In Mexico, anthropology played a central role in the postrevolutionary state’s promotion of mestizaje —
the cultural and racial fusion of the indigenous and Spanish elements of society to forge a higher, more 
powerful, radically new yet uniquely Mexican identity, with the ultimate goal of developing the nation. See 
Alan Knight, “Racism, Revolution, and Indigenísmo: Mexico, 1910–1940,” in The Idea of Race in Latin 
America, 1870–1940, ed. Richard Graham (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 71-113. 
16 Degregori and Sandoval, “Peru: From Otherness,” 156. 
17 José Matos Mar, “Una experiencia de mejoramiento de comunidades indígenas en el Perú: El Proyecto 
Huarochirí,” Boletín Trimestral: Centro Regional de Educación Fundamental para la América Latina 6, no. 
3 (July 1954): 3. 
18 Sebastián Salazar Bondy, “Huarochirí: ensayo actual de etnología aplicada: Etnólogos y técnicos 
diversos intentan mejoramiento social,” La Prensa (May 15, 1955). Salazar Bondy was a philosopher and 
literary figure who was a founding member of Agrupación Espacio; according to Ludeña Urquizo, he led 




post, support artisanal production, and improve agricultural yields. The researchers were to live 
in the community for two years, directing the projects and testing the results via “ethnological 
verifications,” while training community members for an eventual hand-over of the programs. 
Meanwhile, sociologists and psychologists would study “the shape of the groups’ reactions, their 
behaviour and attitude towards change.”19 In short, scientific study would provide data for the 
técnicos to synthesize and translate into culturally appropriate proposals for “social 
improvement”: modern technical knowledge would be rallied to produce a better version of 
everyday life in the Peruvian hinterland. By 1955, architects had already completed plans for 
improving village housing, using locally-available materials combined with “modern construction 
techniques”; the designs were adapted to the conditions of the region, but provided with 
appropriate amenities, including “functional, although rustic, furniture,” and a reform kitchen 
where “the woman doesn’t need to be bending over all the time.”20 Matos Mar anticipated that 
the ultimate effect of these reforms would be to change the very essence and experience of the 
house: 
Up until now, the house as a pleasant place to stay, in which family life develops, 
has not been a reality for Peruvian comuneros; it only represents a place to sleep 
and to keep things, and the negligence in respect to its care is traditional. The 
woman’s infrequent stay [permanencia] in the home is one of the causes.21 
This realignment of household arrangements is the key to an improvement—even a kind of 
awakening—of family life, by encouraging women to spend more time at home; this in turn 
would achieve a “full restructuring” communal life. The house is transformed from an object of 
utility into a place of sociability, offering a symbolic assimilation into the bourgeois domestic 
sphere. 
Though never implemented, the Huarochirí Project was typical of the applied 
                                                
19 Matos Mar, “Una experiencia de mejoramiento de comunidades indígenas en el Perú,” 12. 
20
 Salazar Bondy, “Huarochirí: ensayo actual de etnología aplicada.”  




anthropology programs that emerged as a tool of development professionals in this period.22 It 
could even be seen as a self-conscious response to the long-running Vicos Project, centred on 
a hacienda in the northern Andes from 1952 to 1966.23 While Vicos was largely run by US 
graduate students,24 the Huarochirí Project was designed by a multi-disciplinary group of 
Peruvian professionals—although it did receive funding from a US-based foundation, a reminder 
that such research, at once highly localized in its focus on remote communities, also operated 
within an international network of applied research and policy-making.25 It is not by chance then 
that Matos Mar elected to publish his first report on the project in a UNESCO publication.  
In 1955, Matos Mar completed a second major research project, presenting to the United 
Nations his Estudio de las barriadas limeñas, which shifted his focus from the 
underdevelopment of the countryside to the misdevelopment of the city [3.8]. However the two 
contexts were deeply interconnected: beginning in the early 1950s, an explosion in rural-urban 
migration had dramatically increased the population of cities throughout Peru, leading to the 
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California Press, 1997), 150-175. 
23 The Vicos Project was part of the Cornell University Program on Culture and Applied Social Sciences, a 
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proliferation of self-built housing clustered in improvised squatter settlements. The problem was 
especially acute in key economic centres such as Lima, Arequipa, and Chimbote. Underscoring 
the urgency of the situation, Matos Mar pointed out that the population of the capital had 
doubled over the previous fifteen years to approximately 1.2 million; at the same time, a major 
earthquake in 1940 had eroded the supply of affordable housing, leaving around 10 percent of 
Lima’s residents to make their homes in barriadas.26 Matos Mar’s report collated census data on 
Lima’s thirty-nine recognized barriadas, mapping sample house plans and urban configurations, 
and tracing the economic and socio-cultural factors underlying their increasing prevalence [3.8-
3.9]. As with Huarochirí, the structure of the 1955 report clearly announced its interventionist 
approach: divided into two sections, “the problem” of the barriadas was first measured and 
assessed, laying the groundwork for scientifically derived “solutions”; and once again, the report 
recommended further study by “teams of técnicos” (an architect-urbanist, a geographer, an 
economist, and a social anthropologist) and the completion of more extensive census and 
housing surveys.27  
Matos Mar began by defining eighteen key characteristics of the barriada—the first being 
that they “appear through spontaneous or organized invasion” on the urban periphery. 
Ultimately, while they may resemble other areas of low-income housing such as inner-city 
slums, the barriadas were unique because they were formed by squatters who “occupy fallow 
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lands, pay no rent, and, on the contrary, try to become owners of the land that they occupy.”28 
Emerging as an “urban and local expression” of the “inefficient” socio-economic structure of 
Peruvian society, real, long-term solutions to the barriadas would, according to Matos Mar, only 
come by stimulating economic development on a national level. Judging that Peru was not yet 
ready to take such action, he recommended that, in the meantime, the shape and impact of the 
barriadas should be managed more assiduously: barriadas develop “following a natural course 
and it is neither prudent nor advisable that this situation continue.... it is necessary to tackle the 
problem and try to channel it [encauzarlo].”29 The most powerful mechanism for “channelling” 
the barriadas would be to use legal recognition—the granting or withholding of property title—as 
leverage over residents:  
this is the principal weapon that must be wielded and utilized effectively. We have 
already seen that the barriada poblador [settler] suffers a tremendous psychological 
anxiety ... thinking that he can be evicted at any moment.30  
Given this fact, the authorities were in the position to mandate a series of behaviours in 
exchange for recognition: joining an official barriada association (under the control of “a state-
run technical organization”), participating in running the group, making monthly payments to 
cover the cost of the granted property, and contributing to cooperative public works projects 
within the barriada. The principle articulated here of a coercive guiding hand, backed by the 
requirements of sweat equity, user-pays, and compliance with the rules, formed the Peruvian 
government’s primary approach to barriadas throughout the late 1950s. 
For their part, Matos Mar warned, pobladores are vigorous and politically astute in their 
efforts to achieve support and de facto recognition for their situation, making constant and 
multifarious appeals to the authorities, with invitations to inauguration ceremonies for amenities 
they have constructed, and arranging for visits by social workers, nurses, and schools 
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inspectors. They are also “attentive to changes of the authorities and alert to electoral 
processes and fluctuations in national politics”; one popular tactical manoeuvre was to name 
streets after the head of state, his wife, or other influential people “who have done or are 
thinking of doing something for them.” They will even agree to pay property tax on all the lots 
that the barriada occupies—unthinkable under any other circumstances—if it is seen to bolster 
their position. Furthermore:  
they give a full welcome to every person who comes to get information. We 
never had any difficulty in our fieldwork; on the contrary we were treated 
cordially and furnished with every type of information, even the most private.31   
Matos Mar’s concern about settlers’ lobbying skills seems to reflect an awareness that the 
authorities were not completely in control of the situation—or rather that the técnicos were not in 
control of the authorities, since certain officials were evidently quite vulnerable to the 
solicitations of the settlers when it was to their own advantage. This aspect of the barriada 
“problem”—the symbiosis of illegality between clientelistic politician and poblador—could be 
observed with the finest scientific rigour, but even the best technical solution risked being 
outmanoeuvred in this urban realpolitik. 
The flipside of the report’s evident distrust of residents—in particular, of the power of 
residents left to their own devices—was that ultimately the “key to success” in fixing the 
barriadas would come by taking advantage of the “marked communitarian spirit” that was one of 
their defining characteristics. Matos Mar claimed that the Sunday faenas (work teams) regularly 
organized for building roads, cleaning streets, installing water reservoirs, and so on, were part of 
a “communitarian system, which corresponds to old Peruvian cultural patterns.”32 The 
Huarochirí study had documented exactly such practices of cooperative work within rural 
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comunidades indígenas (indigenous communities)33 whose recognized members were required 
to contribute a designated amount of labour and/or building materials (such as handmade clay 
bricks) each year for communal improvement projects. Fostering this communitarian spirit in the 
urban barriadas could lead to significant results, provided that the state exercised proper control 
over residents’ efforts through technical assistance programs. On the other hand the extra-legal 
initiatives of the pobladores in housing themselves could not be rewarded outright, and each 
resident should be required to pay what they owed for their dwelling: “it is necessary to iron out 
the difficulties for him, but not to make him a gift. Nothing for free.”34  
Matos Mar’s suggestion, frequently repeated elsewhere, that forms of cooperative work 
or “mutual aid” were indigenous to traditional Peruvian society, ultimately reaching back to the 
Incas,35 naturalized these practices and effectively set the stage for the adoption of managed 
mutual-aid self-help schemes as a key element of housing policy. A situation of crisis, with 
citizens forced into the arduous, protracted process of constructing their own dwellings, was 
given the reassuring patina of tradition, enabling the focus to remain on the settlers’ undoubted 
resourcefulness and creativity rather than the structural inequality that had created the necessity 
for it in the first place.  
Underlying this entire discussion was the vexed question of the proper place of the 
provincial migrant in this newly developing urban world. As earlier argued by Luis Valcárcel, the 
traditional Andean village (ayllu) encapsulated the integrity of rural, indigenous culture: “The 
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little Indian village forms spontaneously, grows and develops like the countryside trees, without 
subjection to any plan; the little houses group together like sheep in a herd.”36 By contrast, from 
the colonial period onwards the city in Latin America has been coded as the redoubt of criollo 
(European-descended) civilization and power, set against the untamed realm of the indio and 
the paisano (with “Indian” and “peasant” often treated as interchangeable).37 In this context, the 
indio-paisano was framed as utterly foreign to the city—in ethnicity, race, class, and frequently 
linguistic background. As a result, for many among the metropolitan elites, the waves of 
migration of the 1950s entailed a radical and disconcerting shift in the constitution of Lima, the 
Ciudad de los Reyes (City of Kings) and former centre of the Spanish empire in South America. 
The barriada, then, represented not just the invasion of unused real estate on the urban 
periphery, but of the city as a whole, marking an assault on criollo urbanity itself. 
For his part, Valcárcel argued that the Indian transplanted to an urban setting could only 
become a degraded hybrid, irrevocably alienated from an original, essential identity yet unable 
to adapt to criollo culture;38 discouraging rural-urban migration, the solution would be regional 
development programs, improving the indio-paisano in situ, as at Huarochirí. An alternative 
position (held among others by architect Fernando Belaúnde Terry, discussed in chapter two) 
viewed the city as a civilizing mechanism: the Andean “invaders” could, with due care, be 
                                                
36 Luis Valcárcel, “Los ayllus,” in Tempestad en los Andes (Lima: Populibros Peruanos, 1925), 37, quoted 
in Marisol de la Cadena, “Silent Racism and Intellectual Superiority in Peru,” Bulletin of Latin American 
Research 17, no. 2 (1998): 149. 
37
 In Angel Rama’s evocative formulation: “The conquest triumphantly imposed its cities on a vast and 
unknown hinterland, certifying and reiterating the Greek conception that contrasted the civilized 
inhabitants of the polis to the barbarous denizens of the countryside.” Angel Rama, The Lettered City, 
trans. John Charles Chasteen (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 11.  
38 Furthermore, according to one government report, indigenous highlanders moving to coastal cities 
would inevitably suffer as “victims of climatic illness due to the change of altitudes and ill-adapted for the 
socio-economic-cultural reality of urban areas”; unable “to compete on an equal footing with a capable 
work force,” they constituted a substratum of citizens literally and figuratively unfit for urban life. FNSBS, 





acclimatized to its norms39—the challenge was to facilitate their integration while mitigating 
adverse effects. One influential study sought to employ “social psychiatry” to assess the 
emotional impacts of migration, noting with concern “the tragedy of a huge rural population, 
experiencing transculturation, which does not always satisfy their expectations of social 
elevation.” In this case, practices of cooperative work and mutual aid were specifically singled 
out as “unexpected integrative phenomena,” representing “stabilizing factors for the individual 
and the group.”40 In a similar vein, a few years after his initial study Matos Mar observed that 
these emerging metropolitans were “underdeveloped people of peasant mentality” who faced 
great challenges integrating themselves into the city. Nonetheless he reiterated his earlier 
endorsement of the cooperative practices which they brought with them: “The help which they 
give to projects for the common good is steady and effective and is perhaps their most valuable 
contribution.”41 Such ambivalent, highly charged assessments formed the deep background of 
later government policies promoting cooperative self-help housing.  
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3.3 Reforming Ciudad de Dios  
In the aftermath of the Ciudad de Dios invasion, the Odría government revised its tacit 
policy of tolerance towards extra-legal urban settlements, judging that this organized and willful 
flouting of established property rights demanded a more proactive response. Recognizing that it 
was not politically expedient to forcibly close down the Ciudad de Dios settlement, Odría at once 
needed to confront the housing shortage exposed so dramatically by the invaders, and to 
reassert control over the processes of urban development. Planning law offered the opportunity 
to broker a solution, if new guidelines could be devised that would better accommodate—but 
also more effectively regulate—these emerging patterns of urban development. 
Barriadas were extra-legal in two distinct senses, being established through 
unauthorized occupation of land (in violation of property law), and by failing to meet minimum 
standards in the provision of urban amenities such as water and sewerage lines, electricity, and 
roadways (in violation of planning law). Beginning with the 1955 legislative reforms passed in 
the wake of the Ciudad de Dios invasion, the state endeavoured to utilize the barriada resident’s 
desire for recognition under property law (and its inverse and complement, the anxiety over 
eviction) as a “weapon” to demand conformity with planning law—a strategy that Matos Mar’s 
research suggested would likely prove effective. 
The first task was to define the contours of the new category of urbanización de tipo 
popular (working-class subdivision) which the Odría government had proposed to use as the 
basis of a trial program to provide housing for low-income families, beginning with the residents 
of the improvised Ciudad de Dios settlement. To this end, the government announced revisions 
to the planning regulations that had been in force since 1941. Specifically, the new regulations 
established two basic categories of residential subdivisions: standard subdivisions (“Class B”) 
entailed the provision of road, water, and sewerage infrastructure; the requirements for 
urbanizaciones de tipo popular (“Class C”) were far less demanding, as the services to be 




Additional measures would further reduce costs: smaller lots would be more affordable, and 
also discourage land speculation (they would be impossible to subdivide);42 the amount of open 
space within the urbanized area would be decreased; narrower streets with thinner or less 
expensive surfacing material would be permitted; and the maximum length of the blocks would 
be extended from 100 to 300 metres—the resulting superblocks were intended to facilitate 
circulation and further reduce paving costs. Any existing unregulated settlements would have to 
reformulate themselves in compliance with these new guidelines; those that failed “to regularize 
their situation will be declared ‘clandestine’ and as a consequence their elimination will be 
ordered.”43 Essentially, it was assumed that downgrading the minimum standards set by 
planning law—codifying the new officially substandard city—would be sufficient to “channel” 
future urban development. Those residents who were unable to afford basic services would at 
least be living within the law, if not within the norms followed by the rest of the city. 
On a practical level, the Oficina Nacional de Planeamiento y Urbanismo (ONPU, 
National Office for Planning and Urbanism) engaged architect Carlos Williams to draw up an 
urban plan for a new Ciudad de Dios. The “clandestine” settlement would be reformed by 
transfering the entire population to an adjacent, fully planned site.44 The bulk of the housing was 
to be built by residents themselves (as was the case at “clandestine” settlements), but to 
introduce variety into the urban scheme there would also be zones of multi-family housing 
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constructed by conventional techniques. 20,000 families had registered their interest in 
acquiring a lot in the future settlement,45 so the ONPU scheme envisaged a city of 45,000-
60,000 residents, with industrial zones, as well as areas of agricultural land so that the city could 
be self-sufficient in food production. This was to be a rationally organized and “self-sufficient 
satellite nuclei” as envisaged by Belaúnde, but governed by the standards of the urbanización 
de tipo popular. 
Actual construction, however, was slow in coming. More than a year after the 
government announced its plans, La Prensa reported on residents’ frustration at the lack of 
progress at the site.46 Matos Mar’s Estudio de la barriadas limeñas provides a vivid account of 
the evolving situation on the ground. At the outset of the invasion the families had claimed small 
lots in a concentrated area, for tactical purposes, in order “to establish a compact group which 
could jointly defend itself.” Once assured they would not be evicted, they devised an urban 
layout for their provisional settlement, while the government proceeded with its own studies for 
the envisaged permanent city. Following the pattern familiar from any number of Peruvian 
towns, the provisional Ciudad de Dios reserved space in the centre for a plaza, around which 
were located key public amenities: the association meeting hall—performing an analogous 
function to the cabildo (municipal council)—along with “the infirmary, the first-aid station, the 
cinema, and some shops.” [3.8] By mid-February 1955 the settlement had ninety-four 
businesses serving residents.47 Matos Mar found the settlement association and its president, 
Alejandro López Agreda, to be unusually well-organized, with a considered, ambitious plan for 
its development. In certain aspects, the association’s plan even coincided with that of the 
government, since it also advocated the creation of a self-sufficient city, to be based around “a 
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group of supply services for housing construction”: these were apparently intended to operate 
on a cooperative basis for the benefit of association members rather than as conventional 
businesses. First would be a brick works, established through members’ financial contributions, 
loans, and “organized work”; then a factory for doors and windows, and another for the 
fabrication of glass, “taking advantage of the quality of the sand in the area.” With these 
services in place, construction would be carried out in a highly organized fashion, with “teams of 
specialists who would build mass-produced housing, designed by architects and overseen by 
two engineers who were members of the Association.”48  
The final Ciudad de Dios was entirely different in scale and scope to all these schemes. 
Beginning construction only in 1957 under the direction of the state housing agency, the 
Corporación Nacional de Vivienda (CNV), the project comprised 1,400 dwellings and was 
alternatively called “Urbanización Popular de Atocongo” or “Ciudad de Dios”;49 although the 
documentation is incomplete, it seems likely that Santiago Agurto (as discussed in chapter two, 
the originator of the “growing house” concept within Peru) was the primary architect.50 It is also 
possible that this realized project had some connection to the much larger scheme developed 
                                                
48 Matos Mar, Estudio, 47. 
49 “El Presidente dice que la Ciudad Satélite de San Juan prueba la preocupación del gobierno por la 
vivienda,” January 3, 1961. This date is confirmed by the caption on a photograph of Ciudad de Dios that 
appears in Walter D. Harris and H. A. Hossé, La Vivienda en el Perú/Housing in Peru: A Research Study 
Conducted in the Department of Social Affairs, Pan American Union (Washington: Pan American Union, 
Deptartment of Social Affairs, 1963), 416.  
50 A CNV document from late 1958 mentions a project for “Unidad Popular de Atocongo” described as 
part of the “social welfare program for Ciudad de Dios” and comprising 1,000 dwellings (instead of 1,400), 
built by the CNV for the FNSBS, 1956–1958. CNV, Experiencias relativas de la vivienda de interés social 
en el Perú (Lima: CNV, December 1958), 76-77. An inventory compiled in 1991 of all the housing projects 
built by state entities from 1946 onwards lists “Urbanización Popular Atocongo” completed in 1959, built 
by the CNV with FNSBS funding, again only 1,000 dwellings. INADUR, Estudio de evaluación integral de 
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by Carlos Williams, since a CNV document from late 1958 describes it as the “first stage of a 
project destined to furnish affordable housing to a population of 46,000 residents.”51 The 
reformed Ciudad de Dios was located on a site opposite the original improvised settlement and 
was “urbanized” to the extent of being provided with paved roads, water, and sewerage 
systems, which served simple dwellings of a “casa-núcleo” (core house) type. The dwelling was 
described as being “based on the concept of ‘progressive development’ [desarrollo progresivo]” 
and was available for purchase at different stages of its evolution, costing from S/.11,000 to 
S/.35,000, allowing residents to choose the version that best suited their immediate needs and 
their financial resources [3.10]. The core units were constructed on a mass scale by the CNV 
[3.11-3.12], but could be extended using aided self-help labour to a maximum of four 
bedrooms.52 
House A, the most basic unit, consisted of a cerco (perimeter wall) and a sanitary core 
with kitchen and bathroom in one corner of the lot, making for a total built area of 14 sq. m. This 
conformed to the typical construction pattern in Lima barriadas, where the almost complete 
absence of rainfall and a generally mild climate obviates the need for a roof, so that a perimeter 
wall demarcating territory and providing a basic level of privacy was generally completed before 
any enclosed spaces for living or sleeping. House B added a dining room at the front of the lot, 
and House C included a second, adjacent living space. In the next stage, two bedrooms could 
be added at the front, with another two at the back, framing an interior patio; once fully 
developed, the house covered a total built area of 95 sq. m. The descriptions of the basic 
houses (A, B, and C) do not mention a bedroom. Perhaps the housing agency expected that the 
owner/resident of House A would build some kind of temporary shelter within the lot as was the 
                                                
51 CNV, Experiencias relativas, 76. Similarly, a 1961 article described the 1,400 houses as the “primer 
núcleo” of the “Ciudad de Dios project.” “Prado expone el plan para afrontar crisis de vivienda popular,” 
La Prensa, January 8, 1961. 
52 “Construcción en masa ha permitido hacer 1,400 casas a un costo de 11 y 35 mil soles,” La Prensa, 




practice in barriadas. In Houses B and C, areas designated as the living or dining room could 
have been treated as multi-use spaces and used for sleeping (as would often be the case in 
incipient barriada dwellings, or in inner-city tenement housing, which generally consisted of only 
one room). Despite the very basic nature of the core house, from the outset the dwelling was 
designed with two entrances, planned as openings in the cerco. In House A, one of these led 
into an unbuilt section of the lot, but in the more developed stages of the house their usage 
followed the preferred Peruvian pattern of separating the main entrance (opening into a sala, or 
formal living room) and the service entrance (opening into the kitchen). 
At first glance the scale of this project seems completely inadequate given the many 
thousands of prospective settlers who had made their way to the desert site. However a survey 
carried out in mid-February 1955, less than two months after the invasion, found a resident 
population of just 936 families, or 4,841 people. Many others had left due to the difficult living 
conditions.53 Especially challenging were the daily tasks of obtaining water and disposing of 
waste, as well as dealing with the extreme climate with barely any protection. As La Prensa had 
reported:  
The families live huddled under their tents of mats, suffocated by the sand and 
the sun during the day, and bitten by the intense desert cold at night. Since there 
is no electric light, sometimes the pampas wind blows out all the torches, and the 
town of 10,000 souls is left sunken in the most dreadful darkness, in which only 
the crying of children and the whistling of the wind is heard.54  
One can only assume that the majority of these families simply returned to the inadequate rental 
housing that they had hoped to leave behind, and waited for their next opportunity. Those who 
did remain (and who could afford the CNV housing) were eventually transfered to the reformed 
Ciudad de Dios, and the improvised settlement disappeared altogether sometime in 1959. 
Subsequently the site of the original 1954 invasion was re-invaded in 1968 as part of a new 
                                                
53 Matos Mar, Estudio, 66. 




wave of urban expansion.55 
If not bringing better housing for its participants, what did the Ciudad de Dios invasion 
achieve? Matos Mar observed in 1966 that it “was planned and encouraged by powerful people 
and groups”; writing ten years later, he was more explicit, linking it to political struggles at the 
end of Odría’s regime.56 This is confirmed by David Collier: Beltrán had initially supported 
Odría’s 1948 coup, but as his policies began to conflict with elite interests, Beltrán and others 
“became concerned with establishing a viable basis for opposing Odría,” and seized on the 
issue of low-cost housing as a means of gaining popular support.57 According to this account, 
Beltrán sponsored the Ciudad de Dios invasion in order to dramatize the housing problem and 
gain support for his solutions—hence a certain convergence between the invasion and the 
“growing house” give-away in La Prensa’s coverage. In challenging Odría (the master of 
clientelistic politics) Beltrán sought to establish himself as a populist defender of the aspirational 
barriada resident: “He thus chose to fight Odría on his own ground by supporting settlement 
formation.”58 This dynamic is eloquently expressed in La Prensa’s self-reflexive coverage of the 
crowds in Ciudad de Dios reading in La Prensa of the government’s promises of assistance for 
their new urbanización popular. In this context, Beltrán (apparent friend and advocate of the 
settlers) begins to appear not just as the bearer of good news but as the very agent of these 
reforms.  
As narrated by Matos Mar, plans for the invasion—seen, in part, as a performance to 
further Beltrán’s agenda—had been percolating since 1939, when Alejandro López Agreda first 
visited a barriada nearby, and with others began to consider the Pampas de San Juan as the 
possible site for an urban settlement based on an agricultural economy. As this idea matured, 
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 José Matos Mar, Las barriadas de Lima, 1957 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1977), 16. 
56 Matos Mar, Estudio, 66; Matos Mar, Las barriadas de Lima, 1957, 16. 
57 Collier, Squatters and Oligarchs, 70. 




López carried out “a meticulous study” to determine the ownership of the site (it belonged to the 
Ministry of War) as well as available transport options, the local availabilty of raw materials 
useful to construction, and the possibiities of irrigating the land. Equally importantly: “they 
thought about the repercussions and the effects that this type of invasion would have, not only 
within the country but internationally.”59 This certainly provides another dimension to López’s 
observations that “[t]he people now understand and assess and know a lot of things.” 
Nonetheless, despite their organizational and political sophistication, ultimately the settlers were 
more successful in shifting the political terrain on Beltrán’s behalf rather than securing 
significant, concrete assistance for all the association members.  
 
Beyond the reduced, reformed Ciudad de Dios, the revisions to planning law enacted in 
1955 produced little in the way of concrete results. The government had downgraded its 
regulations in the hope of qualifying more low-income settlements as regularized, but it 
committed no more of its resources to constructing new urbanizaciones de tipo popular. On the 
other hand, residents of existing barriadas complained of the excessive costs of preparing the 
revised urban plans required “to regularize their situation” and as a consequence, by September 
1957—two and a half years after the legislation was enacted—Urbanización Dolores in 
Arequipa was apparently the only urbanización “de tipo popular recognized and authorized in all 
of Peru.”60  
The establishment of technical assistance offices in 1957, on the recommendation of the 
Comisión para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda (discussed in chapter two) was intended to 
facilitate this process by providing the necessary expertise to barriada settlements seeking to 
                                                
59 Matos Mar, Estudio, 65, 66. 
60 It is not clear when Urbanización Dolores had begun the regularization process, how long it had taken, 
or how much it had cost the residents’ association. Typescripts of newspaper articles, JFCT-UW: Habra 
reunión de urbanizadores en diario El Deber el proximo sabado 14,” El Deber, September 11, 1957; 




become regularized. However, these new agencies faced their own challenges. In Lima, for 
example, the new office was immediately responsible for 135 settlements with a combined 
population of over 180,000. At first, most of its efforts were focused on the time-consuming, 
resource-intensive work of data collection and management, which took precedence as the 
essential foundation for preparing any redevelopment projects [3.13-3.14]: numbered houses in 
the field and filing cabinets in the office-“laboratory” signified the chaos of Lima’s barriadas 
being brought to order,61 but no concrete projects emerged from this labour. 
The situation of the technical assistance office in the southern city of Arequipa was more 
promising: an office of this kind had been in operation since 1952, and the city’s relative 
isolation and insulation from the intense politicking in the capital around the issue of barriadas 
seemed to offer a more conducive working environment. As architect John F. C. Turner took 
charge of this office in mid-1957, the growing body of scientific knowledge on barriadas and the 
recent innovations in planning legislation provided a solid platform for new efforts to tackle 
unregulated urban settlements, this time through exploring the potential of the aided self-help 




                                                
61 FNSBS, Barriadas de Lima Metropolitana (Lima: FNSBS, 1960). 
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4.  A Profession in Development  
 
 
On the cover of its August 1963 issue, Architectural Design presented a striking view of 
the city of Lima, with its barriadas dominating the foreground [4.1]. Focusing on the theme of 
“Dwelling Resources in South America” [4.2], the issue juxtaposed modernist mass-housing 
blocks1 with the resident-built housing of barriadas and aided self-help schemes, thereby 
positioning these heretofore marginal practices as equally viable solutions warranting serious 
consideration by a new vanguard of architects and planners. For guest editor John F. C. Turner, 
the aim was to shift the barriada and self-help housing away from the realm of technical reports 
and sensational reportage and into mainstream architectural discourse. In contrast to 
explorations of the bidonville at CIAM IX a decade earlier—framed as an object of sociological 
study and aesthetic appreciation, its spare, function-driven forms sourced as local colour for a 
universal modernism—for Turner the squatter settlement was a valid urban form whose innately 
logical processes of evolution did not require reformulation by an outside expert. Despite its 
“apparent chaos,” it was, as its residents saw it, “an achievement whose existence is self-
justifying and whose appearance is irrelevant.”2 
At the same time, Turner suggested that a genuine engagement with these practices 
would require a revision of the very definition of the architect, raising the question of what, 
                                                
1 The issue included an article on Carlos Raúl Villanueva’s superbloques in Caracas, built 1951–1958. 
Turner visited the projects in late 1962 after some remediation measures had been taken in line with the 
recommendations of a 1959 evaluation report: see Banco Obrero, Proyecto de Evaluación de los 
Superbloques (Bogotá: Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento, 1959). Perhaps surprisingly 
in light of his later writings, his assessment was largely positive: “In a country with as much money 
available as Venezuela had at the time, in a city with very little building land in which the government 
owned suitable sites, and with an adequate proportion of the blue- and lower white-collar class able to 
buy or rent this type of dwelling, a strong case can be made for the superblock solution.” John F. C. 
Turner, “Mass Urban Re-housing Problems: Superblock Program of Banco Obrero, Caracas, Venezuela, 
1954-1958,” Architectural Design 33, no. 8 (August 1963): 374. 
2 John F. C. Turner, “Lima Barriadas Today,” Architectural Design 33, no. 8 (August 1963): 376. The 
resident sees the barriada “as the architect sees his building in the delicate stages of its birth – not as a 
present mess, and, for the uninitiated, an apparent chaos, but rather as the promise of things to come, 
and, above all, as an achievement whose existence is self-justifying and whose appearance is irrelevant.” 
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exactly, would be the profession’s “functions and responsibilities”3 in this new mode of 
architectural production. Turner’s own answer to this question evolved as he moved 
progressively further away from the conventional wisdoms of his education at the Architectural 
Association in the search for a different kind of architectural practice. This was only fully 
crystallized with his move to Peru in 1957, where he gained experience and a certain expertise 
in aided self-help housing projects, providing technical assistance and community organizing 
skills to groups of self-builders. Eventually he would abandon even this minimal approach as 
excessively interventionist, instead advocating what he termed “housing by people” or user 
control over the production of housing, arguing that “who decides what for whom is the central 
issue.”4  
Although it may seem paradoxical to begin a discussion of self-help housing with the 
professional formation of one individual architect, it is through this singular figure that Peru and 
self-help housing—a marginal location and a marginal mode of practice—became legible to the 
larger world of architectural discourse.5 Seeming to emerge as if from nowhere, in fact Turner’s 
metropolitan connections were crucial in providing the initial platform for his work, specifically 
through the aegis of Monica Pidgeon, editor of Architectural Design.6 Still, Turner’s ideas were 
                                                
3 John F. C. Turner, “The Scope of the Problem,” Architectural Design 33, no. 8 (August 1963): 363. 
4 John F. C. Turner, Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environments (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1976), 3. 
5 While Turner consistently published articles in a variety of other journals aimed at a more specialized 
planning and development audience, his appearances in AD provide an interesting marker of 
architecture’s periodic engagement with issues of sponanteous urbanization and self-help housing: thus 
Turner reappears in the 1968 issue on the “Architecture of Democracy”—Turner, “The Squatter 
Settlement: An Architecture that Works,” Architectural Design 38 (August 1968): 355-360—and again in 
1975/1976 with a series of eight articles presenting extracts from Housing by People in the lead-up to the 
book’s publication, which coincided with the Habitat 1976 conference. 
6 According to Turner’s recollection, Monica Pidgeon, who was Chilean, visited Peru on a trip to see her 
family in Chile: “I think she'd heard a little bit about what we had been doing, what I had been doing ... 
and stopped over to see the barriadas for herself. So I took her round and she was enormously 
impressed, and said, ‘We must do a special issue on this.’” Turner recalled that he subsequently handed 
out copies of the AD issue at the 1963 International Union of Architects meeting in Cuba, adding that his 
friend Patrick Crooke—who had been working in Peru on related projects—“surprised me by saying, ‘This 
is really going to knock things sideways.’ It was a catalyst for moving along the change of paradigm that 
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not formed in isolation, so this chapter also discusses the contributions of his key 
collaborators—in particular architect Eduardo Neira, who was pivotal in arranging Turner’s 
migration to Peru and laid the groundwork for Turner’s initial work in the southern city of 
Arequipa.  
 
4.1  Architecture, Anarchism, and the Artist-Technician 
By his own account, Turner’s education at the Architectural Association was significant 
less for the influence of the official curriculum than for discussions with fellow students. Turner 
first enrolled at the AA in 1944 at the age of seventeen, completing just one year before being 
drafted into the British army for two years of national service.7 This proved to be a seminal 
experience for an unlikely reason: Turner came across a copy of the anarchist newspaper 
Freedom which had been left behind in his barracks, and was inspired to explore the 
philosophical underpinnings of the movement, reading the work of Peter Kropotkin, Herbert 
Read, and Eric Gill. Turner also had a close family connection to English radical thought through 
the figure of William Morris, since his maternal grandfather Arthur Gaskin worked as an 
assistant to Morris, and May Morris was Turner’s mother's godmother.8 The influence of 
anarchism is evident in Turner’s approach to aided self-help from the outset, with its emphasis 
on self-generated community development and local action (an implicitly anti-state position), 
                                                                                                                                                       
was already taking place.” John F. C. Turner, interview with the author, June 2007, transcript, Oral History 
Research Office, Columbia University, New York.  
7 Turner began his military training towards the end of the war, but was moved to claim conscientious 
objector status in protest at the Allies’ use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a result he 
served out his period of national service doing farm work. Turner, interview with the author, June 2007.  
8 Turner recalled: “I knew the people in Chipping Camden as a child growing up, because my 
grandmother was still alive.... So there was an influence there—the whole feeling of the vernacular was 
always important, I think, in the background.” There was also an Arts and Crafts influence on his father’s 
side of the family, since Turner’s own father was an architect, who designed and built the house in Kent 
where Turner grew up. Turner described his father’s practice as “contemporary vernacular,” in the 
manner of Lethaby or Voysey, and he worked closely with local builders: “So the scale of the work was 
local, and my interest has really remained at that level. That's where I feel that things really happen, 
between people locally.... That, I think, was a major influence.” Turner, interview with the author. 
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and, echoing Kropotkin, the principle of mutual aid. Turner’s enthusiasm for self-organizing 
groups of builders recalls Read’s comparative assessment of Kropotkin and Rousseau: 
the anarchist recognizes the uniqueness of the person, and only allows for 
organization to the extent that the person seeks sympathy and mutual aid among 
his fellows. In reality, therefore, the anarchist replaces the social contract by the 
functional contract, and the authority of the contract only extends to the fulfilling 
of a specific function.9 
The fullest expression of Turner’s interest in anarchist ideas appears in the distinction between 
“heteronomous” and “autonomous” approaches to housing provision outlined in Housing by 
People (1976), his most expansive theoretical text. While heteronomous systems (centrally-
administrated and “other-determined”) present a top-down dynamic familiar from traditional 
architectural practice, autonomous systems (locally self-governing and “self-determined”) imply 
a network of end-users making decisions for themselves, following the anarchist model. The 
collectively self-managed and apparently spontaneously-organized barriada presents an 
exemplary case—as opposed to government-built mass public housing—but theoretically the 
principle of autonomy could be translated into other contexts, other techniques and modes of 
architectural production.  
Turner returned to the AA in 1947, and early that year, in another fortuitous encounter, a 
neighbour who had been a personal friend of Patrick Geddes gave him a copy of Town Planning 
towards City Development: A Report to the Durbar of Indore (1918), along with sheaves of 
Geddes’ hand-written notes. Already familiar with Geddes through the writings of Lewis 
Mumford, this discovery led Turner into several months of intense research as he focused on 
deciphering the notoriously complex elaborations of Geddes’ “Notation of Life” diagram [4.3]. 
Letters and notes of meetings in Turner’s papers document exchanges with fellow AA students 
Paffard Keatinge-Clay and Bruce Martin as they discussed various iterations of the diagram and 
considered its applicability to their own studies. With the encouragement of Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, 
                                                
9 Herbert Read, 1941, “The Paradox of Anarchism,” in A Coat of Many Colours: Essays (London: 
Routledge & Paul, 1956), 63. Emphasis in original. 
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then preparing a new edition of Geddes’ Cities in Evolution, Turner and Keatinge-Clay 
developed these ideas into a short paper which Tyrwhitt then included as an appendix to the 
volume.10  
Although Geddes’ Indore Report has been credited as the first text to propose aided self-
help housing,11 the paper is not concerned with this issue, but rather celebrates the “new 
universality” offered by Geddes’ synthetic approach, with its potential to reintegrate the 
fragmented and partial conceptions of reality resulting from the increasingly specialized forms of 
contemporary knowledge. While analysis (breaking apart phenomena into their constituent 
elements for closer, specialized study) is a necessary stage of thinking, a complete 
understanding of the “life-process” can only be achieved through synthesis (the “integration and 
coordination” of discrete observations into a holistic worldview). Geddes’ Notation of Life 
diagram provides the paradigm for this “unitary form of thought”: at its core is a three-by-three 
grid demonstrating the reciprocal actions of Place and Folk on each other via the medium of 
Work (elsewhere identified as the actions of Environment and Organism via Function). Geddes 
proceeds to elaborate this field of nine relationships through the four interrelated “Chambers of 
Life” (designated Acts, Facts, Thoughts or Dreams, and Deeds), so that taken as a whole, the 
resulting 36-square “thinking-machine” is seen as mapping an ecology of the vast complexities 
of human life.12 For Turner and Keatinge-Clay, the diagram is emphatically not an analytical 
                                                
10 John F. C. Turner, and W. P. Keatinge-Clay, “Appendix I. Part 2. The Geddes Diagrams: The 
Contribution of the Diagrams towards a Synthetic Form of Thought,” in Cities in Evolution, ed. Jaqueline 
Tyrwhitt (London: Williams & Norgate, 1949), 200-205. 
11 Richard Harris, “The Silence of the Experts: Aided Self-Help in the Developing World, 1939–1954,” 
Habitat International 22, no. 2 (1998): 180. Harris argues that the Indore Report includes what “might be 
the very first policy recommendation” promoting self-help housing. 
12 For further discussion of the Notation of Life, see Volker Welter, Biopolis: Patrick Geddes and the City 
of Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 31-46. Welter’s critique of Geddes’ schema is pertinent to 
Turner’s employment of Geddes: “To understand human life as a mystical glorification of a mechanical 
process taken from simple organic life is ... no explanation at all. Together with social classes, Geddes 
also dismisses notions of human activity as driven by individual and class-determined needs of all kinds—
material needs such as shelter and food, and immaterial needs such as the desire for prestige derived 
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tool; rather its synthetic vision fulfills a longing for wholeness, relatedness, and universality—
values that are repeatedly evoked throughout the text.  
As a measure of the importance of the Geddes diagram to Turner, around this time he 
also made use of its basic structure to draw up a model for his own education in architecture 
[4.4],13 conceived as a “balance of four elements” echoing the Chambers of Life: Experience (to 
be anchored in material reality); Theory (to be disciplined by factual truth); Design (to be 
energized by personal formulation); and Practice (to be humbled by personal expression). The 
resulting program of study weaves together various facets of the four elements into an 
integrated curriculum culminating in a period of travel and practice. This diagramming of the 
“perception of a four-fold reality”14 recurs repeatedly throughout Turner’s thinking: it appears as 
a holistic ideal in the explorations of the late 1940s; as a structuring device for his first program 
of works in Peru; and, in Housing by People, as a model to demonstrate the interconnected 
reality that must be grasped before informed and effective action can be undertaken [4.6].15  
                                                                                                                                                       
from wealth and power—all of which might result in adaptation of the environment in order to satisfy these 
needs.” Welter, Biopolis, 46. 
13
 John F. C. Turner, “Architectural Education: The Intellectual for the Creative Life,” March 1948, JFCT-
UW. 
14 The phrase is from a recent manuscript that continues Turner’s interest in devising a workable 
adaptation of the Geddes diagram, developed in part through a recently resumed correspondence with 
AA colleague Bruce Martin. John F. C. Turner, “A Framework for Mapping Activity with a Faceted Index,” 
April 25, 2007, JFCT-UW. From his earliest research on Geddes, Turner explored parallels with other 
“quaternities” (“Framework,” 8), for example playing with correspondences between the Acts-Facts-
Dreams-Deeds schema and the primary colours, around March 1948 settling on a green-blue-red-yellow 
sequence. Another document from this period employs the colour sequence in a table drawing parallels to 
other quaternities: Jung (the psychological functions: sensational, feeling, thinking, intuition), Steiner (the 
four temperaments: melancholic, phlegmatic, sanguine, choleric), Saarinen (sociological fields: physical, 
social, cultural, aesthetic), as well as Frank Lloyd Wright (the tripartite perceive, conceive, create being 
matched to the last three elements of the Geddes sequence). John F. C. Turner, “Geddes Formula: Acts, 
Facts, Dreams, Deeds,” n.d., ca. 1947–1948, JFCT-UW.  
15 Two versions of the Geddes diagram appear in the book. The first is used to describe the “Four 
Elements of Action”: problems, issues, principles, and practices. A more complex iteration appears in the 
final chapter as “The Elements of Change,” its sectors enumerated as information, theory, legislation, and 
administration describes the “complementary and muturally dependent” relationships of all the actors 
involved in housing production, as demonstrated by the diagram. Turner, Housing by People, 109, 169. 
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In early 1948 Turner’s two key influences converged when he gave a lecture on Geddes 
at an anarchist meeting and published a short article on his work in Freedom. Turner argued 
that the bridge connecting Geddes and anarchism was their shared understanding of the 
“organic nature of society”—governed by the laws of nature, not the arbitrary rules of human 
institutions: “One can, in fact, attribute the failures of all political and philosophical systems to 
the use of inorganic or unbiological approaches.”16 Geddes’ broad synthetic approach, his ability 
to think across the disciplines of economics, “bio-sociology” and “the science of region and city” 
gave his work both intellectual authority and wide applicability.17 
The clearest sense of how these intellectual influences translated into Turner’s ideas on 
architecture emerges in the AA-based student journal Plan no. 6 (1949) [4.7].18 Turner served 
on the editorial board for this and the next two issues with a group of close collaborators 
including Patrick Crooke, Andrew Derbyshire, and John Voelcker. While no individual writing 
credits are given, many of the ideas draw directly on Turner’s reading list of the late 1940s: 
Mumford’s The Culture of Cities, Read’s The Education of Free Men, Kropotkin’s Fields, 
Factories, and Workshops, L. L. Whyte’s The Next Development in Man, as well as Sigfried 
Giedion’s Mechanization Takes Command. More general cultural references include Karl Marx, 
William Blake, and the Bible. The issue consists of three parallel critiques aimed at the building 
industry, architectural practice, and childhood education, revolving around the themes of 
                                                
16 John F. C. Turner, “The Work of Patrick Geddes,” Freedom: Anarchist Fortnightly (January 10, 1948). 
17
 A few months later Freedom published two short articles by Giancarlo de Carlo outlining an anarchist 
approach to housing provision. Arguing that the problem of substandard housing could only be resolved 
by giving control to residents, De Carlo proposed direct, collective action such as the occupation of 
abandoned buildings by squatters; he did not, however, advocate self-help housing, which he believed 
resulted in poor workmanship and high costs. Ultimately, a solution to the underlying issues would require 
a reassertion of “communal collaboration” through urban planning; the city, a collective home, should also 
be controlled by its users, for its users. Giancarlo de Carlo, “The Housing Problem in Italy,” Freedom: 
Anarchist Fortnightly (June 12, 1948), and “The Housing Problem and Planning,” Freedom: Anarchist 
Fortnightly (June 26, 1948). 
18 Plan was the journal of the Architectural Students Association, a group affiliated with the National Union 
of Students, and was based at various architecture schools over the course of its life. It was first 
published in 1943 in Cheshire, then moved Liverpool in 1946, and to the AA in London in 1948. In 1951 it 
moved to Birmingham and seems to have ceased publication shortly thereafter. 
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fragmentation, isolation, and the destruction of community [4.8]. The potential for recuperation 
appears through an appeal to nature as holistic model, strongly recalling Geddes.19 The 
architectural heroes of the text are Peckham's Pioneer Health Centre (architect Owen Williams, 
1935) [4.9] and the Hertfordshire schools program, on which both Turner and Pat Crooke 
worked as students through their friend Bruce Martin.20 While conventional practice has left the 
architect isolated within a sea of facts, Peckham and Hertfordshire show the potential of an 
architecture attuned to human biology, industrial techniques, and the needs of the community. 
To realize such projects, this new architect (again reflecting Geddes) must learn to study “the 
relationship between man and environment—a study of a living process rather than a static 
form,” and as an “artist-technician” he must synthesize this knowledge into building.21  
The discussion of the building industry negotiates a more complex path between a 
Marxist critique of work under contemporary capitalism and enthusiasm for the flexibility and 
variety offered by mass-produced prefabricated components. Most presciently, “building” is also 
considered in social terms, as a collaborative human activity grounded in everyday life: “if a 
mans feels himself to belong to a community, he wants to work for that community.” The 
connection to mutual-aid self-help projects is explicit, as the demoralizing “decentralization of 
work” is to be replaced by the “spontaneous formation of work teams” operating autonomously, 
their “actions ... the result of collective control and responsibility.” Examples include guild-like 
clock-making communities in rural France, decentralized Czech industries, Israeli settlements, 
and the English Midlands, where “fifty families ... are building their own community—a work 
                                                
19
 “Argument,” Plan 6 (1949): 17.  
20 See Bruce Martin, School Buildings, 1945–1951 (London: Crosby Lockwood & Son, 1952); and Bruce 
Martin, "Modular Co-Ordination," The Journal of the Royal Society for the Promotion of Health 76 (1956): 
437-440. 
21 “Architecture,” Plan 6 (1949): 18, 27, 28. 
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group building houses co-operatively in addition to their normal work in factories.”22 
Concurrently with this engagement with Geddes and anarchism, Turner maintained 
connections with CIAM-related projects and practitioners, attending the Bergamo and 
Hoddesdon conferences, touring the Unité d’Habitation construction site with Shadrach 
Woods,23 and undertaking a year’s internship with BBPR, at the end of which he travelled to 
Venice to attend the 1952 CIAM summer school.24 It was there that Turner met the Peruvian 
architect and planner Eduardo Neira, who was fresh from his own pilgrimage to the Unité,25 and, 
as it turned out, also shared Turner’s interest in Geddes, having translated the 1949 paper on 
the diagrams into Spanish. On the basis of this intellectual connection, Neira subsequently 
suggested that Turner move to Peru to practice architecture, an offer Turner readily accepted 
since England offered few opportunities for the kind of work in community development that 
interested him.26 As Turner described the decision in 1972: “I felt that if I could get out from 
                                                
22 “Building,” Plan 6 (1949): 19, 20, 21. A number of European countries supported self-build housing 
programs as part of their reconstruction efforts following the Second World War. See Richard Harris, 
“Slipping through the Cracks: The Origins of Aided Self-help Housing, 1918–1953,” Housing Studies 14, 
no. 3 (1999): 281-309.  
23 Turner noted of his visit to the Unité: “Woods was there ... he was very happy about the way it went and 
the way they worked, and I felt quite envious of that at the time. That would have been nice to work on, it 
was a very interesting project.” Turner, interview with the author. Turner’s visit was faciliated by his friend 
Paffard Keatinge-Clay, who was married to Sigfried Giedion’s daughter Verena, and worked for a time in 
Le Corbusier’s office. Through this connection Turner and fellow AA-student Pat Crooke were able to 
spend some time with Giedion and his wife Carola Giedion-Welcker on a trip to Europe in 1948. Turner 
recalled that Giedion-Welcker was an enthusiastic supporter of anarchism, and strongly encouraged them 
to read Kropotkin: “We didn't manage to get a word in edgeways, but we had been anarchists for about 
three years.” On the same trip they also stayed with Giancarlo de Carlo in Milan; this introduction had 
come through the English anarchist writer Colin Ward, who had met de Carlo “when talking [about] art in 
the Resistance.” Turner, interview with the author, 2007. 
24 Turner’s name appears on the list of student attendees at the 1949 CIAM 7 conference in Bergamo, 
along with Joseph Rykwert, Andrew Derbyshire, and Mary Crittal; Turner, along with Derbyshire and 
Rykwert, is also listed as a participant in the discussions of the commission on “Réforme de 
l’enseignement de l’architecture et de l’urbanisme” at that conference, which was chaired by Ernesto 
Rogers and Jane Drew. ETH gta Archiv, Zürich, 42-X-116. 
25 See Eduardo Neira, “Un arquitecto viaja por Europa,” El Arquitecto Peruano 17, no. 188-189 (March-
April 1953): unpaginated. 
26 Turner had also considered moving to Australia to work as a furniture-maker, but decided that Peru 
would be “a better bet, a more interesting one. It was more in my own line.” Neira’s invitation to Turner 
came around 1956, when the prominent Peruvian architect Fernando Belaúnde Terry was running for 
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among the underbrush of technological innovations and intellectual formulations and into the 
much simpler situation described by Neira, I might be able to see my way.”27 Whether the 
situation in Peru really was “much simpler” or its unfamiliarity simply allowed Turner to work with 
fewer distractions, on a pragmatic level it was a much more receptive environment for a young 
architect interested in exploring new ideas. 
 
4.2  Towards a New Social Architecture  
Eduardo Neira’s own path to the meeting in Venice offers an interesting parallel to 
Turner’s early career. Three years older than Turner, Neira studied architecture in Lima before 
travelling to England in the early 1950s to study urban and regional planning in the Department 
of Civic Design at the University of Liverpool. In 1947 he had been a founding member of 
Agrupación Espacio, a self-consciously vanguardist architectural group which also included in 
its membership Adolfo Córdova (whose 1956 housing study is discussed in chapter two), along 
with artists, literary figures, and musicians.28 Opposed to the eclecticism of mainstream 
architecture in Peru, where the “modern” was treated as just another style, deployed fluidly in 
alternation with the neocolonial, the group’s key points of reference were CIAM and Le 
Corbusier; they were particularly vocal in their support for Sert and Wiener’s projects for Lima 
[2.1] and Chimbote [6.26].29 The group promoted its ideas through articles in the newspaper El 
Comercio (owned by the family of Luis Miró Quesada Garland, an architect and leading member 
                                                                                                                                                       
president: “the idea was to go because there'd be plenty of work for the boys, jobs for the boys, if 
Fernando Belaúnde won the 1956 election. He didn't, and retrospectively it was a damn good thing he 
didn't, because when he was president he was a disaster.” Turner, interview with the author, 2007. 
27 John F. C. Turner, “The Reeducation of a Professional,” in Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the 
Housing Process, ed. John F. C. Turner and Robert Fichter (New York: Macmillan Company, 1972): 124.  
28
 For a list of signatories to the group’s founding manifesto, see “Expresión de principios de la 
Agrupación Espacio,” El Arquitecto Peruano 11, no. 119 (June 1947).  
29
 For coverage of the Lima and Chimbote projects see Paul Lester Wiener and Josep Lluís Sert, “Five 
Civic Centers in South America,” Architectural Record 114 (August 1953): 121-136.  
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of the group) as well as its own journal Espacio, which included Neira on its editorial board in 
the early 1950s [4.10]. In 1955 those members interested in pursuing a more socially engaged 
practice (including Neira) precipitated a split in the group. This was apparently spurred by their 
involvement in a research project led by anthropologist José Matos Mar to study the harsh living 
conditions in the indigenous communities of Huarochirí, near Lima (discussed in chapter 
three).30 This realignment of Neira’s own architectural practice provided the impetus for the 
invitation he extended to Turner. Rather than being the passive recipient of imported expertise, 
Neira solicited Turner's immigration as a like-minded colleague and a potential collaborator, 
seeing in their shared interest in Geddes the potential to shift away from an architectural 
knowledge rooted in the ideas of the Modern Movement, to devise an alternative approach 
better suited to the social and economic conditions of postwar Peru. 
After Eduardo Neira returned from Europe he joined the Ministerio de Fomento y Obras 
Públicas (Ministry of Development and Public Works) as the head of its Departamento de 
Urbanismo. In early 1954, he visited the southern city of Arequipa to report on its problems of 
unregulated urban development. As the second largest city in Peru, by the mid-1950s Arequipa 
had a population of around 125,000, and the area covered by its squatter settlements was 
larger than the planned city. While part of this urban expansion was due to newly arrived 
migrants, apparently much of it was caused by speculation. In 1950 a commission established 
by the Ministerio de Fomento y Obras Públicas had investigated 160 complaints in relation to 
illicit urban subdivisions—for commercial real estate developments as well as squatter 
settlements—most of which had been approved by the mayor of a neighbouring peri-urban 
                                                
30
 In addition to Neira, other architects involved in this project included Adolfo Córdova, Juan Luís Pereira, 
Celso Garrido Lecca, and Emilio Castañón. Wiley Ludeña Urquizo, “Orígenes del urbanismo moderno en 
el Perú: el aporte de la Agrupación Espacio,” in Tres buenos tigres: vanguardia y urbanismo en el Perú 
del siglo XX (Huancayo; Lima: Colegio de Arquitectos del Perú Regional Junín; Ur[b]es, 2004), 152. A 
copy of a publication documenting this project is in Turner’s archive: José Matos Mar et al, 
Investigaciones etnologicas en Huarochiri, Perú (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 
Instituto de Etnología, 1953). 
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district who was eager to capitalize on Arequipa’s anticipated future growth. In 1952 the 
Ministerio established a branch office, the Departamento de Inspección de Urbanizaciones y 
Obras Públicas de Arequipa (IUP), to bring some order to the situation, charging it with creating 
a register of land claimants, carrying out topographical surveys, and preparing and 
implementing development plans.31 However, a lack of resources and competent staff rendered 
this office completely ineffective; hence Neira’s task in 1954 was to reassess the situation in 
Arequipa and to reorganize the IUP office. 
Neira’s initial report sought to clarify the distinction between two types of illicit 
settlements, the “urbanización popular” (working-class subdivision) and the “urbanización 
clandestina” (clandestine subdivision): the first emerged out of organized land invasions by 
groups of pobladores, who then petitioned the authorities to grant them the site, while the 
second involved the illegal subdivision and sale of private land for private profit. Neira argued 
that the government’s purpose in establishing the IUP had been to assist this first group, which, 
he implied, acted outside the law out of desperation but were scupulous in approaching the 
state post-invasion in order to regularize their situation. The second group simply flouted the law 
for personal gain, a situation that had been overlooked in the IUP’s original brief and needed to 
be addressed. In any case, the need for intervention was clear: “[i]t is precisely a function of the 
state to protect and direct private invasions, especially in those groups of limited economic 
potential”; specifically, there was “an official obligation” to ensure that settlements were 
established as economically as possible, on sites that were amenable to the installation of 
essential urban services and free from competing legal claims requiring lengthly litigation. This 
somewhat surprising approach—positioning the government as protector of the unauthorized 
settlements rather than the agent of their removal—was strangely congruent with the 
                                                
31 John F. C. Turner, The Housing and Planning Problems of Arequipa, Peru: A Case Study with 
Particular Reference to the Application of Self-Help Methods in Relation to the Squatter Settlements, 
1959–1960, 25-26, JFCT-UW. 
  
87 
paternalism of President Odría, and reflected the widely held belief that the pobladores needed 
to be kept safe from the predations of real-estate speculators and self-seeking barriada leaders. 
Neira’s interest in assisting the settlers emerged from the position of his socially committed and 
scientifically informed practice rather than any political calculation (as was the case with Odría), 
but nonetheless these discordant motivations converged at the same policy outcome. 
Neira recommended that the IUP begin by determining which households had the right 
to keep a lot—this being their only place of residence, occupied for at least a year and a day. 
Eligible residents should then be relocated from their “‘non-conforming’ urbanización” to a new 
settlement properly prepared by the state and provided with basic services; any remaining “non-
conforming” constructions would be demolished. Neira judged that the office should endeavour 
to take advantage of the “enormous effort” that was evident in the squatters’ self-built houses: 
with an “intelligently directed technical assistance” that was focused on ayuda mútua (mutual 
aid), residents could be shown how to work together as a group under the guidance of an 
appointed expert, constructing their houses as efficiently and economically as possible.32 
Neira’s final co-authored report provided additional details: lots would be offered to families in 
usufruct of extendable 99-year periods, granting the right to extended habitation, but not the 
option to purchase the lot and become its legal owner—a measure that was intended to 
circumvent land speculation. This offer would be valid for a year, “within which time the 
benefitting family should commit itself to building their house,”33 or lose the option to the lot 
altogether.  
                                                
32 Eduardo Neira, “Anexo No. 4: El problema de las Urbanizaciones Populares en la ciudad de Arequipa,” 
February 27, 1954, 5; in Eduardo Neira and José Dulanto Pinillos, “Informe acerca de las Urbanizaciones 
Populares de Arequipa,” May 5, 1954, JFCT-UW. 
33
 Neira and Dulanto Pinillos, “Informe,” 7, JFCT-UW. Even though this report was apparently written for 
the Ministerio de Fomento, the suggestion was that this project should be overseen by the FNSBS. 
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Although it does not appear that Neira had an active role in Arequipa following this 
report,34 these recommendations did result in a substantial reorientation of the IUP, giving it a 
more ambitious and assertive agenda that brought it into much closer contact with barriada 
residents. For his own part, Neira continued his interest in these issues, closely following the 
ongoing research of anthropologist José Matos Mar and of geographer John P. Cole into the 
barriada phenomenon.35 In 1955 he undertook a study trip to Puerto Rico, under the aegis of the 
United Nations Technical Assistance Program,36 where it seems that he met Luis Rivera 
Santos, director of that country’s pioneering program in aided mutual self-help housing, which 
involved small groups of families working together to build their dwellings.37 (As noted in chapter 
two, the national newspaper La Prensa had published an article on this program in 1954, based 
on information provided at a press briefing at the US embassy.38) In 1956 Neira published a 
long article on “The Housing Problem in Peru” in the specialist magazine El Arquitecto Peruano, 
in which—along with suggestions on dealing with the high cost of urban land, the difficulties of 
                                                
34 Unfortunately, I have not yet been able to trace Eduardo Neira’s own papers (if indeed, they still exist). 
35 John Turner recalled that Neira “was helped a lot, at this time, by the English geographer John Cole 
who did very good work in the amazingly short time he was in Peru—including a pioneering report on the 
development of barriadas at that time for … ONPU [National Office for Planning and Urbanism].” Barbara 
Goldstein, “The Originators: John F. Charlewood Turner,” Architectural Design, no. 9 (September 1975): 
524. For Cole’s research see John P. Cole, Estudio geográfico de la Gran Lima (Lima: ONPU, 1957), and 
“Some Town Planning Problems in Greater Lima.” Town Planning Review (Liverpool) 26 (1956): 242-251. 
36 Author’s biography in Eduardo Neira Alva, La transformación del habitat humano (Caracas: Facultad de 
Arquitectura y Urbanismo, Universidad Central de Venezuela, January 1961). This research trip also 
included France, Algeria, and the Netherlands. In 1958 he undertook a similar study trip (this time 
sponsored by the International Labour Organization) to Israel, India, and Japan.  
37 John Turner’s archive contains a copy of a draft contract for participants in a program of housing 
construction through ayuda mútua, dated 1955, typed on the letterhead of the Peruvian Ministerio de 
Fomento y Obras Públicas, where Neira was an official. Also in 1955 an article by Rivera Santos 
discussing this program appeared in El Arquitecto Peruano, where Neira likewise published a number of 
articles: see Luis Rivera Santos, “Experiencias de Puerto Rico en ayuda propria y ayuda mútua,” El 
Arquitecto Peruano 19, no. 216-218 (July-September 1955). 
38 “Aleccionador ejemplo para nuestro problema: 3 soluciones ejecuta Puerto Rico para construir la casa 
barata,” La Prensa, August 7, 1954. The information was presented by Teodoro Moscoso, head of the 
Economic Development Association of Puerto Rico (and later head of the Alliance for Progress), at a 
press conference at the US embassy in Lima. For more on Moscoso see A. W. Maldonado, Teodoro 
Moscoso and Puerto Rico’s Operation Bootstrap (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997). 
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housing finance, and the dire state of the Peruvian construction industry—he argued that mutual 
aid was a “thousand-year old tradition” in Peru that had great potential to combatting the 
housing shortage, particularly in parts of the country “where the simplicity of the dwellings 
makes possible the employment of non-specialized labour.”39  
He returned to the theme in a 1957 article published in La Prensa, advocating the 
adoption of technical assistance as a key element of national housing policy: it represented a 
realistic use of the country’s limited resources, and possessed a unique ability “to liberate the 
potential of collective action via the technical direction [canalización técnica] of communal 
effort,” thus offering a way ahead “towards a new social architecture.”40 Once again Neira 
argued for the cultural appropriateness of techniques of ayuda mútua and trabajo en común 
(cooperative work) for Peru, “a country where for centuries no other form of work existed.”41 For 
Neira this was an organic and autochthonous form of building for Peruvians—yet he also 
identified the specialized practices of “aided” self-help as thoroughly modern, having been 
rigorously tested in a diverse range of countries (India, Israel, Mexico, El Salvador, and 
Colombia, in addition to Puerto Rico). 
In this sense, Peruvian experiments with self-help housing represent a form of imported 
knowledge. During the 1950s, the United Nations, the International Labour Organization, and 
the Pan American Union all promoted the “aided” self-help approach,42 and in 1953 the Centro 
Interamericano de Vivienda (CINVA, or Inter-American Housing Center) in Bogotá published a 
manual on aided mutual self-help housing based on the trial projects in Puerto Rico run by Luis 
                                                
39 Eduardo Neira Alva, “El problema de la vivienda en el Perú,” El Arquitecto Peruano 20, no. 224-225 
(March-April 1956): unpaginated. 
40 Eduardo Neira, “Ahorro de Esfuerzo y Capital,” typescript of article published in La Prensa, April 7, 
1957, JFCT-UW. 
41 Neira, “Ahorro de Esfuerzo y Capital,” JFCT-UW. 
42 Richard Harris, “A Double Irony: The Originality and Influence of John F.C. Turner,” Habitat 
International 27, no. 2 (2003): 252. 
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Rivera Santos [4.11-4.12].43 In this context Neira acted as a conduit for the importation of 
knowledge about self-help housing into Peru—encouraging the Comisión para la Reforma 
Agraria y la Vivienda (CRAV, Commission for Agrarian Reform and Housing) to recommend the 
creation of technical assistance offices44 (as discussed in chapter two), and passing on 
information about the earlier trial projects to colleagues such as John Turner.45 Inevitably, 
regardless of Neira’s own political position or ideological framing of these techniques, they were 
suffused with the Cold War politics of the various agencies that endorsed their promotion of 
individual property ownership and self-improvement through work, as opposed to the “hand-
outs” and latent socialism of public housing.  
However, as Richard Harris has shown, the deeper history of aided self-help housing 
extends far beyond the postwar programs in the developing world generally associated with the 
term. Promoted in Sweden as early as 1904, it first emerged as a widespread solution to 
housing provision in the wake of the First World War, with programs implemented in several 
Western European countries and the Soviet Union.46 Notably, Ernst May worked extensively 
with self-help projects during his tenure directing the provincial housing authority in Silesia 
(1918–1925). In addition to supervising a self-help housing program at Neustadt, he 
experimented with different building methods and materials to improve efficiency, invented a 
manually-operated brick-press, and produced pamphlets for self-builders demonstrating simple 
                                                
43 See Luis Rivera Santos et al, Manual para la organización de proyectos piloto de ayuda propia y ayuda 
mútua en vivienda (Bogotá: CINVA, Servicio de Intercambio Científico, 1953). 
44 Neira (who was the only architect appointed to CRAV) noted in his 1957 article that the commission 
“has welcomed an initiative of the Ministerio de Fomento”—where Neira worked—for the establisment of 
“a Technical Assistance Service, directed towards offereing the advantages of technical guidance to the 
pobladores of the barriadas who want to regularize their situation … and substantially improve their living 
conditions.” Neira, “Ahorro de Esfuerzo y Capital,” JFCT-UW. 
45 For Turner’s knowledge about these programs, see his “Reeducation of a Professional,” 127-130. In 
addition, Turner’s archive contains a small number of related documents in (or adjacent to) a folder 
labelled “Self-help—Puerto Rico, Precedents” JFCT-UW. 
46 For a detailed history of these programs, see Harris, “Slipping through the Cracks.” 
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construction techniques.47 Further back, as already noted, Geddes’ 1918 Indore Report does 
include an important, if brief, theoretical discussion of aided self-help housing. While Geddes 
addresses the topic in only a few pages of his lengthy and wide-ranging two-volume report, the 
passages are worth examining in detail as they foreshadow many of the arguments that were 
made in favour of aided self-help housing in the postwar period. Addressing the issue of 
providing mass housing for workers in the cotton industry, Geddes argues:  
For the needed thousands of houses, we cannot often hope to start with capital 
more than to admit of an initial single room and veranda, especially in pukka 
[first-class, complete construction]. We must even be content in a good many 
cases with kucha [makeshift, unfinished construction]; and this has the 
advantage of more cheaply and easily ensuring the adequate floor-space and air-
space which are prime essentials of health. Moreover in kucha construction, 
labour can often, at least partly be given by the worker himself. 
Geddes continues by suggesting that the state should further assist these efforts by providing 
security for deposits invested in promoting housing construction—this being, in effect, an 
investment with a guaranteed return in future economic growth: “both State and City are 
themselves enriched and strengthened by every increase of material property within their limits, 
and by every tax-payer whose prosperity and permanence they can assist. In short Co-
operation means good business all round; and in Housing peculiarly so.” Finally, better housing 
will make for a more stable workforce: “nothing fixes people like a good house.”48 Returning to 
the subject in a subsequent chapter, Geddes observes: “sweepers and carters have some 
spare time: and they are sturdy fellows, handy, willing, and often intelligent: and what better 
outlet can a man find for these virtues, or for increasing them, even acquiring them, than in the 
construction of his own home?” This proposal is complicated, Geddes laments, by the fact that 
the processes of modernization in India have transformed housing construction from “one of the 
most widely diffused aptitudes” into a specialized occupation; therefore the authorities must find 
                                                
47 Susan R. Henderson, “Self-Help Housing in the Weimar Republic: The Work of Ernst May,” Housing 
Studies 14, no. 3 (1999): 311-328. 
48 Patrick Geddes, Town Planning towards City Development: A Report to the Durbar of Indore, 2 vols. 
(Indore: Holkar State Printing Press, 1918), 1:70-71. 
  
92 
“some capable overseers, for such work of housing—men who could keep up the standards of 
planning and execution, yet utilize and train the more or less unskilled labour of its employees 
into satisfactory house-building.”49 
Here are many themes familiar from postwar debates: the reduction of construction 
costs through self-help; the importance of sound technical assistance to direct the work; the 
deployment of state-backed deposit insurance to extend credit markets, and thereby stimulate 
overall economic growth; the increased work-discipline of the industrial labour-force,50 and the 
moral improvement of the self-builder/home-owner. The key point of connection between 
Geddes and postwar practice is Jacob Crane, director of the International Office of the United 
States Housing and Home Finance Agency (1945–1954). As documented by Richard Harris, 
Crane, “who coined the term ‘aided self-help housing’ in about 1945”51—thereby foregrounding 
the role of experts in guiding such projects—was influenced in his approach at least in part by 
Patrick Geddes, whom he had met in 1921 shortly after Geddes returned from India.52 Crane’s 
first-hand experience of the practice came from his time working as Director of Project Planning 
for the United States Housing Administration beginning in 1938. This involved overseeing the 
provision of low-cost housing in Puerto Rico, including an early sites-and-services project in 
Ponce, whereby the housing authority drew up lots, paved the streets, and at the intersection of 
every four-lot group installed a utility unit with individual toilet, shower, and laundry facilities for 
                                                
49 Geddes, Indore, 2:113-114. 
50 Geddes’ plan for the “city development” of Indore included modernizing its cotton production. In addition 
to improving workers’ housing this involved the construction of a new industrial town and factories 
designed according to “American ‘Efficiency Methods’” in industrial management. Geddes, Indore, 1:36.  
51 Richard Harris, “‘A Burp in Church’: Jacob L. Crane's Vision of Aided Self-Help Housing,” Planning 
History Studies 11, no. 1 (1997): 4. Crane believed that the two key issues in providing low-income 
housing were sanitation (potable water and waste disposal facilities) and land (“with secure tenure, in a 
reasonable location”). Crane, “Huts and Houses in the Tropics,” Unasylva 3, no. 3 (May-June 1949): 104. 
52 Harris argues that it is likely that Crane was familiar with the Indore Report, including its support for a 
form of aided self-help housing, since he observed in a 1951 report written for the United Nations that 
“this individual, self-help approach corresponds to the Geddes method.” Harris, “‘A Burp in Church.’” 6; 
citing United Nations Department of Social Affairs, Low Cost Housing in South and South East Asia (New 
York: United Nations Secretariat, 1951), 67. 
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each family. The housing itself was provided either “in the traditional way” by self-building, or by 
moving the family’s existing house to the newly appointed site.53 The next logical step was to 
improve the outcomes of these “traditional ways” of housing construction through technical 
assistance, enhanced by cooperative work—hence aided mutual self-help, as it would 
eventually be codified. Crane became a key promoter of the practice and the professionalization 
of its techniques, using his office at the HHFA to gather and disseminate information via a 
network of “well-placed individuals throughout the developing world.”54 Thus when Neira first 
proposed this approach for Peru, this was an emerging technique in the new field of community 
development, comparatively untested but well-regarded.55  
 
4.3   Arequipa: The Ecology of Man and Environment 
Turner arrived in Peru in early 1957, staying briefly in Lima where he lectured on 
planning theory at the Instituto de Urbanismo in collaboration with Eduardo Neira.56 From the 
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 Jacob L. Crane, “Workers’ Housing in Puerto Rico.” International Labour Review 49, no. 6 (June 1944): 
628.  
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 Harris, “The Silence of the Experts,” 174. In the case of Peru, his closest contact was David Vega 
Christie, a senior housing official from the late 1940s onwards, and Harris suggests that the rapid 
acceptance of self-help methods in Peru was due to this connection. In 1947 Crane organized a study trip 
to the United States for Vega Christie—see “Impresiones del Ingeniero Vega Christie a su retorno de los 
Estados Unidos,” El Arquitecto Peruano 11, no. 119 (June 1947)—who was at that time head of 
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Secretary and Housing Adviser to the Comisión para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda set up in 1956. 
55 For example, the first report produced by Charles Abrams and associates for the United Nations that 
promoted self-help construction was Report on Housing in the Gold Coast, published in 1956. The report 
characterizes self-help as an effective solution for rural housing, advocating that the government 
“preserve and encourage the traditional self-help methods still practised” which were in danger of 
disappearing with increasing urbanization. Measures to promote its use included establishing “satellite 
villages around the important towns” where traditional self-help housing construction could be replicated. 
For the authors, mutual self-help construction was only possible in these simulated villages, outside the 
city itself; in Peru, it seems that the figure of “Inca cooperation” breached this cultural divide between city 
and village, with indigenous “urban villagers” maintaining a cooperative spirit that could be drawn upon. 
56 In this period Turner also worked on two unrealized projects for Eduardo Neira’s architectural firm, 
Agurto-Cayo-Neira: designing houses for a seaside development at Supe, north of Lima, and preparing a 
consultants’ report on improving company housing for a textile mill at Huayco. 
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extant notes it appears that Turner gave at least two lectures—on the “Definition of Planning” 
and “Geddes’ Basic Theory”—while Neira gave at least one lecture on Geddes.57 Turner’s 
preparatory notes reveal a wide range of sources: assembled in a comparative table are quotes 
from Patrick Abercrombie’s Town and Country Planning, Ludwig Hilberseimer’s The Human 
Environment, Robert E. Dickinson’s City Region and Regionalism, Percival and Paul 
Goodman’s Communitas, as well as Geddes’ Indore Report. However, the brief selected quotes 
all tend to reinforce a Geddesian outlook: thus in Turner’s selection from Abercrombie, planning 
is “the accommodation of several units to make a complete but harmonious whole”; in 
Hilberseimer, its aim is “to bring about a harmonious relationship between man, technics, and 
nature”; and in Dickinson, it serves to create an ecological balance, “designing a pattern of 
human works ... which will bear harmonious relations to the underlying resources.”58  
Turner’s own definition of planning closely followed Geddes: “The science of planning is 
the ECOLOGY of Man and Environment,” whose elements of place, work, and folk operate in 
“an organic process of interaction.” Expanding on the theme, he explained that planning was: “a 
process of ordering ... the physical environment (in its present and future conditions and at all 
scales, from region to dwelling) for the well-being of man (at all scales, individual to 
collectivity).”59 Again reflecting Geddes, this was to be enacted through a dynamic four-phase 
process—survey, plan, administration, and “the plan in action”—before beginning the cycle 
                                                
57 The notes suggest that Turner’s Geddes’ lecture focused on “The Ecological Approach” and “The 
Valley Section” while Neira discussed Geddes’ views on “City Surveys” and “Civics.” Since Turner’s 
Spanish was still fairly rudimentary at this stage, additional assistance was provided by Ernesto Paredes, 
a Peruvian architect who had met Turner while working towards a postgraduate degree at the AA. 
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 John F. C. Turner, two pages of quotes on planning from Abercrombie, Hilberseimer, Dickinson, the 
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 Volker Welter argues that the Smithsons’ interest in the “hierarchy of overlapping human associations” 
likewise derives from Geddes. See Volker M. Welter, “Postwar CIAM, Team X, and the Influence of 
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again, as the “solution ... of PAST problems [is] actually the creation of new ones.”60 This cycle 
of “continuous adjustment” is represented by Turner as a line breaking out of the four-square 
grid of the Geddes diagram [4.5], only to continuously retrace the same path, its circularity 
unfolded across the page with no dialectical intersection or point of conflict to invite an 
alternative outcome. At first glance it is perhaps difficult to reconcile Turner’s work with squatter 
settlements with this profound sense of order; yet the fundamental equilibrium of a holistic, 
harmonious organic world is an important recurring element in Turner’s thought—reflecting what 
is perhaps an inherent ambiguity of the Geddesian “ecological”: conservative in its outlook but 
pragmatic and progressive in its practice. This conservative outlook is founded on the notion of 
an organic unity, whose fundamental structures and relationships do not change; in the closed 
system of a Geddesian world, every action is an interaction, modifying the exact content of a 
situation while maintaining its overall form and balance of elements. Its pragmatic practice is 
non-ideological, suspicious of universal solutions, responsive to the local specificities of the 
situation on the ground, and predicated on the need to review and recalibrate action based on 
the outcomes of the initial interventions.  
In Turner’s experience of contemporary Peru, the equilibrium of the everyday world 
appeared to be shaken and disturbed, in need of being righted through the interventions of the 
architect/planner. His lecture notes on Geddes’ “Valley Section” express concerns about a 
violation of the balance of village-town-city through the recent modernization of agriculture and 
manufacturing (especially the factory production of cotton): 
The town is the urban reflection of the country.... Overgrowth development of 
urban economy and attitudes producing many of the contemporary problems 
planners are concerned with: the depopulation of the countryside and the 
                                                
60 Turner’s notes explicitly linked these four phases to Geddes’ “four chambers of life”—acts, facts, 
dreams, and deeds—with a question mark hovering over the connection between “administration” and 
“dreams.” John F. C. Turner, “Inst[ituto] de Urb[anismo] lecture: Definition of Planning,” May 29, 1957, 
JFCT-UW. Emphasis in original. 
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cancerous growth of cities.... Conversion of Indian farmer into depressed 
industrial proletariat.61 
Recalling the horror of Ruskin or Blake at the distortions of the natural and human environments 
caused by Britain’s industrial revolution (both are cited in Plan 6), the task of the planner is to 
manage the adverse effects of industrial and techological change, and reinstate a sense of 
order into the chaos of unplanned urban development.  
In June 1957 Turner took up a position in Arequipa with the government office 
responsible for regulating and improving barriadas [4.13]. The situation in which he found 
himself was already highly charged, in sharp contrast to the “much simpler situation” that he 
evoked years later.62 As already noted, the recommendations in Neira’s 1954 report had led to a 
substantial reorientation of this office, bringing it into closer contact with the barriadas. Almost 
immediately it became embroiled in political struggles with the residents’ associations 
representing the twenty different squatter settlements throughout the city. Officials were wary of 
the association leaders, convinced that they were operating against the interests of ordinary 
residents by misappropriating association funds and inflating the real estate market. Effectively 
controlling access to all vacant land near the city, it was argued, association leaders frequently 
assigned lots to multiple owners to create the illusion of scarcity, and did little to prevent 
speculators from accumulating multiple lots that they had no intention of developing. On the 
other hand, officials were engaged in their own struggle for legitimacy, attempting to gain the 
trust of residents while lacking sufficient resources to respond to the real scale of the housing 
crisis. Neira’s final report had recommended curtailing the power of the associations through a 
                                                
61 John F. C. Turner, “The Valley Section,” n.d., ca. 1957, JFCT-UW. Emphasis in original. 
62 When Turner arrived in Arequipa, the office was in a period of administrative flux: for the first few 
months he worked for the Departamento de Inspección de Urbanizaciones y Obras Públicas (IUP), within 
the Ministerio de Fomento y Obras Públicas. In September 1957 this was replaced by the Oficina de 
Asistencia Técnica de Arequipa (OATA), administered by the Fondo Nacional de Salud y Bienestar Social 
(FNSBS, National Fund for Health and Social Welfare) of the Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia 
Social (Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare).  
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policy of “obligatory cooperation”:63 eliminating the membership fees that funded their activities, 
and transferring the responsibility for maintaining the empadronamiento (official register of 
residents) to the IUP—neither of which measures the office had the effective power to carry out. 
The conflict came to a head in late 1956: with the IUP committed to suppressing the 
associations, its policy towards the barriadas was now “to paralyse and prohibit all building 
activity”64 while it devised a comprehensive plan for urban development. In this way the IUP 
attempted to assert its authority to regulate and normalize the settlements, superposing the 
clear vision of official planning over residents’ ad hoc construction efforts.  
As soon as the associations became aware of this policy they published a broadsheet 
outlining their objections to it—and to the IUP itself—through their recently-formed umbrella 
organization, the Asociación de Urbanizadores Populares de Arequipa (AUPA). Claiming to 
represent over 30,000 families, the AUPA statement asserted residents’ right to housing, their 
willingness to cooperate with authorities, and their competence in managing their own affairs. 
Through their own efforts and savings, they had selected suitable land for their settlements and 
had “engaged the necessary technical guidance and set out zones that were perfectly 
habitable.” By contrast, they had expected much but had received nothing from the IUP, which 
was “squandering a good part of the national budget”65 supporting an inadequate and 
incompetent staff which had little understanding of the situation, as was evident in their efforts to 
hinder rather than assist construction in the barriadas. Not just responsible citizens concerned 
over the waste of government money, AUPA members also claimed to be trustworthy partners 
ready to work towards resolving the housing crisis:  
[AUPA] understands completely—because it is living it—the serious situation of 
the housing problem, and we are in favour of banishing the “old paternalistic 
                                                
63 Neira and Dulanto Pinillos, “Informe,” 7. 
64 Turner, Housing and Planning Arequipa, 27. 
65
 “La Asociación de Urbanizaciones Populares de Arequipa (AUPA) Plantea sus necesidades,” 
September 17, 1956, JFCT-UW.  
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criteria of the state” and agree that our principal idea and constant practice 
should be “Helping them to help themselves,” without expecting give-aways, that 
is why we have come together “to obtain the cooperation of the state and this is 
ACTING BEFORE BEGGING.”66  
AUPA’s position here directly referenced the preliminary report of the Comisión para la Reforma 
Agraria y la Vivienda that had been released the previous month:  
“Helping them to help themselves” should be the principal idea and the constant 
practice of this work. Nothing should be given away or imposed.67 
As resourceful in their politicking as they were in their building practices, the self-styled 
urbanizadores (urbanizers) salvaged and repurposed elements of the commission’s classic 
liberal rhetoric in order to reinforce their claims for shelter. 
The tactical sophistication of this media campaign reflects the force of need, but also 
demonstrates the organizational abilities and negotiating skills of the barriada residents, which 
were needed to manage intra-communal affairs as much as to navigate the arenas of local and 
national politics. As indicated by census data and membership records from this period, 
barriada residents typically came from a range of socio-economic backgrounds, including some 
white-collar and public sector workers—even members of the police and military—as well as 
tradespeople, the self-employed, and itinerant and part-time workers. As Turner observed in 
1960, contrary to frequent assumptions that barriada residents were helpless and “the most 
destitute section of the community,” in fact “[i]t requires initiative, intelligence, and a little 
capital”68 to construct a house in a squatter settlement.  
The AUPA statement concluded with a demand for the removal of incompetent staff at 
the IUP, and the hiring of a new team (a sanitary engineer, “another engineer architect-
urbanist,” and an accountant) to work under the supervision of AUPA. Further, the state should 
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 “AUPA Plantea sus necesidades.” 
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 “Appendix 2. Informe preliminar de la Comisión, Agosto de 1956,” in Informe sobre la vivienda en el 
Perú (Lima: Comisión para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda, 1958): 298. 
68 Turner, Housing and Planning Arequipa, 12.  
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provide earth-moving equipment as well as the materials necessary for installing water and 
sewerage systems. A couple of years later, Turner noted that AUPA’s demand for oversight 
“would be unacceptable to any Administration and also most unlikely to produce good results if 
it were tried.” Nonetheless, he believed that the declaration was in general terms “sound and 
justified” and that an advisory board including AUPA “could do no harm.” While more open to 
the participation of residents in decision-making roles than other officials, a certain distrust of 
popular power still remained; Turner was not yet ready to embrace full “user-control.” For their 
part, AUPA’s “implied willingness to collaborate with the Authorities”69 did not in fact lead to any 
concrete cooperation, a situation that continued in the months following Turner’s arrival.  
Despite this contentious atmosphere, from the outset Turner projected an ambitious 
vision for the office. In a report written around September 1957, as he was preparing to take 
over the directorship of the office, he argued that the program should not be blinkered by short-
term goals, but “must be orientated to the actual scale and the real nature of the problem and 
the first projects must be a conscious initiation of a process which may take a generation to 
mature.”70 Reflecting his Geddesian worldview, Turner’s proposal consisted of a quartet of 
interrelated aspects which mirrored the “four chambers”: survey, research, communication of 
information, and the design and execution of projects.  
The first of these—diagnostic survey—was a key element of Geddes’ methodology: 
following his medical analogy, a thorough scientific examination was essential for the accurate 
diagnosis of urban ills; only then could a suitable treatment of minimally-invasive “conservative 
surgery” be planned and performed on the urban body.71 In Arequipa, surveys of the physical 
                                                
69 Turner, Housing and Planning Arequipa, 28. 
70 Turner, “Confidential Report on the technical assistance work of the Ministerio de Fomento, 
Departamento de Inspección de Urbanizaciones y Obras Públicas, Arequipa from July to August 1957, an 
assessment of the problem and a suggested outline program of work to be carried out under the 
Ministerio de Salud Pública,” n.d., ca. September 1957, 7, 3.  
71 As described by Geddes, the “method of Conservative Surgery” or “improvement by conservation” was 
“simple, economical, yet more thorough” than more aggressive approaches. However, Geddes continued: 
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and social aspects of the settlements were carried out by “social assistants” (trained to assist in 
data collection for anthropological surveys [4.24]) in order to gauge the likely success of 
proposed programs: tabulating residents’ places of origin, income levels, and occupations, and 
assessing whether the community had a stable population and a well-established cooperative 
ethos, viable infrastructure and solid housing stock—in short, whether there were “material and 
human resources ready to be utilized.”72 Turner noted that the office was already collaborating 
with the US Geological Survey to identify nearby deposits of sillar (a white volcanic stone) and 
Roman Cement, believing that efficient local production of such materials would considerably 
reduce building costs. As with Geddes, the city is conceived as embedded within the 
surrounding region, and the cataloguing of its resources in terms of both “folk” and “place” forms 
the basis of holistic urban planning (or in Turner’s phrase, the “process of ordering ... from 
region to dwelling”). 
Next, the functions of “research” and “communication of information” were targeted to 
make the most of limited resources. Although unable to implement large-scale projects, the 
office could still conduct research “into the organization and problems of cooperative work under 
technical assistance programs,”73 as well as direct valuable experiments with new construction 
technologies, and ensure that the results were widely disseminated. Further, by building up an 
                                                                                                                                                       
“It requires long and patient study. The work cannot be done in the office with ruler and parallels, for the 
plan must be sketched out on the spot, after wearying hours of perambulation.... Even when a detailed 
and corrected map has been produced ... the task is still difficult. Even after a good deal of experience of 
the game, one constantly finds oneself in check; now and then so definitely and persistently as to feel 
tempted, like the impatient chess-player, to sweep a fist through the pieces which stand in the way. This 
destructive impatience is, indeed, an old vice of beginners in a position of authority; and their chance of 
learning the real game is, of course, spoiled by such an abuse of it.” Patrick Geddes, Report on the 
Towns in the Madras Presidency (Tanjore: 1915), 17, quoted in Patrick Geddes in India, ed. Jaqueline 
Tyrwhitt (London: L. Humphries, 1947), 44-45.  
72
 Blanca Gálvez R. and Rosa Bustamante, “Un ensayo de trabajo experimental en la urbanización 
Mariano Melgar,” October 1957, JFCT-UW. 
73 Turner, “Confidential Report,” 11. 
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indexed library of relevant materials, the office would eventually be able develop itself into the 
key housing research centre in Peru. 
Finally, the “design and execution of projects” would be necessarily constrained, focused 
on “prototypes or patterns for the bulk of the work which will be done by local groups with no 
more than occasional advice and supervision.” Following the example of industrial production, 
Turner envisaged an ongoing cycle of research and refinement, using “experimental and 
tentative” projects to reach an optimum solution that was ready to be deployed immediately, but 
always waiting to be improved upon in the next round of testing. Reflecting the stance of Plan 6, 
Turner advocated standardization of components aimed at maximum variation and adaptability. 
For this reason, the various elements of these experimental projects (“walls, roofs, windows and 
doors—plots, the relationship of house to house and of houses to open space and roads”74) 
would in themselves function as prototypes, in order to devise the most appropriate design for 
production by self-builders. While avoiding boiler-plate house types and urban plans, the 
employment of standardized components offered a way to economize not just on the 
construction site but also in the design office, where a small architectural team had little time to 
work on individualized solutions. 
Meanwhile, in practical terms Turner’s first months in Arequipa were limited to small trial 
programs: experiments with the fabrication of soil-cement blocks by and for self-builders, and 
developing remodelling projects for two of the only three barriadas that were willing to work with 
the office at this stage. The first of these projects erupted in controversy in September 1957, 
only a few weeks after it had begun. Residents were unconvinced of the cost savings of the 
method and the soundness of the blocks produced, and they aired their complaints vociferously 
through the pages of the local newspapers: the blocks were “very fragile and flimsy” and 
therefore the project had completely failed and their money had been wasted “in [this] 
                                                
74 Turner, “Confidential Report,” 7, 8.  
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burdensome test.” They also complained about the high cost of the Ellson block-making 
machine acquired for the project, and noted that while Turner and his colleague Luis Felipe 
Calle had told them they could produce 1,000 blocks per day, using a small amount of cement 
mixed with local soil, in fact they were only able to produce a hundred blocks, rendering the 
process completely uneconomical.75  
In an internal office document, Turner responded that these problems had arisen 
because the residents were using too much cement and allowing insufficient time to dry the 
blocks: following the correct procedures, a large quantity of high-quality blocks could indeed be 
made each day.76 The fracas escalated as the residents’ association threatened Turner and 
Calle with legal action for allegedly defaming the city’s barriada associations and their leaders, 
demanding that they provide evidence to support OATA’s habitual claims about questionable 
“selling and division of lots, misappropriations of funds, and all the allegations that they have 
made.”77 The matter did not proceed beyond these initial threats. While there may indeed have 
been problems with the soil cement blocks (and genuine outrage over imputations of corruption 
among association leaders), these controversies were completely enmeshed in a broader 
struggle triggered by the introduction of a new national technical assistance program. 
Under the new operating guidelines, the renamed Oficina de Asistencia Técnica de 
Arequipa (OATA) was given a greater role in the process of qualifying settlements as 
“regularized” urbanizaciones de tipo popular in accordance with the revised urban planning 
                                                
75 Typescripts of newspaper articles, JFCT-UW: “Denuncian malversación de fondos en urbanización,” El 
Deber, September 4, 1957; “Los urbanizadores populares insisten: Elevado costo de material hizo 
fracasar casa barata,” El Deber, September 7, 1957. 
76 John F. C. Turner, “Diario del sucesos entre OATA y Asoc. Dolores desde 8/8/57,” n.d., ca. September 
1957, JFCT-UW. In conversation Turner acknowledged that these experiments with soil cement blocks 
(later repeated in his housing project for Paramonga) “didn't in fact turn out very well.” Furthermore, he 
had subsequently come to believe that the use of experimental technologies was particularly 
inappropriate for low-cost housing, since these residents were the least able to support the additional time 
and expense required to test new approaches. Turner, interview with the author, 2007. 
77 Typescript of newspaper article, JFCT-UW: “A los ingenieros Calle y Turner lleveran al poder judicial,” 
El Pueblo, September 9, 1957. 
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regulations instituted in 1955 (discussed in chapter three).78 The residents resented this 
concentration of power, and were concerned that since they did not have the resources to meet 
the stricter requirements for legalization, they would see their settlements disqualified and 
dismantled. Furthermore, the smaller maximum lot size of 250 sq. m. would greatly disrupt 
existing settlement layouts. Playing on old resentments towards Lima, they claimed that this 
was designed for the conditions of the capital, but could not be applied in Arequipa, where 
residents preferred “viviendas tipo granja” (dwellings of a farmstead type). Finally, while they 
wanted effective technical assistance from the state, the stipulated payment for this assistance 
was beyond the means of residents, and should instead be provided free.79 While residents’ 
calls for their repeal were unsuccessful, in fact the new guidelines had little effect on the 
situation on the ground, since OATA was not in a position to implement them. 
The second trial program, involving remodelling projects, also produced mixed results. 
Turner’s approach here was to modify the existing urban plans to improve circulation, separate 
pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and provide additional green space. In the case of the Miramar 
association in the nearby port town of Mollendo, the modifications also addressed the character 
of the environment, as Turner suggested planting trees to mitigate the “monotonous regularity” 
of the half-built, gridded blocks that created “an aesthetically unsatisfying and even depressing 
character which ... [would] discourage and to some extent frustrate the family and community 
life which is the purpose of any group of dwellings.”80 Thus aesthetics, while a secondary 
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consideration, were nonetheless seen to have real effects in psychological terms on the quality 
of life.81 
Towards the end of 1957, as the new technical assistance program was scheduled to 
come into effect, Turner produced a study for OATA containing detailed proposals for two key 
programs: a rehabilitation scheme for an existing settlement and an outline for a new satellite 
city. Together they presented a comprehensive strategy to direct “the control and integration of 
the barriadas with the city itself”: first, established settlements that were “too deeply rooted to be 
transplanted” would be remodelled into “healthy and modern districts”; second, unplanned or 
“irrational” growth should be “channelled and concentrated to form a logical and appropriate 
extension of the city.”82  
The program for “Development and Remodelling of the Miraflores Zone” followed 
Geddes’ “conservative surgery”83 model, using diagnostic survey as the basis for targeted 
interventions that minimized disruption to the urban fabric. The aim was to curtail unplanned 
expansion which was affecting “the urban balance of Arequipa” by creating problems with traffic, 
transport, and the provision of public services. Focusing on the Mariano Melgar barriada, a 
study of current densities was used to identify zones that already showed incipient consolidation 
[4.14]; new construction would be channelled into these areas in order to speed up the process 
of consolidation towards eventual integration with the existing urban fabric and thereby make 
the installation of services economically viable. The existing urban plan was judged as having 
                                                
81 Reflecting on this projects at the end of his time in Arequipa, Turner noted that while the redevelopment 
process had worked well for other settlements, Miramar had endured three sets of revisions to their 
official plans over nine years; in the meantime, these residents wasted the money they would have 
invested in their own houses by paying rent to live in substandard conditions. All in all, their experience 
underscored “the logic and economy of ignoring the regulations.” Turner, Housing and Planning Arequipa, 
35.  
82 John F. C. Turner for OATA “Las Urbanizaciones Populares de Arequipa: Estudio de los Origenes, 
Estado Actual y Propuestas para la solución del problema,” November 1957, JFCT-UW.  
83 This quintessentially Geddesian term appears in one of the documents related to this program: John F. 
C. Turner, “Sumario de la Programa,” n.d., ca. 1957, JFCT-UW. 
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too much space devoted to circulation and not enough open space; to remedy this, and to 
create a “healthy and modern district,” alternate transverse streets would be turned into parks, 
this having the added benefit of reducing the amount of roadway requiring the expense of 
paving [4.15].84 Pairs of photographs were keyed to the re-drawn plan to demonstrate the 
impact of the proposed improvements, the stark streetscapes transformed into tree-lined 
avenues with cobble-stone footpaths, the disorderly street frontage remade into rows of white-
washed houses with quasi-Mediterranean vaulted roofs [4.16].  
The satellite city program represented a more aggressive effort to control the direction of 
urban development. It was apparently first conceived some years earlier by Eduardo Neira 
along with Hernán Bedoya, head for the southern region of the Oficina Nacional de 
Planeamiento y Urbanismo (ONPU). A report co-authored by Turner and Calle in September 
1957 had argued that this was the “only solution” to the problem of the barriadas: the 
pobladores would have to leave their illegally established dwellings, and as an incentive would 
be offered a site in the new “satellite city.” To begin with, one or two residential zones would be 
provided with basic infrastructure, and drawn up into lots. Once the settlement’s “human 
nucleus” had been established, OATA would begin to implement a housing program using 
“Directed Mutual Aid” (ayuda mútua dirigida)85 with residents building their own houses in teams 
under technical guidance; in the meantime they were presumably expected to erect their own 
provisional dwellings. In his study Turner argued that real estate speculation rather than actual 
housing needs was responsible for many land claims, so that Arequipa’s true housing deficit 
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85 Luis Felipe Calle Calle and John Turner, “Informe confidencial presentado por la Oficina de Asistencia 




could be met using “one seventh of the area actually invaded and solicited.”86 Many existing 
settlements were sparsely populated and poorly consolidated, making them socially fragmented 
and uneconomical for the provision of even basic services; by contrast, a satellite city would be 
planned as “a logical and appropriate extension” from the outset, growing in stages as demand 
required.  
The project was to be kept secret for as long as possible: “our campaign against 
speculation depends on publicizing such a plan widely and suddenly.”87 With a site to the south 
of the city large enough to meet housing needs for the next twenty-five years, accommodating 
30,000 people,88 Turner’s initial schematic plan consisted of a grid of major and minor streets, 
with some effort to introduce variable streetscapes and park space into the overall pattern 
[4.17]. His conceptual planning for the city suggests the importance of creating a logical and 
harmonious relationship between the various urban scales—house, street, and town—building 
up from the smallest unit to a coherent whole [4.18]. More detailed drawings produced around 
1958 by Hernán Bedoya of ONPU [4.19] demonstrate greater specificity in relation to the 
topography and sensitivity in the handing of the urban scheme, but are also more utopian in 
nature, depicting a bucolic setting with tree-lined avenues and a wide range of communal 
buildings (church, schools, civic and commercial centres) that in practice would have been 
difficult to finance [4.20]. This version of the satellite city was clearly inspired by the concept of 
the unidad vecinal (neighbourhood unit), introduced into Peru by architect Fernando Belaúnde 
Terry in the mid-1940s (discussed in chapter two). Like Belaúnde’s unidad vecinal, Bedoya’s 
satellite city is a vehicle of decentralized urban development: framed by a wide green-belt of 
agricultural land, it functions as a self-contained unit with its own commercial and industrial 
                                                
86 John F. C. Turner, “The Housing Problem in the City and Districts of Arequipa, Peru,” n.d., ca. July 
1958, JFCT-UW. 
87 John F. C. Turner, letter to Eduardo Neira, September 7, 1957, JFCT-UW. It is not clear from the 
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88 Turner for OATA, “Las Urbanizaciones Populares de Arequipa.”  
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zones, and is fully equipped with community facilities, most importantly the school, which 
becomes a structuring device forming the centre of each of the city’s sub-zones. 
Turner’s response to this project was highly ambivalent. Some of his statements 
welcome the idea as a way to sidestep the difficulties of dealing with ill-planned settlements and 
their combative leaders, while elsewhere he is highly critical, regarding its “evasion” of the real 
situation as misguided: 
The idea of a new town is infinitely more attractive to us as architects and 
administrators but I have an uneasy feeling that it is an authoritarian and 
dictatorial solution which might destroy the incipient new communities (and 
therefore the basis of democracy), divide the population and, as a result, fail. 
Deservedly. 
I’m shocked and disturbed by Luis Felipe’s calm assumption that we can create 
communities as easily as we can build houses. This kind of thinking is almost 
enough to convince me of the unsoundness of the whole idea.89  
Turner’s unease suggests a discomfort with an urbanism based on the modernist ideal of the 
tabula rasa rather than a Geddesian examination of existing conditions. Despite Turner’s 
reservations, however, the project remained on the agenda until at least the early 1960s.90 
By the end of 1957, with few concrete projects in hand, Turner was pessimistic about the 
future of OATA, writing that relations with the residents appeared to be deteriorating.91 With  
insufficient resources to carry out major projects, OATA was only succeeding in creating 
obstacles and introducing red tape. A massive earthquake on January 15, 1958 dramatically 
changed the dynamic: as Turner observed, “[b]esides providing the necessary credit the 
disaster predisposed everyone concerned to accept new ideas and methods.”92 With 1,647 
dwellings destroyed and 3,407 badly damaged, OATA became the centre for relief work.  
                                                
89 Turner, letter to Eduardo Neira, September 16, 1957, JFCT-UW. Luis Felipe Calle Calle was an 
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4.4 Reconstruction in the Emergency Zone 
The reconstruction effort involved the (not always harmonious) collaboration of a number 
of agencies; OATA’s contribution focused on two new projects—the Rural House Construction 
Program and the emergency settlement of Ciudad “Mi Trabajo” (“My Work”)—as well as the 
development of a third project, the Miraflores Pilot Program in Aided Self-Help, out of the 
existing remodelling plan for Miraflores. 
 
Rural House Construction Program 
With earthquake damage extending to a number of villages in the area around Arequipa, 
a US-government aid agency—Servicio Cooperativo Inter-Americano de Producción de 
Alimentos (SCIPA, or Inter-American Cooperative Food Production Service)—oversaw the 
construction or repair of 385 houses over six months [4.21]. OATA provided technical 
assistance in the form of plans for a simple “house nucleus” which could be further developed 
over time. Pat Crooke, Turner’s colleague from the AA, who had recently been working in 
Colombia, was assigned as OATA’s supervising architect,93 and with the assistance a dozen 
post-graduate agriculture students, he managed a group of four general foremen and eleven 
masons who helped each of the families to build their own houses. When the region suffered a 
second major earthquake on January 13, 1960, the houses performed well [4.22]. 
There was some difficulty getting residents to accept the layout and dimensions of the 
house nucleus, as it differed substantially from local patterns, which were based simply on “one 
large room with light and temporary partitions—sometimes only a curtain to divide the living and 
sleeping areas, or even humans and animals.” As Turner later reported, OATA was “naturally 
anxious to improve the living standards,” and produced a design with a few small rooms 
                                                
93 Crooke went on to manage a technical assistance program for self-build schools in the Peruvian 
highlands in 1959–1960. See Patrick Crooke and Carlo Doglio, “Scuole e comunità,” Comunità: Rivista 
mensile di cultura e informazione fondata da Adriano Olivetti 14, no. 84 (November 1960): 28-57. 
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surrounding a patio, dividing the space according to function in accordance with the tenets of 
modernist reform housing. Yet, Turner added, with more time for “anthropological studies” the 
architects would have better appreciated the significance of the customary house form—
specifically:  
the large room had an important cultural function—the wake—which cannot be carried 
out in the patio.... Finally, a compromise solution was reached by the placing of a large 
opening, closed with doors, between the two small rooms.”94 
Crooke’s success with this program encouraged Turner to consider the possiblilty of 
developing the method further with teams of builders working together to build their houses 
cooperatively. As he later wrote, this would be the first directed mutual-aid self-help program in 
Peru. Still, while the logistics of the method were beginning to crystallize, the disjunction 
between the values of the architect and of the self-builder (of expert knowledge and of local 
custom) over the form and use of the house, and the relative value of “reform” elements 
(functional separation, hygiene, avoiding the danger of “promiscuity”) remained unresolved. 
 
Ciudad Mi Trabajo  
In Arequipa, the first priority in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake was to 
establish an “emergency transit camp” for those left homeless. On the day following the disaster 
OATA and ONPU jointly selected a site which was adjacent to the area already set aside for the 
proposed satellite city, on the theory that the new settlement could act as a “base camp” for its 
construction, providing temporary housing for residents as they worked on their future 
permanent home. Construction began the same day.95 Shortly afterwards, Turner noted 
approvingly that the project had been able “to take advantage of the unique opportunity of 
clearing a large section of the slums” in Arequipa. The greatest challenge in developing the new 
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city would be to prevent the transitional settlement from becoming permanent. Accordingly, all 
constructions were made of provisional materials: “the value of the site as agricultural land ... 
must always be greater than the loss involved in moving people and materials”96—no equity 
would be built up, no real investment made. Ciudad Mi Trabajo was to function as a permanent 
camp for a series of transitory populations, providing a necessary service to those displaced, 
while at the same time operating as “a place of study and readaptation of the people, so that 
during their stay in it the betterment of their economic, moral, and cultural level, and of their 
family organization, is secured, to facilitate their transfer to new zones.”97 In part this would be 
achieved through programs of economic development, “to rehabilitate such families (by forming 
small cooperative workshops for instance),”98 raising their household income to the level where 
they could manage to finance the construction of their own houses through aided self-help. With 
its available population and controlled environment, the camp could also function “as a field of 
experimentation [campo de experimentación], for studies of a social and medical character”; 
OATA, for example, could conduct studies into the community organization of mutual-aid self-
help projects.  
Towards the end of 1958, OATA ran into funding problems and the project was left 
without direction. As one newspaper complained, “the pobladores of Ciudad Mi Trabajo are 
victims of administrative irresponsibility, they live in a non-existent town, without electricity, 
water, police, and are forming a clandestine barriada”99 effectively established by OATA itself. In 
October 1960, some time after Turner had left Arequipa, a former colleague reported to him on 
plans for remodelling the “city” now that it had indeed become a permanent settlement; progress 
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had stalled due to conflicts between two groups of pobladores: “the old ones say that the victims 
of the last earthquake [January 1960] have invaded the zone that they currently occupy, which 
had been destined for the expansion of Ciudad Mi Trabajo.” Both groups eventually agreed that 
they would live in the remodelled settlement, but each insisted on being rehoused in their own 
separate area.100 A year later the residents had finally approved a definitive lot plan, after the 
architects resorted to subterfuge in order to proceed with a reduced lot size. A dummy plan with 
extremely small lots was created expressly for the purpose of being rejected in order to give the 
pobladores the illusion of having successfully negotiated an increase.101 Nonetheless, the lack 
of progress continued: a representative of OATA’s successor agency complained to Turner in 
February 1962 that they were still building model houses.102 Four years after the initial 
earthquake, it appeared that the human and financial resources required to complete the project 
would never be forthcoming. 
 
Miraflores: Pilot Program in Aided Self-Help 
The project in Miraflores was in keeping with the approach of the ONPU urban plan 
developed in 1956: residents were to be moved from crowded inner-city slums (where the 
earthquake damage was the worst) to the peripheral zone of Miraflores, selected because it 
already had a high level of consolidation. From the outset it was intended to function as a 
rebuilding program using “directed mutual-aid self-help”: Turner initially proposed this method in 
March 1958, believing that it would reduce costs by 30–50 percent, allowing for more units to be 
built with the available reconstruction funds. In the end, 141 houses were completed for the cost 
of 100 contractor-built houses.103   
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The first phase was focused on temporary housing, in order to achieve tangible results 
quickly. This proved unpopular, as participants saw little value in expending their efforts on 
provisional construction. Instead they devised their own adaptations to make these structures 
permanent, fortifying the foundations and adding cement to the composition of the mortar. Once 
OATA recognized this, it revised the program and produced a new design for a permanent 
dwelling. This design, developed by assistant architect Federico Mevius, focused on the need 
for flexibility within standardization [4.23], using fixed basic modules with variable internal 
partitions, allowing for expansion from the core unit as needs changed. The first model used a 
vaulted roof, apparently favoured by the architects on aesthetic (as well as structural) grounds. 
However from a practical point of view, a vaulted roof would have greatly complicated the 
addition of a second storey, or even horizontal extensions; for this reason self-builders generally 
preferred a flat roof (azotea), which also provided them with additional usable space. In any 
case, OATA experienced technical problems with the construction of the vaulted roof, and in 
later models it was replaced by a flat roof.  
Despite the standardized design, each of the participants met with an architect “to 
determine the best solution for their particular case”; most participants proposed carrying out 
exactly the same alteration to the house, declaring “their future intention of roofing over the 
patio” in order to create a larger living room. In his subsequent assessment of the program, 
Turner wrote: “After duly admiring the model (made to demonstrate the way in which the house 
could grow by stages) the participants showed little further interest in the design plan,” and he 
concluded that it was unlikely that residents would follow the intended extensions either.104 For 
their part, apparently the architects did not consider adapting the plan to accommodate the 
residents’ evident preferences: their adherence to the modernist dictum of maximizing light and 
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air (here embodied by the culturally appropriate form of the patio) overruled the residents’ desire 
to maximize their usable living space. 
The program began with 150 families divided into six groups, each group having an 
average of four participants each work day, plus a bricklayer [4.24-4.26].105 The first houses 
took around twenty days to build; this later dropped to ten days (the “record” being six days).106 
A high proportion of women (as well as children) provided manual labour, both as scheduled 
workers and as volunteers, despite the initial objections of some men. Again it seems that the 
emergency situation worked in favour of an unconventional solution, as women’s contributions 
were too valuable to exclude.107  
In a report written for the United Nations, Turner noted that the organization of the 
project followed the guidelines set out in the CINVA manual based on Puerto Rican experiments 
with ayuda propia and ayuda mútua [4.11], which had been given to him by Eduardo Neira.108 
Turner noted that it was “impossible to follow all the recommendations,” and indeed the 
administrative requirements were substantial [4.27], generating a staff of some thirty-eight 
people, headed by an architect responsible for framing the overall program, producing designs, 
inspecting each individual lot, and attending weekly meetings with the project participants 
[4.28].109 In addition to educating participants on technical matters, these meetings served to 
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promote good citizenship: as Turner stated, “for many it was their first experience of 
democracy.”110 For example, the rules governing the conduct of the cooperative work groups—
the required work hours, attendance at meetings, fees to cover shared expenses, and the fines 
to be imposed on wayward members—were developed in consultation with the first group to 
participate in the program.111 
Turner’s later writings, such as Housing by People, minimize the issue of conflicting 
interests within communities of self-builders: in line with an anarchist model of society, 
autonomous or locally self-governing groups are characterized as egalitarian and organically 
balanced, as the needs of one person are limited by the needs of another, producing 
equilibrium, stability, and efficiency. They do not appear to be vulnerable to manipulation or 
distortion by their more powerful members; rather, throwing off governance by outside bodies 
leads to a kind of benign laissez-faire system where each receives his “fair share” thanks to the 
network’s self-regulating mechanisms.112 In a marked contrast, the Arequipa report discusses at 
length the problems of internal political disputes, corruption, and speculation by settlement 
leaders. This critique—which Turner would subsequently attribute to his own “liberal 
authoritarianism”113—is used to emphasize the “importance of government intervention” to 
advocate for the interests of ordinary residents and to demonstrate that the leadership of the 
architect-organizer is a necessary corrective to imbalances within the group;114 he is an 
engineer who recalibrates existing dynamics to ensure the smooth functioning of the social 
organism.  
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In the report’s conclusion, Turner wrote that the squatter settlements were a “normal” 
pattern of urban development (“physically indistinguishable” from “typical incipient towns”), as 
illustrated by a series of images that followed their evolution and integration into the established 
city; in fact, “it is only the exaggerated scale of the whole taken together which is really 
abnormal.” [4.29]. Nonetheless, they were also evidence of the failure to provide “appropriate 
popular housing,” a situation which had forced ordinary people to operate outside the law.115 On 
a more fundamental level, Turner viewed the emergence of the barriada as the symptom of a 
future, undefined social imbalance or disorder:  
If, as archaeologists, many historians, and most architect-planners believe, the 
city is the shape of the social order (or the shell, as it were, which is both formed 
by and forms the social structure) then the future product of the spreading chaos 
is as dangerous as its present cause. 
Since the Peruvian government was evidently “unable to contain this movement by force”—due 
both to its scale and to President Odría’s reliance on the urban poor for electoral support—the 
answer therefore lies in “the voluntary collaboration of the people and the state.” In this context, 
the value of the Arequipa project was not in the houses built, or even the people housed, but: 
in the proof of the administration’s ability to build the vital bridge between the 
people and the state across which the complementary forces of coordinated 
government planning and mobilized local action can freely pass.116  
From this decidedly unequal encounter, initiated from above and outside (despite Turner’s 
anarchist leanings, it is the state that builds the bridge), Turner expressed the hope that an 
equitable collaboration would emerge—a view that took little account of the political realities 
facing marginalized low-income citizens in negotiating with their governments.  
The report ends with a consideration of the role of international agencies such as the 
United Nations in resolving the problems facing cities like Arequipa. Turner concluded that along 
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with providing advisors, their most significant contribution would be “the orientation and 
stabilization of government policy,” using targeted financial aid to ensure administrative 
continuity for housing programs, allowing them to “be independent of established institutions 
and have the protection necessary for any scientific experiment.”117 In this scenario the role of 
the international agency was to establish proper laboratory conditions within the host country, 
insulating the trial project and its supervising foreign expert from the contaminations of shifting 
local politics. In fact, Turner himself had suffered the consequences of such shifts: despite the 
successes of the pilot project, OATA lost most of its staff in a political shake-up in late 1958, and 
Turner himself was forced to leave.118 Architect Federico Mevius took over the job of directing 
the programs in part from October 1958, and in full from January 1959; at this time OATA itself 
was closed down, and its programs (along with Mevius) were transferred to the Comisión de 
Ayuda a la Zona Afectada por el Sismo (CAZAS, Commission for Aid to the Zone Affected by 
the Earthquake), an agency set up to oversee the use of reconstruction funds donated by 
national and international organizations. The program shut down entirely at the end of 1959 
when CAZAS used up the last of its funds.119 Writing in mid-1959, with the closure of the office 
all but confirmed, Mevius reported that there was growing interest from barriada associations in 
its aided self-help programs, with calls for the remaining earthquake reconstruction agency—the 
Junta de Rehabilitación y Desarrollo de Arequipa (JRDA, or Restoration and Development 
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Council of Arequipa)—to take up OATA’s initiative.120 Subsequently some ten years after the 
1958 earthquake, the JRDA reported that it had built 1,319 houses throughout twenty different 
barriadas using the self-help system—hailing this as its most successful program due to “its 
social importance, its low cost and the revitalization of a thousand-year-old Peruvian tradition of 
working together.”121 In this sense OATA’s program did have an ongoing legacy, yet with some 
5,000 houses badly damaged or destroyed in the earthquake—not to mention the 30,000 
families that AUPA claimed as members in the mid-1950s—many families were left without 
adequate housing.122  
 
4.5  Systematizing Self-Help 
Among housing experts in Peru the work of OATA was soon recognized as ground-
breaking, representing “the most important experiment in the country, not just in terms of size 
but also the method used.”123 Turner continued to focus on aided self-help, in particular 
contributing to the establishment of an early pilot project in Lima,124 a small urbanización called 
Andrés Avelino Cáceres, situated to the south of the city. Consisting of forty houses built 
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through ayuda mútua by workers of the Cemento Portland factory (with a design recalling 
OATA’s original model house), it was begun in June 1959 and took eighteen months to 
complete  [4.30-4.31].125 
However immediately after leaving Arequipa Turner worked on developing a self-help 
housing project for quite a different context: the US-owned W. R. Grace and Company sugar-
processing factory in Paramonga in northern Peru, whose workers were housed in an 
overcrowded company town [4.32].126 This provided the opportunity for refining techniques used 
in Arequipa, now making greater use of anthropological data, with an extensive social survey 
conducted by anthropologist Eduardo Soler (previously involved with Matos Mar’s Huarochirí 
project), complemented by a physical survey of housing typologies by Turner [4.33].127 This 
research led to increasing sophistication in spatial planning to reflect socio-cultural differences 
in the use of the house. Turner acknowledged that in Arequipa “there was insufficient 
knowledge of family living patterns and requirements when the prototype was designed,”128 
                                                
125 “Dan títulos a nuevos propietarios: Prado entregó ayer 40 casas construídas por ayuda mútua,” La 
Prensa, January 7, 1961; “Sistema ‘ayuda mútua’ se aplicó en casas que recibieron cuarenta familias 
pobres de la ‘Portland,’” La Tribuna, January 7, 1961. The plan shown on the cover of the FNSBS 
document describing its ayuda mútua projects seems to be that used at Andrés Avelino Cáceres. This 
assumption is based on the similarities between the plan and descriptions of the house given in 
newspaper articles; one of the articles also includes a photograph, where the two vaults facing the street 
(one largely cropped out of the photo) appear to correspond to the two bedrooms in the plan. See 
FNSBS, Anteproyecto de construcción de viviendas por ayuda mútua en la República (Lima: FNSBS, 
October 1960). 
126
 W. R. Grace and Company “established itself as perhaps the leading inter-American trading and 
shipping house” in the late nineteenth century; its “presence was most extensive in Peru, where the 
company had major interests in sugar, textiles, mining, paper, chemicals, and shipping and 
transportation.” C. Alexander G. de Secada, “Arms, Guano, and Shipping: The W. R. Grace Interests in 
Peru, 1865-1885,” The Business History Review 59, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 597. In 1952 the Grace 
Company had commissioned Luis Ortiz de Zevallos (with Ernesto Paredes Arana, O. Arrisueño M., R. 
Pérez León) to develop a model modern company town using conventional construction methods, but this 
proposal evidently did not eventuate; see “Plan Regulador de Paramonga” El Arquitecto Peruano 19, no. 
216-218 (July-September 1955); and “2 ciudades industriales nacen: Paramonga y Cartavio: Un plan 
regulador las convertirá en las 2 primeras ciudades-modelo,” La Prensa, December 4, 1955. 
127 Eduardo Soler and John F. C. Turner, Informe sobre la vivienda urbana en Paramonga: 1959-1960, 
1960, JFCT-UW.  
128 Turner, Housing and Planning Arequipa, 54. 
  
119 
which resulted in a layout with smaller rooms than the families would have preferred. In 
Paramonga this insight led to the design of two distinctive house plans, developed in 
collaboration with architect Diego Robles: one for “paisanos” (peasants) and one for “criollos” 
(urban dwellers) [4.34]. The plans employed the same basic footprint, framework, and 
dimensions, but allowed for two layouts: the first featured a grouping of rooms (or one large 
room) at the front of the lot and space at the back to accommodate a kitchen garden and small 
livestock enclosure; in the second a collection of smaller rooms were grouped around a central 
patio. Scale models (with movable pieces) were used to allow the workers to visualize the 
possibilities of the “growing house” [4.35], followed later by full-scale demonstration houses 
[4.36].  
Turner and Soler submitted their report to Grace in 1960, and the company decided to 
proceed with a trial project of sixty self-built houses [4.37]; in all, the program was to include 600 
self-built and 400 contractor-built houses.129 A massive publicity campaign was mounted to 
convince the workers—who would have to take out loans in addition to building their own 
houses—to participate in the program [4.38]: posters, radio coverage, a promotional newspaper, 
a print run of 5,000 leaflets, informational flyers inserted into the worker’s weekly pay packets, 
and a film on construction through mutual aid that screened on four occasions, attracting around 
700 people each time.130 This was not an emergency situation as in Arequipa—the workers 
would have to be persuaded that the benefits of the program warranted their their efforts.  
The first phase went ahead with a group of fifteen families, starting construction in March 
1961 under Turner’s supervision. However from July 1961 he was only able to continue as a 
part-time advisor, since he had taken on a position with a new housing agency, the Instituto de 
la Vivienda (INVI, or Housing Institute); in December 1961 Turner left for Lima permanently, and 
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was replaced in Paramonga by another architect.131 In October 1961 an audit of the project 
raised concerns about lax accounting practices, especially the lack of control over cash 
disbursements, noting that supervision from Turner had been wanting due to his frequent 
travel.132 This was followed a year later by a highly critical report, which had been commissioned 
in order to investigate the misappropriation of funds by the project’s bookkeeper, but in the 
process also uncovered evidence of massive cost overruns on the housing itself. The first fifteen 
houses had been completed in July 1962, at 500 percent of the estimated budget.133 The basic 
house nucleus had been projected to cost the resident S/.20,000; in fact, they cost S/.100,000 
each, paid for by the Grace Company, which then sold them on to workers for S/.35,000.134  
As a result, the self-help approach was abandoned, and in mid-1962 Grace and the 
Paramonga unions decided to complete the remaining forty-five houses of the pilot project using 
conventional construction. They requested bids from two US-based real estate development 
companies which were beginning to establish themselves in the low-cost housing market in 
Peru (Nelson Rockefeller’s International Basic Economy Corporation and the Wichita-based 
Hogares Peruanos). However, after union elections, the new leadership rejected the project “of 
privately owned homes and ... demanded that Grace build houses and give them to the workers 
as has been traditionally done.”135 Although it is difficult to confirm the reasons for the cost 
                                                
131 La Sociedad Paramonga Ltda, memo to David Vega Christie, Executive Director of INVI, n.d. ca. 
December 1961, JFCT-UW. 
132 E. G. Lenton, memo to E. Wehrli on “Proyecto Piloto de Desarrollo Comunal Paramonga-Pativilca,” 
October 10, 1961, JFCT-UW. 
133 T. Bachmann and W. H. Meier, “Confidential Report on Investigation of Defalcation: Self-Help Pilot 
Project (Proyecto Piloto de Desarrollo Comunal Paramonga-Pativilca),” n.d., ca. September 1962, JFCT-
UW.  
134
 “En la primera etapa del proyecto, 60 familias de Paramonga tendrán casa propia,” Paramonga: 
Organo Informativo de Paramonga—Edición Especial, 3, no. 13 (February 1961). A report by Howard 
Wenzel of Hogares Peruanos indicates that the first fifteen houses “were started on a Self-Help Program 
but were later finished by Grace since the self-help did not work out.” Wenzel, Hogares Peruanos Status 
Report, December 1, 1962, Jean and Willard Garvey World Homes Collection, MS 94-09, Wichita State 
University Libraries (WHC).  
135 Howard Wenzel, Status Report, n.d., received November 19, 1962, WHC. 
  
121 
overruns—the report speculated that “a marked lack of on the spot planning and leadership 
before and during the executing of this project”136 had been a major factor—it seems quite 
possible that there was a general lack of enthusiasm for the entire project, which was in 
essence an effort to shift responsibility for housing from the company to the workers. While 
Grace may have assumed that the security of owning a home would naturally appeal to its 
workers, the scale and intensity of the marketing campaign suggests that there was 
considerable resistance to the idea of purchasing housing when it was customarily provided by 
the employer, especially in the case of migrant workers who only lived temporarily in 
Paramonga, a small company town that offered few other economic opportunities. Grace put the 
project on hold in December 1962 following riots directed against a US-owned mining company, 
concerned that the violence would spread to Paramonga. The project appears to have stalled 
permanently at this point.137 
Meanwhile, back in Lima from late 1961 Turner was engaged in preparations for the 
implementation of a nation-wide, two-year program of aided self-help projects planned for 1962–
1963 (discussed in chapter six). Turner was part of the team that had secured funding for this 
program from the Inter-American Development Bank, and would now be responsible for 
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on the houses. Howard Wenzel, Status Report, March 2, 1963. WHC. 
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overseeing it through his new position at INVI. However mid-way through this program, in 
August 1963, Turner left official employment at the housing agency—now renamed the Junta 
Nacional de la Vivienda (JNV, or National Housing Council)—after his status as a foreign 
national employed by the Peruvian civil service was called into question, causing a minor 
political stir.138 Nonetheless he continued to work for the JNV as an advisor, now contracted 
through the British Government's overseas aid office, the Department of Technical 
Cooperation.139 His work no longer dealt with on-the-ground projects, but on theoretical 
proposals. 
Turner continued to explore his interest in standardization, modularity, and prototypes, 
giving some insight into his evolving view of the role of the architect in the production of self-
help housing. In 1963 Turner developed a proposal for “Design Systems for Low-Cost Houses” 
for the JNV [4.39]. Poor design and construction were wasting much of the resources invested 
in housing, he argued, so “[i]t is essential to establish and make general a modern tradition that 
responds to the actual needs and to those of the next generations.”140 As in the “Confidential 
Report” of 1957, this “modern tradition” made use of standardization via the development of a 
modular system made up of a small number of components; this would allow a great deal of 
flexibility and variety in the assembly of the individual house. As at Paramonga, there were 
prototype layouts conceived for a “Casa Popular Criollo” and a “Casa Clase Media”—both 
                                                
138 Turner, interview with the author, June 2007. 
139 John F. C. Turner, “Actividades durante el mes de Noviembre y Programa para el mes de Diciembre 
1963 del Arqto. J. Turner Asesor del DTC a la JNV,” December 11, 1963, JFCT-UW. In addition to 
working with the JNV, Turner also advised the Comisión Ejecutiva Interministerial de Cooperación 
Popular (CEICP)—a national development initiative of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry. In addition, 
on his first trip back to the UK in 1962 Turner had lobbied to get government support for a British version 
of the Peace Corps, and then supervised the group of volunteers who worked in barriadas through this 
program. See Dudley Plunkett, “British Volunteers in Lima,” Architectural Design 33, no. 8 (August 1963): 
356. 
140 John F. C. Turner, “Consideraciones Generales Acerca del Desarrollo de Sistemas de Diseño para 
Casas Económicas,” and “Bases para un sistema de diseño (distribución) de casas economicas,” March 
1963, JFCT-UW. The plans for the progressive development of the house are reproduced in “Minimal 
Government-Aided Settlements: Valdivieso and Condevilla Señor Barriadas,” Architectural Design 
(August 1963): 379-380.  
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suitable for self-build, adaptable in form, and capable of progressive development and 
modification as families changed. In a second proposal for the JNV in 1965, Turner extended 
the question of standards and prototypes to consider three scales: the individual dwelling, the 
group of dwellings (or the street), and the locality. Using Christopher Alexander and Serge 
Chermayeff’s Community and Privacy (1963) as a point of reference, Turner’s proposal 
particularly emphasized the importance of balancing public-private space at each level, since 
the dearth of public space was a particular problem in squatter settlements. As in the 1963 
paper, the rationale for the “systematization of designs” was to facilitate the development of 
improved prototypes, since “neither the popular traditions nor the [housing] agencies’ projects 
provide what is required”: self-builders simply imitated the poor housing models they had 
absorbed from their own experience (whether substandard rural shelters or urban slums), while 
none of the many designs developed by government architects had yet managed to produce a 
solution worthy of widespread reproduction. The problems resulting from this failure resonated 
on a number of levels:  
The value of a viable tradition in the design of the environment is not, of course, 
a merely aesthetic value though the results of such a tradition will, almost 
certainly, be aesthetically satisfactory. The present lack of a tradition—its 
substitution by the habitual repetition of inappropriate forms—is extremely 
damaging to personal, social, and economic health and it produces ugly 
shapes.141  
This concern with the aesthetic dimension is perhaps unexpected, and it is by no means 
at the core of Turner’s later writings on self-help housing; this persistence of a concern with the 
architectural object could be understood as an intermediary step in the shift from conventional 
architectural production to conceiving “Housing as a Verb,” as Turner wrote in 1972.142 Tellingly, 
the first article in the August 1963 issue of Architectural Design edited by Turner [4.40], 
                                                
141 John F. C. Turner, “Criteria for the Development of Planning, Housing, and Construction Standards 
and for the Specifications of the Pilot Projects: A Preliminary Draft Originally Prepared for the Junta 
Nacional de la Vivienda, Lima, Peru,” October 7, 1965, 2, JFCT-UW. 
142 John F. C. Turner, “Housing as a Verb,” in Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process, 
ed. John F. C. Turner and Robert Fichter (New York: Macmillan Company, 1972), 148-175. 
  
124 
preceding the introduction, presented the pristine forms of a “Village Artisan’s Self-Built House,” 
evoking the figures of the bidonville and the Mediterranean village that had already been 
established as objects of modernist admiration. The house, built by Pedro Viscarra near 
Arequipa, demonstrated “how far, given the opportunity, one man’s skill and resource will reach 
in housing his family.”143 Its accomplishment was testament to Turner’s sense of an aesthetics 
of self-building that was also an ethics—a certain integrity inherent to self-build construction, 
arising from the pure potential of what people could achieve on their own, a stance that also 
reflected his anarcho-Geddesian understanding of the organic order of things in their natural 
state. This house had earlier been featured in an article by Eduardo Neira that appeared in El 
Arquitecto Peruano in 1958 [4.41]. According to Neira, Viscarra’s house—with its “plastic and 
pure forms”—was not an isolated example: “it is only the best, more than the prototype, it is the 
archetype, a product of selection, as the Parthenon is nothing but the archetype of the Greek 
temple of the Age of Pericles.”144 A 1957 article by Neira on aided self-help housing provides 
some insight into the nature and significance of this “archetype”: while the main focus is on the 
economic benefits of the self-help method, in the final section—given the Corbusian subtitle 
“Towards a new social architecture”—Neira envisages the “interminable monotony” of social 
housing projects being replaced by a new vernacular architecture, where the architect as 
technical assistant cultivates both a revival and an updating of native creativity. Here emerges:  
a way to overcome the current stagnation, to revive using modern terms the 
plastic and functional qualities of the cheerful little towns of the past where the 
popular spirit created pleasant and fitting environments for a simple and direct 
life.145    
                                                
143 John F. C. Turner, “Village Artisan's Self-Built House,” Architectural Design 33, no. 8 (August 1963): 
361.  
144
 Eduardo Neira, “Un interesante ejemplo de arquitectura espontanea,” El Arquitecto Peruano no. 246-
248 (January-March 1958). As points of reference, Sibyl Moholy-Nagy’s Native Genius in Anonymous 
Architecture had appeared the previous year (New York: Horizon Press, 1957), and Bernard Rudofsky’s 
“Architecture without Architects” exhibition was held at the Museum of Modern Art, New York in 1964. 
145 Neira continued: “We have seen throughout Peru constructions of genuine ‘architectonic’ quality, 
constructions of clay and straw, of quincha and adobe, in which the proportion, the sense of the 
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A fusion of the traditional and the modern, and a return to the authentically Peruvian, appear 
within reach even as the forces of modernization increase. 
Shortly after arriving in Arequipa, in keeping with his definition of planning as a “process 
of ordering,” Turner observed with concern that in the barriadas, “millions of soles and hours of 
work are being misspent by the poorest people to create unhealthy and disorganized 
environments.” Instead, he argued that it was essential to convince residents that their efforts at 
“providing themselves with some sort of home of their own is against their own interests and to 
convince them to wait for alternatives to be put forward by us.”146 On leaving Arequipa, his 
viewpoint had changed little: “[t]he only possible way of ordering city development is through the 
harnessing of the blind but powerful forces of spontaneous popular urban expansion to planned 
development programs.”147 A decade later, in an influential paper written for the United Nations, 
“Uncontrolled Urban Settlement: Problems and Policies,” his position had shifted to some 
degree. On one hand, there was still a role for the architect’s professional training and expertise, 
particularly in addressing the wastefulness of poorly designed and constructed housing, and 
poorly conceived and sited urban plans, which suffered from excessive density and “built-in 
blight” [4.42].148 On the other hand, Turner now called for governments to respond to “the real 
needs and resources of the governed” by focusing on providing those resources that were 
beyond the scope of individual citizens—large-scale infrastructure, legislative guidelines, and 
technical assistance: “The paternalist concept of the State as a provider has to give way to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
landscape, the relationship of the spaces is so exact, the result so pleasing to the sight, that the architect 
has to recognize the present of spontaneous ‘colleagues.’ It is in seeing these authentic creations of art 
that the hope for a new social architecture is reinforced.” Neira, “Ahorro de Esfuerzo y Capital,” JFCT-
UW.  
146 Turner, “Confidential Report,” 7.  
147 Turner, Housing and Planning Arequipa, 58. 
148 John F. C. Turner, “Uncontrolled Urban Settlement: Problems and Policies,” Working Paper No. 11, 
Agenda Item No. 4 for the United Nations Inter-Regional Seminar at Pittsburgh October 24-November 7, 
1966. Published in International Social Development Review 1 (1968): 112. 
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concept of the State as the servant—providing tools.”149 In this formulation, the state (and the 
architect) no longer need to exercise control over ordering urban development by “harnessing 
blind but powerful forces”; rather, their role was to mitigate the “problems of uncontrol” by 
complementing and facilitating the self-generated initiative of ordinary people—in Turner’s terms 
here, “working with” rather than “working for” people. 
Looking back on his work in Peru, in 1972 Turner wrote that the experience of trying to 
administer aided self-help programs had soon convinced him that the extensive “administrative 
superstructure” they required was too expensive and inefficient. Rather than attempting “to find 
and train the army of dedicated field workers and local program administrators”150 such 
schemes required, he now advocated simply providing construction funds to individual house-
builders, with only basic oversight to ensure that dwellings were built to acceptable standards. 
Individuals and locally controlled groups could more effectively direct their own development 
without the encumbrance of outside professionals: in the terminology of his later writings, the 
forces of autonomous (self-determined) building did not need “harnessing” by heteronomous 
(other-determined) organizations in order to produce decent housing.  
After considering, but then declining an offer to join Constantinos A. Doxiadis at the 
Ekistics Institute in Athens,151 Turner left Peru in September 1965 to take up a fellowship at the 
                                                
149 Turner, “Uncontrolled Urban Settlement,” 127, 128. 
150 Turner, “The Reeducation of a Professional,” 144. 
151 Turner gave a series of three lectures on housing and urbanization in Peru at the Athens Center of 
Ekistics in November 1964. In conversation Turner recalled that Doxiadis had been very impressed with 
the August 1963 issue of Architectural Design, so had invited Turner to speak in Athens the next time he 
was in Europe. “He actually wanted me to work with him, but I knew something about his reputation, who 
he was, there were some downsides to it. He was really a big developer. He supported very good work, 
the ATO [Athens Technological Organization] was a very good institution, and did good work. But I 
sensed, or I think [a friend] suggested, ‘Look, be careful of this guy.’ And I declined his invitation.… I think 
he was fundamentally on the wrong track.… During the lectures, I remember one of them shook him a 
little bit, and his remark was as he went out, ‘Very courageous, very courageous.’ You know, too 
controversial.... He was very wealthy, independently wealthy, he had his own ship. I think he made a 
name for himself, and I think it was status, he liked to feel he was on the cutting edge of things. He was a 
hard worker, and he was very knowledgeable, and he knew a lot, and his talks were very interesting. But 
it was always at a pretty high level. When it came down to what you’d do at ground level, I think really he 
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Harvard-MIT Joint Center on Urban Studies. Around the same time he was invited by the 
Housing, Building, and Planning Branch of the United Nations to prepare a study on “the 
definition of norms for barrios clandestinos”152—research that would eventually become the 
article on “Uncontrolled Urban Settlement.” His later work as an advisor to the JNV had already 
prepared the way for this segue into the role of researcher, writer, and teacher. As Turner 
continued to refine his ideas on user control in housing, he diverged progressively further from 
mainstream self-help projects with their emphasis on sites-and-services provision and the use of 
resident labour to lower costs.153 For Turner, the key point was not to leverage the user’s labour, 
but to facilitate the user’s control “of the design, construction, and management of his own 
home.”154 This was not an economic argument, but a political—or rather, ethical—vision of how 
groups of people could work together to house themselves and develop their own communities. 
[4.43] In this sense, Turner’s later writings on “housing by people”—on “autonomous” modes of 
building, under local control—strongly evoke the “work teams” envisaged in Plan 6 (1949). This 
marks the end point of Turner’s gradual move away from conventional architectural practice: 
from the architect as “artist-technician” advocated in Plan 6, to the architect as technician-
administrator of “directed” aided self-help, and finally to the architect as advocate-facilitator of 
unaided self-help or “autonomous” building. Nonetheless the progressiveness of Turner’s 
position was still limited by the positioning of authority and expertise with the professional; it is 
                                                                                                                                                       
became very conventional, and the projects turned out to be very conventional projects.” Turner, interview 
with the author, July 11, 2008. 
152 John F. C. Turner, “Resumen de actividades del Arqto. John F. C. Turner entre el 3 de Junio y el 16 de 
Julio de 1964,” July 17, 1964, JFCT-UW. 
153 For further discussion of this theme, see Harris, “A Double Irony.” 
154 Turner, “Housing as a Verb,” in Freedom to Build, 158. 
  
128 
only in his writings of the 1970s that a full appreciation of the contribution of local knowledge 
and the importance of “dweller control” becomes apparent.155 
If it is now clear who the new architect is, who is the self-builder? At once active 
participant and unequal partner, client, beneficiary, and unremunerated labourer. The 




                                                
155 See for example the anthology edited by Turner, Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing 
Process (New York: Macmillan Company, 1972), and his article “Who Is Teaching Whom To Do What?” 
BEE: Bulletin of Environmental Education 59 (March 1976): 17-20.  
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5.  Mediating Informality 
 
In mid-1957 the Comisión para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda (CRAV, Commission for 
Agrarian Reform and Housing) had recommended the establishment of a national network of 
technical assistance offices, with the intention of providing barriada residents with a tool to 
ameliorate their situation—offering the necessary guidance to those seeking to “regularize” and 
rehabilitate their settlements, or to improve the condition of their housing. With government 
support for this initiative, by 1961 organized groups of self-builders had completed 141 
dwellings in a trial reconstruction project in Arequipa, and a small neighbourhood of forty 
dwellings for factory workers in Lima, demonstrating the viability of the aided self-help 
methodology within constrained budgets (discussed in chapter four). The agency responsible for 
administering these offices planned similar projects elsewhere in Lima and in six additional 
cities, with a total of 3,540 houses; in Chimbote, one project would include some 1,400 
dwellings, which, it was claimed, would make this the largest aided self-help housing scheme in 
the Americas.1 Yet the ever-increasing number and size of barriadas throughout the country, 
and particularly in Lima, demonstrated that these offices were not in themselves sufficient to 
control the insurgent settlements. 
Thus, in February 1961, more than three years after CRAV had delivered its report, and 
following prolonged debate, the government enacted the most innovative and far-reaching 
initiative to emerge from its recommendations:  Law 13517 (Law for the Remodelling, 
Sanitation, and Legalization of the Barrios Marginales). The reforms to urban planning 
regulations that had been introduced in 1955 following the Ciudad de Dios invasion had 
                                                
1 The proposed project for Lima involved constructing 600 houses at “Proyecto San Juan” to be carried 
out in four stages, over five and a half years (December 1960 to April 1966, at the rate of roughly nine 
houses a month); at least some of this development seems to have been carried out, with the assistance 
of funds from the Inter-American Development Bank. The cities selected for additional ayuda mútua 
projects were Chiclayo, Ilo, Iquitos, Piura, Tacna, and Trujillo. FNSBS, Anteproyecto de construcción de 
viviendas por ayuda mútua en la República (Lima: FNSBS, October 1960). 
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included some important measures; notably, the codification of a new category of urban 
settlement, the urbanización de tipo popular, which allowed for urban services to be built to a 
lesser standard in low-income neighbourhoods. Law 13517 advanced a more comprehensive 
legislative framework to tackle unregulated urbanization, outlining a process for upgrading and 
eventually legalizing existing squatter settlements, as well as instituting measures to discourage 
the formation of new barriadas, thereby regaining control over future urban growth.  
The modernist imperative to shape urban space—epitomized in earlier years by the Plan 
Piloto for Lima and Fernando Belaúnde Terry’s unidad vecinal projects—was now expressed 
through alternative strategies, as the new law began to outline a radically different approach to 
understanding and directing the evolution of the self-built city. While conventional urban 
planning techniques had failed, Law 13517 reflected a confidence that once they were 
recalibrated in line with this revised regulatory framework, planning professionals could once 
again deliver rational and effective solutions to managing urban growth. This chapter examines 
the principles and the underlying logic of Law 13517, assesses how efforts to apply the new 
regulations were developed, and how they fared in practice. 
 
5.1 Dwelling on the Margins 
A 1958 report by the agency charged with organizing technical assistance efforts 
observed that the “barrios marginales” (marginal neighbourhoods, being “structured at the 
margins of the law”2) were undermining official property registers because so many ad hoc 
occupations of state land had not been properly recorded. Likewise, in cases involving private 
property, the extra-legal transfer of title by lease-holders (without the owner’s knowledge or 
permission) was blurring the threshold between fully authorized occupants and those who had 
                                                
2 FNSBS, La asistencia técnica a la vivienda y el problema de barriadas marginales (Lima: FNSBS, 
November 13, 1958), 8.  
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gained residency through “irregular, violent, or clandestine tenancy [posesión].”3 Continued 
inaction by the state would only lend legitimacy to this situation, since over time, these 
“marginal” arrangements would gain some legal protections, inevitably leading towards “the 
conversion of barriada property holders [poseedores] into property owners [propietarios]”; 
allowing this increasingly porous boundary—between legally owning land and merely occupying 
it—to dissolve altogether “would mean giving legality to chaos and abuse.”4  
While squatter settlements had been tolerated (even cultivated) under various political 
regimes, the state now recognized that these extra-legal occupations could not be allowed to 
become the norm. The framework of Law 13517 proposed two parallel approaches to reforming 
this landscape of irregularities. First, all existing barriadas would be given the opportunity to 
legalize their status, on the condition that their urban amenities were upgraded and that 
individual dwellings were rehabilitated to acceptable standards as defined by the law. Second, 
no new barriadas would be tolerated: instead, the government would establish its own 
“Urbanizaciones Populares de Interés Social” (UPIS, Low-Income Social Housing Subdivisions), 
where housing would once again be self-built by residents, but construction would be closely 
supervised by architects and conform to an approved urban plan. Both solutions involved 
technical assistance, the difference being that the intervention of architects and planners 
occured at different stages of the process: the first case would employ a "conservative surgery" 
approach to remodel the barriada after building had commenced, while the UPIS would 
establish a framework for self-build construction to develop within, allowing architects to control 
the process from the outset.  
On signing the law, President Manuel Prado [5.1-5.2] described it as “a work of public 
good, leading towards strengthening the family unit, reinforcing work habits, and securing a 
                                                
3 FNSBS, La asistencia técnica, 10. 
4 FNSBS, La asistencia técnica, 11.  
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decent existence for our people.”5 Two key measures would ensure that this “public good” would 
be realized with maximum economy of means on the part of the state: making use of residents’ 
self-help labour, as well as insisting that they cover the costs of technical assistance, urban 
upgrading, and purchasing their lots. In this way the projects themselves would be self-
sufficient, in keeping with the philosophy of self-help underlying Law 13517, and with Prado’s 
promise that it would not become a financial burden on the taxpayers, since all expenses would 
be recuperated from the participants themselves.6 
While most countries continued to regard slum clearance as the only possible response 
to unauthorized urban development, Law 13517 proposed an entirely different approach to 
directing urban growth—one that attempted to negotiate between “marginal” self-generated 
construction (which provided low-income families with much-needed housing) and the dictates 
of official plans (which offered the benefits of coordinated urban development, with the  
implementation of zoning guidelines, and the effective provision of green space, suitable public 
amenities, and circulation routes).7 With this legislation the modernist imperative to shape urban 
space was not abandoned altogether, but rather found an alternative expression in these hybrid 
modes of urbanism, on the one hand capping and reforming existing improvised construction, 
and on the other managing new self-built—but architect-conceived—construction.  
The law transferred primary responsibility for the barriadas from the Fondo Nacional de 
Salud y Bienestar Social (FNSBS, National Fund for Health and Social Welfare), to the 
Corporación Nacional de Vivienda (CNV, National Housing Corporation), shifting the focus of 
                                                
5 “Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente de la República, Dr. Manuel Prado, en el solemne acto de 
promulgación de la Ley Orgánica de Barrios Marginales,” in Ley de Remodelación, Saneamiento y 
Legalización de los barrios marginales (Lima: CNV, February 1961), 8. 
6 Prado, “Discurso,” 8. 
7 According to Julio Calderón Cockburn, “The Peruvian case is pioneering in Latin America with respect to 
the policy of regularizing land tenure”; subsequently Mexico introduced reforms in its policy towards 
informal settlements in 1971, and following Habitat I in Vancouver in 1976, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina 
followed suit. Julio Calderón Cockburn, La ciudad ilegal: Lima en el siglo XX (Lima: Universidad Nacional 
Mayor de San Marcos, 2005), 42. 
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the government’s response from the social assistance agency to the housing agency.8 
Previously focused on the production of conventional housing blocks, the CNV was now to 
oversee the implementation of the new law, translating its ambition to reassert control over 
urban development into policies, practices, and programs.  
In April 1961 the CNV began its new responsibilities by undertaking a nationwide survey 
of all potential or suspected barrios marginales. Completed a year later, the survey resulted in 
the declaration of 271 barrios marginales across Peru, 123 of them in greater Lima. In addition, 
41 settlements (33 in Lima) were found to be outside of Law 13517 (being classified as 
degraded tenement housing, impoverished villages, and so on) and were therefore not eligible 
for the processes of upgrading and legal recognition that it promised.9 In the next step, each 
eligible settlement was to be classified as suitable for eradication or rehabilitation. Since 
rehabilitation would involve not only physical improvements but also resolving disputes over the 
ownership of the settlement site and of individual lots,10 future viability would be determined by a 
panel of four experts: a public health professional, an urban planner, a sanitary engineer, and a 
lawyer.11 Eradication would be mandatory when the settlement was adversely affecting “the 
normal growth of the city”; when it was too expensive or technically challenging to provide 
services; when the site was vulnerable to landslides or river erosion; or when the value of the 
                                                
8 In February 1963 what was left of the FNSBS housing division was subsumed into the newly established 
Junta Nacional de la Vivienda.  
9 CNV, Información básica sobre barrios marginales en la república del Perú (Lima: CNV, 1962), 212-213; 
CNV and Oliverio Portugal Alvarez, Memoria del Departamento de Barrios Marginales, 1961–1962 (Lima: 
CNV, 1962), 25. The text lists a number of forms of substandard housing which did not qualify under Law 
13517: “barrios incompletos [unfinished neighbourhoods], or tugurios [slums] or corralones [shanty 
housing] in the cities, and rancherías [shanty settlements] or villorrios [miserable little hamlets] in rural 
areas.”  
10 “Ley orgánica de barrios marginales y aumento del capital de la Corporación Nacional de la Vivienda: 
Ley No. 13517,” February 14, 1961, in Lima: Historia y urbanismo en cifras, 1821-1970, ed. Wiley Ludeña 
Urquizo (Lima: Ministerio de Vivienda, Construcción y Saneamiento, 2004), 431. 
11 CNV and Portugal Alvarez, Memoria, 26, 27. 
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land “does not justify building low-cost housing [viviendas de tipo económico] on it.”12 These 
guidelines created a conundrum: residents were to be expelled from vulnerable or difficult sites 
quite rightly deemed unsuitable for development, but they had been able to occupy these sites 
in the first place precisely because of their marginal economic value; on the other hand, sites 
which were more suitable from a technical standpoint risked being ruled out on economic 
grounds, their greater value not “justifying” the accommodation of low-income households. 
Clearly technical solutions would be shaded by the political economy of urban development, 
raising questions of the right of access to urban land—or the right to the city more broadly—
which could not be easily resolved.  
In the case of barriadas set for rehabilitation, the guidelines stipulated the provision of 
passable roadways, water and sewerage infrastructure, as well as a wide range of urban 
amenities, to be determined by the settlement’s size, location, and population: at a minimum this 
meant schools, medical posts, churches, parks, and sports fields, but it could also include 
workshops for small-scale industries and commercial centres.13 This approach was influenced 
by the report issued in 1958 by the Comisión para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda, which had 
presented an expanded definition of housing: “the dwelling embraces not only the house itself, 
but also the neighbourhood and the community, and generally the environment as a whole or 
habitat where man and his family develop their usual activities.”14 This definition consequently 
entailed a higher benchmark for an adequate “dwelling”—now conceptualized as being 
integrated into a well-appointed neighbourhood. A contemporaneous study had condemned the 
barriada not simply for its poor-quality housing, but more seriously because of its limited 
                                                
12 “Reglamento de la Ley No. 13517: Remodelación, saneamiento y legalización de los barrios 
marginales: Decreto Supremo No. 23,” July 21, 1961, in Lima: Historia y urbanismo en cifras, 436. 
13 “Ley orgánica de barrios marginales,” 431. 
14 “Por otra parte, la subcomisión considera que la vivienda abarca no sólo la casa misma, sino también 
el barrio y la comunidad, y en general el conjunto ambiental o habitat donde el hombre y la familia 
desarrollan sus actividades normales.” “Appendix 3. Programa y metodo de trabajo de la Comisión en 
relación a vivienda,” in CRAV, Informe sobre la vivienda en el Perú (Lima: CRAV, 1958), 307. 
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economic opportunities and inability to meet its own food supply, revealing it to be “a parasite 
city [ciudad parásito], which is reflected in the high cost of housing.”15 By contrast, these 
reformed neighbourhoods envisaged under Law 13517—self-contained and fully functional—
emulated Belaúnde’s model of the unidad vecinal. 
The detailed workings of the rehabilitation process emerge in a brief report on the Plan 
Fray Martín de Porres from May 1961. This remodelling project covered eighteen barriadas in 
Lima and proposed an ambitious series of programs to be coordinated with various government 
agencies: the Ministry of Public Health was to provide a health post, while the Ministry of 
Education would build schools—an urgent requirement, given that around 10,000 children in the 
area were not attending school.16 However, before any of these programs could begin, it was 
necessary to fulfill the requirements of Law 13157 for establishing rightful residency to the lot, 
an arduous five-part process. First, the empadronamiento—creating a register of residents, 
confirming their status as property holders, without conceding them property ownership. 
Second, the catastro (cadastral survey)—drawing up detailed plans of the settlements in order 
to determine the boundaries of each lot. Third, the “cleaning-up [depuración] of the 
empadronamiento”—identifying unoccupied or unclaimed lots, which would be turned over to 
the CNV to be used as sites for urban amenities or reassigned to other residents. Fourth, 
studying existing provisions for water and sewerage lines. Fifth, developing plans to remodel 
individual lots that were too large, too small, or irregular in shape. Following this, provisional title 
would be granted—non-transferable, non-monetizable title, in order to counter land 
speculation—with residents given seven years to finish their dwellings to acceptable standards 
and to complete payments for their individual lots, as well as for their share of any upgrading 
                                                
15 FNSBS, La asistencia técnica, 51. 
16 CNV and Portugal Alvarez, Memoria, 74. The report estimated that across Lima’s barrios marginales a 
total of 200,000 children were in this situation. 
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costs for the settlement as a whole.17 Only at the end of this process would residents gain full 
title to the property.18 
The logic behind this elaborate procedure was governed by the need to reinforce the 
existing property regime, underscoring the threshold between those who owned property, and 
those who had possession—or had taken possession—of it without proper authority. In the 
process, the legislation also reasserted the state’s right to police this boundary; to grant (or 
refuse) title; to legitimate possession. The aim was not to facilitate, or speed up, the process of 
gaining title but to clearly outline the requirements to pass from property “holder” to property 
“owner”—and to establish them as arduous, underscoring the fact that ownership was not a 
universal right, but a privilege to be earned. In this case, possession was not nine-tenths of the 
law, but merely the first rung on the bureaucratic ladder to recognized legal ownership. For the 
poseedor who did not have the means to purchase land through conventional property markets, 
the law stipulated a series of complementary investments: compliance with bureaucracy, 
expenditure of self-help labour, and at least a nominal payment. 
A vast amount of data was required to ascertain the nature and condition of each 
“marginal” settlement—or the precise degree of each settlement’s marginality—in sufficient 
detail to be able to determine its fate with professional exactitude. As with the FNSBS before it, 
much of the CNV’s time was devoted to collecting and sorting through this data—cadastral 
surveys as well as demographic statistics to gauge the economic and organizational resources 
                                                
17 CNV and Alfredo Pérez Gonzáles, Plan Río Rímac—Remodelación de la Zona 6 (Lima: CNV, 
September 1962), 3.  
18 As Kenneth Manaster notes, in effect “the seller (government) reserves ownership until the price is 
totally paid, even though the land has been delivered to the buyer.” In addition to restricting transfers of 
title, the government’s sales contract can limit the buyer’s ability to take out a mortgage (in order to 
“prevent an occupant's land from becoming subject to claims of outside creditors”), or to rent out the 
property (in order to ensure that they “are securely located in a residence under [housing agency] 
supervision for at least five to seven years” with “adequate living conditions”; this measure “protects the 
squatters from themselves—from their own propensity to rent even though the tangible effect might be 
detrimental”). In practice, however, Manaster observes that these provisions would be all but 
unenforceable. Kenneth Manaster, “The Problem of Urban Squatters in Developing Countries: Peru,” 
Wisconsin Law Review 23, no. 1 (1968): 51, 55, 53. 
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of the residents. With 271 barriadas nationwide and an estimated population of 105,781 
households,19 this was never going to be a fast process. Furthermore, when set against the 
reality of the “marginal” city (outside the law, but within its own norms of improvised urbanism) 
the law faced a series of challenges which sharply defined the limits of its efficacy. 
As one instance, the tangled histories of those barriadas where the mandated studies 
were actually carried out demonstrated that the implementation of the law would be far less 
straightforward than the guidelines had suggested. Replacing the official maps that had included 
the barriadas as indeterminate outbreaks of red dots [5.3], the new cadastral surveys were 
decades ahead of other countries (such as Brazil and Venezuela) in rendering these patterns of 
urban settlement legible and thereby granting them the most basic level of recognition. Yet their 
theodolilzed precision masked competing claims of ownership and occupation that were 
complex and opaque, with invasions and illegalities by tenants equally matched by questionable 
acts on the part of landowners and real estate developers, and further confused by poor record-
keeping and uneven enforcement by the authorities. For example, the neighbouring sites of El 
Altillo and Tarma Chico [5.4] both occupied state land, but while the first was quickly recognized 
under the law, the residents of the second were evicted to accommodate a shooting club, then 
allowed to return on the condition of paying land tax in lieu of rent; however, seeing that their 
neighbours lived rent-free, they stopped paying, leaving their legal situation tenuous.20  
Veintiocho de Julio [5.5] had begun as a disorderly “shanty settlement [ranchería]”21 built 
by a brick factory for its labourers. Following the factory’s closure, the workers continued living 
on the site, paying rent to their former employer; however other families established themselves 
on adjacent sites, paying nothing. At Gonzales Prada the residents had been paying rent 
                                                
19 CNV, Información básica, 212. 
20 JNV, Datos estadisticos de los Barrios Marginales de Lima: Distrito del Rímac, Vol. I. (Lima: JNV, 
December 1963), 22, 37. 
21 JNV Datos estadisticos de los Barrios Marginales de Lima: Distritos de Breña—Pueblo Libre—
Magdalena, (Lima: JNV, 1963), 18. 
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through an agreement with a private owner, but the local municipality now ruled this invalid, 
arguing that this “landlord” had no right to lease out the land since it actually belonged to the 
state.22 Finally, Ramon Castilla Baja was situated within a private subdivision, whose developer 
had been authorized to sell lots once amenities had been installed; regardless, they had also 
sold lots which lacked services and furthermore had been earmarked for a public works project. 
These illegally established sections evolved through the letting and subletting of lots and the 
gradual invasion of any remaining open spaces: eventually, the tenants “had refused to continue 
paying rent, availing themselves of the benefits of Law 13517.”23 
In this way the law revealed another of its limits: while the legislation vowed to enforce a 
cut-off date to benefit existing settlements and to criminalize the establishment of new ones, the 
slightest hope of securing decent, affordable housing inevitably intensified unauthorized 
construction. In the Río Rímac area in central Lima, between 1959 and 1961 the population 
grew from 50,000 to 120,000—the increase being attributed to the promulgation of the new law, 
“since under the promise of a prompt attainment of property title, those who were living in other 
places in the urban area came to occupy its vacant lots.”24 The law operated as a system of 
solids and voids, creating the conditions for its evasion, as requirements and restrictions in one 
area created loopholes and incentives in another.  
 
5.2 Constructing 13517 
The improvised city was by definition constantly shifting and evolving, without much 
regard for what had been planned for it. Despite these challenges by early 1962 plans for the 
first remodelling projects and UPIS schemes were being drawn up. 
                                                
22 JNV, Datos estadisticos: Distrito del Rímac, Vol. I., 99. 
23 JNV, Datos estadisticos: Distrito del Rímac, Vol. I., 114. 




Plan Río Rímac  
The CNV began by dividing Lima—and its 123 barrios marginales—into several zones 
[5.6], each of which required a new master plan. One of the first to be developed was the Plan 
Río Rímac, covering an area close to the historic centre of the city and including over thirty 
barriadas on both sides of the Rímac river, with a combined population of 120,000 [5.7]. The 
Plan Río Rímac called for rationalizing the existing barriadas into ten sectors—termed unidades 
vecinales—in preparation for their redevelopment, as well as the construction on adjacent 
unbuilt land of two UPIS projects (Hacienda Conde Villa Señor and Valdiviezo) [5.8]. The 
existing barriadas had been formed by various independent settlement associations, in an ad 
hoc process that had resulted in large differences in population density throughout the area, 
ranging from 233 to 450 inhabitants per hectare, an issue which the plan also sought to 
address. However these efforts at creating a more “rational” urban layout would have to contend 
with the specific histories of the barriadas and the social connections within (or tensions 
between) the different groups of residents—any technical solution would ultimately have to 
contend with these on-the-ground politics. 
The unidades vecinales of the Plan Río Rímac, each with a population of 10,000-12,000 
people, shared no formal or material qualities with the modernist housing projects of Belaúnde’s 
vision, but the planning documents defined them in exactly the same terms, as urban units that 
were to be “self-sufficient in their primary needs,”25 as if the linguistic gesture of extending the 
category to include the re-formed barriada in itself contributed to its rehabilitation and integration 
into the norms of urban development. Yet this approach was a faithful realization of the 1947 
resolution sponsored by Belaúnde, which had argued that the unidad vecinal model could also 
                                                
25 CNV, Plan Río Rímac: Memoria, 12. The stated objective was to create a balanced, mixed-income 
neighbourhood: “a community with a heterogeneous population in its social and economic aspects and in 




be applied in “the transformation of parts of the city already built”26—that is, the provision of a 
comprehensive range of services could transform “parasite” neighbourhoods into ideal “self-
sufficient” urban units. Accordingly, the Plan Río Rímac listed services to be provided at the 
level of the unidad vecinal and others for the zone as a whole. Each unidad vecinal would have 
its own markets, neighbourhood civic centre and health post, while a main commercial zone, 
civic centre, and a hospital were planned to serve the entire zone. In addition, fifty-seven 
kindergartens, twenty-six primary schools, four secondary or technical schools would be 
distributed throughout the area. 
Ironically, the physical proximity of the plan area to the CNV’s first unidad vecinal 
projects—the largest of which, Unidad Vecinal No. 3, comprised 1,112 housing units and a 
population roughly half of one of the Plan Río Rímac unidades—only underscored the 
limitations of the earlier program. Inaugurated just twelve years before and projected to solve 
the deficit of affordable housing, the earlier unidad vecinal projects were now dwarfed by the 
proposed unidades vecinales of the Plan Río Rímac; placed on greenfield sites to decentralize 
urban growth, they were now close to being absorbed within the fabric of the improvised city. In 
the place of the modernist ex nihilo development of Unidad Vecinal No. 3, the Plan Río Rímac 
proposed that with prudent and timely guidance the unauthorized city could be more or less 
brought into line with established norms of urban planning. To this end the existing barriadas of 
the Plan Río Rímac area would be rehabilitated through a series of measures: better integration 
with existing urban amenities; detailed—but minimally invasive—remodelling projects; and the 
“eradication” of housing when deemed necessary. As one example, all existing construction 
within Unidad Vecinal No. 10 would be demolished, since it was chaotic and overcrowded, and 
its proximity to the city centre demanded high-density housing as a more appropriate use of the 
                                                
26 “Conclusiones aprobadas por el VI Congreso Panamericano de Arquitectos,” El Arquitecto Peruano 11, 
no. 123 (October 1947). 
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land, given its value. Families affected by these “eradications” were to be rehoused in one of the 
two new UPIS projects—or “urban expansion areas”—that were included in the plan. 
The detailed rehabilitation plan for Unidad Vecinal No. 6 of the Plan Río Rímac area 
provides an insight into how the “conservative surgery” approach was to be applied in the zones 
to be rehabilitated. The existing housing was divided into three categories based on the quality 
of construction, the building materials, and the appropriateness of the functional layout in terms 
of avoiding the “promiscuity” of mixed uses (especially in relation to sleeping arrangements).27 
An initial survey found that roughly 20 percent of the dwellings were conservable, with 60 
percent suitable for rehabilitation, and 17 percent requiring demolition [5.9].28 On the urban 
level, two-thirds of the lots required remodelling because they were outside the stipulated size of 
70-250 sq. m. or were irregularly shaped [5.10]. In total, only 1,000 households would be able to 
remain on the same lot, while 395 were to be relocated, and 803 would have to be 
“eradicated”29—a measure required both to reduce the overall population density,30 and to 
provide space for the additional amenities needed to convert the zone into a self-sufficient 
unidad vecinal [5.11]. Specifically, the newly-free space would be used for the construction of 
two schools (the key structuring element of the classic neighbourhood unit), with adjacent green 
space: the school on the north-west edge of the site was located at the end of a tree-lined 
boulevard, and the one to the south-east was linked to a riverside walk. After calculating the 
                                                
27 CNV and Alfredo Pérez Gonzáles, Plan Río Rímac—Remodelación de la Zona 6 (Lima: CNV, 
September 1962), 3.  
28 CNV, Remodelación de la Zona 6, 14. Although there were 2,024 lots in total, this initial survey only 
covered 1,743 lots as it did not include the barriadas 28 de Julio or Zarumilla Baja; the survey also found 
that 44 lots (or 3 percent) were empty. 
29 CNV, Remodelación de la Zona 6, 28. This remodelling/“erradication” would reduce the population of 
Unidad Vecinal No. 6 from 11,575 to 8,376. Note: the total of 2,198 families on 1,980 lots (that is, 2,024 
lots minus the 44 that were empty) presumably reflected that fact that a number of the lots were 
subdivided, most likely to earn rental income, or to house members of the extended family. 
30 Minus the 803 families, the new density would be 250 residents/hectare (total density), and 485 
residents/hectare (net density); by contrast the new UPIS projects at Hacienda Conde Villa Señor and 
Valdiviezo were planned for a total density of 157 residents/hectare.  
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costs per square metre of the remodelling, the CNV determined that project was viable—that is, 
the estimated monthly payment to be levied from each family, at 10 percent of the average 
income, could be covered by the residents.31  
In summary: one unidad vecinal comprising six barriadas out of a total of 123 in greater 
Lima required a vast amount of detailed research and planning—carrying out the project, and 
convincing residents of its value would be even more arduous. Furthermore, the amount of 
rehablitation needed would likely be far higher in other areas, since Unidad Vecinal No. 6 was 
selected as an ideal site for a trial project, housing a relatively stable workforce earning decent 
incomes, including barriadas formed by public sector employees from the Ministerio de Fomento 
y Obras Públicas (Ministry of Development and Public Works) and the Cooperativa Policial 
(Police Cooperative). 
 
Urbanizaciones Populares de Interés Social 
The families “eradicated” by the remodelling in the Plan Río Rímac area were to be 
rehoused in UPIS (Low-Income Social Housing Subdivision) projects to be established nearby: 
Hacienda Conde Villa Señor with 2,000 lots, and Valdiviezo with 557 lots, would each become a 
new unidad vecinal [5.8].32 Once again, the key structuring element of each plan was the 
location of the various kindergartens and schools, sited to minimize the distance children would 
have to walk [5.12]. In order to reduce costs, initially these settlements were provided with no 
electricity, and no domestic water or sewerage system—only a waste silo in the middle of each 
lot; the services were installed a couple of years later, organized and financed by the residents 
                                                
31 CNV, Remodelación de la Zona 6, 37. 
32 CNV and Mario Bernuy Ledesma, Plan Río Rímac—Anteproyecto de Urbanización Popular de la 
Hacienda Conde Villa Señor: Memoria Descriptiva. (Lima: CNV, December 1961). 
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themselves.33 Only a very basic shelter was provided [5.13-5.14]: located at the back of the 10 
by 20 m. lot, a single room was constructed measuring 10 by 4 m., with party walls of brick at 
the back and on each side; the front of the dwelling was a thin partition wall of matting and 
bamboo, and the roof was of cane and clay. It was expected that residents would gradually 
develop their houses, following plans provided by the housing agency, moving towards the front 
of the lot; in the final stage the initial “primitive roofed area” was intended to become an open 
patio framed by boundary walls. In the August 1963 issue of Architectural Design, John Turner 
offered a positive assessment of Valdiviezo and Conde Villa Señor—“except for the form of the 
provisional house”; despite this deficiency, Turner concluded that the advantage of such 
“planned squatter settlement” projects was that the residents’ investment of money, time, and 
labour in their houses was effectively “guaranteed by the planning and controls exercised by the 
agency.”34 
An evaluation report after twenty years of occupancy found that 45 percent of residents 
had completed their dwellings, building three or more bedrooms to house an average family of 
eight; in one case the space had been subdivided into five tiny dwellings (presumably for rental 
income); many others were still in the process of building [5.15]. Since the program had been 
structured for the acquisition of the dwelling through the rental-sale system, all the residents 
became property owners after ten years. Although each household had apparently been 
provided with full construction plans for a permanent dwelling considered suitable for their 
needs, few if any residents had used them; despite Turner’s confidence in the “planning and 
controls” that the CNV would exercise over the evolution of the project, the residents had not 
                                                
33 MVC, Evaluación técnica y social del programa "Alojamiento H” en la Urbanización Valdiviezo (Lima: 
MVC, 1980-1981). CDI-MVCS.  
34 Turner argued: “The system coincides with the traditional and economically logical process of the 
barriadas themselves—but with very important improvements: the lay-out is far better, the plots more 
regular, there is a minimum supply of drinking water at the start ... and the development will be 
completed, eventually, at a lower cost, thanks to proper initial planning.” John F. C. Turner, “Minimal 
Government-Aided Settlements: Valdivieso and Condevilla Señor Barriadas, Lima, Peru,” Architectural 
Design 33, no. 8 (August 1963): 379. 
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been given any technical assistance, and therefore they had “developed their house freely.”35 
The report concluded that as a result at least 28 percent of the resources invested had led to 
poor results. For example, one family had built windowless rooms to serve as living space and 
bedroom [5.16], and many others had decided against including a patio and other open areas in 
favour of additional living space. Finally, the evaluation report recommended a revised layout for 
future use in similar projects: in the original design, the built walls of each pair of back-to-back 
dwellings formed a wide “H”; the revised plan suggested an elongated “U” for the basic 
structure, sited perpendicular to the back of the lot to avoid the use of party walls and thereby 
allowing each family greater flexibility in their future construction plans [5.17].36 This was a small 
innovation with potentially great impact, but it is not clear whether these revised plans were 
employed. 
Other contemporaneous UPIS projects offered a more substantial minimum unit. UPIS 
Caja de Agua (1964) was planned as a relocation settlement following the eradication of the 
inner-city Cantagallo barriada, which was located in the foothills of the Cerro San Cristobal 
[5.18]; the new site was to the north of these hills, wedged into a small gap in the range [5.19]. 
The core unit was a permanent structure with one or two bedrooms, along with electricity, water, 
and sewerage systems,  and was designed to develop gradually into a complete house, with a 
generous amount of open space for patios and a front garden [5.20]. In the end, as at 
Valdiviezo, due to the lack of technical assistance “the development of the house was left to the 
complete initiative of the recipient.”37 Many residents chose to sacrifice the planned open 
spaces to create additional rooms, or extended towards the street, incorporating the intended 
                                                
35 MVC, “Evaluación de las condiciones físicas-arquitectonicas de las viviendas edificadas por los 
beneficiarios del Proyecto Plan H en la Urbanización Valdiviezo en Lima,” in MVC, Evaluación técnica. 
36 MVC, “Plan “U”: Memoria Descriptiva,” March 1981, in MVC, Evaluación técnica. 
37 Ministerio de Vivienda, Evaluación de un proyecto de vivienda, 162. The report concluded that while the 
housing situation of residents did improve, the social goals of the program concerning their social and 
economic advancement were not achieved because they were highly abstract and ill-defined. 
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front setback into the body of the house [5.21]. These were not the improved dwellings 
envisaged in Law 13517. Meanwhile, 103 Cantagallo families who were disqualified from 
participating in the UPIS project because they failed to meet the income requirements were 
given sheets of matting and offered lots at a peripheral site far from the centre of the city to 
construct their provisional shelters anew.38  
  
Plan Carabayllo 
While the Plan Río Rímac covered long-standing working-class districts close to the 
centre of Lima, other CNV plans responded to the expansion of the city to the south (around the 
Ciudad de Dios site) and to the north (in the desert plains around the foothills of the Comas 
area) [5.22]. Law 13517 had excluded any barriadas established after September 1960 from its 
benefits, hoping in this way to stop further unauthorized settlements. However, invasions in the 
Comas area, which had begun in 1958, continued unabated despite the new legislation—each 
time provoking a ritual show of force from the government, which, with some patience, the 
settlers usually managed to outlast [5.23]. By 1963 the half-dozen squatter settlements in the 
area had a combined population of around 100,000.39 The CNV produced modification schemes 
for some of these incipient barriadas and a master plan for the entire zone [5.24], apparently 
hoping that with early intervention they could be transformed into UPIS projects. This required 
negotiating with residents’ associations which were implementing their own settlement plans, 
drawing up simple, gridded urban layouts and distributing lots to their members. Convincing 
them to cooperate required skills that were more political than technical in nature.  
                                                
38
 Many of the “transferred” families decided to leave these lots (at Collique, north of the Pampa de 
Comas) for different parts of the city; at the same time, this government-organized mass transfer 
triggered a broader, uncontrolled invasion of the Collique site. Ministerio de Vivienda, Evaluación de un 
proyecto de vivienda: Evaluación integral del proyecto de vivienda Caja de Agua-Chacarilla de Otero - 
Programa de núcleos básicos o viviendas semi-acabadas (Lima: Ministerio de Vivienda, Dirección 
General de Edificaciones, 1970), 49. 
39 John F. C. Turner, “Lima Barriadas Today,” Architectural Design 33, no. 8 (August 1963): 375. 
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Once again, John Turner discussed these projects in the August 1963 issue of 
Architectural Design. Since the state had not made a concerted effort to stop these invasions, 
Turner observed that these settlements should be seen as the expected outcome “of a laissez-
faire urban development policy”; however, settlements produced “by these unaided or help-
yourself methods” could not be allowed to continue without intervention by planning 
professionals providing aided self-help in some form, “if there is not to be a total collapse of 
organized city development.”40 One example of a positive intervention, which Turner saw as the 
next logical step from the UPIS model employed at Valdiviezo and Conde Villa Señor, was 
Urbanización Popular Tahuantisuyo, a Comas site with 4,000 plots where the CNV had 
“managed to control the invasion” and convinced residents to accept official oversight of the 
settlement’s planning and growth [5.25].41 Turner concluded that the state’s role should be 
precisely this—“to direct and co-ordinate existing forces and resources (and not to abandon 
them to create havoc or attempt to replace them)”—suggesting that this could be best achieved 
through a large-scale, systematic program on the sites-and-services model. The state simply 
needed to acquire the necessary land,  “allowing its occupancy with an absolute minimum of 
utilities and then following up with the full set once the occupiers are well enough established.”42 
This vision of carefully coordinated government action in order to set up conditions for the now-
organized self-builders to begin consolidating themselves into a viable settlement was a 
workable scheme in theory, but only if implemented by the government immediately, 
comprehensively, and on a massive scale.  
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 John F. C. Turner, “Barriada Integration and Development: A Government Program in San Martín, 
Lima,” Architectural Design 33, no. 8 (August 1963): 377. 
41 For a subsequent discussion of whether these “improved” barriadas were in fact better in terms of 
layout due to the intervention of planners, see Horacio Caminos, John F. C. Turner, and John A. Steffian, 
Urban Dwelling Environments: An Elementary Survey of Settlements for the Study of Design 
Determinants, MIT Report No. 16 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969). 




The concept of the satellite city predated Law 13517, but could also be seen as the 
UPIS in expanded form, as envisaged by Turner. The model was derived in part from Belaúnde: 
for example, the siting of the four satellite cities planned for Lima (Ventanilla, Canto Grande, 
Vitarte, and San Juan) [5.26] neatly filled out the circle of opportunity discussed in Belaúnde’s 
1954 La Prensa article [2.13].43 Of these, all but Vitarte were realized in some form, to varying 
degrees of success. 
The first to get underway was Ciudad Satélite de San Juan, planned as a full-service 
urbanización of 8,000 lots, with the installation of basic services (water, sewerage, electricty, 
paving) beginning in late 1960. Situated adjacent to Ciudad de Dios, San Juan’s urban 
amenities were planned to serve both settlements. The city was to develop “on the basis of a 
program of sites and services [suelo-servicio]” with the CNV providing favourable credit 
packages and technical assistance in self-build construction (including supervised credit) [5.27], 
and making available a range of “typical plans of low-cost dwellings” on the “growing house” 
model for buyers to choose from [5.28].44 According to one account, most owners made use of 
these plans, and a well-organized “local field office served to educate and advise participants, 
inspect and maintain standards, and expedite paperwork.”45 The first “unidad” of 2,000 lots was 
to be allocated to prospective residents in August 1961; by January 17, the CNV had received 
                                                
43 Fernando Belaúnde Terry, “Construyamos hoy para no tener que sanear mañana,” La Prensa, June 13, 
1954. Jean-Claude Driant argues that the underlying motive for establishing such ciudades satélites was 
“to order and legalize the occupation of uncultivated land without affecting the good functioning of the 
highly speculative conventional [real estate] markets.” Jean-Claude Driant, Las barriadas de Lima: 
historia e interpretación (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, 1991), 100-101. 
44
 “Por la vivienda popular: La 2da. fase de Ciudad San Juan será licitada hoy en la mañana,” La Prensa, 
May 16, 1961. 
45 Allan G. Austin and Sherman Lewis, Urban Government for Metropolitan Lima (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1970), 147. 
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23,000 expressions of interest, with 4,000 completed applications,46 and was thus able to select 
a group of well-qualified applicants, which contributed in large part of the success of the 
project—although “the selection process seemed to favour a group that was almost middle 
class.”47 San Juan proved that with effective technical assistance such programs could be highly 
successful, but perhaps only with the upper-tier of low-income households, who had reasonable 
resources to draw upon and could consolidate their dwellings fairly rapidly. At the other end of 
the spectrum, Ventanilla was extremely isolated from the established city and offered few 
resources and little support to its residents. Despite the optimistic projections [5.29], the 
settlement took a long time to consolidate itself, [5.30] and its overscaled public spaces 
maintained a sense of desolation long after occupancy [5.31].48 With few urban amenities and 
no local industry, this was a fringe settlement rather than a satellite city. 
Law 13517 also allowed for private entities to undertake development of UPIS projects 
(subject to the approval of the CNV); these were to be “established in the preferred form with 
the collective work of the pobladores”—that is, based on the principle of aided mutual self-
help.49 Canto Grande was to be one such project:50 its brochure invited prospective residents to 
                                                
46 “El Presidente dice que la Ciudad Satélite de San Juan prueba la preocupación del gobierno por la 
vivienda,” La Prensa, January 3, 1961; “Confianza en la Corporación Nacional de Vivienda: Más de 23 
mil postulantes a los terrenos de San Juan,” El Comercio, January 17, 1961, morning edition. 
47 Allan G. Austin and Sherman Lewis, Urban Government for Metropolitan Lima (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1970), 147. 
48 In addition, there were problems with shoddy construction, delays in providing financning which 
postponed occupancy “and allowed vandalism to occur during the vcacany of 600 of the units.  Design 
errors made the houses easy to rob, the kitchens were unsuited to local cooking habits, and the 
structures were unable to sustain a second storey.” Allan G. Austin and Sherman Lewis, Urban 
Government for Metropolitan Lima (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 145. John Turner was involved 
in the design of some hosuing and schools for this project; Enrique (Henri) Ciriani was responsible for 
some housing and the design of the church. 
49 “las cuales se establecerán en forma preferente con el trabajo colectivo de los pobladores.” 
“Reglamento de la Ley No. 13517: Remodelación, saneamiento y legalización de los barrios marginales: 
Decreto Supremo No. 23,” in Lima: Historia y urbanismo en cifras, 1821–1970, 440. 
50 In his speech announcing the passage of Law 13517, Prado specifically noted the example of Canto 
Grande. Prado, “Discurso,” 9. 
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“imagine founding a city” with an implanted cross, and a conquistador’s helmet and sword 
evoking the very birth of Lima itself [5.32]. Planned for an eventual population of 300,000, this 
was a fully conceived scheme for a satellite city to be made up of seventeen “grandes 
unidades”—including industrial, commercial, recreational, and agricultural zones—that was 
simultaneously expected to operate as a profitable real estate venture. Founded in February 
1961, as of January 1966 the planned “City for 300,000” had a population of 2,000.51 Eventually 
absorbed into the urban sprawl of Lima, Canto Grande never functioned as an independent 
satellite city in any real sense. 
 
In a sense, Law 13517 was at once too ambitious—given the financial and human 
resources that would be required to properly implement it—yet not ambitious enough, since it 
risked being overwhelmed by the pace of unauthorized urbanization. It was  also hampered by 
questionable assumptions concerning the level of financial contribution that residents could 
manage, and the ease of organizing such projects on the human as well as the technical level. 
This was especially true with rehabilitation projects such as Unidad Vecinal No. 6, which do not 
seem to have progressed far beyond the preliminary planning stage—perhaps inevitable given 
the difficulties of convincing settled residents of the program’s merits and positive cost-benefit 
versus the disruptions and expenses of mandatory upgrading, or “eradication” and relocation. 
The “tabula rasa” approach was ultimately easier to implement, and in the first couple of years 
of the new legislative regime a number of projects were initiated, but it also faced problems 
acquiring land, which were part political, part financial in nature: the housing agency was forced 
to rely on using available government land, since “plans for extensive appropriation of private 
land around Lima [were] put off because of a shortage of government funds and opposition from 
                                                
51 “Canto Grande: Una ciudad para 300 mil personas,” Vivienda 2, no. 13 (January 1966): 10-11. 
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the land owners.”52 The program faced an uncertain future, with the challenge of assembling 
sufficient human and financial resources to fulfil the promise of the projected settlements. 
However, there was also some reason for optimism, from a source which could not have 
been anticipated at the time the law was passed. By late 1961, the economic and social 
development of Peru—including its efforts to improve housing provision for low-income 
families—had become an issue of concern for President John F. Kennedy, in the context of the 
Alliance for Progress, the core element of his new Cold War strategy for Latin America. The 
regional superpower’s new interest in supporting progressive initiatives promising bold socio-
economic change gave the Peruvian government access to unprecedented financial resources 
to fund its programs, primarily in the form of subsidized loans. The outcomes of this intervention 
on the policies and programs that had emerged out of Law 13517 is the subject of the next 
chapter.    
                                                
52
 Regional and Urban Planning Implementation, Urban Redevelopment in Peru (Washington DC: RUPI, 
[April] 1966), 22. 
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6. World Investments, Productive Homes  
 
On April 3, 1962, David Rockefeller hosted a one-day symposium on Latin American 
Housing at the headquarters of the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York. The event featured 
speakers from nine Latin American countries,1 the US Department of State and Department of 
Commerce, the Federal Housing Commission, the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
Export-Import Bank, and USAID, as well as the founding director of the Inter-American Housing 
Center (CINVA) in Bogota, Leonard J. Currie [6.1]. In the audience were investment bankers, 
construction material manufacturers, US corporations with interests in the region, and housing 
developers such as World Homes and Nelson Rockefeller’s International Basic Economy 
Corporation (IBEC), as well as Ogden Tanner of Architectural Forum, and four attendees from 
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, including Gordon Bunshaft.2 
This was not (entirely) a philanthropic exercise. As one speaker observed of the current 
situation in Latin America, “[i]t is in the slums of the cities where the battle of democracy will be 
fought”3; as the spoils of victory, the symposium presented the tantalizing prospect of “a vast 
lower middle-class market, once financing mechanisms are developed.”4 Most immediately, 
                                                
1 This was a diverse group, with Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Ecuador by represented by politicians, 
Columbia and Honduras represented by bank presidents, Mexico by architect Mario Pani (involved in a 
number of state-sponsored housing projects), Venezuela by prominent businessman Eugenio Mendoza, 
and Peru by Father Daniel McLellan, a priest with the Maryknoll Mission who was originally from the 
United States. The Chase Manhattan Bank, Housing in Latin America (New York: The Chase Manhattan 
Bank, July 1962), unpaginated. A little over a month later a similar event took place on the west coast: the 
Technical meeting on Residential Capital Formation in Latin American Economics, co-sponsored by the 
Organization of American States and the Graduate School of Business Administration at UCLA, which 
resulted in a publication by Walter D. Harris and James Gillies, Capital Formation for Housing in Latin 
America (Washington, DC: Pan American Union, 1963). 
2 US companies with business interests in Peru represented at the symposium included W. R. Grace & 
Co. and Standard Oil of New Jersey, whose Canadian subsidiary the International Petroleum Corporation 
had largely controlled Peruvian oil production since the early 1920s. IBEC was represented by Rodman 
C. Rockefeller and W. B. Dixon Stroud; World Homes by Floyd M. Baird.  
3 Jose Figueres, former President of Costa Rica, quoted in “Introduction,” Housing in Latin America. 
4 “Self-Help Housing,” Housing in Latin America. 
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improving the living conditions of the rapidly-increasing ranks of the urban underclass offered 
insurance against political radicalism; from a broader perspective, upgrading housing stock 
would bring construction jobs, a stimulus to the production of building materials, as well as the 
market for furnishings and appliances. Improving housing—understood as a “productive 
investment” with benefits far beyond the simple provision of shelter—would pay dividends in 
economic development and social stability, along the way shaping new opportunities for US 
business. According to the symposium organizers, government had its role to play, “[y]et it is 
recognized that the problem must be solved principally by private enterprise.”5 Since the state 
could not build housing on the massive scale required, it should instead focus on providing 
incentives for entrepreneurs to commit their resources to the housing sector: specifically, by 
facilitating access to mortgage credit and fostering deeper reservoirs of personal savings, the 
state could develop a market of consumers with sufficient funds to undertake the purchase of a 
house.  
The private enterprise of each individual family, actualized through the self-help 
construction of their own homes, would also play an important role and was endorsed by many 
speakers on economic as well as moral grounds: self-help lowered the cost of the house while 
increasing the self-sufficiency and initiative of the participants. Teodoro Moscoso of USAID 
noted that the Alliance for Progress favoured such programs precisely because they embodied 
“two fundamental ideals of the Alliance: direct, tangible assistance to the under-privileged 
combined with rigorous self-help.”6 As opposed to charity, this form of aid would operate as a 
bracing tonic to strengthen the beneficiary through its demands. On the other hand, housing 
expert Leonard J. Currie advised that such projects would hold little appeal for business due to 
                                                
5 “Introduction,” Housing in Latin America. 
6
 Teodoro Moscoso, quoted in “Self-Help Housing,” Housing in Latin America.  
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the limited “profit incentive”7; likewise, investment in the construction of low-cost housing offered 
only minimal returns, although the local production of building materials was quite promising. T. 
Graydon Upton of the Inter-American Development Bank was at once more pragmatic and more 
idealistic in his concluding assessment: “although the monetary returns from direct sales or local 
investment may be quite limited, the return in terms of US relations with Latin America and self-
satisfaction at having made a valuable contribution to a major hemisphere problem, may be 
tremendous.”8 Not entirely philanthropy then, but not pure business either.  
Beginning with a discussion of the construction of new financing mechanisms for 
housing in Peru, this chapter explores two key projects that emerged out of this convergence of 
finance, geopolitics, aid, need, and architecture, examining the disparate collection of actors 
involved in the production of low-cost housing and their often unlikely partnerships, inspired by 
competing, or even incompatible, agendas. 
 
Above the familiar logo of the Chase Manhattan Bank, a man labours with trowel and 
roughly-formed bricks, carefully building up the walls of a simple house [6.1]: with this image the 
cover of the symposium report offers a perfect illustration of the hoped-for alliance of rustic 
workman and international finance that is presented within. The photograph—“Home 
construction in progress at Ciudad de Dios”—alludes to events that transformed the direction of 
housing policy in Peru: the Ciudad de Dios invasion on Christmas Eve 1954 which brought 
national focus to the crisis of affordable housing, leading to a government commission 
convened under the leadership of conservative economist and newspaper proprietor Pedro G. 
Beltrán, which recommended the promotion of individual home-ownership, to be achieved 
                                                
7 Leonard J. Currie, quoted in “Self-Help Housing,” Housing in Latin America. 
8 Upton, quoted in “The Role of US Business,” Housing in Latin America. 
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through a combination of self-help construction and expanded availabiity of mortgage credit.9 
This pro-market position was perfectly in line with the priorities of US development policy, and 
as a result, from the late 1950s Peru became a major recipient of US aid for housing through 
various channels.10 The largest single loan (approved in late 1961) was $22.8 million from the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to establish a national program of aided self-help 
housing. A number of smaller loans—by 1969 totalling more than $24 million11—were allocated 
to support a system of mutuales (savings and loans associations) aimed at giving lower-middle-
income consumers easier access to housing finance.12 Although in later years international 
agencies such as the United Nations and the World Bank would become involved in the 
sponsorship of housing programs, the earliest aid for housing in Peru came exclusively from the 
United States. 
                                                
9 Although the photograph appears to show self-built housing, in fact the first stage of the dwelling—
designed on the “growing house” model—was organized as a conventional large-scale construction 
project; however, it was envisaged that the owner’s aided self-help labour would subsequently be used to 
lower the cost of extensions. 
10 These included low-interest loans from Public Law 480 proceeds (disbursed by the Export-Import 
Bank), loans from the Development Loan Fund (DLF), and the Social Progress Trust Fund of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), as well as a housing guaranty program managed by USAID. The first 
of these projects were initiated under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, while the latter two fell under the 
umbrella of President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. See also Walter D. Harris and H. A. 
Hossé. La Vivienda en el Perú/Housing in Peru: A Research Study Conducted in the Department of 
Social Affairs, Pan American Union (Washington: Pan American Union, Department of Social Affairs, 
1963)—an extensive bilingual 700-page study indicative of US engagement with the problem. 
11 Of this, $7.5 million from the Development Loan Fund (DLF, later merged into USAID) went to the 
government of Peru “to assist in regulation and financial support of national system of private mutual and 
cooperative home savings associations”; Mutual El Perú received $2 million in DLF funds and Mutual El 
Pueblo $1 million in IDB funds as seed money to promote the new savings and loans organizations. 
Timothy Atkeson, “Aid for Latin American Housing,” The George Washington Law Review 31, no. 3 
(March 1963): 581-586. Subsequently the the IDB provided another $1.2 million in funding for the 
mutuales (August 1965), as well as $12.58 million for “Housing Subloans” to be distributed through the 
Banco de la Vivienda del Perú (April 1969). Inter-American Development Bank, “Projects,” 
<http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/projects,1229.html>. 
12 In addition, US aid agencies provided small amounts of funding to two US-based corporations that were 
starting operations in the low-cost housing market in Peru: $140,000 in Cooley Loans (Public Loan 480 
funds) to Hogares Peruanos, and a housing guaranty of $1,260,000 administered via USAID to Apollo 
Industries. Atkeson, “Aid for Latin American Housing,” 583-584.  
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Underneath the surface of this image, then, is the issue of how the dynamics of on-the-
ground events, the circumstances of local and national politics, converged with the wider frame 
of US government development programs at this specific moment; how US aid agencies 
seeking to sponsor housing programs within Peru, to reinforce policies amenable to their aims, 
were able to gain traction due to the synergy between their outlook and the positions of key 
actors within Peru. This chapter begins with an examination of efforts to develop new 
mechanisms for housing finance, before turning to a discussion of two very different projects 
focused on the production of low-cost housing. First, the operations of Wichita-based real estate 
developer World Homes—on a self-appointed mission to universalize the “American dream” in 
fulfillment of its credo: “Home Ownership—The Free World’s Unused Weapon”—focusing on its 
endeavours to organize and finance the Villa Los Angeles development in Lima. Second, the 
development and implementation of the Plan Bienal 1962–1963 Perú-BID, an ambitious 
program which aimed to mobilize self-help labour for housing construction in cities throughout 
Peru. Both projects were funded through US government aid programs, and both involved John 
Turner—emerging as an influential expert on self-build housing—as consultant. Turner—a 
Western-trained, Anglophone técnico with the benefit of local, on-the-ground, hands-on 
expertise—can be seen as a translator between US developers and development professionals 
and the Peruvian government, between architecture and social policy; at the same time, he was 
developing his own practice as a housing expert and theorist, absorbing the outcomes of each 
project into a more ambivalent understanding of the self-help methodology.  
 
6.1 The Money Miracle  
 The first substantial US aid programs to Peru emerged during the Second World War, 
overseen by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA), established in 1942 under the direction 
of Nelson Rockefeller. Framed as technical assistance projects and funded jointly by the United 
States and Peru, the programs were largely motivated by national interest rather than altriusm. 
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As one military official observed, “a considerable proportion of these cooperative activities were 
aimed at facilitating the extraction or the production of raw materals needed to further the war 
effort.”13 For example, the Servicio Cooperativo Inter-Americano de Producción de Alimentos 
(SCIPA, or Inter-American Cooperative Food Production Service) initially focused on the 
Amazon region, boosting the production of fresh food for US troops, as well as rubber and 
quinine.14 Following the war, it focused on introducing new “scientific” farming methods (which 
often involved importing US technologies such as machinery) but in the wake of the 1958 
Arequipa earthquake, SCIPA also funded the self-help housing project in rural communities that 
was overseen by Patrick Crooke (discussed in chapter four).  
Apart from the practical, material benefits to the United States of such programs, their 
original strategic aim was to foster hemispheric solidarity against the Axis powers; following the 
war the model was redeployed to ensure “mutual security” in the region by encouraging the 
incorporation of Latin American countries into the Western Bloc rather than the Communist 
world system. In the wake of the Cuban Revolution, these operations would take on an added 
urgency. Under President Harry S. Truman these ad hoc efforts coalesced into the Point Four 
Program, which established technical assistance as a key tool of US foreign policy. Once again, 
Nelson Rockefeller was appointed to implement the program. Originally focused on health, 
agriculture, education, and industrial productivity,15 by the late 1950s it had expanded to include 
entrepreneurial skills such as “marketing, … administrative and management training,” as well 
                                                
13 Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Westphal, “A Report on the Operations,” 1946, quoted in James C. 
Carey, Peru and the United States, 1900–1962 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), 
121. As Carey points out, prior to this the United States had been providing military aid to Peru since its 
Naval Mission was established in 1920; similarly, under the Educational Mission founded in 1920 Peru 
recruited some two dozen US experts to reform its secondary and higher education systems—however 
this civilian technical assistance program was markedly less successful and soon dissolved.  
14 Similar programs were established in the Amazon regions of Brazil and Eastern Bolivia. Claude C. Erb, 
“Prelude to Point Four: The Institute of Inter-American Affairs,” Diplomatic History 9 (Summer 1985): 265. 
15 Erb, “Prelude to Point Four,” 268. 
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as community development, housing, and economic planning.16 In the case of Peru, it also 
comprised technical assistance to guide the establishment of a savings and loans system.17 
In parallel, US-based Christian missions had long operated in Latin America and 
beyond, blending religious and more pragmatic uplift (Rockefeller’s own family had been 
prominent in sponsoring such activities18). Particularly significant in postwar Peru was the 
contribution of the Catholic Maryknoll Fathers. As characterized by one contemporary account, 
the Maryknoll Mission operated under the belief that “the only way to help a man spiritually is 
first to help him materially,” and it generally gave its missionaries “wide latitude in the choice of 
projects into which they may channel their energies.”19 Noted for their particular success were 
Father Robert Kerns, who founded a series of indigenous-language radio schools in the 
southern city of Puno,20 and Father Daniel McLellan, who established a credit union in his Puno 
parish in early 1955 [6.2]. Providing modest loans for personal use (family emergencies, 
medical expenses, funerals, and minor home repairs) or small-scale business ventures, the 
                                                
16 Rollin S. Atwood, “The United States Point Four Program—A Bilateral Approach,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 323, no. 1 (May 1959): 34. 
17 This assistance began in the late 1950s under the auspices of the Comisión para la Reforma Agraria y 
la Vivienda (CRAV, Commission for Agrarian Reform and Housing), with advisers coordinated through 
the International Cooperation Administration (which merged with the Development Loan Fund in late 1961 
to form USAID); the ICA carried out a similar project in Chile. Timothy Atkeson, “Aid for Latin American 
Housing,” The George Washington Law Review 31, no. 3 (March 1963): 558. The advisers included: 
Morton Bodfish, chair of the Executive Committee of the US Savings and Loan League; Stanley Baruch, 
Regional Director for Latin America, Housing Division, ICA; and Raymond P. Harold and Joseph T. 
Benedict of the Worcester Federal Savings and Loan Association. Father Daniel McLellan, “Talk given by 
Father Dan McLellan, President People’s Mutual Association, Lima, Peru: 1st Interamerican Congress of 
Savings and Loans,” January 23, 1963, WHC. 
18 Nelson Rockefeller’s grandfather, “John D. Rockefeller Sr., the greatest supporter of missionaries in his 
generation, expanded and secularized this tradition with the creation of the Rockefeller Foundation.” Erb, 
“Prelude to Point Four,” 253.  
19 Raymond P. Harold and Joseph T. Benedict, Report on Savings and Loan Associations in Peru, 
presented to David E. Bell of USAID, March 29, 1963, p. 9, WHC.  
20 Dan C. McCurry, “US Church-Financed Missions in Peru,” in US Foreign Policy and Peru, ed. Daniel A. 
Sharp (Austin, TX: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1972), 383. 
According to McCurry, the Maryknoll Mission was originally set on China, but world events intervened: 
“Latin America has received many missionaries who were withdrawn from the Orient in the wake of World 
War II and the creation of the People’s Republic of China.” McCurry, 409.  
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credit union grew quickly, finding a ready constituency among the vast numbers of ordinary 
people excluded from conventional bank loans.  
Following McLellan’s lead, 1956 saw the creation of five more credit cooperatives 
throughout Peru; by 1960 there were 207. Of these, the largest group (almost 40 percent) was 
coordinated through the Catholic Church at the parish level, with others organized through 
various workplace or community groups.21 McLellan remarked on the importance of the 
leadership of the Catholic Church—and of the Maryknoll Mission in particular—in this effort: 
“The Protestants and other groups would like to move in but the people want the Church to 
guide them and it is true that through this material aid they come to look more for the spiritual 
guidance of the Church.”22 Raising the standard of living helped to achieve a second goal: 
solidifying the authority and influence of the Church in the lives of its parishioners, effectively 
leveraging faith in the credit union to maintain denominational market share. Evidently Maryknoll 
considered this work to be of great value: in January 1958, McLellan was released from his 
pastoral duties to focus on the credit cooperatives full-time; the following year he began 
teaching workshops on the management of credit cooperatives through the Universidad 
Nacional Mayor de San Marcos in Lima.23  
By fostering the values of private initiative and personal responsibility, and providing an 
opportunity for self-sustaining material advancement, the credit cooperatives were also working 
to construct a bulwark against communist influence, the mutual enemy of capital and the 
Church. The dangers of ideological infiltration were acute, however, and McLellan issued a 
vehement warning concerning the need to remain vigilant:  
                                                
21 Father Daniel McLellan, “Memoria para la Asamblea Episcopal Peruana sobre el desarrollo de 
Cooperativas de Crédito Parroquiales en el año 1960,” n.d, ca. 1961, MMA. 
22 Father Daniel McLellan, “Puno Parish Credit Union,” May 25, 1957, MMA. 
23 McLellan was appointed Director of the Department of Cooperatives in the Institute of Human Relations 
at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. Father Daniel McLellan, “Historical Highlights of 
Credit Union Movement in Peru,” n.d., ca. May 1960, MMA. 
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Communism is always deploying efforts to take control vis-a-vis cooperatives. 
Publications come to us from Prague, and they solicit the exchange of ideas with 
us and with our affiliates.  These publications are a great danger, since they try to 
use the word cooperative, with aims foreign to it, in order to then twist it 
according to their own interests.24 
As emphasized in a number of articles about McLellan’s efforts, although founded on mutualist 
principles, the credit union was very definitely a proto-capitalist venture, offering “a form of self-
help assistance that lets the proud individual keep his pride, and that develops the managers 
and risk-takers for a free, modern society.”25 Initiating its members into the operations of the 
credit market, the cooperative would transform Andean peasants—cast as “backward, 
distrustful, and a severe drag on Peru’s economic structure”26—into model entrepreneurs. As 
McLellan once stated: “The French have their worker priests.  Well, I am a capitalist priest.”27 
McLellan’s original organization, the Puno Parish Credit Union, soon addressed itself to 
the housing problem, and approached the government of Manuel Prado for assistance. A loan 
of S/.450,000 was arranged to facilitate the purchase of land for a model housing scheme, 
which would be developed under the guidance of the government housing agency, the 
Corporación Nacional de la Vivienda (CNV).28 The seventy-two dwellings were to be sold to 
                                                
24 McLellan, “Memoria para la Asamblea,” ca. 1961. 
25
 Lester Velie, “The Money Miracle of Father Dan,” Reader’s Digest (April 1961): 171-173. In a similar 
vein, the credit union was described as “a real self-help institution,” Richard L. Henschel, “The Minor 
Miracle of Padre Dan,” World: The Compact National Newspaper 1, no. 6 (November 22, 1961), WHC; a 
UN committee had “labeled it as the most significant self-help program in Peru’s modern history,” James 
Joyce Donahue, “Father Dan’s Big Adventure,” Saturday Evening Post 234, no. 27 (July 8, 1961); and 
ordinary people saw “hope of liberation in Father Dan’s sensible program of self-help,” Harold and 
Benedict, Report on Savings and Loan Associations in Peru, 9.  
26 Joyce Donahue, “Father Dan’s Big Adventure,” Saturday Evening Post.  
27
 “Father Dan the Money Man,” Time, April 22, 1966.  
28 “The National Corp. of Housing [CNV] is giving us their technical assistance and direction free of cost. 
The National Commission on Housing [CRAV] has named the Puno Parish Plan as a national pilot 
project. Thus a real Community Development Program was started.” McLellan, “Puno Parish Credit 
Union.” Another interesting connection here: in a 1975 interview Turner noted that his “failures and 
occasional successes in the first years … included a rather abortive effort to build cooperative houses in 
Puno for Daniel McLellan.” Barbara Goldstein, “The Originators: John F. Charlewood Turner,” 
Architectural Design, no. 9 (September 1975): 525. 
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members of the credit union, to be paid for with six- or seven-year loans. In line with the 
Maryknoll worldview, McLellan argued that “Christian family life can hardly exist in a mud hut.”29 
Instead, the new “Christian home” appeared in a scene lit by large-paned windows, as the newly 
modern Peruvian family gathered around a neatly set table, in a room furnished with artefacts of 
an imported domesticity—a blender, a radio; the personal transformation was echoed by a 
change is costume, the father’s collared shirt and the son’s baseball cap replacing the poncho, 
chullo (knitted hat), and sombrero [6.3]. In addition to Prado’s government, the credit union also 
impressed the US embassy and the “Point 4 people”: the latter extended their supervised credit 
program to Puno, and granted the manager of the Puno credit union a “Point 4 scholarship … 
for study in Puerto Rico”30—then in the midst of Operation Bootstrap, a massive, US-sponsored 
economic development program. The US embassy provided further support in the form of 
publicity, which apparently included a film about the credit union’s achievements.  
Despite these successes, McLellan was initially reluctant to become involved in the 
savings and loans business: unlike the revolving short-term loans of the credit unions, long-
term, high-value home financing would require a substantial reserve of funds in order to 
commence lending—far more than could be raised through deposits alone. Instead, it was 
Pedro Beltrán who organized the first savings and loan association. After recommending their 
creation in the report of the Comisión para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda (CRAV, or 
Commission for Agrarian Reform and Housing) and helping to devise their founding legislation, 
Beltrán established Mutual El Perú in September 1958. It was quickly granted $2 million from 
the US government’s Development Loan Fund (a precursor agency of USAID) to support its 
initial capitalization; however, by the end of 1960 Mutual El Perú had made few loans. A second 
institution, the Mutual Lima, was only in operation for a brief period before being forced into 
                                                
29 Joyce Donahue, “Father Dan’s Big Adventure,” Saturday Evening Post.  
30 McLellan, “Puno Parish Credit Union.”  
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liquidation as a result of poor management. The combined effect of these abortive efforts was to 
bring the entire initiative into disrepute with the general public.31 Hoping to salvage the program 
by association with his stellar reputation, the Peruvian government and the US “banking team” 
of savings and loan experts providing it with technical assistance turned to McLellan.32 At their 
urging, in late 1960 McLellan agreed to establish a mutual, once assured of legislative support 
(from Peru) and financial support (from the United States).33 McLellan’s Mutual El Pueblo began 
operations on March 1, 1961. 
Meanwhile, in September 1959 President Manuel Prado had appointed Pedro Beltrán as 
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, positions he held until April 1961. Beltrán’s first focus as 
Finance Minister was to stabilize the economy, cutting inflation and increasing foreign 
reserves.34 As Prime Minister, Beltrán—who in the past had used his newspapers to influence 
housing policy—was now in the position to push for the implementation of his own favoured 
projects. However, his approach was not uncontested. In late 1960, at the same time as 
Beltrán’s Mutual El Perú was facing criticism for its lack of progress in establishing lending 
operations, El Comercio—a main rival of Beltrán’s La Prensa—began to publish a series of 
articles questioning his policy priorities, especially his outsized support for the mutuales. These 
progressive critics—partisans of the Movimiento Social Progresista (MSP), including Adolfo 
Córdova (discussed in chapter two), Germán Tito Gutiérrez, and Sebastián Salazar Bondy, as 
                                                
31
 [Father Daniel McLellan], “Long Term Home Loan Financing in Peru,” June 23, 1961, WHC. 
32
 US experts were disappointed that Mutual El Perú had “moved slowly because of conservative 
management.” Atkeson, “Aid for Latin American Housing,” 558.  
33
 Specifically, McLellan agreed to establish the mutual “upon assurance that the Home Loan Bank Law 
would be passed by [the Peruvian] Congress and DLF funds [of] US$7,500,000 would be available to it 
plus the Peruvian government’s matching funds to provide seed capital.” [Father Daniel McLellan], “Long 
Term Home Loan Financing in Peru,” June 23, 1961, WHC. 
34 According to one analysis, his efforts were greatly assisted by a concurrent export boom which 
improved the balance of trade; furthermore, “Beltrán was able to use creative accounting techniques and 
an internal bond issues to stop the monetary expansion.” Geoffrey Bertram, “Peru, 1930–1960,” in The 
Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. VIII. Latin America since 1930: Spanish South America, ed. 
Leslie Bethell (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 447, 444.  
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well as Luis Miró Quesada Garland35—argued that the mutuales were not the panacea 
promised by Beltrán, but could only address the needs of the middle-income market. Further, 
since the loans could also be used to improve an existing dwelling or refinance a mortgage (all 
the while providing costly tax breaks), they would not actually help to build many more houses. 
Most damningly, while supporters claimed for them the heritage of the US Federal Savings and 
Loans system, critics countered that the mutuales were a counterfeit of this prestigious model, 
since the US associations were far better regulated and better armed to prevent the distorting 
influence of speculative investors.36 Elsewhere, Beltrán was condemned for using his 
newspaper to orchestrate support for the mutuales in general, and his own Mutual El Perú in 
particular (“as if it had special virtues that the others lack”). Further, his promise that by 
investing in mutuales, the poor would become homeowners was dismissed as “a marvel similar 
to the multiplication of the loaves and the fishes”; and finally an editorial pointedly endorsed 
Adolfo Córdova’s critique (expressed in La vivienda en el Perú, 1958) of the easy appeal but 
ultimate mendacity of Beltrán’s promise to bestow a “casa propia” on all Peruvians.37 Despite 
these critiques, in February 1961, Prado’s government moved ahead with a comprehensive 
series of policy initiatives, including Law 13517, the proposal to construct satellite cities for Lima 
at San Juan and Ventanilla, and the establishment of the Banco de la Vivienda del Perú 
(Peruvian Housing Bank) to oversee the operations of the newly founded mutuales.38 In the 
same month, President Kennedy announced to the US Congress his intention to forge an 
                                                
35 It seems clear that a series of articles appearing under the byline “LMQG” were written by architect Luis 
Miró Quesada Garland, whose family owned El Comercio. 
36 Germán Tito Gutiérrez, “Verdad y mentira de las Mutuales de Vivienda (2): ‘Mutualistas’ y ‘Viviendas,’” 
El Comercio, October 16, 1960, Sunday supplement; Germán Tito Gutiérrez, “Verdad y mentira de las 
Mutuales de Vivienda (4): ‘Savings and Loan’ y ‘Mutuales’,’” El Comercio, October 30, 1960, Sunday 
supplement. 
37 Tito Gutiérrez, “Verdad y mentira de las Mutuales de Vivienda (4)”; Sebastián Salazar Bondy, “El 
laberinto y el hilo: la otra demogogia,” El Comercio, November 28, 1960, morning edition; “La vivienda y 
la demagogia,” El Comercio, November 29, 1960, morning edition. 
38 “Casa para el que no la tiene,” La Prensa, February 5, 1961, Sunday supplement. 
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“alliance for progress” with Latin American nations. The $500 million in funding that Kennedy 
proposed to initiate this alliance seemed to promise a bright future for Peru’s development 
agenda.  
In order to promote the mutual concept—still unfamiliar to many of its readers—in a 
February 1961 editorial, La Prensa cited Father McLellan (“the apostle of cooperativism in 
Peru”) in order to draw parallels between the credit cooperative and the mutual: according to the 
newspaper, both were “Christian solutions” which drew on “the ancient communitarian roots, so 
characteristic of the psychology of this country … practised since the Inca Empire.”39 A 
promotional magazine produced by the Banco de la Vivienda—entitled simply Vivienda 
(Dwelling)—continued the campaign in every issue [6.4]. Advertisements featuring proverbially 
thrifty species—ant, bird, and bee—sought to naturalize the savings regime, while the vision of 
a vast city populated by 100,000 savings-and-loan members promised the community of home 
ownership. The houses presented to the reader were universally “modern” in their stylistic 
markings—flat-roofed boxes with large window openings filled with gridded glass panes—
although the magazine frequently featured examples of colonial architecture on the cover, as if 
to reconcile the images of (Peruvian) tradition and (Americanized) modernity. Vivienda eagerly 
reported on the stories of “modest families” who had managed to attain their dream homes, but 
in many cases they had done so via winning promotional lotteries organized by the mutuales 
rather than completing the purchase of the house themselves [6.5]. More typical was the case of 
the Contreras-León family, both parents working as high-school teachers, who had built their 
house in a brand-new neighbourhood with “[w]ide avenues, groves, parks, good nighttime 
illumination”—all elements which made “forceful arguments to attract middle-class families.”40 It 
was relatively easy to join the mutual: prospective homeowners could open an account with as 
                                                
39 “Cooperativas y mutuales: Solución cristiana,” La Prensa, February 22, 1961. 
40




little as S/.50, and as their deposits had reached S/.250 they would begin to receive interest on 
their investment; once they had “demonstrate[d] a real will to save” the mutual would lend up to 
90 percent of the cost of the house. However, with dwellings at one project defined as “social 
interest housing” costing S/.280,000 (in 1968), reaching the requisite 10-percent deposit still 
represented a considerable challenge for the vast majority of households. Indeed, the residents 
of this development were identified as “white-collar workers, teachers, técnicos, experts in 
middle management [de mando intermedio]”41—all clearly middle-income occupations. This did 
not exactly square with the definition of “social interest housing” as set down by the 
Organization of American States: “housing … that is attainable in such a way that it does not 
prove to be burdensome on the family budget of people of limited economic resources.”42  
Nonetheless, the mutuales did support a range of projects, since they were required to 
set aside 12.5 percent of their loanable funds for upgrading projects. For example, with their 
local priest as intermediary, twenty-eight families living in Pasaje Defensa, within the San Martín 
de Porres barriada in Lima, undertook small loans of approximately S/.3,000 each in order to 
pay for the installation of electricity in their homes as well as street lighting [6.6]. One resident 
noted that as soon as the money was repaid, they were planning to approach the mutual again 
to arrange “another loan to build a good paved footpath and to complete the houses.”43 
However, McLellan objected to this requirement on the grounds that within a couple of years of 
operation, his Mutual El Pueblo “had made 85.77 percent of these loans in the Lima-Callao 
area, and … given the three-year maximum terms allowed by the Housing Bank (which put 
these loans far out of the reach of those who needed them the most), the market was 
                                                
41
 “El ahorro que a Usted le conviene...: Como hacerse socio de una Mutual,” Vivienda 2, no. 23 
(November 1966): 7-10; “Casas de interés social con acabados de lujo se entregaron en 
Ingeniería,”Vivienda 4, no. 45 (September 1968): 6-7. 
42
 “Elio: una urbanización a pocos minutos del centro de Lima,” Vivienda 1, No. 5 (May 1965): 8-9. 
43 “Luz para el Pasaje ‘Defensa,’” Vivienda 2, no. 22 (October 1966): 6-7.  
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saturated”;44 as a consequence, McLellan estimated that $1 million in mutual funds were sitting 
idle waiting for borrowers who would not appear. 
More usually, the mutuales sponsored new housing developments—whether organized 
by housing cooperatives established to serve government employees, or built by the state 
housing agencies themselves (such as the Urbanización Santa Cruz [6.35]), or promoted as for-
profit ventures by private developers.45 The mutual funding was particularly crucial to this last 
group, since they could not count on a pool of dedicated buyers (as with cooperative projects) or 
access to government resources (as with state housing). A case in point was the Wichita-based 
firm Hogares Peruanos, whose customers received some of the first loans granted by Father 
McLellan’s Mutual El Pueblo.   
 
6.2 The Wichita-Lima Axis  
According to his own account, World Homes founder Willard Garvey first became 
interested in establishing an international home-building corporation in 1958 [6.13]. His father, 
R. H. Garvey, had been an agribusiness pioneer, starting with a mortgage investment firm, and 
then amassing extensive land-holdings to form his Wichita-based grain empire. Willard was 
particularly involved with the family’s real estate concerns, beginning with the construction of 
grain elevators: in the 1950s alone the firm built eleven grain terminals, giving them the capacity 
to store almost 200 million bushels.46 The Garveys diversified into housing in 1941, as Wichita’s 
population swiftly doubled with the influx of wartime workers to staff the area’s aircraft factories. 
Writing two decades later, Garvey recalled their first development: twenty houses selling for 
$350 each, located on a marginal site “outside the city limits on gravel roads” and with only 
                                                
44 Sean M. Elliott, Financing Latin American Housing: Domestic Savings Mobilization and US Assistance 
Policy (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1968), 86. 
45 “Vivienda para los servidores del estado (VISPE),” Vivienda 1, no. 3 (March 1965): 8-9; “Presidente 
inaugura Urbanización Santa Cruz,” Vivienda 2, no. 18 (June 1966): 2-3; “La casa mil uno de Salamanca 
de Monterrico,” Vivienda 2, no. 14 (February 1966): 2-3.  
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provisional services—“a WPA outdoor toilet, pitcher pump for water and city electricity.”47 By 
1946, when Garvey returned from his wartime service in Europe, the development was 
incorporated into the city: 
paved streets, sewers, modern plumbing, wings, annexes, fences, porches, and 
shrubbery had been added. I was struck with the basic principle of the motivation 
provided by pride of homeownership.… [which] causes a man who had property 
to help himself to exercise his own enlightened self interest through economic, 
political, socio-moral, creative, and ideological activities which are the five realms 
of human endeavour. It separates him with an iron curtain from the non-
homeowner just as the free world is separated from the communist world.48 
In contrast to his father, who was a strict isolationist,49 Willard Garvey was deeply 
engaged with the question of US influence in the international sphere, in line with his fellow 
Kansas Republican, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Garvey had served as the adjutant general of the 
Allied Komendatura in Berlin, and—as he recalled—“stood 45 feet away from Stalin” at the 
Potsdam conference,50 experiences that evidently left him with a heightened awareness of Cold 
War geopolitics. In 1958, Garvey become involved in supporting another Wichita-based 
entrepreneur, Bill Graham, and his associates, in their efforts to develop low-cost housing 
internationally, operating under the name Private Enterprise Inc. Following a meeting between a 
                                                                                                                                                       
46 Craig Miner, “R. H. Garvey: 'Operations are Interesting,'” in John Brown to Bob Dole: Movers and 
Shakers in Kansas History, ed. Virgil W. Dean (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 261.  
47 There is a surface similarity here with the initial situation of many squatter settlements, with the 
substantial difference that—lacking economic resources and secure tenure—they generally remain in this 
provisional state for much longer. 
48 Willard Garvey, “This is a chronology of low-cost private housing as a Builders, Inc. concept,” n.d., ca. 
March 1960, WHC. Garvey’s explanation of the “creative” dimension of human endeavour referenced the 
29,000 workers in Wichita who were laid off at the end of the war: “Fortunately for Wichita, 65% of these 
discharged workers were home owners.” Left without income, and tied to “the community where they had 
established their roots,” they started their own businesses in order to support themselves: “In effect, these 
Wichita home owners were an example of the creative power of private initiative going to work literally to 
save their homes.” (As Patrick Geddes observed in his 1918 Indore Report: “nothing fixes people like a 
good house.”) Willard Garvey, “Home ownership—The Free World’s Unused Weapon,” n.d., ca. March 
1960. WHC. At the request of Senator Frank Carlson of Kansas, this text, along with Garvey’s statement 
promoting the concept of “Wheat for Homes,” was entered into the Congressional Record—Senate, for 
May 2, 1960. 
49 Miner, “R. H. Garvey,” 260. 
50 Jerry Siebenmark, “Willard Garvey has built legacy as Wichita developer, government critic,” Wichita 
Business Journal 16, no. 13 (March 30, 2001): 4. 
  
167 
member of this group and President Eisenhower (apparently arranged at the President’s 
request to discuss “developing the individual, ‘the basic solider,’ abroad”), Garvey helped to 
write a “one-page resume” (again at the President’s request) “on how best to help people to 
help themselves.”51 This text—entitled “Every Man a Capitalist” as a riposte to Kruschev’s 
“every man a communist”—warned that since communism “has tripled in 10 years and may gain 
100% of the world in 10 more,” the United States needed a straightforward and appealing 
“Master Plan” to reach “the little man” being targeted for communist recruitment. The strategy 
should be to focus on basic human needs: shelter, food, and clothing. Of these, “[s]helter, or 
home, has most appeal. It is the ‘little man’s’ best chance to be a capitalist or a property 
owner.”52 To implement this plan, the US government itself should act as housing developer on 
a trial project, tapping its various international aid programs for “interim financing.” If successful, 
the program could be repeated, with some involvement from the private sector, in perpetuity.53 
The short-term goal was “Ten million new private homes this year”; the intermediate goal, one 
hundred million new homes; and eventually, “Every man a home owner.” Rather than earning 
any wages, the construction worker should be remunerated in kind:  
Perhaps surplus flour (“food”) in sacks (“clothing”) could be taken by [the] 
construction worker to pay one half his labour and the other half taken as 
downpayment or equity in a house (100 workers build 100 houses, move in, then 
hire another 100 workers?).54  
In this highly efficient operation, simultaneously targeting all basic needs, the worker—reframed 
as an involuntary self-help home-builder—becomes the (captive) market for his own product, 
and is instantly unemployed to make way for the next batch of workers. 
                                                
51 The initial meeting was between Eisenhower and Dr. Ronald Meredith. Garvey, “This is a chronology of 
low-cost private housing,” n.d., ca. March 1960. 
52 [Willard Garvey, Ronald Meredith, et al.], “Every Man a Capitalist,” June 19, 1958, WHC.  
53 “National Association of Home Builders, private home builders and other private investors might help 
with money, supervision and know-how and copy with similar projects.” “Every Man a Capitalist,” June 19, 
1958. 
54 “Every Man a Capitalist,” June 19, 1958.  
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Two months later Garvey expanded on these thoughts in a presentation to the 
Committee on Foreign Economic Practices, an advisory body of the Commerce Department.55 
By this time, he was himself investigating the possibility of building low-cost housing overseas, 
in Nicaragua.56 Garvey recommended that the United States focus its efforts where it clearly 
had the upper hand over the Soviet Union: “Let’s hit them where they live, housing and food.”57 
Specifically, through the Public Law 480 program (also known as “Food for Peace”), established 
under Eisenhower in 1954 to dispose of surplus agricultural products in the form of overseas 
aid, the United States should “lend” its food surplus to developing countries with repayment 
scheduled on a long-term, low-interest basis. The proceeds of these transactions (which could 
not be converted into US dollars and repatriated) should then be reinvested in the purchasing 
country “as long-term mortgage financing on low-cost privately owned homes.”58 As titans of 
agriculture, the Garvey family was receiving around $15 million a year in government subsidies 
to grow grain, to not grow grain (thanks to the federal soil bank program), and to store grain;59 
                                                
55 Garvey’s stated aims in addressing the committee were to assist Private Enterprise Inc. in getting 
clearance to “help them on their way to provide a pilot plan that others may follow”; and to help the 
committee “explore its broader charge to come up with a Marshall Plan or better” as “your committee 
seeks to combat Kruschev’s cold war.” Willard Garvey, “Talk presented by William Graham, Robert 
Martin, and Willard Garvey to the Committee on Foreign Economic Practices of the Business Advisory 
Committee in Washington, DC, August 28, 1958,” WHC. 
56 Garvey had been approached “by a man who said he was purchasing agent for the President of 
Nicaragua … [who] wanted 7,000 low-cost privately owned houses to be built by private builders.” 
Garvey, “Talk presented,” August 28, 1958. 
57 Garvey, “Talk presented,” August 28, 1958. 
58 Willard W. Cochrane, “Public Law 480 and Related Programs,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 331 (September 1960): 15. The three other channels (Titles) were: grants of 
produce for emergency situations, donations of food distributed through relief agencies, and “the barter of 
surplus agricultural commodities for strategic and other materials produced abroad.” Cochrane’s 
assessment (covering 1954-1959, the first five years of the program’s operation) was that around half of 
the PL 480 funds, “or $1.8 billion, has been allotted to loans to foreign governments for economic 
development. But, as of March 31, 1959, less than a third of that amount has been disbursed on projects. 
Further, we have no way of knowing how many of these paper projects have reached completion and 
have added to the stock of effective capital, or how many of these projects would have been undertaken 
anyway out of some kind of internal financing.” Cochrane, “Public Law 480 and Related Programs,” 16. 
59 Garvey’s embrace of self-help principles was neatly matched by his superlative ability to help himself to 
whatever state resources were on offer. This was a rich family tradition—a 1959 article noted that 
Willard’s father, R. H. Garvey, was one of the most effective “harvesters” of the nation’s “scandalous farm 
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under this new proposal, when surplus grain was sold overseas Garvey would access the 
proceeds to fund his housing ventures. 
Garvey pointed out that as of late 1958, $89 million in PL 480 funds were awaiting 
reinvestment in a range of countries, including Mexico, Turkey, and India. Since the money had 
not yet been committed to specific projects, he suggested that it should be earmarked for 
housing.60 After receiving in-principle support for this proposal from the Export-Import Bank—
which was charged with distributing the PL 480 funds—Garvey now asked the bank to 
recommend where to start his operations (since by this stage, his Nicaraguan prospect had 
fallen through). They advised him that “the real demand” was “in the Eastern hemisphere, 
Pakistan, India, etc.” but suggested mounting a trial program closer to home for ease of 
supervision. Only three countries in the region still had funds available—Colombia, Ecuador, 
and Peru—so in February 1959 Garvey undertook a research trip to determine how his plan 
would be received by the prospective hosts. Apparently he found greatest encouragement in 
Peru, where he met with government officials, bankers, and entrepreneurs who were generally 
enthusiatic about the scheme.61 Pedro Beltrán—who had established his Mutual El Perú only a 
few months earlier and no doubt welcomed the prospect of additional business—made a 
particularly good impression on Garvey for the manner in which he used his newspaper to 
forward his ideas on the housing problem: “Most of the newspapers in this country have lost 
                                                                                                                                                       
subsidy program.” In addition to the 27! percent tax break claimed by his 500-well oil company and the 
FHA-insured mortgages supporting his Wichita-based house-building firm, over the previous four years 
Garvey had received almost $800,000 in support loans for the wheat he had grown, as well as over 
$400,000 “in cash from the federal soil bank program for the acreage he left idle.” Finally, thanks to his 
massive grain elevator business, “[t]he US Department of Agriculture pays him $14.7 million a year to 
store surplus wheat, corn, and grain sorghums.” “Garvey’s Gravy,” Time, June 8, 1959.  
60 Garvey, “Talk presented,” August 28, 1958.  
61 Apparently Garvey also visited Ecuador, where officials were less receptive to his project; it is not clear 
whether he went to Colombia. Howard Wenzel, Special Report to Floyd Baird on “Lee Thayer’s questions 
concerning his case study of Hogares Peruanos,” August 13, 1960, WHC. 
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your crusading zeal, much to my regret.”62 This favourable opinion was apparently shared by 
one senior US aid official who reported that Beltrán was “one of the strongest advocates of 
private housing in the entire world.”63 (Similarly, in greeting Beltrán’s appointment to the prime-
ministership, Ludwig von Mises described him as “a tireless champion of political and economic 
liberty”;64 Milton Eisenhower, the president’s brother, went further, citing Beltrán’s pleas as the 
inspiration for his own advocacy of the importance of aid to Latin America.65)  
By August 1959 Garvey had established the World Homes headquarters in Wichita, and 
the following month the Export-Import Bank approved a loan of $140,000 in PL 480 funds as 
partial financing for a project of seventy-two houses in Peru. In October, manager Howard 
Wenzel arrived in Lima to set up World Homes’ first office [6.7]: Hogares Peruanos, or Peru 
Homes (code name: Operation Guinea Pig).66 On his first exploratory trip Garvey had held “sort 
of an informal contest” and selected Ernesto Aramburú to be the architect of the first Hogares 
Peruanos project.67 In April 1960 the Hogares Peruanos Model House opened to the public, and 
by the end of the year the firm had completed its first group of houses, financed using the PL 
                                                
62 Willard Garvey, letter to Pedro Beltrán, March 19, 1959, WHC. 
63 Howard Wenzel (citing the opinion of “Mr Stanley Baruch of the ICA, a good friend”), letter to Pedro 
Beltrán, November 18, 1959, WHC. Wenzel had only recently arrived in Lima to head the Hogares 
Peruanos office and was writing to Beltrán in an effort to enlist his help in expanding his contacts within 
the Peruvian business community. 
64 Ludwig von Mises, quoted in Pedro G. Beltrán, ed. Salazar Larraín, 26. 
65 Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America (Garden City: Doubleday, 
1963), 205-206, quoted in Fredrick B. Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics: Peru, Bolivia, 
and Ecuador (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 274. 
66 Wenzel attended Harvard Business School, and began to make connections in Washington through 
one of his professors, Raymond Miller; he received an invitation from Eisenhower him to attend a seminar 
on international aid, where he met Bill Graham, who offered him a job with his new firm Private 
Enterprises Inc., based in Wichita; from there Wenzel moved on working for Garvey, who was having 
more success with his international enterprises. “Community Memories: Howard Wenzel Story,” Harvard 
Business School, <http://institutionalmemory.hbs.edu/memories/howard_wenzel_story.html>.  
67
 Wenzel noted that Aramburú’s political connections would greatly faciliate the firm’s efforts to negotiate 
the building approval process: “Aramburú … will probably be far more valuable to us because he is head 
building inspector for Lima and on the Bd. of National Housing Corp. than because of his architectural 
ability (which is still highly regarded in Lima).” Howard Wenzel, “Status Report,” January 2, 1960. 
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480 funds [6.8].68 (Meanwhile, the Model House had been paid for with a loan from the 
University of Wichita—Garvey’s alma mater—which they were apparently expected to classify 
as an overseas research venture.69)  
As with most Hogares Peruanos projects, the design followed the “growing house” 
model, originally devised in 1954 by architect Santiago Agurto (discussed in chapter two). 
Beginning with a minimal core unit, the dwelling would evolve over time as the family’s needs 
and resources changed, extending horizontally into the garden and vertically with an additional 
storey, facilitated by the flat roof; all the while the pattern of expansion would follow the original 
plans set out by the architect, which would be provided to the buyers with their purchase. As 
Wenzel described the rationale:  
It is the desire of most middle class Peruvians to own a two-storey house.  For 
this reason most one floor houses constructed in the low and middle cost range 
in Lima are prepared for second floor construction.  The buying public insists on 
it.70 
The “growing house” was a conventional dwelling in the sense that it conformed to basic 
building codes and standards of amenities and was sited on legally-acquired land, but it 
borrowed and formalized the incremental construction of squatter housing to create an 
affordable dwelling for the lower-middle-income market.71  
                                                
68 Although this first group of houses sold well, within a few months serious problems had appeared with 
cracking in the concrete, necessitating repairs to all the houses. The costs were shared fifty-fifty by the 
contractors (Silva and Araujo) and the architect (Aramburú). Howard Wenzel, “Status Report,” June 6, 
1961, and August 21, 1961, WHC. 
69 Letter Ralph Wulz, Treasurer of the University of Wichita, to Howard Wenzel, January 6, 1960, WHC; 
Wenzel, Letter to Floyd M. Baird, February 9, 1960, WHC. 
70 “Plans are given to the buyer at the time of purchase indicating the manner in which the house can be 
quickly expanded adding bedrooms, a complete dining room, etc. This gives the buyers the assurance 
that they can add space as their needs and available funds permit.” Howard Wenzel, Letter to the Contest 
Editor of American Builder, October 5, 1962, WHC. Wenzel was describing the Atlas model from Sol de 
Oro. The magazine gave the project a Special Award in the category “Awards of Quality,” in “Announcing 
American Builder’s Model Homes Contest Winners,” American Builder (December 1962): 135.  
71 In a letter to Stanley Baruch of the ICA, Wenzel also claimed that the “growing house” model had 
contributed to the Peruvian economy because “we have created a market for additional building materials 
and labor which is being used by the homebuyer to add driveways, additional bedrooms, and a second 
floor.” Howard Wenzel, Letter to Stanley Baruch, Regional Director for Latin America, Housing Division, 
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Hogares Peruanos was not the only US housing firm operating on this basis in Peru at 
the time. In July 1960, Wenzel reported that Coral Ridge Properties, based in Fort Lauderdale, 
was looking to buy land in Lima for a housing development and that the International Basic 
Economy Corporation (IBEC) was “expected down here within a month”; two years later, 
Pittsburgh-based Apollo Industries appeared on the scene, working with the financial backing of 
Equitable Life Insurance and an investment guaranty arranged through USAID.72 Of these, 
IBEC was both its strongest competitor, and closest to its larger goals; as World Homes 
executive Floyd M. Baird wrote to an IBEC counterpart: 
Our housing interests seem to be parallel and our aims the same in achieving 
property or home ownership on the broadest possible basis for the people in the 
world.  We believe this is the fundamental basis for private enterprise, 
competitive capitalism, and the single thing that the United States can contribute 
to these underdeveloped countries. 
If we can work together on any projects from time to time, please let us know.73 
Following the Second World War, Nelson Rockefeller had continued his engagement with the 
development agenda in Latin America, and through his family, established two complementary 
private organizations: the American International Association for Economic and Social 
Development, which would undertake projects in health and education along the lines set by the 
Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA), and IBEC, which would operate on a for-profit basis in 
order to stimulate economic development, “to increase the production and availability of goods, 
things, and services useful to the lives or livelihoods of their peoples, and thus to better their 
                                                                                                                                                       
ICA, January 26, 1961, WHC. The growing house was employed by other private developers targeting 
this market: see advertising for the Canto Grande development using the slogan: “The house that grows, 
while your savings advance!” 
72 Howard Wenzel, “Status Report,” July 14, 1960; Howard Wenzel, “Status Report,” July 11, 1962. 
According to Carey, by 1964 Apollo had built one hundred houses; as he noted, although it was called as 
low-cost: “At 123,500 soles (about $4,500) this is not ‘low-cost’ for the majority of Peruvians, but it does 
bring capital into a field where it is much needed, and where it should work to improve housing conditions 
in general.” Carey, Peru and the United States, 226. 
73 Floyd M. Baird, letter to Robert Purcell, President of IBEC, December 6, 1962, WHC. 
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standards of living.”74 IBEC began operations in Venezuela, where Rockefeller had previous 
experience with business ventures;75 its projects were varied, including food production (milk 
pasteurization, poultry breeding), US-style supermarkets, investment banking, manufacturing, 
and housing.76 While it had some involvement with self-help housing—undertaking the global 
manufacture and distribution of the CINVA-RAM, a manually-operated machine for fabricating 
rammed-earth bricks77—its chief aim was to produce housing using the most efficient 
construction technology at its disposal. Beginning with 1,500 houses in Puerto Rico, IBEC 
continued with projects in the Middle East, Chile, and Peru; by 1965, it had completed 1,000 
houses at its Lima development, Salamanca de Monterrico [6.9-6.10].78  
Meanwhile, in accordance with its innovative business model, Hogares Peruanos now 
pursued various sources of development aid to finance its next projects—applying for a second 
round of PL 480 funds, as well as loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, and a 
housing investment guaranty from USAID. Its next two projects were located on adjacent sites 
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 IBEC draft certificate of incorporation, as quoted in Wayne G. Broehl, The International Basic Economy 
Corporation, United States Business Performance Abroad, no. 13 (Washington: National Planning 
Association, 1968), 9. As an illustration of the overlapping interests of capitalist entrepreneurship and 
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Emphasis in original. 
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76 Broehl, The International Basic Economy Corporation, 85. 
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 See CINVA-RAM: Portable Block Making Press (Bogotá: Inter-American Housing Center, 1957). 
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Agriculture Ministry and the US Agency for International Development examine an idea for ‘minimarkets’ 
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Peruvian Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 56, 103. 
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[6.11], but aimed at quite different markets: Sol de Oro would be developed as a speculative 
venture with the houses sold on the open market, while Villa Los Angeles had been initiated by 
members of a housing cooperative who had approached Hogares Peruanos to be their 
developer after visiting the Model House. 
Sol de Oro was promoted using a sophisticated marketing campaign that played on the 
popular appeal of the US space program, with its streets named after planets, stars, and 
astronomers. The naming of the four model houses continued this theme, with some 
misalignments—perhaps an inevitable by-product of Cold War ambiguities: Explorer and 
Discoverer were known as space research programs, though the latter actually performed CIA 
reconnaissance; Atlas was a space launch rocket that doubled as an intercontinental ballistic 
missile, while Polaris was a nuclear missile pure and simple. The housing was presented as 
modern and sophisticated, the single-family dwellings with cars in the driveway invoking an 
imagined Americana suburbia (although in fact these flat-roofed row houses would never have 
appeared in a US subdivision) [6.12-6.13]. With funds from the Alliance for Progress backing the 
mortgages available to buyers, Hogares Peruanos made a point of using the organization’s logo 
on the publicity materials, betting on the added cachet of Kennedy’s new program.79 (On his 
1965 trip to Latin America, Senator Robert Kennedy would visit the development, accompanied 
by Father McLellan [6.14].) 
On paper at least, Villa Los Angeles would seem to be a less profitable venture, but its 
suitability to the broader Hogares Peruanos mission—and to the priorities of funding agencies, 
which “wanted to reach lower down the income scale”80—offered other incentives for the firm to 
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take on the project. More than a business, Hogares Peruanos operated as a philanthropic-
ideological-entrepreneurial conglomerate with multinational ambitions, endeavouring to 
proselytize free market values wherever US aid funding led it, under the dual objectives of 
making “a fair profit” and advancing its motto “Every Man a Home Owner.”81 This ideological 
commitment was not just a public relations posture: as becomes evident in the company’s 
internal memos, business decisions were never simply financial in nature, but guided in large 
part by considerations of their strategic impact in furthering the cause. As a case in point: the 
500 members of the Villa Los Angeles cooperative—many of them low-income families—had 
been paying small weekly fees over several years to build up sufficient funds to buy the land for 
their housing project. As Howard Wenzel observed, it was more usual for such cooperatives to 
acquire their land through organized invasion, “then claiming the land … under squatters’ 
rights.”82 Wenzel argued that by respecting private property and abiding by the law, this group 
had set a positive example which deserved to be endorsed via aid support.83 Elsewhere, 
Wenzel reported on the culture shock he experienced in real-estate negotiations with wealthy 
limeños on discovering that this ideological commitment was not shared: “The Peruvian rich 
love to talk about the social problem of housing and how the ‘revolution’ may come unless they 
do something about it but when money is involved the social conscience goes out the 
                                                                                                                                                       
wanted. Apparently the Board of the IDB is thinking in terms of self-help projects.” Baird, letter to 
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window.”84 For the Peruvian elite, there was no question of making concessions on a business 
level to forward a particular agenda—profit came before altruism, ideology, or class interest, 
whereas for Hogares Peruanos, promoting the pro-capitalist message was part of the 
company’s core business plan. 
Since purchasing the land for the Villa Los Angeles development would likely exhaust 
the savings of many families, it was anticipated that they would complete their houses through 
self-help labour. Wenzel expressed great enthusiasm about the potential of this model, 
emphasizing its importance as a trial project: 
Self-help offers the real long-run solution to the housing problem in the 
developing countries and if a private company can develop a system for 
profitably working in this field the market is unlimited. Not to mention the 
tremendous social contribution that will be made and the propaganda in the 
struggle with Communism.85 
Having committed the firm to the self-help model, Wenzel recommended John Turner to 
coordinate the project. In general, the prefered Hogares Peruanos modus operandi was to find 
an investment partner to share the financial risks of its projects; in this case, Wenzel reported 
that Turner lacked the funds for such an arrangement (he had been “unemployed during 1958 
and part of 1959 since there was little doing in Self-Help here”), but he was prepared to work for 
out-of-pocket expenses until the financing came through.86 More importantly, Wenzel argued 
that Turner’s expertise was invaluable, and enthusiastically recommended Turner’s Arequipa 
report to officials at World Homes.87 For its part, the company would act as “technical and 
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financial consultants” for the project, offering their services for 10 percent of the net construction 
costs.88 Although the cooperative agreed to this deal, the IDB—providing mortgage financing to 
the Villa Los Angeles association members en bloc, since they had all been persuaded to join 
McLellan’s mutual—objected, arguing that 2 percent was the usual fee; in the end, they settled 
on 5 percent.89 At such times, its heavy reliance on US government aid funds presented 
particular challenges to the company’s efforts at profitability. 
At Villa Los Angeles Turner began by commissioning “an exhaustive market research 
study” of prospective residents,90 carried out by anthopologist Eduardo Soler who had 
previously worked with Turner on the project for W. R. Grace and Company at Paramonga. It 
soon became evident that the majority preferred to pay for contractor-built houses and had 
sufficient means to undertake a mortgage (although many could only afford “a minimum house” 
which they would finish themselves). The remaining 25 percent would have access to no 
resources but their own labour.91 Turner now prepared the initial plans for the urban layout and 
for the various house types required to accomodate the different budgets. The site plan [6.15] 
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was defined by pre-existing boundaries and, in accordance with planning regulations, 40 
percent of the land was set aside for park space. In order to reduce paving costs—and since 
few residents would have cars—the passageways between the lots were no wider than double 
sidewalks. The effect was to create multiple points of pedestrian access to the central spine of 
green space, while limiting cars to parking areas at the centre and at either end of the 
development. The most basic house [6.17] consisted of two bedrooms, a living-dining room, an 
outside toilet, an outside kitchen protected with a roof of straw matting (called a cocina ramada), 
and an area in the backyard “to keep chickens and other animals.”92 With extensions and a 
second storey the house could include up to five bedrooms. Block plans demonstrated a mixture 
of different houses, reflecting the variety of incomes and needs [6.16]; with the incremental 
development of the dwellings, the streetscape would be continually evolving. 
Each house was available in finished or unfinished states—the latter, “minimum” house 
being considerably less expensive; provided with the bare structure and basic plumbing 
connections, self-help labour would take care of the rest.93 Proceeding in this way, residents of 
the minimum dwelling could move in as soon as basic construction was completed, and, living 
on site, could work on their houses “in their spare time”—otherwise, since the development was 
on the urban periphery and most worked in central Lima, they would only be able to work on 
Sundays, leading to a protracted construction period that would adversely affect neighbourhood 
coherence.  In an additional effort to accommodate the lower-income residents, Turner’s project 
proposal envisaged the establishment of a cement block factory on-site to provide well-paying 
local jobs, a gesture in the direction of holistic community development.  
Estimates of the time needed for construction were unduly optimistic: less than a year for 
the installation of services (roadways, water reservoir, etc.) and the completion of all contractor-
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built houses, and eighteen months for the self-build housing.94 In fact, work was repeatedly 
delayed by the process of preparing aid applications, waiting for approvals, and arranging for 
money to travel through the bureaucracies of US funders and Peruvian housing agencies. In 
contrast, by using its own construction funds, IBEC was able to get its projects off the ground 
much more quickly.95 As a solution to this problem, Hogares Peruanos seriously considered the 
possibility of taking over an existing mutual or establishing their own,96 or even becoming a 
wheat broker—selling grain directly to Peru, and using the profits to establish a “revolving fund” 
for mortgage financing that would be directly controlled by the company or its associated 
businesses.97 None of these projects came to fruition, leaving the company tied to the agendas 
and procedures of the development agencies. 
In the meantime, Wenzel began to explore alternative proposals for the housing. In 
March 1962 engineer Leonard Oboler submitted two designs for consideration: a standard 
three-bedroom house, and a “Paraboloid Roof House” consisting of “a simple shell roof, middle 
column and cement floor with one enclosed bathroom.”98 This second design would serve as 
the core of a self-build house [6.18]: once enclosed with exterior walls, the space could be 
divided into a series of rooms with distinct functions; the kitchen would be located behind this 
unit, framed by a half-wall, as in the cocina ramada of Turner’s design. Within a few weeks, 
Wenzel was investigating using this “Shell Home” more widely in an “urban renewal project.” In 
September, having received provisional approval from the Instituto de Vivienda (INVI, or 
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Housing Institute),99 Wenzel reported that: “We are now doing a brief market study of 4 different 
slum areas to see just how ma[n]y units we can expect to sell.”100 As a result of this survey, 
Wenzel determined that there were “over 5000 buyers qualified”101; the institute approved a first 
group of 250 houses, with the possibility of extending the program up to 1,000 units. In this 
context the “Shell Home” [6.19-6.20] seems to have been envisaged as an addition to a minimal 
dwelling that had been offered for sale by the CNV only a year or so before (as discussed in 
chapter five).102 Consisting of a single room at the back of the lot, with brick walls on three sides, 
bamboo matting for the front wall, and a roof of cane and clay, residents would gradually 
construct their houses to fill the lot [5.14]. With the addition of the “Shell Home” the lot would 
now contain two provisional, expandable shelter units, which did not quite add up to a house.  
While the initial proposal anticipated delegating the organizational aspects of the self-
help program to an outside body such as the Peace Corps, Wenzel subsequently reported that 
INVI had recommended that Hogares Peruanos take charge of all aspects, “including the self-
help phase of the project in the provision of materials and technical assistance as well as 
constructing the shell unit.” While the firm had no prior experience in this area, Wenzel judged 
that “if handled properly the supplying of materials for the self-help phase could be very 
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profitable.”103 Shortly after this report, Wenzel’s notes on the project end, indicating that it did 
not proceed any further as an “urban renewal” solution or as a model for Villa Los Angeles. 
Indeed, at Villa Los Angeles the self-help component of the project disappeared entirely by early 
1963, and Turner’s involvement came to an end. Wenzel had become aware that the 
Paramonga project had failed due to massive cost overruns—Hogares Peruanos proposed its 
own alternative solution for workers’ housing at Paramonga104—and he lost faith in the self-help 
solution: 
Self-help housing is a nice text book solution sort of like Utopia, the early Utopian 
Socialists, but it just doesn’t work in practice. Sounds wonderful when you read it 
in a book but it takes too many technicians and too much administration.… If it 
isn’t done properly, the people gradually lose interest and the whole thing falls on 
its face.105 
Rather than a magic ticket to an “unlimited” market, self-help housing presented complex 
challenges of its own, and proved resistant to successful for-profit production.  
The Villa Los Angeles project did progress, but at a much slower rate than initially 
projected; actual construction began around 1964 and continued into the early 1970s [6.21]. 
Hogares Peruanos had reached agreements with three architectural firms to present new model 
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houses to the cooperative106 and within a couple of years, residents began moving into their 
homes. Although the self-help component disappeared from the first stage of construction, it 
was certainly made use of in post-occupancy extensions, with the addition of a second, third, or 
fourth storey, or as little as a parapet wall to enclose the usable roof space (azotea) [6.22-6.23]. 
Considering the scale of the housing deficit and the limited financial capacity of most 
Peruvian families, from the outset critics such as Adolfo Córdova and others from the MSP 
questioned the viability of broad-based home ownership as a solution.107 In any case, the 
government-to-government and government-to-business partnerships cultivated in the early 
1960s to enact this policy quickly showed signs of strain, fatally compromising the Hogares 
Peruanos project. Following a military coup in 1962—staged to stabilize the country after 
inconclusive election results—the United States suspended diplomatic relations as well as aid 
funding, making it difficult for the firm to conduct business. Wenzel hoped that they would soon 
resume operations with continued—if reduced—US support, but sensed that the coup would 
have broader repercussions: “Peru was to have been the example for South America,”108 and 
this unwelcome turn in its domestic affairs brought US policy towards the entire region into 
question. Soon after, US aid was again restricted, this time in retalliation for the government’s 
efforts to renegotiate the terms of its contract with a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.109 
As a final blow, the 1968 military coup initiating the (short-lived) Peruvian Revolution created a 
climate hostile towards foreign-owned businesses, while a declining economy hurt the firm’s 
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core market of lower-middle-income families.110 In the early 1970s Hogares Peruanos wound up 
operations altogether, after completing 450 of the 500 houses planned for Villa Los Angeles.111 
Converted into a gated community during the years of civil violence but with its green corridor 
intact, the development remains under permanent construction—almost as envisaged by 
Turner, but self-built by default rather than by design [6.24].  
 
6.3 $22,800,000 and Two Years  
In a sense, Hogares Peruanos was an Eisenhower-era project that subsequently 
adjusted itself to Kennedy-era funding opportunities; by contrast, the Plan Bienal 1962–1963 
Perú-BID was very much a by-product of Kennedy’s vision for Latin America. 
In August 1961, Kennedy’s call for an “Alliance for Progress” within Latin America was 
made concrete with the Declaration of Punta del Este, which identified a series of goals for 
participating beneficiary nations in order to foster social and economic development. For its part, 
the United States committed itself to providing technical and financial assistance in four key 
“fields of activity”: land settlement and improved land use; communal water supply and 
sanitation facilities; education and training; and low-income housing.112 As with the World War II-
era technical assistance programs administered under the IIAA, the projects were to be jointly 
funded by the United States (through the Social Progress Trust Fund of the Inter-American 
Development Bank) and the participating government. The very first Alliance for Progress loan 
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to be approved—proudly announced by Beltrán and La Prensa in February 1961—was for the 
construction of water and sewage infrastructure in Arequipa.113  
In November 1961, the IDB approved funding for the Plan Bienal 1962–1963 Perú-BID, 
providing $22.8 million for low-income housing, primarily to be constructed using aided self-
help.114 John Turner was part of the Peruvian government delegation that went to Washington, 
along with Luis Marcial, an architect and senior official at the Instituto de Vivienda (INVI, or 
Housing Institute), and Luis de los Heros, the editor of La Cronica, who had previously served 
on the board of the Comisión para la Reforma Agraria y la Vivienda and was now the director of 
INVI. Turner recalled that in advance of the meeting, the IDB “made known that [they] would be 
prepared to consider funding a national program of self-build,” and that after the group’s 
presentation, “the bank's board was delighted” and immediately doubled the amount of the 
loan.115 In fact, by 1963 the IDB had sponsored self-help housing projects in ten other countries 
in Latin America, although none were on the scale of the program planned for Peru.116 
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In fulfilment of its first obligation under the Punta del Este agreement, in October 1962 
the Peruvian government presented to the Organization of American States its Plan nacional de 
desarrollo económico y social, 1962–1971 (National Plan for Economic and Social 
Development, 1962–1971). Constructed specifically to meet the criteria and expectations set by 
the Alliance for Progress concerning administrative reform within participant countries, in a 
sense the production of this plan formalized Peru as a modern, technocratic society, articulating 
a vision for its own “development” and setting out a process to fulfill it by disciplining the 
somewhat ad hoc workings of government policy and public investment into articulated targets, 
budgets, outcomes, and evaluations. Parallel to the process of formalizing the status of the 
squatter home-builder via registration, mapping, and titling, the Alliance for Progress prescribed 
the subject-formation of a democratic nation-state, marked by administrative transparency, 
efficiency, and accountability. 
The Plan nacional outlined a three-fold objective in the housing field: to meet any 
housing deficit due to demographic increase over the decade, replace any housing lost due to 
delapidation, and cover 30 percent of the existing housing deficit. To this end, it determined that 
over ten years the state should build 671,350 new dwellings and rehabilitate an additional 
343,800. With the correct policies to encourage investment in the construction of low-cost 
housing, the private sector could be expected to contribute an additional 118,474 housing 
units.117 However, the plan stressed that “these figures are nothing but indications of the 
need,”118 and that its actual targets would have to be negotiated within the overall plan for 
national development, which also included projects in the areas of agrarian reform, public 
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health, education, and electrification. Accordingly, the concrete projects it outlined for the first 
two-year period (1962–1963) were more modest, specifying the construction of 22,000 
dwellings by the newly established INVI, and a series of upgrading projects by the existing 
housing agency, the CNV. The latter would focus on four areas, all connected to the 
approaches proposed by Law 13517 (Law for the Remodelling, Sanitation, and Legalization of 
the Barrios Marginales) which had been instituted the previous year: “urbanistic remodelling” of 
271 barrios marginales housing a total of 700,000 people; “saneamiento ambiental” 
(environmental sanitation)—providing water, sewage, and electricity—for 400,000 people; 
legalization of 100,000 property titles; and granting 12,500 loans for “the improvement, 
completion, or construction of dwellings” in barrios marginales.119 In addition, sites and services 
programs (run by both the CNV and INVI) would provide 25,000 lots, and land would be secured 
for future projects. In sum, in terms of actual new housing (as opposed to upgrading), the 
proposed total of 22,000 dwellings and 25,000 lots would accommodate 47,000 households 
against the approximately 67,000 that the Plan nacional argued should be built on average 
annually.  
For many observers, the decision to establish a new housing agency was redundant, 
and worse, counterproductive. The Prado government attempted to position INVI as fulfilling a 
new and distinct mission. According to Beltrán’s newspaper La Prensa, its emphasis would be 
to “construct ‘basic’ houses (incomplete, to be expanded, which have been called ‘la casa que 
crece’)” while the CNV “with its recognized technical capabilities, will elaborate and execute the 
projects entrusted to it by INVI.”120 In a similar vein, an exhibition held in central Lima, organized 
by John Turner and Hans Harms, underscored the new agency’s specialized task as mobilizing 
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“the resources of the people”121 in tandem with those of the state to improve housing [6.25]. 
However, writers in El Comercio questioned why the CNV, with all its acknowledged expertise, 
was being sidelined: were Prado and Beltrán “trying to destroy or interfere with the Corporación 
because it is identified in its origins with architect Fernande Belaúnde Terry or in its projects with 
architect Santiago Agurto Calvo?”122 In fact, these suspicions are confirmed in a Hogares 
Peruanos document from late 1962, describing the agencies as “both public housing organs 
with the same functions, one created by Pres. Odría, the other created by Beltrán since he 
didn’t get along with the then President of the Corporation.”123 Because of this bureaucratic 
power struggle, the challenges of implementing a complex and extensive new housing program 
would be compounded by the decision to hand its execution to two competing agencies, one of 
which was completely untested.  
By the time that the Plan nacional was presented in October 1962, it was able to report 
that INVI had already carried out the construction of 9,899 new dwellings, and that 10,000 sites 
and services lots had been prepared. For its part the CNV had completed the “urbanistic 
remodelling” of 95 barrios marginales (of the proposed 271); the “saneamiento ambiental” for 
180,000 people (of the proposed 400,000); the legalization of 20,000 property titles (with 
another 105,000 being processed124); and granting 300 loans (of the proposed 12,500).125 
However, apart from the modest number of loans reported, these figures appear to be wildly 
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inflated: in particular, gauging from contemporaneous CNV documents such as the Plan Río 
Rímac, given the complexity of the logistics involved in preparing and carrying out remodelling 
projects, the most that would have been completed in the 95 barrios marginales at this stage 
was a preliminary survey. 
In September 1963, two months before the two-year Perú-BID program was due to be 
completed, the contract was renegotiated, extending the deadline by thirteen months, 
significantly increasing the allowable maximum cost per house, and altering the primary 
construction system from “auto-ayuda” (self-help) to “indefinido” (undefined). According to the 
documentation explicating this shift,126 while the original aim had been to employ self-help on 
17,350 new dwellings127—along with the “direct construction” of 5,350 new units, and 
rehabilitation work on 12,500 units in barrios marginales, for a total of 35,200 units—by May 
1963, only 1,050 self-help units had been completed, compared to 3,750 in direct construction. 
The revised contract maintained the overall goal of 35,200 units, but dramatically reduced the 
self-help component to only 7,950 units, with the remainder allotted to upgrading projects in 
barrios marginales. It is not at all clear exactly what these latter projects were intended to entail, 
and even less so what was eventually completed; as one 1966 study noted, projects in the 
barriadas, whether supported by Perú-BID or other programs: 
have been realized in a dispersed fashion, by various entities, from which it is not 
possible to obtain with exactitude the necessary figures. The barriada pobladores 
themselves are unaware what projects have been realized. Neither is it possible 
to know if they are definitive or provisional in character, nor how much they 
cost.128  
                                                
126
 See “Gráfico de estado del “Proyecto” en dos fechas—Contrato Perú-BID,” in Documento básico para 
el Plan Habitacional Urbano: Documento general del estudio de 42 ciudades del país y fundamentos para 
la política habitacional urbana (Lima: JNV, March 1965), 167. 
127
 INVI’s own initial estimate was slightly higher: planning 40,000 lots in sites and services projects, it 
anticipated that around half of these (20,000) would be built using self-help. See Instituto de la Vivienda, 
Plan de Vivienda, 1962–1971 (Lima: INVI, 1961). 
128
 Germán Tito Gutiérrez, Análisis censal para una evaluación de vivienda (Lima: Oficina de 
Planificación Sectorial de Vivienda y Equipamiento Urbano, January 1966), VIII: 5. 
  
189 
Overall, given that the numbers are not consistent across the various sources, the best estimate 
is that Plan Bienal Perú-BID eventually funded 38,698 units: of these, 4,106 used self-help, 
compared to 8,895 in direct construction, with the remaining 25,697 in barriada erradication or 
upgrading.129  
This represents a precipitous decline in the expectations for self-help housing: initially, 
17,350 dwellings were to be completed over two years; this was then modified to 7,950 within 
an additional three years, while the eventual total was 4,100 built over the five-year period. 
Although the extant documentation is slight, by reviewing field reports and evaluation studies it 
is possible to trace the outline of problems emerging from the Plan Bienal Perú-BID and from 
the aided self-help methodology more generally. The focus here will be on the city of Chimbote, 
since this represents the most extensive set of documentation. 
Sited on the coast a few hours north of Lima, Chimbote was described in one report as a 
“heterogeneous city, where the only commonality is disorder, the bad smell, … and the 
existence of ‘barriadas’ … in an institutionalized form, in such a way that it can be confirmed 
without fear of error that Chimbote is one ‘large barriada.’”130 In 1948 Paul Lester Wiener and 
Josep Lluís Sert had developed a plan for the city centre on behalf of the Oficina Nacional de 
Planeamiento y Urbanismo (ONPU, or National Office for Planning and Urbanism), based on 
what they described as “a modern expression of the old colonial ‘Plaza de Armas’” [6.26]. 
Although the current population was only 12,000, they were optimistic about the city’s potential 
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for economic development, noting that it had excellent port facilities and had been selected “as 
the outlet for the hydroelectric development of the Santa River (Peru’s TVA), which means the 
future population may reach 40,000.”131 In fact the city faced astronomical growth rates: a 
population of 4,200 in 1940, 15,600 in 1950 (30 percent higher than the figure cited by Wiener 
and Sert), 63,900 in 1961, and 100,000 in 1968.132 According to Adolfo Córdova’s survey, by 
1957 only 5.3 percent of the housing was in decent condition, 38.5 percent was “improvised” 
barriada housing, with the remainder degraded tenements and single-family houses [6.27].133 
The city had begun as a speculative venture in the late nineteenth century: in 1872 an 
entrepreneur received official approval for the development of a city, but after reserving sixty 
blocks for the urban centre as well as sufficient land to serve a railway line, he sold the outlying 
areas and then abandoned the project altogther.134 The settlement remained little more than a 
fishing village until 1945, when the government provided land nearby for the hydroelectric 
project as well as a steel plant; evidently this was conceived as an integrated regional 
development plan, with Wiener and Sert’s project to provide the focal point of a new urban pole. 
However, the newly created industries initiated a sudden increase in migration which far 
exceeded their actual labour needs, and uncontrolled urban growth rapidly overtook the 
framework of ONPU’s vision. Much of the unemployed migrant workforce was absorbed into the 
fishing industry, specifically the production of fish meal,135 and in the momentum of this boom, 
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fish-meal plants were established next to recreational beaches and residential areas, and 
frequently “without considering the direction of the winds,” leaving much of the city perpetually 
cloaked in their “pestilent emanations.”136 The fish-meal boom lasted until 1970, when the 
industry collapsed due to a combination of overfishing and infrastructure damage from a large 
earthquake.  
INVI’s Perú-BID projects in Chimbote represented a kind of remediation effort against 
the effects of this rampant industrial modernization. They fell into two broad categories, both of 
which utilized aided self-help. First, the upgrading of existing barriadas, which included the 
provision of technical assistance and loans in the form of building materials to individual families 
in order to facilitate housing construction, “and with this [achieve] the definitive rehabilitation of 
the neighbourhood.”137 According to the brochure promoting this program, participants could 
construct their dwellings using esfuerzo propio (one’s own effort) or ayuda mútua (mutual aid). 
Other services provided by INVI at the urban level, such as planning new urban layouts 
(lotización) or the remodelling of existing layouts (remodelación), as well as the installation of 
basic services (saneamiento) would not employ self-help labour but were expected to operate 
on a self-sustaining economic basis, with all costs to be covered by the residents. 
Second, INVI proposed to construct a new urbanización, along the lines of the Ventanilla 
satellite city on the outskirts of Lima. Urbanización El Trapecio would consist of 773 residential 
lots for single-family houses and 288 apartments, with the provision of a comprehensive range 
of urban amenities and areas for light industry [6.28]. Provided with basic services, the houses 
were designed to be low-cost, beginning with a núcleo básico (basic core unit) but offering “the 
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best facilities for the comfortable and decent development of family life.”138 The family had a 
choice of three options in building their house: conventional construction, whereby the residents’ 
association would arrange to hire a contractor on behalf of its members to carry out the work 
(costing S/.36,950 for the basic dwelling), or they could elect to use either esfuerzo propio or 
ayuda mútua under the auspices of INVI (costing S/.26,290). In this way, INVI’s brochure 
argued that El Trapecio represented a streamlined version of a familiar system, offering the 
modest family “that traditionally builds their house with their own intitiative and efforts, the 
necessary elements to build it rapidly and economically with the essential services for a healthy 
life.”  
Some indications of the difficulties that emerged with the implementation of these 
projects can be found in the small number of extant field reports prepared for the head office in 
Lima, dating from 1963. By this stage INVI was in the process of merging with the CNV to form 
the JNV (Junta National de la Vivienda, or National Housing Board) in an effort to streamline the 
housing bureaucracy. At El Trapecio, after a year and a half of work, the first stage consisting of 
530 núcleo básico dwellings had been completed. The housing agency had handed out a total 
of 1,400 application forms to prospective residents, but only 804 were actually submitted, and of 
these only 524 were declared to be suitable for the program. Meanwhile, there were 
approximately 5,000 families in the city who were renting, and should therefore have been 
attracted to this opportunity to own their own homes.139 The report concluded that El Trapecio 
“hasn’t had the reception that was hoped for” because it did not correspond to the priorities of 
residents, which began with “the solution of the tenancy of the lot.” Furthermore, its location far 
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from the centre of the city detracted from its appeal, particularly since it was adjacent to “the 
only group of casas de diversión [bars and gambling halls] in Chimbote” which according to the 
housing office’s own rules, made it a “dangerous and undesirable neighbourhood” for families. 
Finally, it was still not possible to hand over the houses to residents because administrative 
delays had left work on the installation of water, sewerage, and electricity infrastructure 
“practically paralyzed,” and key urban amenities, such as the school and the market, were not 
yet completed; as a consequence, “with the discouragement of the current, qualified concerned 
[parties], one is running the risk of giving free rein to opponents’ attacks.”140 
The most powerful of these opponents was apparently the El Acero barriada [6.29], “the 
barriada with the greatest influence in all of Chimbote and perhaps in all of Peru, because of its 
leadership and its history.”141 Resistance to the government programs was blamed on the fact 
that the barriada had two rival residents’ associations, with leaders who were hostile towards 
the authorities and found it to be in their interests to intimidate residents into withdrawing from 
the Perú–BID programs. On the other hand, it was evidently not difficult to sow dissent against 
the housing agency among the pobladores since “they have been the object of many surveys 
and have received few concrete results.”142 For their part, the reports’ authors complained that 
there had not been enough time allotted to carry out preparatory surveys—instead of a few 
days, a month was necessary to build rapport with the pobladores and thus collect accurate 
information; furthermore, there were few existing studies to use as a foundation, and to 
compound the problem, a high turnover of staff in the local offices meant that there was little 
continuity of institutional knowledge, and little consistency in interactions with the barriada 
residents. 
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More generally, the complaints underscored the disjunction between the situation on the 
ground and the “normative aspects determined by the Lima office”; one statement—dealing 
specifically with the constraints of having to comply with standardized bureaucratic 
procedures—encapsulates a key problem underlying the entire enterprise: “In many aspects the 
local reality cannot always agree with the Guide.”143 For example, the qualification rules 
(apparently determined by the IDB) specified an ideal candidate—married, healthy, with full and 
correct documentation—when in reality cohabitation was more common than formal matrimony, 
poverty and unsanitary environments compromised health, and acquiring certificates of birth, 
baptism, and property represented a considerable expense to most prospective residents.144 As 
a result, it was often difficult to muster sufficient qualified participants to carry out the projects. In 
the barriada La Libertad, for example, the housing agency had been building a relationship with 
the community over the course of a year, and the plans for remodelling had proceeded well in 
eighteen of the twenty blocks; however, a time limit had been set on the project, and the 
residents’ lack of interest in signing up for the associated loans meant that it would be hard to 
enroll the target numbers by the deadline. By contrast, the rehabilitation program at the barriada 
21 de Abril promised to be easier to implement, since it was sponsored by USAID rather than 
the IDB and thus had fewer restrictive guidelines.145 At an even deeper level, there was a 
fundamental disjunction between the range and scope of the projects offered through Perú-BID 
and the actual needs of the intended beneficiaries, since the focus on the dwelling per se was 
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not in keeping with residents’ priorities, which were ranked as: secure tenure; water, sewerage, 
and electricity connections; and communal amenities such as schools, markets, health posts.146 
Aside from these contemporary reports, a short evaluation study from 1969 provides an 
ambivalent coda to the projects. The two accounts making up the study present a sharp 
contrast, at least in part due to real differences between the two neighbourhoods under 
examination, but the gulf between the two also serves as a reminder that official reports are 
often constructed by unreliable narrators. At El Acero—a disordered “urban blemish”—the 
project included the rehabilitation of 500 dwellings, and the “eradication” and resettlement of an 
additional 170 families in order to reduce the population density. According to the evaluation, 
since their construction five years earlier, the community facilties had effectively been 
“destroyed” by the residents, an outcome that was blamed on a lack of social cohesion and on 
the housing agency’s failure to establish “an organization for the promotion and appropriate use 
of the dwellings and the amenities through a plan of educational diffusion.”147 The simple two-
bedroom houses were self-built, and included the possibility of extensions [6.30], but they had 
been carefully designed in order to circumvent barriada residents’ tendency to subdivide the 
dwelling along the central corridor, in order “to sell one of the parts of the house”148 or to rent 
rooms off the passageway; instead, by positioning the corridor along the side wall, the floor plan 
eliminated the temptations of a central dividing line [6.31].  
At La Libertad, the project involved the participation of Turner’s colleague from 
Paramonga, Diego Robles, who had recently returned from studying at the Architectural 
Association’s School of Tropical Architecture with Otto Koenigsberger, where he had submitted 
a study on Chimbote for his master’s thesis.149 At La Libertad around 185 families participated 
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and five years after the completion of the program, the authors reported that “the entirety of the 
families have contributed to the processs of consolidation and improvement of the barrio and 
that the supervised action [of the aided self-help project] … has served as a positive stimulant to 
provoke a multiplier effect” as individuals invested their own resources “in order to achieve their 
shared individual goals.”150 In this case, the architects had been willing to accommodate the 
living patterns of residents, and in particular, recognized the importance of allowing for the 
house to be subdivided, so that part could be used “to lodge relatives or to rent it to obtain 
secondary income.”151 The result was a long and narrow layout, which could accommodate two 
dwellings side by side on the same lot [6.32]. This solution was not ideal from the perspective of 
modernist housing reform, but in contrast to El Acero the architects had allowed their expertise 
to be guided in another direction in order to meet the residents’ needs. 
Despite the diverging descriptions of the outcomes, in both cases it seems evident that a 
number of households did benefit from the program in Chimbote, although they were relatively 
few considering the scale of the housing problem, and the considerable investment of labour on 
the part of the housing agency (the El Acero program, for example, included a staff of twenty, 
ranging in responsibilities from the chief and assistant architects, to social assistants, master 
builders, machine operators, and watchmen.) Even at La Libertad, collaboration with the 
residents did not come easily, despite the genuine engagement—and valuable experience—of 
Robles:  
One of the first problems that the técnicos had facing the population was to gain 
their trust, and to demonstrate that their intentions were not political promises, 
and represented a change of attitude in order to work together and in parallel 
with the population.152 
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As the architects argued, the challenge was to establish a collaborative relationship in an 
environment that had been shaped by a paternalistic and clientelistic model—to “change the 
figure of working for the pobladores to working with the pobladores.”153 At this point the 
geopolitics of loan-making and development met the realpolitick of doing business in the 
barriada, as the architects faced the challenge of reassuring residents who had learned to be 
wary of government promises of assistance that making a commitment to this program would be 
worthwhile. From the perspective of the pobladores, participation in aided self-help projects 
represented a considerable investment of time and financial resources, and the consequences 
of any mistakes or inefficiencies would have enormous repercussions for them—far greater than 
for the housing agency or its international funders.  
After his role in negotiating the Perú-BID loan, Turner had the responsibility of 
overseeing the aided self-help component of the program. He soon began to feel that the whole 
enterprise was heading in the wrong direction: pressures for production from the sponsors and 
the need to implement the project within a strict schedule led to quick solutions that were less 
than ideal; in particular, there was insufficient time to properly organize the participants—or, 
more precisely, to assist them to organize themselves.154 Nonetheless, along with Luis Marcial 
of INVI, Turner undertook a smaller project in parallel with the main Perú-BID program which 
explored an alternative approach to organizing self-help housing. At Huascarán, a settlement of 
thirty or so houses, participants were provided with a series of small cash advances to cover the 
costs of each stage of construction—foundations, walls, basic shell, roof—with money for the 
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subseqent stage disbursed as the scheduled work was completed. Using this technique of 
“supervised credit” the role of Marcial and Turner was simply to carry out inspections to ensure 
that construction been carried out to an acceptable standard, and then to approve the next 
installment of credit. According to Turner, this approach was treated with some scepticism by 
officials concerned at the prospect of giving so much control to the residents; in any case, the 
possibiility of further trials along these lines effectively ended when Marcial was killed in a plane 
crash in late 1962.155 Writing a decade later, Turner underscored that given the high 
administrative costs of conventional aided self-help projects, the supervised credit approach 
used at Huascarán had appeared to offer a “genuinely radical alternative” to housing 
provision.156 
In summary, in the face of various challenges to its implementation, Perú-BID funds 
dedicated to aided self-help housing programs contributed to the construction of a total of 4,106 
housing units in nine projects located in seven cities across Peru, ranging in size from 56 to 900 
units. In addition, through the “barriada eradication” and “sanitation” sub-programs, Perú-BID 
funds contributed to realizing self-help projects developed under the umbrella of Law 13517, 
such as the UPIS (Urbanización Popular de Interés Social, or Low-Income Social Housing 
Subdivisions) at Condevilla, Valdiviezo, and Caja de Agua.157 Although this was far from what 
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had been initially planned, the Alliance for Progress ambition to foster progressive social policy 
could claim some success in these innovative efforts in the provision of affordable housing.    
 
6.4 The Value of “Aided” Self-Help  
In mid-1967, the Inter-American Development Bank completed its first evaluation of the 
initial round of housing programs it had funded, comparing the outcomes in four countries—
Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile, and Peru. Arguing that it was essential for IDB-sponsored 
programs to become self-sufficient by mobilizing domestic resources for sustained growth in the 
housing sector (thus performing as a productive investment), the evaluation focused on the 
rates of repayment on its various loans. Primary borrowing institutions (such as national housing 
agencies) negotiated the terms of the loan and its repayment with the IDB, and then employed 
the funds to grant loans to individual homebuyers. Low recovery rates from these borrowers to 
the housing agency would severely affect not just their ability to repay the IDB, but also, 
potentially, their overall financial stability.158 
In the case of Peru, the two institutional borrowers were the JNV (funding four sub-
programs) and Father McLellan’s Mutual El Pueblo. The latter had given out more than 4,000 
mortgages, as well as 800 smaller loans for upgrading; 97 percent of its borrowers were up-to-
date with their payments, and only 2 percent were more than three payments behind—generally 
in cases where borrowers had experienced unemployment or unanticipated family crises. At the 
JNV, however, the repayment rates varied dramatically among its four sub-programs: in direct 
construction 61.5 percent were up-to-date, in rehabilitation only 19.6 percent were, while in self-
help and “barriada eradication” programs there were no borrowers who were up-to-date with 
their loans and 74 percent were more than three payments in arrears. According to the IDB, the 
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primary reason for the lack of repayment was “political”: opportunistic candidates had curried 
favour with residents by encouraging them to stop payments and offering vague promises of a 
better deal.159 For its part, the JNV lacked the will or the means to evict delinquent tenants, 
giving others the courage to follow suit. The report concluded that this problem was ultimately 
due to the fact that many of the selected families had insufficient and erratic incomes and 
probably should not have been given loans in the first place.  
The report identified two sub-programs as problematic across the four countries 
surveyed: “incomplete houses” and aided self-help programs. With incomplete or “basic unit” 
houses, the IDB evaluators determined that borrowers tended to overburden themselves by 
taking on additional loans in order to be able to complete the dwelling: “The mentality of this 
type of delinquent borrower is aggressive, since their cultural antecedents and the instability of 
their work generally do not allow them to make a self-analysis of their financial situation and 
their capacity to pay.”160 In essence, their lack of financial literacy had led them to take on the 
commitments of a mortgage without sufficient due diligence; when they fell behind, they felt that 
had been cheated (“with some reason”), and as a result became disillusioned and distrustful of 
institutions. 
As for aided self-help housing, the report argued that the success of such programs was 
highly dependent on the adequacy (or not) of the organized assistance. In any event, the 
projects tended to be very drawn-out, taking eighteen months to complete as opposed to four 
months for direct construction, since work was limited to three nights a week and a half-day on 
Sunday (which nonetheless would have represented a substantial commitment of time for 
                                                
159
 This phenomenon is confirmed by a field report from Chimbote, which argued that the unstable 
political situation during a protracted election period was a contributing factor to the lack of participation in 
the Perú-BID programs; at such times, candidates “make large promises and the people anticipate the 
benefits that could follow for free or with better advantages than those that are offered now with the loans” 
—for example, one politician was encouraging residents to demand interest-free loans from the JNV 
instead of the 5.5 percent loans on offer. Samañez de Tovar, “Informe sobre el viaje a Chimbote,” 23, 10. 
160
 Scioville-Samper, “Misión para analisis,” 34. 
  
201 
working families).161 In addition to the actual mechanics of managing construction and financing, 
aided self-help programs required a great deal of retraining for residents in the good use and 
maintenance of their dwellings—a costly exercise, but failure to carry this out could jeopardize 
the entire investment. Housing agencies needed to provide “a real school where families can 
‘learn to live’” and become motivated “for a change towards a better system, inculcating in them 
at the same time the need to fulfill the social and financial obligations imposed by their new 
‘status’ as propietarios of a dwelling.”162 The missionary tenor of the enterprise was 
unmistakable; this represented not simply the provision of a house but a new socio-economic 
identity as owner and borrower. 
In conclusion, the report noted that the IDB’s initial programs had been organized 
without having “great experience in international financing for housing programs.” In July 1966, 
with the benefit of some experience, the agency had produced a memo suggesting a change in 
direction. The IDB’s paramount goal must be to provide “seed capital” for housing, not endless 
funding, and thus it needed to achieve a reasonable return on its initial investments. It was now 
clear that self-build and núcleo básico housing could not meet this benchmark, and that 
furthermore “there is a socio-economic group that cannot be helped in the attainment of their 
dwelling except through high subsidies.”163 These would-be homeowners needed to be provided 
with an alternative solution of a “global character”: that is, “a job and decent wages”164—a tacit 
acknowledgement that the physical rehabilitation of the dwelling and its surroundings meant 
little in the absence of economic development. For future programs the report recommended a 
greater emphasis on direct construction and a more critical assessment of any proposed self-
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 In the case of Peru, the report noted that JNV officials “were not very enthusiastic” about self-help 
because “the system ends up being very expensive in terms of time for the execution and in costs for 
technical and social assistance.” Scioville-Samper, “Misión para analisis,” 14. 
162
 Scioville-Samper, “Misión para analisis,” 40; “status” in English in original. 
163
 Scioville-Samper, “Misión para analisis,” 35; 36, citing memo PRA-VI-379, July 15, 1966. 
164
 Scioville-Samper, “Misión para analisis,” 38. 
  
202 
help programs, considering the capacity of the housing agency to carry them out. In its final 
recommendation, the report advised a turn towards technological solutions: the IDB “should 
develop and promote the study of new materials and construction systems” in an effort to lower 
construction costs. 
Apparently, the JNV reached a similar conclusion: its outline for a second IDB loan 
application, prepared in July 1966, emphasized sites-and-services projects to be executed by 
“supervised credit,”165 replacing the more resource-intensive approaches of aided self-help 
housing. In the end, the IDB approved this loan in the form of funding for mortgages to be 
distributed via the Banco de la Vivienda and the mutuales. According to one estimate, by 
February 1968 mutuales had financed the construction of 17,000 dwellings, in twenty-two cities 
across the country.166 Having the advantage of working with the upper-tier of low-income 
groups, the mutual approach had achieved more concrete results than self-help in the 
production of standard (middle-class) housing. Despite the hopes that had been placed in it, 
aided self-help housing was facing scepticism from above (IDB), below (residents), and within 
(JNV): this was not a profitable undertaking for venture capital, not an economically sustainable 
solution for state agencies, and not a productive investment for development funding. 
Theoretically, the aided self-help methodology remained part of the JNV’s repertoire,167 
but in practice official support for it had begun to wane soon after the Perú-BID contract was 
signed, as political shifts brought dramatic changes in the direction of housing policy. The 
question of how much could have been achieved with more government support is impossible to 
answer—whether the challenges of running the projects could have been resolved, approaches 
modified as more experience was gained. International funding had been essential in expanding 
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aided self-help housing programs to a national scale, but in the absence of domestic political 
support these trials were likely to be short-circuited. 
 
6.5 The Architect of a New Peru    
Between 1961 and 1966 policies concerning the barriadas and the potential of self-help 
housing to contribute to a solution underwent radical shifts. In February 1961 President Manuel 
Prado signed Law 13517 with measures to upgrade existing barriadas through self-help labour 
and prevent the formation of new ones through the provision of alternatives such as the UPIS 
projects, which offered core housing to be completed through self-build construction. In the 
same month the first Alliance for Progress loan was approved, covering infrastructure projects in 
Arequipa; in November 1961, the IDB approved funding for one of the largest Alliance-
supported housing projects, the Plan Bienal 1962–1963 Perú-BID, providing $22.8 million for 
low-income housing, initially intended to include 17,350 units constructed using aided self-help. 
In July 1962, presidential elections were held, with candidates including Pedro Beltrán, 
who was forced to end his campaign after attracting little support, and Fernando Belaúnde 
Terry, who had lost to Prado in the 1956 election, but now ran a much stronger campaign. 
Posing as “the architect of a new Peru” in front of unidad vecinal blocks (as he had in his 1956 
campaign), Belaúnde invited voters to envisage the “thousands of houses” he would provide as 
president, promising a bold expansion of the housing programs undertaken by the CNV in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s [6.33]. 
 However, with a field of six candidates, the 1962 elections produced no clear winner, 
and on July 18, 1962, a few days before the end of Prado’s term, the military staged a 
prophylactic coup in order to circumvent the efforts of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria 
Americana (a party it considered to be too radical) to form a coalition government. During its 
brief period in power (it had agreed to hold new elections within a year) the military government 
carried out the important reform of uniting the CNV and INVI into one new body, the Junta 
  
204 
Nacional de la Vivienda (JNV, National Housing Board), and reaffirmed the importance of the 
UPIS as a means of developing well-ordered and affordable urban settlements.168  
One year later, the re-run presidential elections were won by Fernando Belaúnde Terry 
and his Acción Popular party in a reformist coalition with the Partido Democrático Cristiano. His 
incoming government unequivocally steered housing policy in the opposite direction. With little 
tolerance for self-build construction, let alone the idea that architects should facilitate such 
efforts, Belaúnde’s response to the demand for affordable housing in the ever-expanding cities 
was to direct government resources back into conventional mass-housing schemes, now 
projected on a larger scale than ever before. Increasingly sophisticated in design and 
construction methods, they were likewise increasingly beyond the means of most low-income 
citizens [6.35]. Belaúnde also promoted large-scale infrastructure projects—modernizing 
irrigation, transport, and communications networks169—in order to stimulate regional 
development, seen as the key to discouraging rural-urban migration, the ultimate cause of the 
barriadas.170 Upon his election, Belaúnde enjoyed a brief honeymoon with the US government: 
with strong democratic, reformist credentials, he was viewed as the ideal “Alliance president” by 
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US officials, and framed as an “architect of hope” by Time magazine in 1965 [6.36]. Belaúnde 
was encouraged that this high regard would help him to secure funding for the grand building 
plans that he believed would hasten the country’s modernization efforts.  
Belaúnde’s unwillingness to countenance the unconventional measures proposed by 
Law 13517—in particular the establishment of new UPIS projects—left a vacuum; projects 
regarded by John Turner as promising experiments (such as Valdiviezo and Tahauntisuyo) 
were left to languish, lacking the resources for thorough implementation and evaluation. In fact, 
Turner’s August 1963 issue of Architectural Design was published only a few weeks after 
Belaúnde took office, marking the beginning of the end for the innovative aided self-help 
housing projects that Turner described with such enthusiasm. In this sense the AD issue 
represented a catalogue of past achievements rather than a vision of the future. In 1966 the 
JNV office overseeing self-help housing projects was dismantled altogether.171 
Nonetheless, Belaúnde did not repeal Law 13517 (he acknowledged that it had 
introduced important measures to regularize property title, for example172). Moreover, towards 
the end of his presidency, under the threat of large-scale street protests from barriada residents, 
the Belaúnde government eased some aspects of the law’s implementation, facilitating the 
granting of titles.173 First, in June 1967, in a law specifically focused on the agglomeration of 
barriadas in the San Martín de Porres area in Lima, the state transfered the ownership of the 
land and responsibility for overseeing the upgrading programs—including the authority to grant 
title—from the JNV to the local district council (whose mayor, León Velarde, was a leading 
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barriada activist).174 On paper, the upgrading requirements did not change, but they were no 
longer policed by government officials, but rather by local politicians with close ties to the 
pobladores and with a greater interest in extending title to their constituents than enforcing 
planning regulations that were clearly beyond the means of the vast majority. Second, in July 
1968 revised guidelines for Law 13517 waived the upfront payment for the installation of water 
and sewerage infrastructure, on the grounds that these were effectively a public sector 
investment whose costs would be recuperated once residents began paying bills for these 
services. It was now considered “advisable to facilitate the granting of property titles” because 
this would ease residents’ access to credit, and because the newly legalized neighbourhoods 
would generate tax income for local councils. In the case of the UPIS projects, which were 
officially organized and managed from the outset, property title could be granted before 
complete urban services were installed, providing there was an approved plan in place.175 
These refinements to Law 13517 eased the way for the granting of property title, while 
maintaining (at least in theory) the requirements for upgrading; meanwhile, the state committed 
no additional resources to the issue, but instead transfered its responsibilities to the municipal 
councils and to the public utilities. As a result, Belaúnde—the architect of a new Peru—
effectively oversaw the inexorable downgrading of minimum standards and the relaxation of 
enforcement efforts.  
As late as 1966 Belaúnde was proposing the large-scale demolition of central city 
tenement housing (the tugurios he had been campaigning against since the 1940s), envisaging 
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in their place vast modern housing projects.176 However, with rapidly mounting foreign debt, due 
in large part to his spending on infrastructure and construction projects, it soon became clear 
that this strategy towards housing provision was economically unsustainable. Although unwilling 
to support self-build construction, Belaúnde recognized that there was a pressing need to 
investigate alternatives. In the spirit of the 1967 IDB evaluation report which recommended 
exploring technological solutions in an effort to lower construction costs,177 Belaúnde found an 
ideal venture to support in the ambitiously conceived Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda 
(PREVI, or Experimental Housing Project), which is the focus of the next chapter. 
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7. Building a Better Barriada 
 
In the nine months between August 2010 and May 2011, three prominent international 
architecture magazines featured articles on a medium-scale housing project built in Lima in the 
early 1970s: PREVI, the Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda (Experimental Housing Project) 
[7.1]. Labelled variously a “metabolist utopia” and the apex of Peru’s “Modern Project,” in these 
accounts PREVI appears as the long-lost solution to the problem of low-cost housing in the 
developing world—or it would have become so, if only its lessons had been heeded.1 
This renewal of interest seems to have been sparked by two main sources: a detailed 
post-occupancy study produced by a group of three Chilean architects (beginning in 2003 as 
research for a master’s thesis, and culminating in a book in 20082), and Alejandro Aravena’s 
identification of PREVI as a key precedent for the Quinta Monroy housing project in Iquique, 
Chile (2004) built by his Elemental partnership (a lineage that is given critical weight by Kenneth 
Frampton in the 2007 edition of Modern Architecture: A Critical History3). For Aravena, the 
roster of high-profile, international architects involved with PREVI evokes the legacy of the 
Weißenhofsiedlung in Stuttgart—suggesting that together these projects are “perhaps [the] two 
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major moments in the history of social housing”; in this scenario, PREVI marks the moment 
“when attempts by avant-garde architects to help overcome a housing deficit came to an end.”4 
This association has been encouraged by PREVI’s British-born managing architect, Peter 
Land,5 and reiterated by other commentators such as the architectural team Supersudaca, 
which observed in its research on the project: “If the Weißenhofsiedlung is the natural childbirth 
of social housing in the industrialized world, PREVI is the coitus interruptus of social housing in 
the Third World.”6 The comparison evokes the sense of a destiny thwarted, a Latin American 
failure to reproduce European modernism. Yet there is perhaps an uncomfortable truth in this 
recurring trope of PREVI as Weißenhofsiedlung redux—a closer similarity than PREVI’s 
boosters would care to acknowledge, given that few of the architects at Stuttgart met the goal of 
providing realistic, repeatable models for low-cost housing (with the notable exception of J. J. P. 
Oud7), constructing instead a competitive showcase of the new architecture.  
This chapter outlines the history of PREVI, and examines the source of its mythology: 
that is, its assemblage of an impressive cross-section of the architectural avant-garde at the end 
of the 1960s to focus on the elusive modernist ideal of fusing social engagement, new 
technologies, and radical form-making, now within the unfamiliar arena of the Third World. It 
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considers the strategies and solutions that PREVI proposed, discusses post-occupancy 
evaluations of its outcomes, and finally, reconsiders its place in the history of social housing, in 
particular the notion that it represents a “third way” able to move beyond the limitations of the 
entirely planned housing project and the entirely unplanned informal settlement, and thus offers 
a viable, under-explored alternative for the provision of low-cost housing. 
  
7.1 A Peruvian Weißenhofsiedlung 
According to Peter Land’s account, he first proposed the concept of an experimental 
low-cost housing project to Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry in 1966.8 Trained at 
the Architectural Association In London, Land continued with postgraduate study in the United 
States at Carnegie Mellon and then at Yale; through Yale, Land was appointed as field director 
of the Inter-American Graduate Program in Urban and Regional Planning at the Universidad 
Nacional de Ingeniería in Lima (1960–1964), where he made many professional contacts within 
the Peruvian government. In 1964–1965 Land returned to Lima at the invitation of the 
government, taking up an advisory position with the Banco de la Vivienda (Housing Bank), 
inspecting new housing projects throughout Peru which were under their consideration for 
funding through the mutuales (savings and loans assocations).9 Given his connections in the 
housing finance sector, and Belaúnde’s background as an architect with a long-term interest in 
housing construction, Land recalled: “I realized this was a unique opportunity to do something 
special with an international splash.”10  
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In mid-1966 Peru presented the project to the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) for funding, and it was approved a year later; the official contract between Peru and the 
UNDP was signed in June 1968, specifying the realization of the entire project within three 
years.11 As originally conceived, PREVI consisted of three complementary “pilot projects” 
developed in response to the main factors identified as contributing to the housing crisis: a 
quantitative housing deficit due to growing urban populations; a qualitative housing deficit due to 
the deterioration of existing housing stock into slum conditions; and “the formation of 
spontaneous settlements” around the fringes of large cities.12 To meet these varied challenges, 
the pilot projects employed contrasting strategies: Proyecto Piloto 1 (PP1) was a scheme for the 
design and construction of a new neighbourhood of approximately 10,000 people, with 1,500 
housing units; PP2 proposed the development of techniques to rehabilitate compromised 
housing stock; and PP3 focused on “the provision of sites-and-services for new settlement 
areas,”13 using aided self-help to guide the growth of self-constructed neighbourhoods. With this 
tripartite approach, it was hoped that PREVI would generate a range of prototypes which could 
be replicated en masse to address Lima’s severe housing shortage, and—as signalled by the 
UNDP’s involvement—would also be transferable to other developing countries. Following a 
devastating earthquake in May 1970 centred north of Lima, a fourth pilot project was added: 
PP4 was to be a small trial reconstruction program focused on aided self-help housing. 
Contemporary discussions tend to reduce PREVI to the international contributions in 
PP1, thereby sidelining the less spectacular pilot projects, along with the Peruvian architects 
who were involved, but a comparative evaluation of the various contrasting approaches was a 
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key element of the “experimental housing project” as originally conceived. Further, as 
preparatory planning documents make clear, although all the pilot projects were intended for 
low-income groups, they were pitched at different income brackets within that category (officially 
defined as socio-economic levels I, II, and III). PP1, for example, was specifically aimed at those 
“with incomes that allow, through a monthly saving, the acquisition of a dwelling with long-term 
financing”14 (corresponding to levels II and III), while PP3 was intended “for families of very 
limited financial resources”15 (levels I and II) and would therefore make use of autoconstrucción 
and ayuda mutua, with a strong “community development” element, “to guide the people in 
making better places in which to live: by helping them to help themselves.”16 PP2 would straddle 
all three socio-economic levels, and accordingly participating families would construct their 
homes with a mixture of financing and self-help labour.  
Aimed at the upper-end of the low-income spectrum, the stated goal of PP1 was “to 
demonstrate advanced ideas in housing design and economical construction,” balancing the 
imperative to keep costs low with the desire for innovation and quality design solutions. The 
financing of PP1 (as well as PP2) was to be arranged through the Caja de Pensiones del 
Seguro Social del Empleado (White-Collar Workers’ Social Security Pension Fund)—an 
organization serving office workers, government employees, and similar groups, who tended to 
identify themselves as middle-class.17 Accordingly, although some of the entries to the PP1 
                                                
14 Government of Peru and UNDP, Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Perú, 2. 
15 Government of Peru and United Nations, “Concurso Internacional para el diseño de un proyecto piloto 
de vivienda de bajo costo en Lima,” September 1969, p. 2. 
16 A. C. Kayanan, “Final Report: Selection of Sites for an Experimental Housing Project, Lima, Peru,” 
March 31, 1967, p. 11, 37. TE 322/1 PERU (240-3), UN-ARMS. 
17 In Peru the “empleado” (white-collar worker) was established as a legal category in the 1910s, granting 
the additional social welfare benefits that were seen as due to office workers since they had a 
responsibility to maintain a respectable lifestyle. Although the category of empleado was continually 
expanded to include additional kinds of jobs, its special status was jealously guarded—for example, 
separate hospitals served empleados and obreros (blue-collar workers) into the 1960s. See David Parker, 
The Idea of the Middle Class: White-Collar Workers and Peruvian Society, 1900–1950 (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). 
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competition included plans for very basic core houses, when it came to the construction phase 
the Caja selected dwellings of two-, three-, and four-bedrooms as appropriate for its members, 
“taking into account … the dwelling patterns of these families.”18 The houses were to be 
aspirational, not minimal. 
Project organizers solicited designs for PREVI PP1 via an architectural competition that 
was open to all Peruvian architects, as well as thirteen invited international teams. Peter Land 
travelled personally to issue the invitations, and the range of countries included reflected the 
desire to present “a truly global selection” in keeping with the UN sponsorship of the project:19 
the Eastern Bloc was represented by Poland (Oskar Hansen and Svein Hatløy), Latin America 
by Colombia (Esguerra, Saenz, Urdaneta, Samper), Asia by Japan (Kiyonori Kikutake, Fumihiko 
Maki, and Noriaki Kurokawa), and India (Charles Correa). Nonetheless, the majority of the 
participants were from Western Europe—England (James Stirling), Denmark (Knud 
Svenssons), Switzerland (Atelier Five), Finland (Toivo Korhonen), Germany (Herbert Ohl), 
Spain (J.L Iñiguez de Onzoño, A. Vázquez de Castro), the Netherlands (Aldo van Eyck), France 
(Candilis, Josic, Woods)—and finally, the United States (Christopher Alexander and the Center 
for Environmental Structure, with Sandy Hirshen).20 Six winning projects (three international, 
three Peruvian) were to be selected for construction, with 250 examples of each to make up a 
total of 1,500 units; the overall design of the neighbourhood would be determined by the PP1 
                                                
18 Government of Peru and UNDP, Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Perú, 6. On the other hand, a 
competition entry by Peruvian architects Juan Gunther and Mario Seminario that proposed eliminating the 
individual kitchen in favour of a communal kitchen shared between a group of houses, was rejected early 
in the judging process (presumably because it evoked working-class restaurants rather than the desired 
living patterns of the empleado). Silvio Grichener, “PREVI/Perú: Un intento en el más alto nivel,” Summa: 
Revista de arquitectura, tecnología y diseño 32 (December 1970): 46. 
19 Land, phone conversation with the author, April 2006. 
20 Land recalled that he had originally wanted Alexander to collaborate on a project with Serge 
Chermayeff, but they were unwilling to work together, so he selected Alexander because Chermayeff was 
a more difficult personality. Giancarlo de Carlo and Balkrishna Doshi were also on the short list, but were 
not in the end invited because Land had not been able to meet with them on his research trip. Land, 
phone conversation with the author, April 2006. 
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working group assembled from architects and planners at various Peruvian government 
agencies.21  
In March 1969 the international architects attended a required ten-day briefing in Lima in 
order to familiarize themselves with the “terrain, population, climate, construction materials and 
methods,”22 as well as seismic issues; they visited the project site, existing low-cost housing 
projects, and other residential areas. The project brief specified dwellings of 60-120 sq. m., on a 
plot of at least 80 sq. m., and no more than three storeys high, creating a low-rise, high-density 
urban scheme.23 The costs of high-rise housing were prohibitive in the Peruvian context, so it 
would not even be considered as a solution. The unidad comunal (community unit) of 1,500 
houses was to include a range of facilities to create a fully functioning neighbourhood—schools, 
sports grounds, community centres, commercial areas, parks—and to ensure the clear 
separation of vehicular and pedestrian routes. The stated intention was to build on the 
experience of Belaúnde’s unidad vecinal model using “contemporary ideas and experiences of 
other countries.”24 
The individual dwellings were to provide for a household of four increasing to sixteen 
members, taking into account the “socio-economic mobility” of the prospective residents, who 
were imagined as a young family, adding rooms with the arrival of new children, then 
subdividing the space to accommodate adult married children, or perhaps a family business. In 
                                                
21
 Peter Land (representing the UN), oversaw all four PREVI pilot projects in its first stages (March 1968–
April 1973); on the Peruvian side, the main coordinator of the project was Carlos Morales Macchiavello, 
with the initial planning committee including Luis Ortíz de Zevallos (president of the Banco de la 
Vivienda), Fernando Correa Miller (director of the Oficina Nacional de Plameamiento y Urbanismo), and 
architect Luis Dorich. In addition, the Peruvian architect Carlos Jara was in charge of PREVI PP1 
throughout its realization (November 1969–December 1975). See Jorge Vivanco; Banco de la Vivienda 
del Peru, “Informe Preliminar: Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Lima, Peru: Recopilación de 
Antecedentes,” February 4, 1967, UN-ARMS; ININVI, PREVI resultados y conclusiones: 20 años 
después (Lima: ININVI, 1988), 41.  
22 Government of Peru and United Nations, “Un concurso internacional para el diseño de un Proyecto 
Piloto de Vivienda de Bajo Costo en Lima, Perú,” September 2, 1968, p. 58.  
23 Ministerio de Vivienda and ININVI, Publicación PREVI, vol. 1, PREVI introducción, 1:14.   
24 Government of Peru and UN, “Concurso Internacional,” September 1969, p. 2. 
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this way, the house would develop from its initial nucleus as the circumstances of the owner 
allowed: “The dwelling should not be considered as a fixed and unchangeable unit, but as a 
structure with a cycle of evolution.”25 Accordingly, each architect was to present a two-fold 
design—a core housing unit to be constructed by professional contractors and taking advantage 
of the economies of mass-production, and a blueprint for gradual horizontal and/or vertical 
extension of the house over time by self-help, contractors, or a combination of the two. The 
architects were to facilitate this incremental construction by incorporating the increased loading 
requirements of any additional storeys into the initial structural calculations for the core unit, and 
also by providing designs for standardized building components that could be mass-produced 
on site and thereby made available to residents at low cost. The rationalization in construction 
methods and materials, in particular the use of modular coordination, was to be based on the 
guidelines of existing UN publications [7.2].26 Here one aim was to modernize the Peruvian 
construction industry, improving efficiency and productivity. In addition, as the project brief 
explained, “[I]n the past self-help methods have often been identified with improvisation and with 
primitive construction materials and methods.” Now, due to recent technological advances 
bringing “simplicity, ease of assembly, and reduction in weight,” the results of self-help labour 
could be significantly enhanced and refined, “and the development and employment of new 
techniques can extend its application.”27 This approach was in line with the UN’s Manual on 
Self-Help Housing (published in 1964), which had advocated the use of modular coordination on 
                                                
25 Government of Peru and UN, “Un concurso internacional,” September 2, 1968, p. 15, 16. 
26 Government of Peru and UN, “Un concurso internacional,” September 2, 1968, p. 34. The document 
specifically mentions two UN publications from 1966: Diseño modular de vivienda de bajo costo and 
Coordinación modular en la construcción. In addition, Alvaro Ortega—a Colombian architect who was the 
UN’s inter-regional consultant to PREVI (August 1969–September 1970)—had produced a publication on 
modular coordination for the UN some years earlier. At least one of the diagrams in this publication was in 
turn based on specifications for modular design produced by Bruce Martin, John Turner’s colleague from 
the AA. United Nations and Alvaro Ortega, Coordinación modular en la vivienda económica (New York: 
United Nations, 1960).  
27 Government of Peru and UN, “Un concurso internacional,” September 2, 1968, p. 19. 
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the grounds that it saved labour, materials, money, as well as the time required for training and 
supervising the self-helpers.28  
Thus, despite the claims made for PREVI PP1’s originality, its hybrid model was less a 
radical innovation than a deeper exploration of existing approaches. Further, while Peter Land 
has asserted that “in the areas of expansion, flexibility, and adaptation, PREVI [PP1] broke new 
ground,”29 the UN’s Manual on Self-Help Housing had already argued for the importance of 
“expandable” houses,30 and within Peru the concept of the “growing house” had been employed 
by housing agencies in aided self-help projects at Ciudad de Dios, Valdiviezo, and elsewhere, 
and by private developers such as Hogares Peruanos as a marketing strategy for their new 
subdivisions. Such projects borrowed and systematized the techniques of barriada housing—
progressive development, resident participation in construction—but aimed to circumvent ad 
hoc building efforts through technical assistance and carefully conceived expansion plans. 
PREVI PP1’s innovation was to transfer these techniques into the realm of high architecture and 
“advanced ideas” in order to refine the results still further. 
A total of forty-one projects were submitted to PREVI PP1 (thirteen international and 
twenty-eight Peruvian). The international winners were a diverse group: Atelier Five, Herbert 
Ohl, and Kiyonori Kikutake, Fumihiko Maki, and Noriaki Kurokawa.31 This decision was not 
unanimous: in a minority report, three jury members vehemently condemned the project by Ohl 
                                                
28 United Nations, Manual on Self-Help Housing (New York: United Nations, Deptartment of Economic 
and Social Affairs, 1964), 69. 
29 Land, “The Experimental Housing Project (PREVI), Lima,” 22. Land’s claims for the project have been 
adopted uncritically and amplified by subsequent writers, such as McGuirk: “That was the genius of 
PREVI [PP1]: it was designed as a platform for change.… It was revolutionary.” McGuirk, “PREVI, The 
Metabolist Utopia,” 65. 
30 United Nations, Manual on Self-Help Housing, 67. The manual included plans of proposed “expandable 
self-help housing” from Liberia, Costa Rica, and Zanzibar. For an important contemporary discussion of 
this approach see also “Self-Help, Core Housing, and Installment Construction” (Ch. 12), in Charles 
Abrams, Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), 164-181.  
31 The three Peruvian winners were Elsa Mazzarri and Manuel Llanas (P-22); Fernando Chaparro, Víctor 
Ramírez, Víctor Smirnoff, and Víctor Wyskowsky (P-25); Jacques Crousse, Jorge Páez, and Ricardo 
Pérez León (P-27). 
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(director of the Institute of Industrialized Building at the Hochschule für Gestaltung, Ulm) as “a 
personal regimented and expensive solution both as to dwelling units and site plan. It is 
inhuman”; conversely, it commended the Center for Environmental Structure’s plan as “a 
milestone in low-cost housing design,” advising that the UN move to promote the project as a 
matter of urgency.32 The official competition report reiterated that the intention was to construct 
the six winning designs, but also suggested that due to the valuable ideas proposed by each of 
the projects, their best elements should be further explored. It therefore recommended that the 
next stage should be to develop prototypes of twenty additional projects (the remaining ten 
invited international projects and ten selected Peruvian entries),33 constructing a smaller number 
of each design. An imagined affinity with the Weißenhofsiedlung is already evident in the 
organizers’ vision of the project as “being used as a permanent exhibition of low-cost housing 
for Peruvian and foreign specialists.”34 
In early 1970, the decision was taken to build the expanded number of prototypes. The 
organizers now planned for the completion of preparatory work by the end of 1972, and of the 
construction phase by the end of 1975. However in the end only twenty-four of the twenty-six 
prototypes would be realized, with approximately twenty examples of each constructed, creating 
a neighbourhood of 467 houses—Ohl’s project was “left for a later stage”35 due to technical 
difficulties, along with that of the Peruvian team of Franco Vella, José Bentín, Raúl Quiñones, 
                                                
32 “PREVI/Lima: Low Cost Housing Project,” 189.  The dissenting jurors were Carl Koch, Alfredo Perez, 
and Halldor Gunnlögsson. 
33 The ten additional Peruvian projects were: Miguel Alvariño Guzmán (P-5); Ernesto Paredes (P-6); Luis 
Miró-Quesada, Carlos Williams, Oswaldo Núñez (P-7); Juan Gunther, Mario Seminario (P-9); Carlo 
Morales Machiavello, Alfredo Montagne Fort (P-12); Juan Reiser (P-16); Eduardo Orrego (P-18); Luis 
Vier, Consuelo Zanelli de Vier (P-20); Franco Vella, José Bentín, Raúl Quiñones, Luis Takahashi (P-21); 
Frederick Cooper Llosa, José García-Bryce, Antonio Graña, Eugenio Nicolini (P-24). 
34 Government of Peru and UN, “Concurso Internacional,” September 1969, p. 3. 
35 Government of Peru and UNDP, Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Perú, 4. 
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and Luis Takahashi.36 The urban plan for this trial neighbourhood, on a site eight kilometres 
north of the centre of Lima, was developed by Land and the PP1 working group [7.3].37 It 
emerged as a patchwork of the disparate proposed solutions, loosely structured around a 
narrow central walkway; allocated only a small number of units, none of the architects were able 
to fully realize their urban concepts for the residential groupings—a decision that seriously 
compromised the integrity of the project as built.  
Following the completion of this abbreviated version of PREVI PP1, no additional 
housing units were ever constructed [7.4]. Consequently in a very real sense the unrealized 
competition proposals offer richer ground for exploration than the project as built—representing 
interpretations of, and responses to, practices of progressive development and self-build 
construction as read through different strands of late-1960s avant-garde architecture. The 
proposals by Herbert Ohl and by the CES represent the most comprehensive and radical efforts 
to rethink housing provision generated by PREVI PP1—one emphasizing the potential of 
technology to revolutionize production, the other the importance of culture in designing a 
rationalized, but indigenized, domesticity—and thus provide an appropriate starting point for the 
discussion. 
 
7.2 Houses Generated by Architects 
 
The establishment of minimum constraints for an optimization of free growth 
combining elements of user-design for both the individual and the community, 
forms the basis of this project. 
The basic order devised is intended to establish a democratic interchange 
between human and technological factors. The order devised will stimulate 
multiplicity, multiformity, micro and macro relations; all expressed through 
logically derived dimensional and functional modules.38 
                                                
36 In practice the number of each type to be constructed varied rather widely, with only six of Oskar 
Hansen’s houses (I-10) compared to thirty of Esquerra, Saenz, Urdaneta, Samper’s (I-3). 
37 See ONPU, Esquema Director, 1967–1980, Plan de Desarrollo Metropolitano Lima-Callao a 1980, vol. 
1, Aspectos Globales (Lima: ONPU; Ministerio de Vivienda; Concejo Provincial de Lima, 1967).  





All houses are formed by the same sequence of rules, based on the form of the 
generic house. But each house has to meet certain particular conditions: those 
imposed on it by the family’s choices, and those imposed on it by its position in 
the site....   
Each individual house is formed by the interaction of the local conditions which it 
has to meet and the generic rules of the combination process.39 
At first glance the two schemes by Herbert Ohl and the Center for Environmental 
Structure (CES) appear to be utterly opposed to one another, both formally and conceptually, 
and they were certainly viewed as such by the dissenting jurors. The stark contrast between the 
two urban plans—Herbert Ohl’s rigid punch-card pattern-making [7.5], and the CES’s extended 
spinal structure with its organic flows and interchanges [7.14]—is reinforced by the language 
used to introduce the proposals: Ohl’s technocratic jargon (“minimum constraints for an 
optimization of free growth,” “democratic interchange between human and technological 
factors”) against the CES’s somewhat more straightforward phrasing (at least to the extent of 
using the words “house” and “family”). Yet there are also significant parallels in the way they are 
conceived. First, the idea of an underlying system to guide the design process (Ohl’s “basic 
order” and the CES’s “sequence of rules”). Second, the modulation of this system through the 
resident’s influence over the details of the design (Ohl’s “user-design” and the CES’s “choices”), 
so that the particular object is able to emerge from the general system (Ohl’s “multiplicity, 
multiformity” and the CES’s “individual house” formed by “local conditions”).  
In the broadest terms, both proposals were predicated on employing quasi-scientific 
systems to generate new residential forms and promoting enhanced user-participation in the 
design process. Ohl’s “logically derived dimensional and functional modules” established 
standardized construction units for the physical framework of the housing project; the resulting 
simplicity of the structure was intended to maximize individual expression within the unit. The 
advocacy of a thoroughly rational, rationalized construction process was in effect a practical 
                                                
39
 Christopher Alexander, Sanford Hirshen, Sara Ishikawa, Christie Coffin, and Shlomo Angel, “Houses 
Generated by Patterns,” Architects' Yearbook 13 (1971): 96. 
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critique of the inefficiencies and distorted marketing fantasies of capitalist housing production, 
reflecting Ohl’s institutional affiliation with the Hochschule für Gestaltung, Ulm. For Christopher 
Alexander and his colleagues at the CES in Berkeley, the aim was nothing less than developing 
a new model of architectural practice, one more responsive to the specific socio-cultural, 
technological, and climatic conditions of each context, and to the individual needs of prospective 
users. Borrowing techniques from ethnographic fieldwork to make close observations of 
everyday habits of spatial organization, the CES translated the resulting data into a 
comprehensive, but adaptable, catalogue of practical design solutions. These “patterns” of 
variable design elements could be presented to prospective residents as a kit of parts from 
which to assemble the ideal house for their particular circumstances. Closer analysis of the two 
proposals demonstrates how their conceptual and ideological principles were manifested in the 
design proposals.  
 
Herbert Ohl: Minimum Constraints, Free Growth 
According to his own description, Herbert Ohl’s proposal is based on the progressive 
combination of “dimensional and functional modules”40 to generate the house, the 
neighbourhood, and the urban plan; the social and spatial organization of the site, and likewise 
the house, is entirely subsidiary to these modular combinations. The fundamental unit of 
measurement in this system—the “basic micro-planning module”—is set at 30 cm., which can 
be broken down into smaller units (10, 5, or 2.5 cm.) for “more refined dimensional areas.” The 
30cm unit is used to draw up the grid of the floor plans [7.8]; multiplied by four, it produces the 
“basic planning module” of 1.2 m., which defines the grid underlying the housing lots. This in 
turn determines the dimensions of the standardized “building frame sections” measuring 1.2 m. 
wide, 7.2 m. long (equivalent to six 1.2 m. units). The width of each housing lot is 9.6 m. (eight 
                                                
40
 Unless otherwise note, all quotations in this section are taken from Ohl’s excerpted project statement, 
as published in “PREVI/Lima: Low Cost Housing Project,” Architectural Design 40, no. 4 (1970): 192. 
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1.2 m. units), allowing for the “building frame sections” to be shifted laterally by one or two grid 
squares to produce more complex internal volumes. 
At the next level, the entire site plan is overlaid with a 9.6 m. by 9.6 m. grid [7.5].  In the 
housing zones these 9.6 m. units (or “urban planning modules”) are combined into groups of 
“three linear or nine square urban planning modules” to form 28.8 m. squares, which are then 
subdivided into groups of housing lots and pedestrian walkways according to a strict pattern: 
along the east-west axis, a group of three 9.6 m. units is divided into two 12 m.-deep housing 
lots, with the remaining space given over to walkways on either side.  Like the “building frame 
sections” within the grid of the individual lot, the lots themselves are laterally displaced by one or 
two units within the urban grid, modulating its monotony by these subtle setbacks and 
projections from one row to the next, creating dynamic passages of undulating width. Ultimately 
the guiding factor behind the design of the parallel walkways is functional rather than aesthetic: 
they house sets of tracks, spaced 28.8 m. apart, to convey the massive movable crane system 
used to slot the “building frame sections” into place [7.6]. Travelling north-south along the centre 
of the broad walkways, Ohl claimed that this mobile crane could be deployed at any stage 
throughout the life of the neighbourhood to carry out alterations, additions, or the “replacement 
and modernization of individual units”; in this way the system “permits a combination of high 
density with considerable formal flexibility impossible to achieve by traditional methods.”  
Ohl’s competition proposal treated the designated site as the first phase—or “module”—
of a larger urban settlement, which would be composed of ten or so of these “module[s] of the 
dwelling community [comunidad habitacional].”41 In the larger scheme, extending into the 
countryside to the west, Ohl’s grid of community modules weaves itself apparently effortlessly 
into the contour lines of the hilly topography. For the detailed planning of the first phase, Ohl 
                                                
41 Herbert Ohl’s project statement, as published in Silvio Grichener, “PREVI/Perú: Un intento en el más 
alto nivel,” Summa: Revista de arquitectura, tecnología y diseño 32 (December 1970): 50. It appears that 
Grichener has included the entire text of Ohl’s statement. 
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reshapes the two unequal parallelograms of the site into one slightly irregular rectangle [7.5]; a 
large number of walkways punctuate the site north-south, while vehicular access is strictly 
limited to an underground service road. Working within this streamlined version of the site, Ohl 
employs a central pedestrian zone crossing the site east-west as the main organizational 
element: this connects a series of public parks and facilities (educational, administrative, social, 
and commercial) which are situated in evenly spaced symmetrical lozenges of various sizes 
whose positioning effectively shapes the site into six neighbourhoods (or, in Ohl’s terminology, 
“the module of the community … is in turn subdivided into six contiguous modules”42). The 
clustering of the isolated ziggurat forms of these public facilities creates a monumental focus for 
each neighbourhood, but little is done to distinguish one facility from another, as the 
establishment of a legible hierarchy is made subservient to the demands of symmetrical 
patterning. Within the residential zones the housing is planned at such a high level of density 
that there is little allowance for local green spaces or other community amenities; as a result, 
there is nothing to give the neighbourhoods individual character, or to provide a social focus. In 
essence the division into public (social, commercial) and private (residential) zones appears to 
be inspired by the desire for a visually rational plan—that is, creating the visual effect of rational 
planning rather than actually following a functional rationale.   
Ohl had previously experimented with similar construction systems at Ulm. The 
“Prefabricated Space-Cell System” (published in 1966) was one such project [7.7]: a reinforced, 
double-shelled concrete frame is assembled by joining together small, open-ended orthogonal 
chambers or “toruses”; the resulting “space cells” are slotted together to form square concrete 
tubes with high structural stability, “making horizontal and vertical staggering and cantilevering, 
possible.”43 The “space cells” follow a similar dimensional system to PREVI PP1, based on a 30 
                                                
42 Ohl’s project statement, in Grichener, “PREVI/Perú,” 50. 
43
 “Prefabricated Space-Cell System,” Arts and Architecture 83, no. 6 (July 1966): 11.  
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cm. module, and with an anticipated potential span-width of 7.2 m. for an individual cell; 
however, the full-size cells produced in this iteration of the experiment appear to be much 
smaller, approximately 2.4 m. square. The associated models show the system applied to a 
variety of low- and high-rise structures as an example of its versatility. However, unlike PREVI 
PP1, the individual “space cells” are never shifted from direct alignment to vary the internal 
spaces, producing uniform boxes inevitably recalling shipping containers. As applied in the 
theoretical project of a student dormitory, the fabrication of architecture utilizing the “space-cell 
system” closely follows the mass-production model of motor vehicle assembly,44 with all “interior 
equipment” built in at the plant—“windows, partition walls, floor and wall coverings, sanitary 
equipment, heating and air conditioning installations”45—suggesting that the individual rooms 
follow one basic model, with few (if any) variations.46  
Ohl’s proposal for PREVI PP1 appears to take a step back from the mass-production of 
complete housing units; the competition guidelines’ emphasis on progressive development may 
have inspired this more flexible approach, and evidently the single-family house layout also 
facilitated greater customization of the individual housing units. Ohl presented an array of 
possible layouts for the house, carefully enumerated as mathematically generated variations on 
a theme [7.9]. In an attempt to adapt an industrialized building system “to the social and 
economic conditions currently reigning in Peru” Ohl proposed the separate fabrication of outer 
frame and interior fittings, distinguishing “the central and continuous production of highly-
finished three-dimensional building frame sections” from the “on-site manufacture of housing 
                                                
44 According to one source, after leaving Ulm Ohl taught automobile design at the School of Design in 
Pforzheim. Martin Krampen and Günther Hörmann, Die Hochschule für Gestaltung Ulm—Anfänge eines 
Projektes der unnachgiebigen Moderne (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 2003), 51.   
45
 “Prefabricated Space-Cell System,” 11. 
46
 Related projects include a prefabricated house for a competition organized by the European 
Community for Coal and Steel in the mid-1960s, and the “System for petrol filling stations” developed at 
Ulm by Ohl and Bernd Meurer, where this convergence of technology, form, and function seems less 
forced than in the domestic context. See “CECA steel housing competition awards,” Architectural Design 
37 (1967): 510-521; Krampen and Hörmann, Die Hochschule für Gestaltung Ulm. 
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elements”—the one focused on speed and efficiency, the other on local fabrication and 
responsiveness to shifts in consumer demand since it did not require specialized plant and 
machinery.  
This exterior-interior division is comparable to N. J. Habraken’s proposed mass-
production of housing units in two distinct parts: the “support” (or housing “superstructure”) and 
the “detachable units” (all its finishings, furnishings, and fixtures, to be purchased and installed 
by the individual occupant) [7.10]. Habraken makes an important distinction between the 
support and the dwelling per se: while the former is an object fabricated in a factory, the latter 
cannot be mechanically produced but rather “is the result of people fulfilling the need to 
dwell”47—first by making an identification with their living environment, and then by taking 
responsibility for shaping that environment. The support is not conceived as an end in itself, but 
is intended to inspire the occupant’s more vital engagement with the living environment: “to 
dwell is to take action.”48 Despite the utopian shading of Habraken’s rhetoric, in practice the 
proposal becomes rather more prosaic: Habraken’s newly engaged dweller appears less a free-
wheeling creator than a particularly sensitive consumer, thoughtfully choosing from the “different 
possibilities and different products” presented to him: 
On the way he is developing a definite feeling for quality. A sense of what is 
going well for him and what is not; keeping an eye on what the neighbours are 
doing and trying hard to please himself but not being too different from the crowd 
he feels he belongs to. It comes quite naturally.49 
Here Habraken’s argument recalls the Ulm School’s emphasis on the designer’s responsibility 
to educate the consumer, manifesting superior designs in order to elevate aesthetic 
discernment.   
                                                
47 N. J. Habraken, “Supports: Responsibilities and Possibilities,” AAQ: Architectural Association Quarterly 
1, no. 1 (Winter 1968–1969): 27. 
48 Habraken, “Supports,” 26. The Dutch term used by Habraken (Drager, or “framework for living”) 
apparently underscores the social function of the support, a connotation lost in the English translation. 
49 Habraken, “Supports,” 31. 
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In his proposal for PREVI PP1, Ohl reduces the work of architectural composition to the 
combination of pre-set modules, seeming to suggest that the designer should recede into the 
background, allowing the individual resident to determine the shaping of their domestic 
environment. The layout is generated and determined by the modular system, with little 
definition of how the house would be occupied and experienced as a habitable space. In the 
most detailed version of the plan available [7.8], the primary entrance appears to be situated in 
the lobby-like area in the centre of the right side; this lobby extends fully halfway into the body of 
the house, with little indication as to the disposition of the other rooms apart from the placement 
of one full-length partition wall marking off the back half of the house, and two short walls 
creating smaller rooms either side of the lobby area. The schematic floor plans of the various 
projected house types (60, 90, 120 sq. m.) give little additional information: apart from a rough 
division into public, private, and service zones, there is no indication as to how the individual 
spaces of the house would work. Likewise the relationship between the indoor and outdoor 
spaces is opaque: the basic plan includes a total of five exterior doorways, as if to prove the 
openness of the structure, yet there is little indication of what kind of spaces are being created 
here—whether service patios, leisure areas, or gardens. It is hard to escape the conclusion that 
they are doors to nowhere, leading aimlessly into the empty spaces created by the lateral 
displacements of the “building frame sections” within the underlying grid.  Ohl employs these 
transpositions to suggest the potential complexity of the plan, but it is a complexity generated 
purely by the play of dimensional units rather than in response to the patterns of domestic life, 
or to environmental factors such as sunlight or air. 
For Ohl, the use of a minimal framework, creating an open structure of the simplest 
possible form, ensures maximum internal freedom by removing all “constraints for an 
optimization of free growth.” The system is assumed to be objective or neutral enough to 
accommodate anything within its modular dimensions and grid lines. However, while the 
austerity of the building frame sections may be easily modified by the overlays of habitation, it 
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would be impossible to overcome their rigidity to make any structural adjustments, 
circumscribing any spatial intervention through the establishment of their initial, pre-determined 
coordinates. Modifications at the urban level would encounter similar difficulties, being hemmed 
in by the rules of the established grid pattern; “free growth” would effectively be limited to the 
insertion of occasional green spaces or local amenities along the north-south residential bands, 
small enough adaptations to avoid disrupting the overall parameters of the pattern. 
Although Ohl describes his system as a “democratic interchange between human and 
technological factors,” rather than offering an equal collaboration, it appears that the 
technological defines and limits the possibilities of the human: at the level of the house, through 
the intractable concrete “building frame sections”; at the level of the site, through the parallel 
crane-tracks that provide the guidelines for the entire urban plan. There is a complete 
disconnection between the immense technological sophistication of the system and its utter lack 
of socio-spatial awareness, between its mechanical ability to generate a wide variety of floor 
plans and its conceptual inability to evaluate the effectiveness of any of these plans on a 
functional level, as used by an actual resident. The dissenting jurors’ verdict of “inhuman” does 
not seem excessive.  
 
Center for Environmental Structure: Local Conditions, Generic Rules 
While the needs of the resident are barely perceptible in Ohl’s conception of the house, 
they are central to the proposal devised by Christopher Alexander and the CES. In contrast to 
Ohl’s extreme rationalization of housing production, the CES attempted to create a viable mass-
production system based on multiple variables and individual choice, making a heroic effort to 
streamline the unwieldy—and economically irrational—process of participatory design into a 
manageable form. 
The CES was formally established in 1967 with the aim of developing a set of general 
principles which would constitute a systematic language of design. Its experiments along these 
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lines had begun a couple of years earlier with projects to produce conceptual designs for the 
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit system (1964–1965),50 and then for the Hunts Point 
Multi-Service Center (1967–1968), where it first used the terminology of the “pattern language” 
to describe its design process [7.11].51 In 1969, PREVI PP1 became the largest CES project to 
date to use the pattern language system, and the first in which the CES was engaged directly 
rather than acting as a consultant.52 
The projects for BART and Hunts Point had emerged from a detailed analysis of the 
operational needs of the proposed program, as well as observations of people’s behaviour in 
the environments under study. For PREVI PP1, this ethnographic approach was greatly 
expanded, as Alexander and three other members of the CES—Shlomo Angel, Christie Coffin, 
and Sara Ishikawa—each spent a month in Lima before the official competition briefing, living 
with low-income families as participant-observers to document how they inhabited their houses. 
In addition, Sandy Hirshen, a Bay Area-based architect, joined them for a shorter period in order 
to research local construction techniques.53 
                                                
50 For this project the CES acted as consultants to the office of Wurster, Bernardi, & Emmons; the 
research was published as Christopher Alexander, Van Maren King, Sara Ishikawa, Michael Baker, and 
Patrick Hyslop, “Relational Complexes in Architecture,” Architectural Record (September 1966): 185-190.  
51
 The CES was engaged to advise Urban America and architect Kenneth Simmons. The project was 
eventually designed and built by architect Max Bond, with financing from the New York City Human 
Resources Administration and the federally funded HUD 702 Neighbourhood Centers Program. See 
Christopher Alexander, Sara Ishikawa, and Murray Silverstein, A Pattern Language Which Generates 
Multi-Service Centers (Berkeley: Center for Environmental Structure, 1968). In their next project, the CES 
worked with Skidmore, Owings & Merrill on the “schematic development” of a facility for the Southwest 
Regional Laboratory for Education Research in Southern California (1968). See Roger Montgomery, 
“Pattern Language: The Contribution of Christopher Alexander’s Center for Environmental Structure to 
the Science of Design,” Architectural Forum 132, no. 1 (1970): 52-59. 
52
 Soon after, researchers at the National Institute of Mental Health who were working on the effects of 
environment on mental health approached the CES to submit a grant application. The resulting $300,000 
grant funded the development of the “pattern language” over the next several years, culminating in the 
publication of the book of that name in 1977. Sara Ishikawa, interview with the author, January 2007. See 
Christopher Alexander, Sara Ishikawa, Murray Silverstein, Max Jacobson, Ingrid Fiksdahl-King, and 
Shlomo Angel, A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1977).  
53 From 1964 Hirshen worked at Wurster, Bernardi, & Emmons on urban design for BART. In 1965 he 
established his own architectural office with Sim Van der Ryn after they were awarded a contract from the 
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The result was a conceptual blueprint for “houses generated by patterns”54: less 
architectural plans than general principles to guide the design process, the patterns identified 
various “problems” which would need to be addressed for the successful formation of the 
individual house or of the neighbourhood, proposing spatial (and on occasion technical or 
constructive) “solutions” for each issue. Falling into three basic categories—Community 
Patterns, House Patterns, and Construction Patterns—the ambition was to document the socio-
spatial specificities of the Peruvian context and to translate these observations into a design 
lexicon. Accordingly, many of the sixty-seven “patterns” referred to or replicated traditional 
spatial forms. For example, the importance of a clearly defined, secure “Perimeter Wall” for 
each house;55 the close social interface between the house and the street, expressed as “Front 
Door Recesses”; or the “Mirador”—emulating the enclosed balconies of colonial Lima—which 
included a built-in seat in order to facilitate watching the street [7.12-7.13]. 
On the urban level—the Community Patterns—the CES borrowed some elements and 
invented others. The main structuring device, the central spine or “Paseo” [7.14], is a diffuse 
                                                                                                                                                       
Office of Economic Opportunity to construct temporary “Flash Peak” housing settlements for migrant farm 
workers in California. These projects received attention for their innovative use of low-cost building 
materials and structural systems, such as the tent-like plastic “Paradome” (designed by Bill Moss) and the 
“Plydome” shelter of Kraft paper layered over a polystyrene core (designed by Herb Yates). See “Short-
term Housing for a Long-term Problem,” Progressive Architecture  (May 1966): 166-173; David Wild, 
“Drop In,” Architectural Design 39, no. 2 (February 1969): 99-104. This exploratory approach to 
construction systems would be Hirshen’s key contribution to the PREVI PP1 proposal. Although Hirshen 
had a number of points of connection to the CES—in addition to his work on BART, he taught at Berkeley 
from 1966, and contributed advice to the CES Hunts Point project—as he recalled, the collaboration for 
PREVI PP1 was initiated by Peter Land. Sandy Hirshen, interview with the author, January 2007, 
transcript, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, New York. 
54 See Christopher Alexander, Sanford Hirshen, Sara Ishikawa, Christie Coffin, and Shlomo Angel, 
Houses Generated by Patterns (Berkeley: Center for Environmental Structure, 1969). An article published 
under the same title in 1971 is essentially a truncated version of the earlier text: Christopher Alexander, 
Sanford Hirshen, Sara Ishikawa, Christie Coffin, and Shlomo Angel, “Houses Generated by Patterns,” 
Architects' Yearbook 13 (1971): 84-114. 
55 This is explained as follows: “Peruvians who live in cities … feel a tremendous need for security against 
the outside world—both against theives, and against curious strangers.  This feeling is so strong that 
many low-income Peruvians spend their money on a fine perimeter wall of brick or concrete, even when 
they know this means they won’t be able to have a roof, or rooms, inside.” Alexander et al, Houses 
Generated by Patterns, 117. Significantly, the notes for this pattern refer to an article by John Turner: 
“Lima Barriadas Today,” Architectural Design 33, no. 8 (August 1963). 
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kind of public space loosely inspired by Latin American pedestrian promenades: it is formed of 
pairs of pathways, framing the double rows of residential blocks running through the centre of 
the site, and linking together eight “Activity Nuclei”—nodes in the network that house no specific 
program, but operate as points of intersection between the various facilities (clinics, dance halls, 
schools, markets, and so on) spread throughout the site. The concept and terminology of the 
“Activity Nuclei” is clearly more CES than limeño. Likewise with the “Subculture Cells”—forty-
three residential micro-neighbourhoods within the urban plan, each containing twenty-five to 
seventy-five houses, along with a number of intimate public spaces for the local community. The 
proposed function of these spaces is sometimes straightforward and clearly circumscribed—the 
cloister-like “Walled Gardens”; places for “Street Football”; and the “Visible Kindergartens” with 
a sunken play area but maintaining visual contact with the street [7.15]. By contrast, with the 
“Multipurpose Outdoor Rooms”56 the exact shape and function is left open, to be decided by the 
priorities of local residents, housing anything from playgrounds, to open-air bars, to chess tables 
for elderly people. An important mechanism for maintaining the local character of these 
amenities are the “Cell Gateways” which announce the entrance to each “Subculture Cell” 
[7.15]: the gateway stages the transition into the local community as “the path narrows down, 
changes level, passes under cover or passes through an enclosure.”57 This threshold provides a 
symbolic point of arrival both for the visitor, and for the resident returning home. 
In their supporting documentation, the CES made it clear that the application of the 
patterns was not to be subject to the creative whims of the designer, but would be responsive—
and responsible—to each group of residents for its immediate neighbourhood, and to each 
family for its own house. To make this workable for the stipulated population of 1,500 
                                                
56 These are enclosed plazas, “at least partly surrounded by a continuous roofed arcade always at least 
two metres deep, and, where possible, built up against the walls of existing buildings.” Alexander et al, 
“Houses Generated by Patterns,” 105. 
57 Alexander et al, Houses Generated by Patterns, 101. 
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households, Alexander and his collaborators devised a method of streamlining the participatory 
element of the design process via a six-page questionnaire, which would then be translated into 
an easy-to-follow twenty-step design template. A “Family Choice Sheet” asked prospective 
residents to decide how much space they wanted for each room of the house, and where their 
house should be located within the site. The questionnaire provided pricing for each option, so 
that residents could tabulate the financial impact of each improvement to their domestic comfort: 
a small kitchen could be had for S/.13,000, or a large one for S/.22,000; a corner lot with a 
second entrance at the side and a rental space cost S/.10,000, while a centre lot with a second 
entrance at the rear was S/.2,000.58 Other options were free of charge, but personalized the 
design by asking residents to specify which facilities they would like to be near (market, clinic, 
church, and so on), and whether they prefered a quiet or a busy area. While it was possible to 
outline a “generic house” based on the overall relationship of the elements, which remained 
constant, the essence of the CES scheme was precisely its infinite variability according to 
personal taste and budget. 
The CES was convinced that this highly individualized housing model could be swiftly 
and systematically translated into usable plans via the twenty-step guided design process 
[7.16]. The first step was to assign the house to an appropriate area within the site, followed by 
an assessment of how the lot’s immediate site conditions (“the positions of next door houses, 
positions of adjacent paths and roads”) would affect the design. Next, the dimensions of the 
house were established, with a uniform width set at 5.2 m., and the length varying from 13 m. to 
27 m., depending on the cumulative spatial requirements for the ground floor rooms: sala 
(parlour), main patio, family room, kitchen, and service patio. The patio openings were the first 
architectural element to be positioned (“always on the east side of the house”), followed by the 
front door (determined by the north or south aspect of the lot, and the presence or absence of 
                                                
58 Alexander et al, “Houses Generated by Patterns,” 95.  
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adjacent houses), and so on for the rest of the rooms and various custom features. The process 
could almost be reduced to a binary code of 0-1 options for each element, as if presenting a 
prototype for computer-aided design. Indeed, the CES argued: 
the rules of the combination process are almost mechanical, and can be carried 
out by any trained draughtsman. The low cost of the houses cannot support any 
individual design time. We estimate that a trained draughtsman will need about 
one hour per house, to translate the family choice sheet into a set of working 
drawings and specifications for the contractor.59   
No reference was made, however, as to how much additional time would be required for the 
actual fabrication of these made-to-measure houses. Offering a larger number of options than 
tract homes, and more fundamental modulations—not just in terms of finishes and fittings, but 
the size of every single one of the various rooms—the production phase would arguably be the 
most complicated part of the entire process. Furthermore, building individualized row houses, as 
opposed to free-standing homes, would present additional difficulties, requiring customization at 
the level of the entire housing block.  
The patterns guiding the design of the house fall into two broad categories. On one 
hand, patterns deriving from environmental factors are to be applied universally: the north-south 
orientation creates a “Cross-Ventilated House,” an effect intensified by the deployment of open-
air patios at both front and back, so that all ground-floor living rooms have the benefit of upwind 
and downwind exposure; there are sources of “Light on Two Sides of Every Room” to avoid the 
excesses of glare or shadow caused by a single light source; and alternating opened and 
covered areas achieve a balanced “Tapestry of Light and Dark” throughout the house [7.20].  
On the other hand, patterns expressing the social functioning of each household—and 
its division into public, shared, and private spaces—produce the greatest modulations in the 
form of the individual dwelling. The key feature which allows internal differentiation between 
various types of spaces is the very shape of the plan [7.18]: the “Long Thin House” is intended 
                                                
59
 Alexander et al, “Houses Generated by Patterns,” 96. Emphasis in original. 
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to reduce the potential for overcrowding and lack of privacy by ensuring that even within the 
most constrained footprint “the mean distance between rooms is as high as possible.”60 The 
form recalls the layout of the Court House presented in Alexander and Serge Chermayeff’s 
Community and Privacy (1963),61 whose single-storey plan is divided front-to-back into zones 
for adults (master bedroom), family, and children [7.17]. The PREVI PP1 house employs a 
similar distinction, but establishes a more formal separation of public and private zones, 
translated into a pattern called “Intimacy Gradient” [7.19]. Reflecting the layout of the traditional 
Peruvian house, passage into the “intimate” spaces of the house is staged in a strict sequence: 
entry-sala-family room-kitchen-bedrooms. In more affluent Peruvian households, the sala 
tended to be a formal parlour containing prized furnishings and ornaments, but the CES 
provided even the most modest house with a symbolic sala in the form of “a tiny receiving 
alcove immediately inside the front door.”62 The “entry” marks the physical threshold between 
inside and outside, but it is the sala which demarcates the transition between public and private 
zones within the dwelling, outlining a limit for visitors to the household. Beyond the sala are the 
shared family spaces, such as the social patio, with the service patios at the back of the house.  
The most private spaces—bedrooms and sleeping alcoves—are relegated to the upper storey, 
and carefully differentiated: children’s bedrooms, separated by gender, are arranged in clusters 
around common areas; the master bedroom is located at the top of the stairs, sharing no 
common walls in order to establish “maximum acoustic privacy,”63 while maintaining visual 
control over the front door to watch for intruders and to monitor the comings and goings of 
children. (Nonetheless, this was insufficient for Spanish jury member José Antonio Coderch, 
                                                
60 Alexander et al, Houses Generated by Patterns, 114. 
61 Serge Chermayeff and Christopher Alexander, Community and Privacy: Towards a New Architecture of 
Humanism (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 244-245. 
62 Alexander et al, “Houses Generated by Patterns,” 107. 
63 Alexander et al, Houses Generated by Patterns, 158. 
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who submitted a brief individual report condemning this as the “worst project” with its sleeping 
arragements “dangerously facilitating promiscuity, making individual independence in relation to 
the family impossible.”64) 
The distinctions of public, shared, and private spaces are repeated at the micro-level of 
domestic organization. For example, the main family room includes a number of shallow 
alcoves, with slightly lower ceilings than the main space, allowing family members to withdraw 
from the general social activities to work, study, or read, while remaining connected to their 
surroundings [7.21]; in this way “the family can be together, even when they are doing different 
things.”65 The relationships of public and private between the house and the world outside are 
carefully structured via a number of transitional devices. There are no ground-floor windows 
facing onto the street, making the house into its own introspective world; however the “Front 
Door Recesses” create spaces “half in, half out” in a similar vein to the family-room alcoves, 
allowing a vacillation between participation and withdrawal, between the street and the house, 
as the mood dictates [7.13]. In addition, optical connections to the street are established from 
the first floor: the “Mirador” invites observation of the public realm from a private zone; the 
“Gallery Surround” [7.21] offers a more reciprocal exchange of views, since it is intended to 
represent something of the household to its neighbourhood: 
What is needed is some outside to the house, which is enough “part of the 
inside” so that it will quickly be made personal and different from the 
neighbours.... After a few years, each gallery will contain a unique collection of 
extensions, planting, furnishing, and decoration.66 
Over time, these projecting balconies are intended to express the public face of the 
household via an accumulation of individual details.  
                                                
64 “Appendix 4. Opinión del Arq. J. A. Coderch,” in Government of Peru and United Nations, “Concurso 
Internacional,” September 1969. 
65 Alexander et al, “Houses Generated by Patterns,” 109. 
66 Alexander et al, Houses Generated by Patterns, 178. 
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For the CES, even very simple architectural elements have the potential to play a 
significant role in the social interchanges within the house, an approach underscored by the 
hand-drawn plans and perspectives accompanying the PREVI PP1 proposal, which depict 
the architecture animated by the incidents of everyday life. By contrast, Ohl’s plans 
emphasize the neutrality of domestic spaces, their interchangeability rather than social and 
functional specificity [7.9]: the prospective inhabitants are represented as a series of dots, 
components in a system, while the various domestic functions are translated into an abstract 
code which shuns any metonymic or associative values. 
In terms of its construction patterns, the CES plans for the progressive development of 
the house are as open-ended as its initial planning; the primary concern is to facilitate additions 
and adaptations by establishing a simple structural system based on easily produced elements 
requiring no specialized skills or technologies. The original intention was to rely primarily on 
manual labour with some mechanical assistance for heavier tasks such as laying concrete 
slabs, making use of highway-building equipment which would have been readily available in 
Peru [7.22]. According to Sandy Hirshen, the rest of the structure was to be extremely 
lightweight, primarily through the innovation of floor planks and roof beams fabricated from 
bamboo stalks and sulphur (or urethane) foam.67 In Peru bamboo was widely regarded as a 
low-prestige, temporary building material—bamboo mats (esteras) were commonly employed in 
the first stage of barriada housing, for example—but the CES architect Sara Ishikawa had 
visited a local resort which used sophisticated bamboo construction techniques for exotic effect, 
suggesting the value of further experiments with the material.68 The concrete blocks were also 
innovative, designed to stack easily in an interlocking system that would not require specialized 
                                                
67 Hirshen, interview with the author, January 2007. Once he had returned to Berkeley, Hirshen 
experimented (with the assistance of engineer Bill Gilbert) with various prototypes for the formwork for the 
bamboo beams, and tested their loading capacity and ease of transport. 
68 Ishikawa, interview with the author, January 2007. 
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labour. Their aesthetics were also a consideration—describing the decision to finish the surface 
with sulphur coating, and highlight the detail of the hexagon-shaped knob forming the tip of the 
interlock, Hirshen noted:   
I don't know if this was Chris's influence so much, but I think we were all attuned 
to the idea of making these traditional materials more aesthetically pleasing.  So, 
for example, these … little coloured hexagons, I think we used shoe polish or 
stains, or something, to just make the point that these could be physically 
attractive things.69 
In the end, these efforts to fabricate vernacular-inflected materials proved to be too costly to 
reproduce, so in the construction phase the PREVI PP1 working group made the decision to 
use mass-produced concrete elements instead. 
Alexander and his team were confident that their fieldwork had allowed them to develop 
patterns that closely reflected local needs, creating a sourcebook of authentic but modern forms 
that were ready to be employed by other architects and builders: “In this sense, these patterns 
may begin to define a new indigenous architecture for Peru.”70 Opposing itself to a modernist 
universalizing approach to design, the CES emphasized its responsiveness to the specificities 
of the context. However, while their patterns emerged from close observation of low-income 
households, they were not developed in consultation with them; it is therefore legitimate to ask 
whether the CES was projecting its own vision onto potential residents of their housing 
scheme—here assumed as local and traditional, rather than a universal modern subject. Along 
these lines, some jurors argued that the CES proposal reflected outdated cultural models—it 
“tended to reinforce customs and traditions, some of which had already changed, rather than 
adapting itself to a process of change and improvement of family life, as incomes increase.”71 
Without accepting the language and assumptions of modernizing “improvement” expressed in 
this statement, it is important to acknowledge the implicit nostalgia underlying much of the CES 
                                                
69 Hirshen, interview with the author, January 2007. 
70
 Alexander et al, “Houses Generated by Patterns,” 84. 
71 Government of Peru and UN, “Concurso Internacional,” September 1969, p. 9. 
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proposal, from the fetishized vernacular of the construction system, to the unquestioning 
reiteration of “traditional” gender differentiations in the use of space—for example, sites for 
“Street Football” were provided for boys, while the “Miradors” for passive street-watching were 
conceived as “for young girls, especially”72 [7.12]; similarly, the sketch of the “Front Door 
Recesses” presents the outside/inside (or street/house) polarity as coded male/female [7.13]. It 
seems unlikely that the CES would have considered that the reinforcement of restrictive gender 
roles through design would have been an appropriate solution in a US-based project of the 
same period. 
Finally, a question that CES architect Sara Ishikawa asked of the family she was living 
with in Lima provides an insight into the competing visions cultivated by the architects and by 
their potential clients, constrasting the “new indigenous architecture” envisaged by the CES with 
the hopes that residents themselves had for their future homes: 
I remember when I first got to know them, I asked: “What kind of house do you 
think you want? Just in your own words, without any hints or anything like that.”  
And they all immediately—I mean four of them at the same time—said, “I want a 
I Love Lucy house”!… I said, “Well, how come?” And they said, “It's so BIG”—
and the mother said, “and it has a BIG kitchen.” I said, “Yeah, but you know the 
kitchen is wide open to the living areas, so that if you were cooking there, all the 
smells would drift into the rest.”  And she said, “Oh! that's no good.”  So it was 
good that they knew at least, once they identified a house, that there were some 
problems with it—you know, for them, just given the way they lived.73 
Needless to say this account does not appear in the CES publications on the project. It does 
however suggest that the families were not always as attached to traditional elements as the 
CES architects were, and raises the question of whether actual resident participation in the 
development of the patterns would have produced a significantly different outcome.    
   
 
                                                
72 Alexander et al, Houses Generated by Patterns, 174. 
73 Ishikawa, interview with the author, January 2007. 
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Self-Build and Advanced Ideas 
Other proposals by international participants, while rarely outlining as complete a 
system—from residence to construction to urban scheme—as Ohl or the CES, nonetheless 
present distinctive responses to the challenges raised by the project, marking the encounter of 
each architect’s practice with the logic and processes of self-build. Of particular importance is 
the imperative to design for future adaptation, balancing the architect’s management of the 
complete lifecycle of the structure against the possibilities of improvised transformations. In the 
process, some possibiities and limitations of this “collaboration” between architect and user in 
the planned evolution of the dwelling become more evident. 
Many of the proposals focused on the construction system, particularly the requirements 
for modularity and prefabrication. For example, the proposal by Knud Svenssons was based on 
concrete slabs and indented wall panels cast in situ [7.23]; the architect argued that the custom 
fibreglass formwork required to produce these could “be retained as community property” to 
facilitate any future extensions.74 In the proposal by J. L. Iñiguez de Onzoño and A. Vázquez de 
Castro, the larger reinforced concrete elements (walls, pillars, beams) would be poured in situ, 
with smaller elements (stair treads, floor tiles) to be factory-fabricated and sold to residents as 
needed [7.24]. According to the architects, “the plant for making these … can produce 250 
dwellings a year”75—at which rate the planned 1,500 units would have taken six years to 
complete, once the factory was fully operational. In both these cases, the solution to the housing 
deficit was conceived in terms of the improved efficiency of industrial production, but it is far 
from clear that the proposed systems were appropriate to the scale of the problem and would 
have performed as envisaged in the Peruvian context. 
                                                
74 “PREVI/Lima: Low Cost Housing Project,” 204. 
75 “PREVI/Lima: Low Cost Housing Project,” 201. 
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In Charles Correa’s proposal the primary emphasis was on improving the performance 
of the house in terms of climate, seismic engineering, and layout [7.25]. The houses were 
aligned to take advantage of natural light and cooling winds (the original design even included a 
wind scoop in order to mitigate Lima’s high year-round humidity); the staggered deployment of 
the row houses (adapted slightly in its eventual realization) would further assist with regulating 
temperature and improve seismic performance; the variation of width in the layout reduced the 
monotony of the narrow row house form—a further iteration of Correa’s experiments with the 
“Tube House” concept.76 The design maximized flexibility in growth, making use of prefabricated 
components within a construction system simple enough to be carried out by self-builders 
provided with technical assistance. Here the architect would act as a kind of design consultant, 
perfecting the template of a simple house that could be fabricated by the non-specialist. In a 
similar vein, Toivo Korhonen borrowed closely from the growth patterns of barriada housing, but 
rationalized the form [7.26]: noting that the boundary wall was always the first element to be 
built, Korhonen proposed a very minimal dwelling nucleus—beyond the basic requirements 
specified by the competition—consisting of a perimeter wall and a single room “with water and 
drainage laid on in the service yard, which at the outset would serve as kitchen.”77 Based on a 
grid of standard modules, the structure could be built with a range of materials—timber, light 
concrete, and so on—which allowed both mass construction and self-built construction of 
extensions. Korhonen also imagined the potential for self-help labour to assist with the 
establishment of green spaces planned for the site—specifically, digging the irrigation channel 
required to water the park: “This kind of work, improving the level of the environment, could be a 
                                                
76 Correa had previously employed a similar layout in the GBH-2 project in Ahmedabad (1961). See 
Charles Correa: Housing and Urbanisation (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2000), 24, 26. 
77 “PREVI/Lima: Low Cost Housing Project,” 202. 
  
239 
way of increasing social contact, and getting the inhabitants to feel that they belong to the 
neighbourhood, and that their neighbourhood belongs to them.”78 
Other proposals focused on the concept of community interaction as fostered by spatial 
form. The proposal by Esguerra, Saenz, Urdaneta, Samper [7.27] employed a variation of the 
neighbourhood unit concept: the key organizational element was the agrupación residencial 
(residential grouping), a pedestrian-only zone housing around fifty families; these groupings 
would be aggregated to form superblocks, served by communal centres. The agrupación 
residencial was square in form, inspired by the Spanish colonial urban grid, which was seen as 
being the most cost-efficient for installing infrastructure. While the outer edge of the agrupación 
(its street frontage) consisted of regular rows of lots, the clustering of houses in the centre was 
more dynamic. (The Quinta Heeren, a large residential block near the historic centre of Lima 
with a picturesque grouping of dwellings surrounding a communal courtyard, was claimed as a 
specific point of inspiration.79) Employing the organic variation and the human scale of the 
medieval city, according to the architects: “This type of urbanism stimulates coexistence.”80  
The project by Kikutake, Maki, and Kurokawa was dominated by a quasi-megastructural 
“omnibelt” [7.28], but in essence also worked with the neighbourhood unit concept, framing it 
within this specific geometry because, as the architects noted: “Attempts to maximize the 
community involvement of each dwelling led to the discovery that triangular groups of dwellings 
provided the greatest degree of exposure for each unit.”81 This decision determined the layout of 
the urban plan, resulting in the diagonal zig-zag of the multifunctional “omnibelt” that 
accommodated all the community services. Within each residential zone, the housing was 
                                                
78 “PREVI/Lima: Low Cost Housing Project,” 202. 
79 Germán Samper Gnecco, Germán Samper: La evolución de la vivienda (Bogotá: Escala, 2003), 111. 
John Turner lived in the Quinta Heeren during his time in Lima.  
80 Ministerio de Vivienda and ININVI, Publicación PREVI, vol. 13, PREVI PP1 I-3 I-3v (Lima: Ministerio de 
Vivienda; ININVI, 1979), 13:17. 
81 “PREVI/Lima: Low Cost Housing Project,” 191. 
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placed in double bands, connected by pedestrian walkways; the outer band faced the roadway, 
and the inner band faced a central open space for “intimate recreation”82 housing playgrounds 
or small plazas. The house displays a similar strict functional separation of “service” and “living” 
zones, with a high degree of flexibility within that compartmentalization: the layout is divided into 
two lengthwise, with the narrow strip containing services (entry, dining room, kitchen/bathroom), 
and the wider section boxes for interchangeable uses (bedrooms, living rooms) and patio 
spaces ready for possible extension according to the residents’ needs. Although the architects 
claimed that their additive prefabricated system allowed maximum flexibility with a minimum 
number of components, some of the modular elements were highly specialized and appear 
inflexible (in particular the toilet/washbasin/shower and kitchen sink/cooking/storage units).  
By contrast, the urban scheme presented by Oskar Hansen and Svein Hatløy [7.29] 
rejects the neighbourhood unit, or any other predetermined organizational system for 
community life. Rather, in concert with Hansen’s concept of “open form,” interconnections 
between groups of dwellings would be determined by the residents themselves as the 
relationships between neighbours evolved. Spatial form would not direct community interaction, 
but community interaction would direct spatial form. Like Correa, the prevailing winds shaped 
the overall layout of the site; like Kikutake, Maki, and Kurokawa, the “serviced and servicing 
zones” (here two residential areas, and three strips of amenities) were stricly separated but 
interrelated. In order to achieve the goal of “minimiz[ing] hierarchical structures in favour of 
parallel opportunties for all inhabitants,”83 the urban plan sought to promote random social 
contacts, for example by placing the dwellings in close proximity to small-scale public garden 
spaces or encouraging pedestrians to stray beyond designated footpaths. The dwellings 
themselves were to be built in two-stages: in the primary construction phase the main elements 
                                                
82 Ministerio de Vivienda and ININVI, Publicación PREVI, vol. 17, PREVI PP1 I-8 (Lima: Ministerio de 
Vivienda; ININVI, 1979), 17: 6. 
83 “PREVI/Lima: Low Cost Housing Project,” 200. 
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would be handled by a five-ton crane, with completion to be carried out by residents using 
lighter elements. In practice this proved to be extremely expensive—evidently a model of 
development based on heavy industrialization translated poorly from a “Second World” to a 
“Third World” context. 
The proposal by Candilis, Josic, Woods promotes interchange between neighbours at 
the very physical, bricks-and-mortar level of the house. Alexis Josic had primary responsibility 
for the proposal and was the only partner to be present in Lima at the mandatory pre-
competition briefing,84 although Georges Candilis did visit Lima in 1971 (enthusiastically 
documenting his participation in a land invasion) [7.30] and may well have visited the PREVI 
PP1 site as the housing was under construction.85 The urban plan is structured by a central 
pedestrian strip containing the communal facilities, with six perpendicular zones housing the 
educational and sporting facilities; additional pedestrian paths cross diagonally through the 
residential areas, providing direct access to community services [7.31]. No single section is 
emphasized above the others, suggesting a non-hierarchical organization; as distilled in the 
schematic representation of the circulation and service system, the plan appears to be a 
variation of the “stem” concept. The houses are densely built, with interlaced lots for compact 
development, based on an underlying system of alternating wide and narrow bays (respectively 
4.50 m. and 2.7 m. wide). Initially, all the dwellings are the same size (120 sq. m.), formed from 
                                                
84 The partnership was already disintegrating by the late-1960s and no longer developed projects 
collaboratively. Doscenko Josic, architect and wife of Alexis Josic, confirmed that she had worked with 
him on developing the proposal. She emphasized that Josic also reused the distinctive floor plan in a later 
project for a single-family house in France, the Villa Residentielle at Chalon/Saone, 1979–1980. 
Doscenko Josic, conversation with the author, March 10, 2006. In a brief paragraph in his study on the 
partnership, Tom Avermaete connects the PREVI PP1 proposal to the Centre Artisanal in Sèvres (1962), 
but the comparison is unconvincing, particularly since he misdates the Lima project to 1962. Tom 
Avermaete, Another Modern: The Post-war Architecture and Urbanism of Candilis-Josic-Woods 
(Rotterdam: NAi, 2005), 299. 
85 Georges Candilis, with Michel Lefebvre, Bâtir la vie: un architecte témoin de son temps (Paris: Stock, 
1977). The Candilis archives contain a document sent from the office of “Alexis Josic—Architecte” to 
“Agence Candilis” dated June 12, 1969, including background information on the competition, such as the 
typical provisions for transport and public space in Lima. CANGE/I/69/3, 236 ifa 353/02, Fonds Georges 
Candilis, Institut Français d’Architecture, Paris. 
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portions of one wide and two narrow bays; over time “if variations in lot size are required they 
may be obtained by trading off areas between the interlocking lots.”86 The proposal attempts to 
internalize adaptability as an organizing principle—however it is not at all clear how these 
exchanges would function in practice in structural, spatial, and legal terms, and still less in social 
terms, since it seems unlikely that many residents would be willing to abandon the future 
possibility of expansion by ceding unused space to their neighbours.  
At the urban level, the proposal by Aldo van Eyck also emphasizes a non-hierarchical 
approach: the main public amenities, such as schools and parks, are not concentrated along a 
central strip but are located throughout the site, positioned to allow vehicular access from at 
least two sides, and connected to each other via pedestrian pathways. There is no designated 
commercial zone with all the expense of its associated infrastructure; rather, “[i]t is expected 
that small home-based businesses will develop spontaneously along the principle avenida,”87 in 
response to local needs, resulting in a dynamic mixture of usages [7.32]. The straight, parallel 
roadways crossing the site subdivide it into four residential bands; while the proximity between 
pedestrian and vehicle may contravene planning orthodoxies, van Eyck argues that the close 
connection is justified because it reflects existing “Peruvian urban reality” and thus offers a 
proven pattern of spatial organization, bringing traffic to local businesses and facilitating 
residents’ access to informal public transport networks. Although potentially monotonous, for 
van Eyck the long, straight avenues are a means to create views deep into the urban fabric—
the prospect of the distant, framed horizon offering the resident hemmed-in by a seemingly 
endless carpet of low-rise construction the sense of being situated in a larger landscape.   
The polygonal residential lots are oriented to take advantage of the prevailing winds, 
offset laterally to facilitate the movement of air. The residential fabric is punctuated at frequent 
                                                
86 “PREVI/Lima: Low Cost Housing Project.” Architectural Design 40, no. 4 (April 1970): 197. 
87 Aldo van Eyck: Works, ed. Vincent Ligtelijn (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1999), 169. 
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intervals by small, irregularly-shaped parks: these provide pedestrian access to houses located 
in the centre of the block, and create communal spaces shared by micro-neighbourhoods of six 
to twelve dwellings. A sketch by van Eyck of a Lima streetscape depicts the “urban reality” to 
which this scheme responds: tightly packed row houses built right up to the property line, 
straining to absorb all usable space [7.33]. With its honeycomb of residential lots forming a 
carpet over the bulk of the site, van Eyck’s urban layout suggests a similarly high density; 
however, as the house itself is intended to occupy no more than 60 percent of the lot, van 
Eyck’s reformed urban fabric is much more open than it first appears. By designing the house 
within a virtual square in the middle of the lot, with patios at the front and back, there are no 
complex adjustments required to account for the unusual geometry of the perimeter walls [7.34]. 
In fact, the necessary awkwardness of any enclosed space in this section of the lot, with its 60° 
or 30° angle corners, was precisely intended to deter subsequent construction up to the 
perimeter. Van Eyck explained that the use of “saw-tooth, non-loadbearing yard walls” was 
deployed as additional disincentive for “expansion outside the house’s maximum orthogonal 
perimeter,”88 which would reduce the amount of light and air available to the house, and 
eliminate its sense of openness: “In a sense the houses are designed so that further free 
development cannot work against the best interests of the occupants.”89 In effect, van Eyck 
makes a self-defensive architecture of the house itself, protecting the integrity of its design from 
the would-be self-builders, thereby protecting them from themselves. Instead, progressive 
development was expected to follow the architect’s own designs, which employed a low-
technology construction system well-suited to self-building, using only materials, methods, and 
equipment that were currently in use in Peru.  
While van Eyck attempted to prevent substantial changes to the core form of the house, 
                                                
88 Aldo van Eyck: Works, ed. Vincent Ligtelijn (Basel: Birkhäuser, 1999), 168.  
89 “PREVI/Lima: Low Cost Housing Project,” 205. 
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his writings suggest that individual interventions at the decorative level were part of his original 
conception, and he was disparaging about the decision to finish the neighbourhood uniformly: 
“Painting the houses should have been left to the people: literally dipped in white it looked like a 
postwar Weißenhofsiedlung.”90 He expressed approval when residents employed other surface 
treatments (such as tile), leaving none of the walls “looking like the original material (brick or 
concrete block), which is customary in Peru and very effective.” It is as if van Eyck imagined his 
houses being absorbed into the existing building fabric, camouflaging the differences between 
the prevailing “urban reality” and his own reformed version of a Lima neighbourhood. 
James Stirling’s urban proposal is based on a generative principle of progressive 
nucleation [7.35], from four-house blocks, to twenty-house groups, to the project’s four 
neighbourhoods. Whenever the logic of the plan comes into conflict with the realities of the 
site—even in a larger-scale version of the urban scheme developed for ten neighbourhoods, 
with an idealized and relatively obstacle-free plan—the strict rules of the serialized system 
produce awkward interstices whenever the programmatic form meets the particular constraints 
of the site.  
The principle of nucleation is more convincing at the level of the house. The various 
house types share the same square lot, with a floor plan defined by a modified three-by-three 
structural grid, its slightly enlarged central square designated as an open-air patio space 
intended for social exchanges [7.36]. The underlying grid facilitates the coherent growth of 
housing units outwards to the property-line and upwards along the central structural core, 
creating a harmonious but potentially diverse urban fabric including houses of various sizes. As 
the drawings indicate, it is anticipated that the symmetry of the initial layout will begin to break 
down as the houses extend to an upper level: one may develop into an entirely separate 
dwelling, now accessed via exterior stairways. The axionometric drawings of the process of 
                                                
90 Aldo van Eyck: Works, 168. 
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progressive development (executed by Leon Krier) celebrate this breakdown of the initial form, 
not only in terms of variations to the layout, but also in the eclecticism of materials and detailing, 
exhibiting a variety of stylistic references, from louvred and round-arched window types, to an 
ogee-arched doorway [7.36]. In a 1969 interview Stirling described a six-year-old housing 
development he had visited in Lima that was suffused with such alterations. Noting the 
“tremendous free-for-all among house owners and builders” that left “only one house in every 
thirty like the original, and even that was barely recognizable,” Stirling observed: 
They always seem to change the architect’s windows, they put up wrought iron 
work, they paint them different colours. One might extend in concrete, another 
brick. It has its own very extraordinary quality.… We have to allow for this, and 
organize it into something less uncontrolled. In a way, it is restrictive not to build 
for some kind of change and adaptation.91  
Although Stirling’s emphatic use of porthole windows and curved-corner doors in the initial 
construction could be seen as an attempt to maintain his signature throughout subsequent 
overlays—they in fact remain one of the few recognizable features of the entire PREVI PP1 
project [7.49])—the project description expresses an acceptance, even an appreciation, of the 
gradual dissolution of the original form, as residents assumed responsibility for its evolution:  
The pride and sense of ownership achieved through self building must be 
retained and the inventiveness and variety of environment which this produces is 
to be encouraged and is considered essential for a dynamic community.92  
The framework of the house provided clear guidelines for these self-built extensions, preserving 
key elements such as the central courtyard throughout all phases of development, but leaving 
plenty of latitude for residents’ customization. Without being entirely predictable, the changes to 
the dwelling would be “something less uncontrolled” than in a purely improvised construction. 
Stirling’s PREVI PP1 house clearly relates to his earlier experiments such as the Stiff 
Dom-ino Housing (1951), an homage to Le Corbusier which is based on an evenly measured 
                                                
91 Interview with James Stirling (from “The Times, 1969”), cited in James Stirling: Buildings & Projects 
(London: The Architectural Press, 1984), 166.    
92 James Stirling, catalogue of an exhibition at the Royal Institute of British Architects, London, April 24–
June 21, 1974, (London: RIBA Publications, 1974), 66. 
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three-by-three grid, with a structural frame that is rigid in its articulation of interior spaces [7.37]. 
The idea reappears in Stirling’s Expandable House (1957), designed with James Gowan,93 
where the square plan is divided into a two-by-two grid, with a monumental canister as a central 
core for domestic services [7.38]. The PREVI PP1 house employs a more open framework, and 
revolves not around a functional core, but the social core of the central patio. In a different vein, 
Stirling’s Village Project from 1955 (produced for Team 10) anticipates the self-building ethos of 
PREVI PP1 with its concomitant openness towards adaptations and tranformations [7.39].94 
Proposing a “method for extending existing villages with unskilled labour,”95 Stirling envisaged a 
simple continuation of the linear form of the typical village layout, using the full range of local 
vernacular materials: walls would be of brick, stone, or rammed earth, and roofs of tile, thatch, 
slate, or newer industrial materials such as corrugated iron or asbestos. The success of the 
Village Project would be reliant on residents’ introduction of elements foreign to the architect’s 
original scheme, but local to the particular building culture; as at PREVI PP1, these traditions of 
self-building are seen as complementary, rather than antagonistic, to the planned interventions 
of the architect. 
Finally, Atelier 5’s detailed proposal outlined their analysis of the key conditions to be 
addressed by their design—emphasizing the site specificity of the urban plan, environmental 
factors affecting the layout of the house, and economic and technical aspects in the proposed 
                                                
93 Mark Crinson’s recent article on this project also draws a comparison to Stirling’s PREVI PP1 proposal. 
Some key features of the latter project that Crinson attributes to Stirling were actually requirements set 
out in the competition guidelines. Similarly, the claim that Stirling’s house was the most freely adapted by 
residents is unconvincing, given the wide range of adaptations made to all the house types, as García-
Huidobro et al. have clearly demonstrated in ¡El tiempo construye! Time Builds! Nonetheless, it is true 
that Stirling seems to have particularly embraced the concept of change and adaptation at the heart of 
PREVI PP1. Mark Crinson, “‘A House which Grows’: Stirling and Gowan, the Smithsons, and Consumer 
Society,” in Neo-avant-garde and Postmodern: Postwar Architecture in Britain and Beyond, ed. Mark 
Crinson and Claire Zimmerman (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2010), 177-199. 
94 See also Turner’s evocation of the village model in Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building 
Environments, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), 34-35. 
95 James Stirling: Buildings & Projects (London: The Architectural Press, 1984), 43. 
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construction system [7.40].96 For example, urbanistically, tree plantings in a continuous green 
strip along the two busiest edges of the site create a “Fortress” that protects the neighbourhood 
from the perceived “Dangerous Nowhereland” of the highways, preserving its integrity as a 
residential district97; overall, a “Unifying Centre” for the neighbourhood is provided via a central 
spine of commercial spaces and parkland, its two halves joined by a pedestrian bridge over the 
roadway dividing the site [7.41]. The design of the house is guided by environmental factors 
(exploiting cross-ventilation and exposure to sunlight), as well as the need for phased 
progressive expansion. The two types of row houses are of a subtlely different character: the 
WE (west-east-oriented) houses are planned on elongated lots to maximize exposure to 
sunlight, while the NS (north-south) houses are on somewhat shorter and wider lots that form 
insulating buffers on the edges of the neighbourhood clusters, ensuring the privacy of residential 
zones [7.42]. The plans contain a mixture of fixed and flexible elements, organized together in a 
cellular system that is intended to facilitate subsequent growth with minimum disruption to the 
household: over the course of the development, while the surface area only increases from 66.2 
to 105.5 sq. m., three additional bedrooms are added and the kitchen and dining areas double 
in size, without compromising any of the open terrace and garden space.  
Following the principle of “Unfold your Life,” Atelier 5 argues that each family must be 
able to withdraw from the public sphere despite the necessarily high density of the 
development.98 In the WE type, the privacy of each house is established by a walled garden 
patio that entirely frames each end of the lot; in the NS type, a garden patio and a bedroom 
                                                
96 Anatole du Fresne and Alfredo Pini led the develpment of this project for Atelier 5, both attending the 
information sessions in Lima. 
97 Conversely, the proposal also takes into account the external, fleeting views of the community 
experienced by the passing driver: rather than offering a blank “fortress”-like wall, “there must be 
openings offering views inside, both to ease the problem of his orientation and the monotony of his trip.” 
Atelier 5, “International Competition for an Experimental Housing Project in Lima, Peru: The Project of 
Atelier 5,” n.d., ca. 1969, Plan No. 2, p. 7. Thanks to Heinz Müller of Atelier 5 for providing a copy of this 
document.  
98 Atelier 5, “International Competition,” Plan No. 6, p. 15. 
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share the street frontage, but are similarly sheltered from passing traffic by high walls. This 
model of the house as “shelter for the privacy of the family”99—and internally, as providing 
shelter for the individual’s privacy within the family—again recalls the design for a Court House 
published in Community and Privacy [7.17]. However Atelier 5 takes advantage of the flexibility 
offered by the plan’s cellular organization to redeploy the rooms in a freer manner, creating 
more dynamic and varied interactions of public and private zones.  
With their street-front gardens and setback building volumes, both of Atelier 5’s PREVI 
house types present a broken, varied street facade rather than a uniform surface. The 
anticipated development of the houses at different rates is easily incorporated into this dynamic 
street frontage, while the regularity of the underlying structural system maintains an overall 
sense of unity: “In this dense community the individual house should serve primarily as a part of 
the community’s framework, as a unit in a recognizable whole, and only secondarily as the 
expression of the home’s individuality.”100 The dynamic building profile recalls Atelier 5’s 
contemporaneous Siedlung Thalmatt 1 (1967–1974), a grouping of eighteen houses with 
freedom of extension within each lot. At PREVI PP1, the process of extending the house is 
made clearly visible to the street, by adding one box after another. According to their 
conceptualization of progressive development, the growth of the individual house is not of purely 
private significance, but carries a strong performative, public element: “the individual is aware 
that when he adds to his house he adds to the community; that his house is a building block of 
the whole environment.”101 Further, carefully regulated and planned expansion allows each 
household to make modifications without compromising the integrity of neighbouring units, or 
                                                
99 Atelier 5, “International Competition,” Plan No. 2, p. 7. 
100 Atelier 5, “International Competition,” Plan No. 2, p. 7. 
101 Atelier 5, “International Competition,” Plan No. 2, p. 7. 
  
249 
the coherence of the community as a whole.102 
The construction system was guided by the particularities of the Peruvian context. Atelier 
5 argued that the relatively small number of skilled workers available necessitated the careful 
division of tasks: “operations of a precise and complex nature” required for fabricating the 
components would be closely supervised in an on-site workshop, while the actual assembly of 
the houses could be carried out by unskilled workers using a minimum of mechanized 
equipment. Two simple precast concrete components would be used for fabricating walls, 
ceilings, and roofs; these were compact and lightweight, so that little more than a forklift would 
be required to move them around the site. The simplicity of this system would facilitate the 
growth of the house via self-building: “The assembly and handling of these elements must be 
easy enough that the residents are persuaded to use them…. In this way these elements will 
constantly be produced, assuring their continuing availability.”103 Atelier 5 thus anticipated that 
careful design of the entire construction process—from production to assembly—would foster a 
self-sufficient, self-sustaining system. Overall, Atelier 5’s proposal is comparable to that of the 
CES in its attention to the specificities of site and of climate, without any claim to establishing a 
“new indigenous architecture”; it emphasizes the use of appropriate technology and managing 
with available resources, without fetishization of vernacular traditions; it allows for dynamic, self-
managed growth within a predetermined template, without romanticizing the principle of 
adaptation. Establishing a balance between universal modernist principles of reform housing 
and the demands of local conditions, it arguably presents the most effective “architectural” 
response to the housing problem as it was framed by the competition.   
A 1984 article by Alfredo Montagne, the Peruvian site architect for Atelier 5, argued that 
                                                
102 “[T[he continuous modification of the environment can become an enriching factor in the community 
only if it is incorporated into a general system, into the permanent frame of high density housing.” Atelier 
5, “International Competition,” Plan No. 2, p. 7. 
103 Atelier 5, “International Competition,” Plan No. 13, p. 25.   
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technical support for the residents had been non-existent, rendering extensions according to the 
architects’ original plans impossible.104 Furthermore, because only twenty-five of the Atelier 5 
houses were actually constructed as part of the realized neighbourhood of 467 houses, the 
urban dimension of the project was compromised from the outset. According to Atelier 5’s vivid 
account, they were not in principle opposed to the decision to expand the number of proposals 
to be constructed—even though this resulted in fewer examples of their own houses being built 
than had been promised by the original competition guidelines.  Rather, they argued that the 
expanded experiment inevitably over-stretched the available resources:   
What followed is beyond description. The UN (whose agile architect Peter 
Land—a man with taste, but little sense for the practical—had always seen in 
PREVI a kind of Latin American Weißenhofsiedlung) was obviously asking too 
much. At the gigantic, empty site, first 26 types of stairs were finished and 
erected as a test. 26 different staircases, outside the city, that rose up into the 
sky ... a grotesque sight, that only made clear how here time and energy would 
be frittered away.105   
In this parable, the skyward-gazing staircases express the misguided utopian impulse of 
an experiment derailed by questionable priorities, reducing itself to the arcane exercise of 
producing variations on an single architectural element abstracted from its function rather than 
building actual livable housing. Beyond the poor implementation of the project, however, this 
landscape of staircases raises questions concerning the overall assumptions behind PREVI—
the value of “Architecture” in providing low-cost housing in low-income countries, and thus the 
ultimate viability of the whole enterprise, irrespective of the competence of its realization.  
 
7.3 PREVI and the “National Reality” 
In each case, the implementation of the four PREVI pilot projects proved to be protracted 
and difficult. None of the projects progressed beyond the initial trial stage, and none succeeded 
                                                
104 Alfredo Montagne, “Maisons expérimentales Previ, Lima, Perou,” trans. from the Spanish by Marie-
Claude Bétrix, Archithese 14, no. 5 (1984): 6. 
105
 The account concludes with the note that no one from Atelier 5 had ever seen the finished houses. 
Atelier 5: Siedlungen und städtebauliche Projekte (Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Vieweg, 1994), 89.   
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in completing the number of dwellings originally planned. As already noted, while PP1 was 
projected for 1,500 dwellings, only 467 stage one houses were built: an evaluation report 
presented to the UN in 1976 cited the expansion of the construction phase to include over 
twenty projects as a key factor in the delay.106 For PP2, preparatory surveys were undertaken in 
sixteen different areas of the city at the behest of the funder, the Caja de Pensiones del Seguro 
Social del Empleado, in an effort to locate a site suitable for urban renewal which also housed 
representatives of its membership; once it became evident that empleados did not live in or 
aspire to own such housing, the Caja withdrew its support from the project. Eventually a site 
was selected in Barranco: this area was “not qualified as highly blighted [tugurizada]”107—but 
had the advantage that the local municipality and most residents supported the project. 
Although 295 families were surveyed, renovation work was only completed on twenty-six 
houses [7.43]: factors included legal complications, difficulties financing the rehabilitation work 
(less attractive to lenders than new construction), and the unresolved question of how to compel 
landlords to invest in improvements without passing on the costs to their low-income tenants.108 
PP3 was planned as a sites-and-services development of approximately 1,000 lots with 
communal services for a future population of 6,000, but actually resulted in 286 contractor-built 
dwellings, with self-build to be employed in the residents’ own extensions [7.44]. In total, the 
three pilot projects within Lima resulted in 779 dwellings.   
                                                
106
 Government of Peru and UNDP, Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Perú, 1. This report was 
prepared by Ernesto Winkowski, Uruguayan architect and UN adviser to PREVI Proyecto Piloto 1 
(October 1969–December 1975). In 1979, some years behind schedule, this report was supplemented by 
a more extensive comparative evaluation, produced by a newly established Peruvian government 
agency, the Instituto de Investigación y Normalización de la Vivienda (ININVI, Institute for Housing 
Research and Standardization). The twenty-seven volumes—covering twenty of the proposals for PREVI 
PP1, as well as the concurrent PP2, PP3, and PP4)—were highly technical in nature, bypassing any 
consideration of social or economic factors.  
107 Government of Peru and UNDP, Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Perú, 3. 
108 Ministerio de Vivienda and ININVI, Publicación PREVI, vol. 25, PREVI PP2: Rehabilitación y 
renovación urbana (Lima: Ministerio de Vivienda; ININVI, 1979). 
  
252 
Outside of Lima, PREVI PP4 was developed in response to the May 1970 earthquake 
which had left 1.5 million homeless [7.45-7.46]. This project focused on two towns in the 
province of Ancash: Casma (on the coast) with 127 lots and Catac (in the sierra) with 200. In 
this case, the construction system was revised from contractor-built housing to “ayuda mútua 
dirigida” in order to accommodate residents’ limited financial resources, while also taking 
advantage of architectural expertise in order to rationalize the design of the house “to 
incorporate new technology into traditional local construction systems.” However a post-
occupancy study of Catac expressed concern that “due to ignorance and lack of follow-up 
technical assistance” these improved techniques developed for PP4 had not been employed in 
subsequent extensions: “Despite the example of the self-build program, none of the proposed 
construction recommendations have been utilized.”109  
In addition to the logistical challenges, the organizers’ work was further complicated by 
the political crises of late-1960s Peru: after President Belaúnde was overthrown in October 
1968, the leftist Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces which replaced him continued 
with the project but without Belaúnde’s enthusiasm for it. (In a similar vein, Belaúnde had 
inherited the Perú-BID program negotiated under President Prado, with little enthusiasm for its 
promotion of self-help housing.) Peter Land’s account implies that any shortcomings of PREVI 
are attributable to these political shifts;110 however, rather than being deliberately undermined by 
the new government, it seems just as likely that PREVI simply suffered from the lack of 
technical and administrative resources required to manage a large-scale housing project, as 
had been made evident with the problematic implementation of the Perú-BID program a few 
years earlier. 
                                                
109 Ministerio de Vivienda and ININVI, Publicación PREVI, vol. 27, PREVI PP4: Auto-construcción post-
sismo (Lima: Ministerio de Vivienda; ININVI, 1979), 5, 65. 
110 Land, “The Experimental Housing Project (PREVI), Lima: Antecedents and Ideas,” 10. 
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In fact, an even larger problem emerged from the economics of the project. Initially, the 
total construction costs per house (including land and communal amenities) had been fixed at 
S/.78,000-S/.164,000, within reach of families with a monthly income of S/.2,800-S/.5,800, 
estimated at a quarter of Lima’s households. As the project dragged on, rising construction 
costs began to outpace family incomes; by January 1975, the actual cost per house was 
S/.275,000-S/.425,000, with financing charges adding another 15 percent. This left the houses 
accessible to families with a monthly income of S/.15,000-S/.24,000, “representing only 12 
percent of socio-economic level II” of Lima households111 (translating into a smaller subset of 
the total population). Despite the ballooning costs, the 1976 report argued that on average, per 
square metre the houses cost 5 percent less than conventional models;112 as construction 
processes were refined, it anticipated this could be further reduced by as much as 15 percent.113  
As for the immediate future, the Ministerio de Vivienda was currently revising the project 
guidelines “to adapt them to the national reality”: the standards initially used had been borrowed 
from “other, highly industrialized countries” and were therefore ill-suited to Lima (for this reason, 
five of the PP1 proposals had to be revised in order to realize their construction, including those 
by Stirling, the CES, and Hansen114). Now, by “giving preference to basic and minimum housing 
programs suited to development and to logical and ordered expansion” the government hoped 
to provide solutions for “a broad sector of the urban population with few resources.” In practice 
this meant utilizing “shell” dwellings (viviendas tipo “casco”), and encouraging “the direct 
                                                
111 Government of Peru and UNDP, Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Perú, 6. 
112 However there was a broad range in the performance of the various house types, from -20 to +10 
percent. 
113 There was also room for improvement in indirect expenses (35-40 percent of total costs)—covering the 
design, contractor, financing, and in particular supervision of works: throughout the construction of PP1 
inefficiencies on the worksite had been substantial—30-35 percent of work-hours were unproductive, due 
partly to the workers (10-15 percent) and partly to the management (20-25 percent). Government of Peru 
and UNDP, Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Perú. 
114 Government of Peru and UNDP, Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Perú, 7, 4. 
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participation of the community” in urban upgrading, self-build (autoconstrucción) of dwellings, 
and self-fabrication (autofabricación) of building components such as soil-cement blocks.115 
Following an assessment of the effectiveness of these revisions, the “most appropriate” designs 
and technologies were to be employed for the next stage of PREVI PP1, projected as an 
enlarged neighbourhood of 2,000 dwellings.116 If these changes had been implemented, it would 
have entirely reframed PREVI PP1, since the intention had always been to rely on mass-
construction initially, with self-help labour as supplementary. 
According to official evaluation reports, the major achievements of PREVI PP1 were in 
the technical field—developing improved construction systems and components, such as the 
PREVI brick and the PREVI concrete block [7.47]. In addition, its low-rise high-density model 
had influenced the state-sponsored housing developments Túpac Amaru (1971) [7.48] and Los 
Próceres (1974). Within its own terms, then, the truncated PREVI PP1 experiment was 
successful in generating new designs and technologies. However, assessed more broadly, its 
effectiveness in producing low-cost housing is questionable. Even if it had produced innovations 
and efficiencies that could have been replicated, the program was squarely aimed at the upper-
tier of the low-income sector: families that were able to finance the legal purchase of a 
conventional house, which they would expect to modify over time.117 This was not an option that 
would be accessible to a meaningful number of Lima residents who lacked permanent, secure, 
full-time employment. While these upper-tier low-income residents did have difficulty securing 
                                                
115 Government of Peru and UNDP, Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Perú, 7, 13, 12 . 
116 Government of Peru and UNDP, Proyecto Experimental de Vivienda, Perú, 12.  
117 This is not a pattern that is comparable to US or European welfare-state social housing. In 
fact, the intended resident-owners of PREVI PP1 were very similar to the Hogares Peruanos 
target market (discussed in chapter six). See also Holston’s analysis of the distinction made by 
residents between their “autoconstructed” upper-tier low-income neighbourhoods on the urban 
fringes of São Paulo and the favela in terms of class identification, especially as framed in 
relation to their legal ownership of land versus the appropriated sites of the favela. James 
Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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decent affordable housing via the existing market, they were only a small minority of those 
requiring assistance with housing. In this context, the characterization of PREVI PP1 as “low-
cost” can be quite misleading. One recent article counted among the project’s “successes” the 
fact that: “People didn’t move out as their financial situations improved. Residents stayed, and 
turned a housing estate into what feels like a middle-class community.”118 In fact, PREVI PP1 
was planned and realized as a “middle-class community” of homeowners, not low-income public 
housing. 
The most recent evaluation of PREVI PP1—which does not address the economics of 
the project—documents the phased transformations of ten households over thirty-five years of 
occupation between 1978 and 2003 [7.49-7.50].119 As this research indicates, instead of the 
planned progressive development, residents have improvised their own additions, in the 
process superimposing a new set of vernacular references. Significantly, the resulting dwellings 
tend to far exceed the maximum surface area of 120 sq. m. mandated by the original 
specifications, ranging from 172 sq. m. to 352 sq. m., and as a consequence retain less 
openness, light, and air than many architects would have wished. 
An earlier study from 1985, part of a larger report on housing in Peru, was likewise 
based on a small sample (twenty families), but included socio-economic profiles of the residents 
along with their qualitative assessments of their houses and documentation of the changes they 
had made [7.51].120 In most cases the owners were empleados, and the majority (fourteen) held 
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 Justin McGuirk, “PREVI, The Metabolist Utopia,” Domus 946 (April 2011): 70. 
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 See Fernando García-Huidobro et al, ¡El tiempo construye! Time Builds! (Barcelona: Editorial Gustavo 
Gili, 2008). 
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 PCM Construction Control Consultants Limited and Julio Gianella Silva, Affordable Housing for Low 
Income Families in Peru: A Study on Behalf of the Instituto de Investigación y Normalización de la 
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public sector jobs. Most had undertaken some extensions or modifications—often enlarging 
rooms, as the houses were widely felt to be small and hot—and four had established 
businesses on the premises.121 None had used their own self-help labour; instead they had 
hired contractors, and a few drew upon the expertise of family members with some knowledge 
of engineering. The majority of these extensions were self-financed, since few households were 
prepared to take on loans. More surprisingly, a total of four families did not have legal title to the 
house, two of these having apparently received the dwelling extra-legally from the previous 
owner.122 A second survey published in 1991 confirmed that 70 percent of the owners were 
empleados, primarily working in public sector jobs.123 By this stage, two-thirds had made 
extensions to their houses, in particular enclosing the patios;124 almost a quarter of the residents 
complained that the houses were too small overall.125 This report also noted that the innovative 
construction systems and materials had little influence, because the owners had no knowledge 
of “the technical characteristics of the houses that they occupy, although they have extended 
and modified them, putting the stability of the structure at risk.” Most damningly, the report 
                                                                                                                                                       
recommended that overseas aid be solicited and used to engage such management expertise and that 
local qualified Peruvian architects and engineers be appointed to give on-site supervision and direction to 
all forms of mutual- and self-construction housing projects.” PCM et al, Affordable Housing for Low 
Income Families in Peru, 102, 103. 
121
 In particular, the owner of the Korhonen-designed house noted that their transformations “were 
facilitated due to the free spaces that the original house had.” By contrast, the residents of the Svenssons 
model were not able to make structural changes due to the rigidity of the elements, only to change the 
usage of the rooms. 
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 One family had exchanged an apartment in central Lima for their house; another had received theirs 
from a relative who had worked at the Banco de la Vivienda.   
123
 INADUR, Estudio de evaluación integral de los programas de vivienda ejecutados y/o promovidos por 
el Estado, vol. I, Informe período 1969–1979 (Lima: INADUR, 1991), I:41. This survey interviewed fifty-six 
households, roughly 12 percent of the total number of residents. 
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 In an apparent reference to the van Eyck houses, the survey also note that “in the dwellings of 
irregular form, the setbacks enclosing them have been invaded in an effort to align them with the streets.” 
INADUR, Estudio de evaluación integral, vol. I, Informe período 1969–1979, I:42. 
125
 INADUR, Estudio de evaluación integral, vol. I, Informe período 1969–1979, I:47. In addition, 10 
percent complained that the rooms were too small, while a third had no complaints at all; at a comparable 
project, Los Proceres, 24 percent of residents had no complaints concerning the house, indicating that 
PREVI PP1 enjoyed slightly higher approval from residents. 
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suggested that in practice, for all the expense and expertise invested in it, PREVI PP1 as lived 
had minimal impact on day-to-day experience: “For the resident population this project does not 
differ from others in terms of the quality of life and of functionality.”126  
As a point of contrast, it is worth reviewing the framework and outcomes of PREVI PP3 
in some detail, since it was planned as an entirely self-build project [7.44], while PREVI PP1 
only utilized the method as a supplementary technique. PREVI PP3 was organized by Federico 
Mevius, who had worked with John Turner in Arequipa in the late 1950s. It recalled aspects of 
housing policy prior to the Belaúnde government, and in particular seems to have drawn upon a 
proposal prepared by Mevius for the Junta Nacional de la Vivienda (JNV) in 1963.127 In that 
proposal, Mevius noted that in response to the hopes raised by Law 13517, passed in February 
1961, as of mid-1963 over 35,000 families in Lima had applied to the JNV for housing, with the 
expectation that 65,000 would have registered by the end of 1963, and 149,000 by the end of 
1965. If these needs were not met in a timely manner, Mevius warned of continued invasions in 
the greater metropolitan area.128 The most realistic solution—given the limited economic 
capacity of these low-income applicants—would be aided self-help; accordingly, the JNV 
needed to devise a program along these lines with good urban amenities and credit plans, 
thereby keeping the legal option attractive and stemming the drift towards the barriadas. 
Mevius’s proposal was to expropriate up to ten sites located on minimally productive 
agricultural land within greater Lima, selected so as not to interfere with any private initiatives in 
low-cost housing, and located near existing “nuclei of demographic pressure” [7.52]. Although 
few of the selected sites were near the urban centre, they were at least on or near major 
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 On the other hand, Mevius argued that housing projects aimed at higher-income groups could be 
postponed with fewer adverse consequences because they were less likely to invade “for cultural 




roadways leading into the city. Mevius estimated that only 3 percent of the JNV applicants could 
pay for a completed house, but 85 percent should be able to afford at least a basic unit 
(although 12 percent could afford nothing at all, graphically illustrated by a haunting question 
mark below the dotted line indicating extreme poverty [7.53]). In order to best accommodate the 
various budgets, the JNV would provide a model dwelling which could be constructed in three 
stages [7.54]. This first stage was a sites-and-services unit which included the provision of 
water, sewerage, and electricity to the urbanización as a whole; private connections would be 
available at a later stage. Stage two consisted of “the necessary works for the completion of a 
partial definitive house”129: this would begin with the construction of the first built structure on the 
lot—a two-bedroom unit—and continue with a sanitary block and a partial perimeter wall. 
Finally, the entire lot would be enclosed within a wall, allowing the resident to delineate the 
remaining rooms around an interior patio. While the costs for the dwelling unit were relatively 
modest—S/.2,800 for stage one, S/.23,000 for stage two, and so on—a surcharge of 15 percent 
was to be added at each stage to cover the costs of technical assistance provided to the “self-
helpers” by the JNV, including architects’ and planners’ fees, as well as financial advice 
concerning loan applications.130 For homeowners who would begin their residence with nothing 
more than street lighting, a faucet in the middle of their lot, and provisional sewerage, an 
additional investment of 15 percent represented a substantial expenditure, and it is likely that 
the JNV would have faced a considerable challenge in convincing applicants of its value. 
In essence, Mevius’s 1963 proposal was an extension of the UPIS concept into a global 
plan for new low-income settlements, anticipating the provision of tens of thousands of basic 
lots in an effort to come to terms with the scale of Lima’s housing shortage. However, the UPIS 
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model fell out of favour following Belaúnde’s election to the presidency in late 1963, and 
therefore this proposal was never implemented. Beginning in late 1968 the self-help principle 
had a revival of sorts under the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces. Mevius was a 
key contributor to a policy document produced in November 1970 that promoted 
autoconstrucción in housing, recommending a central body to coordinate self-help housing 
programs; a “National Program of Experimentation” to determine the best self-help systems for 
various contexts; and better training for professionals in the specialized practices of “technical 
assistance in autoconstrucción of housing,” seen as “fundamentally a work of collaboration with 
the participants, in which one works ‘with them’ and for not ‘for them.’”131 However it was only 
some years later that PREVI PP3 offered Mevius the opportunity to undertake this kind of 
experimentation with the self-help model in a coordinated manner. 
The PREVI PP3 proposal reiterated Mevius’s earlier argument that the acquisition of 
peripheral, inexpensive sites for the development of planned settlements was “the first truly 
realistic step for the control of urban development,”132 and introduced a number of new 
innovations. The urban scheme emphasized green spaces (often lacking in the barriadas), here 
planned “in small nuclei, facing onto the largest number of dwellings”133—apparently in an effort 
to promote a sense of ownership and thus ensure their ongoing maintenance by local 
volunteers. New construction materials were developed: a redesigned system of concrete 
components would facilitate the erection of walls and beams by non-specialists [7.55], and fire-
resistant esteras (bamboo matting) would improve the safety performance of provisional self-
help dwellings. The dimensions of the lot and of the dwelling itself were based on standardized 
                                                
131 Comisión de Trabajo y Colaboradores, Hacia una política de vivienda por autoconstrucción (Lima: 
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measurements, working from the inside outwards using a “bed-module” (módulo cama) [7.56], 
in an effort to maximize flexibility in the combination of elements of the plan and in the size of 
the resulting house.134 On an administrative level the project endeavoured to encourage greater 
user-control by participating groups and by individuals: rather than being assigned from above, 
neighbourhood groups would self-select their members (“autoformación”) and choose the 
location of their own area within the site; each household would be able to select their particular 
lot, and assemble their prefered house plan from the standardized elements.135 The proposal 
also advocated the use of supervised credit, arguing that it provided the lowest-cost solution, 
and greatest scope for self-building.  
By 1979 only 286 “basic, incomplete dwellings” had been built—for reasons of time, 
these were erected by mass-construction, not by self-build. However it was still anticipated that 
these houses would be gradually completed by self-help labour. The costs far exceeded the 
initial estimates: S/.166,500 for the núcleo básico (basic core unit) or S/.187,500 for the vivienda 
básica (basic house); the evaluation report optimistically suggested that this could be lowered 
by 30 percent using self-help labour. Due to the change in construction method, none of the 
project’s innovations were implemented. For this reason, the report recommended a second trial 
project of 1,000 lots specifically to test the unexecuted proposals. In view of the country’s 
deteriorating economic situation, this would have to be planned “within much lower standards”—
that is, based on the provision of lotes tizados (surveyed lots outlined with chalk), creating an 
urban grid of sites-without-services. In fact, no additional trial project was forthcoming, and PP3 
would remain (in essence) unrealized.  
While architects such as Mevius presented a clear vision of the value of technical 
assistance to self-help housing, the perspectives of self-builders themselves tended to be more 
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ambivalent. According to a 1967 survey of residents of Lima barriadas, official efforts seemed to 
have had little impact generally, since almost half those surveyed had no knowledge of the main 
housing agency, the JNV, while 18 percent said they knew of it but that “it did not carry out any 
work.”136 Relatively few expressed dissatisfaction with the JNV’s technical assistance programs: 
“In most cases this was because they had not used such facilites and did not regard them as 
important.” Only 11 percent had used assistance in the construction of their dwelling; while 30 
percent would have liked assistance, 31 percent were ambivalent, and 28 percent would have 
refused it if it was offered.137 When asked what kind of technical assistance they would like, 33 
percent nominated building materials, 30 percent plans or designs (which they would 
presumably execute on their own), but only 12 percent wanted “engineers” (“architects” was not 
included as an option).138 When respondents were asked to list the services that they 
considered to be a priority, they were overwhelmingly concerned with infrastructure provision—
water, sewerage, and electricity, as well as upgrading streets and walkways139—and with 
property title, rather than assistance in the construction of their houses.140 Similarly, a 1982 
survey of eighteen squatter settlements in Lima reported that when asked what kind of help 
residents expected from the state, on average 16 percent nominated basic infrastructure, 
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compared to 5.3 percent for technical assistance; 7.5 percent responded that they expected no 
help at all.141 When asked to nominate the major obstables to the building of their housing, lack 
of money accounted for roughly one third of responses, lack of materials for roughly one 
quarter, while “technical hindrances” was negligible142—indicating that this was not a felt need 
that had to be addressed by officialdom.  
In this context, it seems clear that while architects were deeply engaged with the 
possibilities of formal-informal collaboration in the production of low-cost housing, with modes of 
assistance to self-builders ranging from avant-gardist gesture to chalk-drawn lot, the viability of 
this collaboration was very much open to question from the point of view of those to be 
“assisted”;  despite all the explorations and all the evaluations, self-help housing was still to 
discover a workable, affordable form. 
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8. Revolutions in Self-Help  
 
In a speech delivered in June 1976 to delegates from 130-odd countries and various 
intergovernmental organizations, British economist Barbara Ward began with the observation:  
One of the most hopeful developments of the seventies is the degree to which 
world society has begun to examine, seriously and together, what one might call 
the basic facts of “planetary housekeeping”1 
This examination had been initiated with the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (Stockholm, 1972), and continued via a series of meetings on issues of global 
concern: the World Population Conference (Bucharest, 1974), the World Food Conference 
(Rome, 1974), the World Conference on Women (Mexico City, 1975), and now Habitat: United 
Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Vancouver, 1976). Reflecting on the 
unprecedented and intertwined crises now emerging—escalating rates of population growth, 
food shortages, rising energy costs, and massive urban agglomerations caused by “the 
lemming-like surges of peasant to city which threaten to overwhelm even the bravest urban 
plans”2—at Vancouver Ward called for a radical rethinking of social responsibility at the global 
level, linking “planetary housekeeping” to the task of developing “a ‘new international economic 
order,’ aiming at justice and cooperation.”3 Accordingly, “the old blind dependence upon market 
forces” would diminish as the pull of social factors increasingly intervened in calculations of 
economic and political interest, resulting in policies shaped by “some concept of the general 
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welfare.”4 Ward envisaged the extension of “the nineteenth century reforms of urban sanitation, 
public housing, education and communal services” to the cities of the developing world. Most 
immediately, she endorsed a World Bank proposal supporting sites-and-services and self-help 
housing projects, along with initiatives in transport, health, and clean water; costing $30 billion a 
year, this could be funded by redirecting just 10 percent of the $300 billion spent annually on 
arms.5 Such measures, it seemed, would be entirely within the means of an emergent imagined 
international community. 
While Ward’s proposal to channel funding from arms to aid was not to be embraced, the 
Habitat Conference did become a catalyst for smaller-scale changes on the policy level. The 
new conceptual category of “human settlements” promoted by Habitat facilitated a more 
nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics of unplanned urban development, and opened 
the way for the widespread adoption of sites-and-services and self-help housing schemes by 
national governments and international development agencies alike. The broader project of a 
“new international economic order”—which had initially been proposed by Third World nations 
as an impetus for global redistributive policies6—was to be short-lived: as the immediate 
challenges to global well-being seemed to subside, the urgency for radical change faded to a 
historical footnote. Soon enough, the fall of communism confirmed the (apparently) inevitable 
collapse of any alternative to the capitalist model, setting the stage for the inexorable rise of 
neoliberalism and its own concomitant “new world order.”  
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Against the background of these larger political shifts, this chapter examines the fortunes 
of self-help housing in Peru through episodes from the waning decades of the Cold War, into 
the emergence and subsequent unfolding of neoliberalism. The perspective moves between the 
national and international spheres, between the practical and the theoretical, discussing 
programs designed by successive governments in Peru, along with key texts by John Turner, 
and by Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, which would contribute to reframing housing 
policy at agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations. Overall the discussion 
traces the changing roles and the shifting weight of responsibilities in the provision of low-cost 
housing between individual, local community, state, global community, and market. 
 
8.1 The Revolution Will Be Organized 
The Peruvian Revolution began in the early hours of October 3, 1968, as leftist radicals 
within the military detained President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, and sent him into exile in 
Argentina. The self-styled Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces which assumed 
control explained its actions in a manifesto: the Belaúnde government had come to power with 
promises of comprehensive reform, but had betrayed the hopes placed in it—incompetent, 
corrupt, and self-serving, it was no longer fit to govern. As for its own vision of the future: 
The Revolutionary Government, fully identified with the aspirations of the 
Peruvian people, calls upon them—together with the Armed Forces—to fight to 
achieve an authentic social justice, a dynamic national development, and the 
reestabishment of moral values that will affirm our country in the achievement of 
its higher destiny.7 
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Rhetoric aside, it was true that much of Belaúnde’s legislative agenda had been stymied by a 
powerful opposition coalition in the parliament. In addition, Belaúnde’s developmentalist vision 
had entailed large government expenditures on infrastructure projects and improvements to 
education, which dramatically increased the foreign debt. These fiscal difficulties were 
compounded by the US decision to withhold financial aid to Peru in an effort to influence the 
government’s position in renegotiating its contract with IPC (International Petroleum Company, 
a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey). In the end, Belaúnde’s anxiety to resolve the IPC 
dispute led to the signing of a contract whose overly favourable terms were widely perceived as 
a national disgrace. This provided the immediate trigger for the coup, and the new 
Revolutionary Government settled the issue by nationalizing the company, arguing that it was 
“fulfilling its constitutional duty, … defending one of [Peru’s] natural sources of wealth, which 
being Peruvian, should be for Peruvians.”8 Filtered through the lens of dependency theory,9 
Belaúnde’s proposed deal was framed as increasing the country’s “dependence on economic 
powers” (that is, the United States) and postponing the ability to “overcome our current state of 
underdevelopment.”10 Conversely, reasserting national sovereignty and geopolitical autonomy 
were prerequisites for realizing national economic development, as Peru would draw on its 
human and natural resouces in order to achieve greater self-sufficiency.  
In these and other initiatives—agrarian reform, improving bureaucratic processes, 
extending the franchise to the illiterate—the Revolutionary Government was enacting policies 
that had been proposed by a number of reform-minded parties, including the Movimiento Social 
Progresista, APRA, Partido Democrata Cristiano, and Belaúnde’s own Acción Popular. As 
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Abraham F. Lowenthal has observed: “What distinguished Peru’s military rulers was not the 
originality of their program, but their capacity to put familiar ideas into effect.”11 Freed from the 
complications of electoral politics and parliamentary negotiations, the Revolutionary 
Government envisaged itself guiding the country’s development for “fifteen or twenty years at 
least,”12 implementing a comprehensive and coherent program of structural reforms, after which 
it would reintroduce democratic government into Peru. (At this period in its history, military rule 
functioned as a normative means of resolving political deadlocks, as had been evidenced only a 
few years earlier with the 1962 coup that effectively opened the way for Belaúnde’s victory in 
the 1963 presidential elections.)  
After twelve years of military government—led first by General Juan Velasco Alvarado 
(1968–1975), then General Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975–1980)—Fernando Belaúnde 
Terry reemerged as president in the 1980 elections that returned Peru to democracy. This 
passage “from Belaúnde to Belaúnde”—as one writer has termed it13—reinforces the sense that 
the revolutionary decade was a mirage, nothing more than a misstep en route to the neoliberal 
reform initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s. However, the very unlikelihood of this late flowering of 
revolutionary utopianism heightens the impact of its actions and its rhetorical imagination. This 
deviation from the apparently straight line of historical inevitablility recalls (and perhaps projects) 
a moment of other possibilities—an alternative future contemporaneous with the promise of 
Ward’s incipient “world society.”  
Neither capitalist nor communist, but combining elements of both socialist and Christian 
thought, Peru’s “humanist revolution” envisioned “the construction of a social democracy of full 
                                                
11
 Abraham F. Lowenthal, “The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered,” in The Peruvian Experiment 
Reconsidered, ed. Cynthia McClintock and Abraham F. Lowenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983), 421. 
12
 Kruijt, Revolution by Decree, 135. 
13
 José María Caballero, From Belaunde to Belaunde: Peru’s Military Experiment in Third-Roadism 
(Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies, University of Cambridge, 1981). 
  
268 
participation”14 [8.1]. The cooperative ethos of squatter settlements, evident in the shared labour 
of communal construction projects, became a privileged image: framed by slogans such as 
“Popular Revolutionary Work: Popular Participation is Revolution,” it offered an alternative 
model of development, based on the values of self-help and mutual support [8.2-8.3]. No longer 
considered marginal, the self-built community heralded both the emergence of a new 
revolutionary polity and the revival of a social solidarity that was framed as essentially Peruvian, 
rooted in a tradition leading back to the Incas, which had been damaged but not destroyed by 
capitalism, colonialism, and neocolonial exploitation. According to one educational pamphlet, in 
the foreseeable revolutionary future, “like our Inca forebears” the Peruvian people would “not lie, 
nor steal, nor live from alienated labour.”15 This ethos was embodied by the figure of Túpac 
Amaru II, an eighteenth-century anti-colonial revolutionary of indigenous ancestry, who had 
anticipated a modern state founded on Inca principles of governance, and whose stern but 
noble demeanour became central to the iconography of the revolution.   
A key aim of the Revolutionary Government was to foster economic development via 
coordinated national planning (an initiative that came to be packaged under the suitably nativist 
rubric “Plan Inca”16 [8.4]). In the short term this would be directed by competent agencies within 
the (military, revolutionary) state, but in the longer term control would pass to everyday 
representatives of the new nation. To this end, the Revolutionary Government created two new 
agencies to organize and train its citizens: the Oficina Nacional de Desarrollo de Pueblos 
Jóvenes (ONDEPJOV, or National Office for the Development of “Young Towns”), which was 
essentially a community development progam; and the Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la 
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Movilización Social (SINAMOS, or National System of Support for Social Mobilization) which 
was established to promote the ideals of “participation” and “popular organization.”  
ONDEPJOV was established in December 1968, in the first months of the revolution, 
with the personal input of General Velasco.17 As a sign of the Revolutionary Government’s new 
outlook, the term “barriada” was condemned as derogatory, and replaced in all official 
documents by “pueblo joven” (young town, or young community).18 The new agency had two 
precedents of sorts: the residents’ own associations, in particular the Pro-Obras de Bienestar 
Social (Support for Projects of Social Well-Being), a federation that by September 1968 included 
over 600 local groups representing 100,000 people in Lima;19 and the organizing work of the 
Catholic Church in squatter settlements, beginning around 1963 under the leadership of Bishop 
Luis Bambarén.20 ONDEPJOV was intended to surpass these efforts—as well as previous 
state-run programs—by formulating integrated proposals for “the advancement [promoción] of 
man, family, and community” in concert with plans for national economic development, since 
better incomes and employment opportunities were seen as the fundamental basis of any 
sustainable improvement in the lives of the pobladores. To this end, ONDEPJOV would 
coordinate the contributions of the public sector and the private (primarily the Church), with the 
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self-help of the residents themselves [8.5].21 It aimed to supplant the old approach to squatter 
settlement improvements, mired in paternalistic political patronage, by empowering the “pueblos 
jóvenes”—the young communities—to unlock their latent potential to enact collective self-
improvement. The focus of self-help action was not to be on housing per se, but rather on 
promoting civic engagement as a basis for developing communal projects for the settlement, 
constructing needed infrastructure and amenities. In a sense ONDEPJOV suggested the 
template for a new citizenry—a microcosm of the new Peru; however actual experience on the 
ground rarely came close to meeting these aspirations.22 
To organize its work, ONDEPJOV established twenty-one regional offices throughout the 
country; in addition, four “sector” offices covered Lima’s peripheral squatter settlements [8.6]. 
Within this structure, the settlements were to be managed in their development via a clear 
hierarchical system: each block of thirty or so households23 would elect its own three-person 
Neighbourhood Committee; these representatives would act as delegates to the zone-wide 
Advancement and Development Committee, which would elect a six-person Central Board of 
Directors; finally, the Board’s Secretary General joined the Coordination Committee for the 
regional or sector office, which provided liaison with ONDEPJOV officials and professional staff  
[8.7].24 This machinery was intended to systematize the political interactions—from grassroots 
to government—of a significant proportion of the population. In 1970 ONDEPJOV identified 610 
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pueblos jóvenes across Peru, with 273 in greater Lima alone.25 760,000 people, or a quarter of 
the capital’s population, lived in such settlements.26 Absorbing this population into ONDEPJOV 
while maintaining the granularity proposed by the organizational model would generate a 
substantial administrative system: for example, by mid-1972, there were 4,875 neighbourhood 
committees throughout greater Lima; by August 1974, there were over 8,000, covering an 
estimated 95 percent of the residents of the capital’s pueblos jóvenes.27 Throughout this 
process, ONDEPJOV effectively incorporated into its membership structure the earlier resident-
run and Church-affiliated groups, thereby neutralizing any independent settlement 
organizations.28 
In practice, despite ONDEPJOV’s broad mandate, initially it designed only a small 
number of new programs (training leaders for community development, for example), and was 
largely confined to coordinating existing ones—some advanced by the private sector 
(workshops to reinforce the values of conjugal life run by the Christian Family Movement), but a 
significant number were projects that would previously have been undertaken by the state 
housing agency, the Junta Nacional de la Vivienda (JNV): surveying and drawing up urban 
plans, road grading, installing water, sewerage, and electricity infrastructure.29 In this latter case, 
ONDEPJOV’s materials emphasized scenes of soldiers assisting with construction work in the 
pueblos jóvenes, reversing the often antagonistic relationship between squatter settlers and the 
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armed forces—as defenders of the status quo, deployed to protect existing property regimes. 
This collaboration that was less implausible than first appears, since many members of the 
armed forces, as well as the police, lived in unauthorized settlements [8.8].30 
Although the General Coordinator of ONDEPJOV and the directors of all the regional 
and sector offices were from the military, it had as its civilian head Diego Robles [8.5], an 
architect who had worked on aided self-help housing programs in Paramonga (with John 
Turner) and in Chimbote. Robles was a close observer of the dynamics of squatter settlement 
formation and consolidation: writing shortly before the revolution, in August 1968, he noted that 
residents’ associations tended to fragment once they had fulfilled their immediate needs for 
basic amenities and secure tenure—thus, ultimately “even if this form of collective action solves 
specific problems for the families, it does not represent a radical change in respect to formal 
established society.”31 In fact it tended towards a certain conservatism, because once residents 
had managed to achieve gains by working through the mechanisms of clientelistic politics, they 
were invested in maintaining the system that they had benefitted from. In a subsequent article 
Robles employed a Marxist framework to further his analysis. In contrast to Turner’s anarcho-
Geddesian vision of the liberatory possibilities of user-controlled self-help building, Robles 
argued that within “the capitalist economic system” self-help housing had not allowed the 
pobladores to improve their socio-economic situation, but had reinforced prevailing structural 
inequalities.32 Self-help programs retarded social change because “mutual aid in the barriada is 
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restricted to immediate action and is not oriented towards the poblador’s basic interests, such 
as increase in income-levels, opportunity for stable occupation, and active participation in the 
urban production structure”; therefore, like Adolfo Córdova in 1958, Robles identified economic 
development, not housing, as the key issue to be addressed.33 Robles remained hopeful about 
the possibility of achieving an “authentic mobilization”34—collective self-help action directed 
towards demanding structural reforms. His proposals to effect this coincided with many of the 
goals proclaimed by ONDEPJOV, and thus at least in its early history the agency seemed to 
present the opportunity to foster community development initiatives to address the fundamental 
issues underlying the formation of urban squatter settlements. 
In mid-1971 the Revolutionary Government turned its attention to the question of how to 
institutionalize its vision of Peruvian society, an issue made more urgent by the appearance of 
spontaneously organized “Committees for the Defense of the Revolution” in several parts of the 
country which needed to be brought within an official framework. This led to the establishment 
of a new agency, SINAMOS [8.9]. The founding legislation identified its objectives as “the 
training [capacitación], guidance [orientación], and organization of the national population” and 
promoting “the communication and particularly dialogue between the Government and the 
national Population”35; this would be achieved through the twin pillars of participation and social 
mobilization. In a sense this was a mutual-aid self-help community development project 
extrapolated to the national scale, counting among its tasks “fostering the creative capacity of 
the population so that it unfolds its energies and potentials in actions for its own development, 
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with the support of the Government.”36 In addition to 2,000 new staff, SINAMOS absorbed 5,000 
staff members and other resources from eight existing government agencies, including 
ONDEPJOV. Theoretically, SINAMOS would reach out to mobilize the entire nation, but initially 
its mission was to focus on six prioritized areas: rural organizations; youth; unions; cultural and 
professional associations; newly established workplace cooperatives; and finally, the pueblos 
jóvenes and “áreas de sub-desarrollo urbano interno” (ASDUIs, or “underdeveloped inner-city 
areas”; the term reflected the influence of dependency theory, and was intended to replace 
“tugurio”—tenement slum).37 In each case SINAMOS sought to build on existing organizational 
structures, for example retaining the neighbourhood committee system already established 
under ONDEPJOV. 
SINAMOS contained an inherent contradiction: in addition to being the agency’s 
acronym, “sin amos” means “without masters”—yet the agency was founded on the 
understanding that the correct orientation of collective action could only be ensured with 
concerted guidance from above.38 The claim of inclusiveness and popular empowerment (“You 
are SINAMOS”) was confounded by the organizational chart (“This is SINAMOS”), revealing an 
elaborate four-tiered structure—national, regional, zonal, local—making very clear each 
operative’s position and function [8.10]. SINAMOS operated at the blurred edge between the 
utopian and the sinister, where concerned guidance slides into control. This tension was already 
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latent within ONDEPJOV, but now intensified as efforts moved from concrete development 
projects towards the work of ideological instruction. On the one hand, the sheer volume of the 
educational and exhortatory materials produced to promote the engagement of the masses 
proved the Revolutionary Government’s commitment to social mobilization and the capacity for 
human improvement: the SINAMOS Reports bi-monthly magazine;39 booklets on the 
characteristics, achievements, and uniqueness of the Peruvian Revolution;40 collections on 
themes such as “Education and Change” (Rural Training: Analysis of the Chilean Experience; 
Demystification of Consciousness), “Planning” (Planning and Planning the Base; Planning for 
the Planners or for Social Change) and the “Third World” (Intregrated Analysis of Development; 
Means of Mass Communication and Study Groups in China).41 The use of graphic techniques to 
convey information to illiterate populations represented a further concrete effort towards genuine 
social inclusion. But on the other hand, SINAMOS was wielded by some within the government 
as a tool to carry out surveillance of non-sanctioned political organizations, particularly within 
the pueblos jóvenes. As described by a sociologist who was involved with SINAMOS in mid-
1975: “Most of all I remember the detailed info on the opposition.… After a while it seemed as if 
I was working in a police station, reading detective reports.”42 
The contradictory impulses within the Revolutionary Government are particularly evident 
in its policies towards property title within the pueblos jóvenes. On the one hand, it espoused 
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the rhetoric of a new communal ethos. An educational pamphlet produced by SINAMOS in the 
early 1970s, What are Property Titles? [8.11], reiterated the principles established by Law 
13517 some years earlier, but particularly underscored the fact that the law prohibited land 
sales: “The lot is for those who need it” and selling one “threatens the interests of the people.”43 
Previously the prohibition on re-sales had been couched as protecting residents from real estate 
speculation; now the strategy was to present the case for a new ethics of property, prioritizing 
the use value of the land over its exchange value (a similar argument would be made for the 
redistribution of rural land under agrarian reform). In this pamphlet, the argument is reinforced 
by the adjacent image of the revolutionary collective working as one for the common good as if 
banishing forever memories of for-profit trafficking in land for housing. This seemed to anticipate 
a “revolution” in the entire category of property ownership as it had been framed under 
liberalism, its mechanisms and the standards of validation that it had implied.  
On the other hand, the Revolutionary Government oversaw a massive increase in 
property titling in the pueblos jóvenes: only 3,000 titles were granted in the seven years from the 
passage of Law 13517 in early 1961 to October 1968; following the simplified titling process 
instituted at the very end of the Belaúnde administration, over 10,000 titles were granted 
between October 1968 and October 1972, and another 6,500 by the end of August 1974.44 This 
was not an unconsidered or passive continuation of the previous policy: as noted by Alfred 
Stepan, the Revolutionary Government generally granted title only after the whole settlement 
had completed “all phases of the organizational training and election processes” required for the 
neighbourhood committees, so that the aspiration to gain title was “a major incentive for 
cooperation” with the official agencies.45 As articulated by one SINAMOS official: “We want 
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participation but it should be organized participation. We want to make as many people as 
possible homeowners, then they will act responsibly towards their community and have a stake 
in it.”46 Under this logic, property title was intended to instill in beneficiaries a more concrete 
sense of having something at stake in the new Peru, and therefore something to lose by failing 
to “participate” in the state’s programs—a policy that played on the tendency towards 
conservatism already observed by Diego Robles.  
 While the revolutionary utopia came to be actualized as an elaborate bureaucratic 
structure, the organizational charts did not represent the real abilities of the Revolutionary 
Government to coordinate its populations or to implement its vision on the ground. The reality of 
its response to the pueblos jóvenes was far from its ambitions and its rhetoric, as became very 
evident in incidents leading to the creation of Villa El Salvador. On the morning of April 29, 
1971, 200 families invaded a site at Pamplona Alta to the south of Lima; within days the 
invasion had swelled to 9,000 families. The action was carefully timed: Lima was due to host a 
meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank beginning on May 10, and the invasion 
organizers hoped that some embarrassment to the government would hasten a decision in their 
favour. Instead, the government launched a public relations assault, labelling the invasion anti-
Peruvian, an effort to discredit the revolution, and the work of agitators. However once it 
became clear that this strategy would not work—the invasion having won too much popular 
support to defeat with a smear campaign and become too large to easily suppress by force—
General Velasco and other officials made well publicized visits to the pobladores to express 
their solidarity with their plight and to propose a coordinated plan to resolve the crisis [8.12].  
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Planning officials selected a “relocation site” further south at Villa El Salvador, which had 
previously been identified as a suitable zone for urban expansion,47 and produced a rapid-
response conceptual urban plan. By mid-May, the military had transported 3,000 families to the 
new site, where they were allocated lots (of 140 sq. m. with a nominal payment), and began to 
establish their provisional dwellings [8.13]. Overall the plan for the new “urbanización popular”—
“conceived using modern urbanistic techniques”—included zones for heavy industry, commerce, 
multi-family housing, and a large park space48 (recalling the earlier concept of the self-sufficient 
satellite city, just as the invasion drama replayed the Ciudad de Dios scenario). Employing the 
structure of a grid layout, the urban planning model was based on progressive nucleation—
manzana (block, each with twenty-four lots), grupo residencial (residential group of sixteen 
manzanas, 2,000 people), barrio (7,500 people), and sector (10,000-30,000 people). Open 
space at the centre of each grupo residencial would be used for communal services—such as 
park spaces, kindergartens, or meeting rooms—which were to be organized and managed by 
the local community [8.14]; at the level of the barrio and of the sector spaces would be set aside 
for additional shared services. Finally, the new settlement was to be fully provided with basic 
infrastructure (electricity cables for street lighting, water distribution).  
In effect, the uncontrolled “popular participation” of the initial invasion was redirected into 
an official project for “popular” urban development; as depicted by SINAMOS, Villa El Salvador 
was paradigmatic of the participatory, communal self-help ethos of the Peruvian Revolution—an 
idealized version of regime’s engagement with the pueblos jóvenes [8.15]. However, while Villa 
El Salvador was embraced rhetorically, the settlement was all but abandoned in reality, 
receiving minimal government support beyond the provision of the site and drawing up the grid. 
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The initial proposal put forward by planning officials had included a project “to encourage the 
construction of low-cost dwellings made with rustic materials (esteras, cement, lime, sand, and 
stones) … constructed via a new system which is currently in an experimental phase”49—but 
this did not progress beyond a couple of model houses; a pilot program of self-help construction 
resulted in sixty-nine houses.50 Following these abortive efforts, residents were provided with no 
further technical assistance for their dwellings; similarly, residents alone financed and built the 
area’s first schools. The promised electricity was only provided in 1975, with water and 
sewerage infrastructure in 1979.51 Due to the state’s lack of action, the residents of necessity 
provided a city for themselves, which was gradually consolidated through individual efforts to 
build housing, and collective efforts to develop public amenities. By the end of 1973 Villa El 
Salvador had over 100,000 residents [8.16-8.17]; by 2003 this had grown to over 380,000 
[8.39].52 
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After suffering a serious illness in early 1973, General Velasco became increasingly 
isolated from his cabinet, and in August 1975 he was replaced in a palace coup by General 
Francisco Morales Bermúdez. Despite an initial promise to strengthen the regime’s socialist 
credentials—announcing that the revolution was now moving into its “second phase”—Morales 
Bermúdez oversaw an unwinding of revolutionary rhetoric and a move to the right, and by end 
of 1976 all remaining Velasco sympathizers had been removed from positions of power. In this 
new climate, Villa El Salvador and the pueblos jóvenes no longer held much interest for the 
regime; likewise SINAMOS was weakened and then dismantled outright in 1978.  
The achievements of the Revolutionary Government included upgrading the 
bureaucratic status of the housing sector, creating a fully fledged Ministerio de la Vivienda 
(Ministry of Housing). At the same time, the number of squatter settlements continued to grow 
exponentially.53 The Revolutionary Government’s final statement on this problem was Peru’s 
official report to the UN Habitat Conference in 1976. Articulated within the framework of 
dependency theory, the report identified the seed of the problem of asentamientos humanos 
(human settlements) in the nation’s uneven economic development, as rural poverty had led to 
vast waves of migration to the comparatively affluent capital in search of greater opportunities. 
The remedy was an integrated plan of national development connecting and coordinating the 
urban and rural spheres, via “a rational occupation of the national territory” that would establish 
new urban centres throughout the country to relieve the pressure on Lima, creating of “a 
national development based on interdependencies, in place of a development based on 
hegemony and domination.”54 
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On a practical level, the report outlined measures to assist the consolidation of urban 
squatter settlements—including legal recognition, promoting neighbourhood organizations, and 
technical assistance in infrastructure provision and urban remodelling. It also advocated the 
development of construction systems suited to “our geo-social-economic context” to increase 
access to the housing market (the “self-fabrication” of adobe bricks was one popular solution at 
this time [8.18]), as well as the use of low-cost, labour-intensive building practices such as 
“labour equity [inversión-trabajo], auto-construcción, ayuda mutua, esfuerzo propio and 
similar.”55 (It is worth noting that although stage one of the UN-backed PREVI program was 
being completed around this time, none of the PREVI projects are mentioned here as 
solutions.56) The report also suggested the possibility of a more visionary approach to housing 
in revolutionary Peru, encouraging “new patterns of dwelling” as an alternative to the individual 
lot and the single-family home. This was further explored in a contemporaneous proposal for a 
settlement at Canto Grande in Lima, eliminating the traditional lot—which reinforced “the 
isolation of the family nucleus in respect to the collectivity”57—in favour of forms facilitating a 
new communal sociability [8.19]; for instance, the patios of traditional Peruvian housing 
(condemned as “free space for private and passive use”) would be replaced by a shared 
outdoor recreational space framed by multi-family dwelling blocks;58 further, shared kitchen, 
laundry, and childcare facilities would not only foster communality, but also encourage women’s 
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entry into the workforce. Finally, the report turned to the issue of “popular participation” as 
integral to the definitive development of the asentamientos humanos. A genuine participation 
would only occur with the transfer of power to the citizens themselves—subject to their prior 
training and organization for their self-determination; viable solutions would only arise from “the 
people itself autonomously organized for its true and total liberation.”59 
This vision of self-help within Peru’s Habitat submission came a decade after Turner had 
left the country, almost two decades after his first assignments in Arequipa [8.20-8.21]. 
Meanwhile, Turner’s own position on self-help housing had been entirely reformulated. 
 
8.2 An Architecture that Works 
Turner arrived at the Harvard-MIT Joint Center on Urban Studies in September 1965, 
where he worked as a research associate for two years, then continued in a teaching position at 
MIT for another six years. In June 1973 Turner returned to England, where he taught at the AA 
School of Tropical Architecture, while Otto Koenigsberger was still running the program, and 
then at the Development Planning Unit, University College London, until 1983. Turner’s long-
term focus as he moved into this new role as an academic and a writer was to systematize his 
ideas on housing into a larger work, which would become Housing by People: Towards 
Autonomy in Building Environments (1976). 
In an influential paper from this period, “Uncontrolled Urban Settlement” (first presented 
in 1966, published 1968), Turner had endorsed the role of the architect in providing expertise to 
improve outcomes in the framing of urban plans and in the design and construction of housing 
in squatter settlements. He also considered the role of the state in supporting this work, pointing 
to infrastructure, legislation, and technical assistance as some key areas where governments 
could intervene to facilitate the actions of individual residents or local communities. Most 
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crucially, Turner emphasized that the state should not act unilaterally “as a provider” handing 
out assistance according to its own priorities and interests, but “as the servant—providing 
tools.”60 In this model, the relationship between state and citizen was to be a collaborative 
“working with” that responded to the input of residents. In subsequent writings Turner continued 
this concern with the role of state and international agencies in relation to low-cost housing in 
“uncontrolled” urban settlements, however the emphasis of “control” gradually shifted away from 
the professional’s imperative to “control” and manage urban development, to the end-user’s 
right to “control” their own decisions concerning their housing. In these later writings self-help 
housing was less important for its particular techniques than for what it represented of the 
possibility of user control—increasingly articulated as the “freedom” or autonomy to guide and 
shape one’s own living environment. 
This discussion was informed by the development of a second major theme in Turner’s 
work: the very definition of housing—or the “value” of housing for its users. In “A New View of 
the Housing Deficit” (first presented in 1966, published 1971) Turner argued that while state 
housing agencies tended to focus on the provision of “modern standard dwellings” whatever the 
context and the situation of prospective residents, this was not an immediate priority for many 
families, and was in fact often beyond their means. As the basis for an alternative—and more 
realistic—approach to the problem, it was necessary to move away from considering housing 
exclusively on the basis of its material qualities or “appearance” (its standards of “modernity”), 
and instead evaluate it in terms of its three core “attributes”—defined by Turner as “shelter” 
(protection from the elements), “security” (guaranteed tenure), and “location” (access to 
employment, transport, urban amenities).61 Ideally, housing would fulfill each of these 
requirements, but in practice, residents weigh the relative importance of each attribute in their 
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own particular circumstances, as well as their costs and benefits, and make decisions 
accordingly [8.22]. Turner argued that for recent migrants to the city, location is the main priority 
because this facilitates access to employment opportunities, allowing the family to build up its 
economic resources; the quality of the shelter and long-term security are far less important, so 
renting substandard housing in the central city may be the best available (or only affordable) 
option in this circumstance. When families are more financially stable, the priorities shift to 
establishing long-term security and gradually improving the quality of the dwelling, both of which 
can be achieved through home-ownership in a squatter settlement; these advantages are 
usually offset by their peripheral location, but the money and time that must be devoted to a 
longer commute are considered an acceptable sacrifice.  
Significantly, Turner does not argue that self-built squatter settlement housing is the best 
option in all circumstances, any more than the “modern standard dwelling” could be a universal 
solution. With this understanding, housing providers should develop greater flexibility in devising 
specific solutions, which must always be informed by the available resources. Most importantly, 
as Turner argued in “Housing Issues and the Standards Problem” (1972), households must 
have the ability to determine their own priorities in housing—not to have their needs defined, 
assessed, and resolved by an expert or government agency: 
The best results are obtained by the user who is in full control of the design, 
construction, and management of his own home. Whether or not he builds it with 
his own hands is of secondary importance—unless he is very poor.62 
In this context, scarce public resources should be deployed to “support local action” and “help 
the mass of the people make the best use of their own resources and in their own ways.”63 
There was still a clear imperative “to avoid the disorder and diseconomies of unplanned direct 
action”—but governments could not expect to control the entire process of housing provision, 
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only to make strategic interventions; instead of constructing “conventional and now descredited 
closed housing projects” they must focus their energies on “the development of open housing 
service systems.”64 
This concept of “closed” or “open” interventions into housing provision was further 
developed in a co-written report on Government Policy and Lower-Income Housing Systems in 
Metropolitan Mexico (1971–1972), the key arguments of which Turner outlined in a memo to 
Robert Sadove of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) 
in November 1971. There were three “levels of housing action” available to state agencies: 
“packages” (the complete housing project), “components” (“a discrete part with a discrete 
function”65—such as a street, water supply infrastructure, school, or individual dwelling), and 
“elements” (the basic building blocks of housing—land, materials, tools, labour, financing). The 
“package” required a large investment from the public sector, and offered little space for the 
prospective resident to contribute their own resources to improving their housing; “component”-
based projects were less costly on a per capita basis so could benefit a larger population, and 
presented the opportunity for greater “private sector response to public action”; finally, 
“elements” were the most cost-effective, and “open-ended” in encouraging individual action.66 
Arguing that “the measure of effectiveness for any public policy on housing … is the ratio 
between public expenditure and consequent private investment,” it was clear for Turner that 
intervention at the level of “elements” was the prefered solution: for example, “a government can 
precipitate immense housing investments through relatively simple legislative actions of low cost 
and risk to the public,” such as the FHA mortgage guarantee system.67 Other “element”-level 
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interventions included the revision of minimum housing standards, legalization of tenure in 
squatter settlements, expanding access to low-cost credit, or exercising controls on land 
markets.68 However, as Turner advised Sadove, the overarching challenge was to achieve a 
kind of structural transformation of the housing sphere, making “the necessary change-over 
from packaged products to open component service programs.” In this context, the significance 
of sites-and-services programs was that they operated mid-way between the “package” and the 
“component” level—consequently it provided more “freedom of action for the users,” and could 
be deployed as “the thin end of a wedge” to further open up systems of housing support.69 
Turner emphasized to Sadove that the sites-and-services approach should only be employed as 
a “temporary strategy”—a transitional device—because it still functioned at “the high-risk/low 
payoff end of the spectrum,” and was predicated on “certain assumptions about the nature of 
financing and the building materials submarkets that might be more effectively dealt with if 
addressed directly.”70 
In essence Turner was advocating that the World Bank support significant state 
intervention to restructure markets in “elements” (land, materials, financing, and so on) in order 
to create the conditions of possibility for effective local action. As Turner re-emphasized in the 
introduction to the US edition of Housing By People—in an effort to correct misunderstandings 
concerning his position on the role of the state—government should “concentrate on what it has 
the authority to do: to ensure equitable access to resources which local communities and people 
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cannot provide for themselves.”71 The state had a responsibility to rebalance the distribution of 
resources in favour of low-income citizens, and thus to provide them with the means to 
undertake self-determined and empowered initiatives to house themselves. This vision of a 
powerful activist state would seem to be at odds with Turner’s anarchist beliefs, but it had 
already been foreshadowed in his 1960 report on the Arequipa projects, which argued for the 
importance of connecting “the complementary forces of coordinated government planning and 
mobilized local action.”72 In response to a Marxist critique of his approach, Turner underscored 
his viewpoint73: “only radical anarchists will argue that modern society is possible without any 
central controls or government; conservative anarchists like myself accept the necessity of 
central planning.”74 
Turner was paradoxically a pro-state anarchist, but he envisioned a version of the state 
that does not exist, reflecting a scientistic understanding of government as a rational actor 
distributing resources according to clearly established and agreed upon technical requirements; 
framed in relation to an abstracted world, it appeared to be unaffected by the forces of political 
or economic power. For example, his observations concerning the viability of self-help housing 
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in the United States identified a huge set of preconditions that would be necessary to allow 
individuals and local groups to “maximize the use of their own resources”—but which he 
nonetheless seemed to believe were achievable with the correct action from above: 
As long as building plots or vacant buildings were available at reasonable prices 
and not inflated by speculation or monopolistic aggregation; as long as there was 
a plentiful supply of appropriate tools and materials through local distributors who 
did not discriminate against small or non-professional purchasers; and as long as 
local banks gave credit and were not absorbed into impersonally administered 
national corporations: then individual households and small groups could 
maximize the use of their own resources.75 
As long as the prospective self-builders existed outside of capitalism—Turner seemed to 
argue—they were free to access and exploit their own resources, to determine and direct their 
own housing. 
In Turner’s writings from the late 1960s, the squatter settlement appears as the epitome 
of this “freedom to build” or self-determined action. In the August 1968 of Architectural Design 
(on the theme of the “Architecture of Democracy”) Turner returned to the topic of the squatter 
settlements which he had introduced to the magazine’s readers five years earlier,76 now less 
concerned with the government-run aided self-help housing programs that had been intended to 
improve the settlements than with their innate “unimproved” qualities. For Turner, this was “an 
architecture that works” [8.23]: developed by residents with their own hands, in accordance with 
their own desires, it “works” both in pragmatic terms, reflecting the capacities of a developing 
economy, and in human and ethical terms, facilitating the empowerment of individuals and their 
communities. In contrast to the lives of “the urban poor in wealthy and highly institutionalized 
mass-consumption society,” the squatter self-builder “finds in the responsibilities and activities 
of home-building and local improvement the creative dialogue essential for self-discovery and 
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growth.”77 The “existential value” of this mode of living emerged from three essential “freedoms” 
available to the squatter self-builder: freedom to form self-selected community groupings, 
freedom to budget and organize the resources at hand, and freedom to shape the immediate 
environment. 
The question of how to transfer these “freedoms” into the context of Western consumer 
society would become a major theme in Turner’s work, as he sought to derive universal 
principles from the squatter settlement; practices such as urban homesteading, sweat equity, 
and squatting cooperatives which emerged in some US cities in the early 1970s appeared to 
replicate some of these “existential values” [8.24].78 Nonetheless there was (at least on 
occasion) an acknowledgement of the harsh realities framing the “freedoms” of squatter 
settlement residents: while the poor in the US were seen as being “helped” into dependency 
(taking cues from Oscar Lewis’s The Culture of Poverty), in Peru “people are almost forced into 
helping themselves”: “Autonomy is born of desperation and the resulting initiative of the 
squatters has its own reward in increased self-esteem, high morale, and the achievement of 
creating a community.”79 If Turner’s position is often vulnerable to charges of romanticization, 
here this alternates with a brutal realism in its assessment of the conditions facing the squatter 
settlement resident, celebrating the imposition of “self-help” (the only remaining option) as the 
ends justify the means. Ultimately the question of how much “freedom” squatter settlers can 
really expect to exercise without having real (economic, political) power is never addressed. 
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In Housing by People80 the issue of the user’s freedom to act, to control their decisions 
concerning housing, is once again central; however the discussion is often abstract, as Turner 
searches for a means to systematize solutions to facilitate local action. Under the influence of 
anarchist thought, the modes of housing provision are defined in terms of how much control 
individuals or local groups are able to exert, based around the polarity of “autonomous” (self-
determined) and “heteronomous” (other-determined) construction. Translated into the terms of 
mainstream Western architectural production, this dichotomy explains the failure of Pruitt-Igoe 
(developed heteronomously and hierarchically, with insufficient user-input), and the success of 
the model of the English village (outcome of autonomous organization and network planning) 
[8.25]. Turner’s supplementary example of “heteronomous” housing—the Fergusleigh Park 
public housing estate, in Scotland—is “traditional” in form, clarifying that for Turner the core 
failure is not due to modernism (as for Charles Jencks), but the mode of social organization 
behind the construction of the project.  
Although Turner’s focus was on marginal practices, on the question of user control there 
are clear points of connection to discussions within mainstream architectural culture at this time, 
particularly reflected in the concept of architecture as an open system, as seen in Herman 
Herztberger’s Diagoon Housing, Delft, 1967–1972, and Ralph Erskine’s Byker Housing Estate, 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1968–1981. Further, Turner’s writings marked a connection between the 
academy and the international development sphere, engaging both with the United Nations and 
the World Bank, although in the latter case, the institutionalization of sites-and-services tended 
to erase much of the nuance of Turner’s ideas.81 
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Following Robert MacNamara’s appointment as the president of the World Bank in 1968, 
the organization shifted its focus to include issues of housing and urbanization. By the early 
1970s, the World Bank had come to regard conventional minimum housing as an unaffordable 
solution in much of the developing world. Instead, it argued that sites-and-services projects 
offered improved living conditions and “more efficient urban development patterns” that allow 
“greater opportunities for subsequent upgrading” than unplanned settlements, as well as 
“security of tenure and a basis for community development.”82 sites-and-services projects also 
provided employment opportunities and job training, and their generation of self-help labour 
could thus be considered as contributing to national economic development.83 
Within the United Nations, the Housing, Building, and Planning division had been 
operative since the early 1950s, but the Habitat Conference in 1976 represented a significant 
elevation of the profile of housing and urbanization as issues of global concern within the 
organization. The “ideological framework” for the conference was established via discussions at 
a four-day meeting held in Dubrovnik in May 1975, chaired by Otto Koenigsberger.84 The thirty-
one participating experts included development-focused economists such as Fernando Cardoso 
and Albert Hirschman, along with architects claiming a specialization in this field: John Turner, 
Panayotis Psomopoulos (representing the Athens Centre of Ekistics, since Constantinos A. 
Doxiadis’s failing health prevented him from attending85), Charles Correa, Yona Friedman, 
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been monetized.” World Bank, “Site and Services Projects,” 13. 
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n.d., ca. 1975). 
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 According to Panayiota I. Pyla, the World Society of Ekistics, which had emerged out of the Delos 
Symposia organized by Constantinos A. Doxiadis, was instrumental in pushing for the UN to organize a 
conference on human settlements. Furthermore, Doxiadis produced a series of four publications that 
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Eduardo Neira (then working for the UN Economic Commission for Latin America), Nuno Portas 
(architect and director of the Portuguese self-help housing program Ambulatory Support to 
Local Residents86), and Ernest Weissmann (director of the UN Housing, Building, and Planning 
Branch, 1951–1965). The report emerging from Dubrovnik drew on the analytical framework of 
dependency theory to diagnose the cause of the problems facing the developing world: 
“underdevelopment” (as manifested in the uncontrolled urbanization of “human settlements”) 
was ultimately due to the “unequal economic and political relations between nations”; the 
remedy for these global structural inequalities was “a new international economic order” based 
on principles of social justice (as also endorsed by Barbara Ward).87 Within nations, the report 
called for more equitable access to land, and furthermore, for any benefits from the 
improvement to land to belong to the local community: “any increase in its value is not only [due] 
to individual effort but also to the decisions and investments of society as a whole and of the 
local community. Consequently, it belongs to them.”88 In terms of housing, the report definitively 
rejected direct construction by governments as a viable solution, in favour of providing support 
to the initiatives of local communities: “It should be noted in particular that in vast areas of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
were intended to be used as support material for the conference: Ecumenopolis: The Inevitable City of 
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 Habitat, Dubrovnik, 8. Similarly, in Peru’s Habitat report land is conceptualized as a common good, not 
an object of speculation, therefore profits from improvements of the urban soil should revert “to the 
community since it is the one that generates it.” MVC, Perú Habitat 1976: Informe Nacional, 29. These 
assertions bring to mind Engels responding to the Proudonhist argument concerning the value of land: 
“[which states] that since this increment is brought about without the landowner having contributed 
anything, it does not equitably belong to him but to society as a whole. However, he overlooks the fact 
that he is thereby in reality demanding the abolition of landed property.” Friedrich Engels, The Housing 
Question (1872; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979), 22. 
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Third World self-help construction and improvement of housing on the basis of investments of 
human resources seem to offer the only realistic way of meeting the needs of the majority.”89 
In Vancouver, at the Habitat Conference itself, these discussions around “human 
settlements” made the awkward transition from the technical to the diplomatic sphere; 
representatives from 132 countries attended, along with observers from various UN bodies, and 
high-profile intergovernmental organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the Organization of American States. The resulting “Vancouver Declaration on Human 
Settlements”—nineteen general principles, twenty-four guidelines for action, and eighty pages of 
recommendations subdivided into six categories—was intended to set out the way forward for 
both governments and the UN itself.90 Meanwhile, the Habitat Forum, a meeting of non-
governmental organizations, was held in parallel with the main conference, with over 5,000 
participants from ninety countries; topics for discussion included “self-help and low-cost 
housing, land policy, participation, appropriate technology, nuclear energy, and rural 
development.”91 Turner helped to coordinate the Self-Help and Low-Cost Housing Symposium 
and gave a keynote speech (containing a pointed critique of his own position as expert, 
protesting the fact that he had been selected to speak rather than a representative of “the 
people whose problems we have met here to discuss”92). In the end, this conjunction of 
professional and political connections was pivotal in tranforming conceptions of the 
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 The Vancouver Declaration was not adopted by consensus: the United States, supported by Egypt and 
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United Nations, 1976), 147-152. 
91
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“uncontrolled urban settlement” (as Turner had denominated it a decade earlier); a number of 
governments modulated their policy positions, just as the World Bank had shifted its funding 
priorities. In particular, the “Vancouver Declaration” argued for the importance of defining 
“progressive minimum standards for an acceptable quality of life”93—an acceptance that 
previous benchmarks of acceptable housing could not be met for the majority, but nonetheless 
some sense of a “minimum” should be preserved as a goal to be worked towards. On a practical 
level, the document advocated both the “reorganization of spontaneous urban settlements”94 in 
a manner that engaged the participation of local communities (as opposed to a top-down “slum 
clearance” approach), as well as a strong emphasis on “aided” self-help. Here, government 
support could take the form of regularizing tenure, promoting sites-and-services schemes 
(“popular subdivisions properly serviced”), simplifying “procedures for acquisition of sites,” as 
well as financing and building permits.95 
   However, any sense of a developing consensus around the new approach was to be 
short-lived: already in June 1976 one expert had begun to ask: “Whither Sites and Services?”—
expressing concern that “the expectation that considerable savings could be effected”96 by this 
approach had not materialized. Meanwhile sites-and-services projects had delivered poor 
outcomes in terms of housing, exacerbated by the selection of remote, peripheral urban sites, 
which had the advantage of being inexpensive, but isolated low-income citizens from 
employment and urban amenities (reflecting the low priority placed on their well-being by their 
governments). Experience had shown “that providing shelter for the urban poor requires 
                                                
93 Habitat, Report of Habitat, 7. 
94 “Governments should concentrate on the provision of services and on the physical and spatial 
reorganization of spontaneous settlements in ways that encourage community initiative and link ‘marginal’ 
groups to the national development process.” Habitat, Report of Habitat, 58. 
95 Habitat, Report of Habitat, 48. 
96
 Aprodicio A. Laquian, “Whither Sites and Services?” Science 192, no. 4243 (June 4, 1976): 951. The 
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anthropologist Margaret Mead. 
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subsidy”97—but without its promise of self-sufficiency, the sites-and-services option was rapidly 
losing its appeal for government sponsors.  
The UN’s own assessment, a decade after Vancouver, was that the approach to the 
provision of low-cost housing needed to be revised once again. In 1987 the UN Centre for 
Human Settlements presented its first Global Report on Human Settlements. The language of 
dependency theory and structural inequality was superseded by “integrated management” and 
economic efficiency; housing was not a “social welfare concern” but a question of “industrial 
output and marketing”98—instead of a “narrow focus on sites-and-services and squatter-
settlement upgrading schemes” the key was to “scale up” housing production, suggesting a 
return to a reliance on the economies of scale promised by mass-housing.99 Rather than 
undertaking housing projects on their own account, governments now needed to focus on 
“enabling strategies” to foster the contributions of the private sector: “Governmental measures 
will be concentrated mainly on improving institutional structures and mobilizing the resources 
needed to support action by others.”100 However, the report did acknowledge that this approach 
could not offer a universal solution: “those who live in destitution”—as opposed to the “poor” and 
“very poor”—“will need to be assisted directly through programs shaped by principles other than 
those of affordability and cost-recovery.”101 Here the UN at once recognized the efficiency 
offered by the market, but also the limitations to its effectiveness under certain economic 
conditions; it was however unclear exactly where this line between a workable level of poverty 
and irremediable destitution could be drawn. 
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Within Peru some longer-term problems with the self-help approach were now becoming 
more evident. In particular, a detailed study in 1987 by sociologists Gustavo Riofrío and Jean-
Claude Driant observed that the processes of consolidation within self-built settlements was 
protracted and burdensome on residents [8.26-8.27].102 While it was once assumed that these 
difficult living conditions would be temporary, “[t]oday, badly equipped bathrooms, overcrowding 
in the few completed rooms, and the unfinished floors, windows, and doors” reveal that 
substandard housing has established itself as permanent; it has become clear that 
“[s]pontaneous popular activity in housing construction has multiple and serious limits.”103 
According to the authors, the situation could only be improved by the state’s commitment to 
providing genuine “technical assistance” for self-help housing, through closer supervision of 
construction, to ensure more effective results.104 
Turner had moved away from advocating the architect’s direct control and guidance in 
self-help housing projects in favour of a greater “freedom to build”; for Riofrío and Driant, the 
built outcomes of this “freedom” made the argument for a return to closer control. However by 
the late 1980s the new “freedoms” promised by neoliberalism were in the ascendant: the debate 
over the respective roles of the state and the market in the provision of low-cost housing would 
only intensify.  
 
                                                
102 The report primarily focused on examples from unauthorized settlements (such as 28 de Mayo) but 
also included the “urbanización popular” Ciudad de Dios established by the Peruvian government in the 
late 1950s. The report observed that this planned development brought a couple of advantages: Ciudad 
de Dios had “developed with great speed in the early years due to the núcleos básicos provided in a 
completed urbanización, but subsequently this development has come to a halt or has been very slow.” 
The layout of the house, with three rooms at the front of the lot represent “a better use of space” than the 
common pattern in barriada housing of having two rooms at the front. Gustavo Riofrío Benavides and 
Jean-Claude Driant, ¿Que vivienda han construido? Nuevos problemas en viejas barriadas (Lima: 
CIDAP; TAREA, 1987), 79, 159. 
103
 Riofrío and Driant, ¿Que vivienda han construido?, 135, 136. 
104 For example, a plan for the construction of additional low-cost housing could be developed making use 
of “self-built” dwellings that are currently under construction: “A system of technical assistance and credit 
and incentives for those who want to extend their dwelling could result in the better use of existing land, 
and also in improved living conditions.” Riofrío and Driant, ¿Que vivienda han construido?, 143. 
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8.3 Freedom to Borrow 
In a sense, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and President Jimmy 
Carter shared joint responsibility for definitively ending the Peruvian Revolution, since the loans 
that they provided to Peru in the late 1970s in order to solve an ever-growing economic crisis 
came with the requirements to enact structural adjustment policies and to commit the country to 
a return to conventional democracy. The election of Belaúnde as president for a second time 
(1980–1985) was accompanied by the rapid flourishing of neoliberalism; values were once 
again inverted as the ideal of social solidarity was superseded by the validation of private 
enterprise and private property. The country embarked upon a protracted and often painful 
period of transition, with the Belaúnde administration was marked by increasing economic and 
social instability, and rising political violence (perpetrated by insurgents and by the state). The 
conflicts only intensified under the succeeding governments of Alan García (1985–1990) and 
Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), with the situation finally stabilizing in the late 1990s. 
Belaúnde’s housing policy was summarized by the catch cry “Make the dispossessed 
into small property owners.”105 [8.28]. The results were schizophrenic: on the one hand, high-
end apartment buildings in the capital’s established suburbs harked back to the prestige 
projects of the 1960s [8.29]; on the other hand, massive low-cost projects (núcleo básico, sites-
and-services, sites-without-services) attempted to grapple with the needs of lower-income 
populations, leading to the creation of “cities” as satellites orbiting in space on the periphery of 
the established city, provided with few services; as a result they were slow to be populated and 
consolidate themselves as viable neighbourhoods [8.30]. 
Under García, to the extent that the state involved itself in housing provision, it limited its 
efforts to minimal, large-scale, peripherally located settlements, typified by Ciudad Mi Perú, a 
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relocation project with lotes tizados (chalk-drawn lots), and very basic communal services 
(latrines, water pipes, graded but unpaved roads) [8.31]. Here the state offered little more than a 
grid in the sand, but its attentions were to be paid for—in part—by careful displays of clientalistic 
gratitude [8.32]. However, reforms to municipal government initiated by Belaúnde had given 
local municipalities greater control over urban development, opening up the possibility of 
alternative approaches to the housing problem. Alfonso Barrantes, the socialist mayor of Lima 
(1984–1986) promoted the Laderas de Chillón Experimental Housing Project (architect Miguel 
Alvariño, 1985) [8.33]—presented as a vision of orderly self-guided community development 
which bore little resemblance to the actual practices of incipient construction. Once again, the 
program was made cost-effective by the selection of a difficult site, distant from the established 
city and fragmented by topography. As a result the settlement was slow to consolidate. Since 
the Barrantes was administration short-lived, this program was not repeated elsewhere. 
The regulatory controls once proposed by planning law were by now a distant memory; 
the dynamism of “uncontrolled” settlements outpaced the (minimal) official efforts to manage 
them, leaving “unassisted” self-help settlements as the norm. The rate of rural-urban migration 
further intensified, with one additional impetus: the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) Maoist 
guerilla movement had marked the 1980 presidential elections with its first bombing attack, 
centred on a polling station in the Andean city of Ayacucho. The cycle of insurgent violence and 
state repression thus initiated brought refugees from political violence in the hinterland into the 
capital; the first refugee squatter settlement was established at Huanta I in northeast Lima in 
1984, and other similar settlements soon followed.106  
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 “Forty-five Huanta desplazados made an agreement with the Huanta-born mayor of San Juan de 
Lurigancho, a municipality in northeast Lima, to build housing on a tract of municipal land.  Another five 
hundred families … made a similar agreement to found Huanta II next door.” Robin Kirk, “Chaqwa,” in 
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These events provide the background to Hernando de Soto’s El otro sendero: La 
revolución informal (1986, published in English in 1989 as The Other Path: The Invisible 
Revolution in the Third World).107 As opposed to the Maoist roadmap to a new revolutionary 
society, de Soto and his think-tank, the Instituto Libertad y Democracia (ILD) argued that “we 
Peruvians” should be able to determine “a deliberate path which will enable us to escape from 
backwardness and advance towards a modern society,”108 which would be built on the 
entrepreneurship evidenced in “informal” markets. According to novelist and sometime 
presidential candidate Mario Vargas Llosa—who provided a preface to the book and introduced 
its ideas to a US audience via an article in the New York Times [8.34]—the state was incapable 
of providing solutions to the problem of chronic underdevelopment because it was itself part of 
the problem; “the informal market is actually the solution … the spontaneous and creative 
response of the impoverished masses to the state’s inability to satisfy their basic needs.”109  
De Soto’s discussion of the informal economy focuses on three sectors—housing, trade, 
and transport—described as having emerged spontaneously in response to social needs; 
scorned as criminal by mainstream society, for de Soto these markets are essential to the 
development of the broader economy, and operate perfectly well as self-regulating systems until 
encountering interference from official bureaucracies [8.35-8.37]. Rather than attempting to 
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impose regulation on informal markets, the state should recognize that promoting the “incipient 
market economy generated by the popular classes in Peru”110 is the only real path to economic 
takeoff; the state should concern itself with how to facilitate these mechanisms of private 
entrepreneurship, via deregulation and the removal of any obstacles to the growth of informal 
markets. 
The market in vivienda informal (informal housing) is central to de Soto’s argument. His 
narration of the process of squatter settlement formation emphasizes not community-organized 
action (valorized by the Revolutionary Government and Turner alike), but the role of small-scale 
spontaneous entrepreneurs—such as professional invasion organizers, operators of ad hoc bus 
routes, or the on-site sellers of water, fuel, or building materials—who find business 
opportunities in the niche markets serving these emerging settlements. For de Soto these 
asentamientos informales (informal settlements) are primarily “an expression of the people’s 
desire to own property”; furthermore, the ultimate aim of any “communal activity” by settlement 
residents (organizing associations to lobby for secure tenure or urban amenities, for example) is 
to accrue benefits to their private property.111 This new vision of a neoliberalized “self”-help 
housing is also contrasted to what would have occurred if these households had elected to 
remain in inner-city rental housing, contributing to overcrowding, and thereby making Lima into 
“one vast slum.”112 
Another key aspect of de Soto’s argument is the claimed monetary value of vivienda 
informal, estimated in terms of its “replacement cost” in mid-1984: thus “the average value of an 
informal dwelling was $22,038 and the total value of the building located in Lima’s informal 
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settlements came to $8,319.8 million, an amount equivalent to 69 percent of Peru’s total long-
term external debt in that same year.” By comparison, the state’s investment in housing from 
1960–1984 for lower-income residents was $173.6 million, “a mere 2.1 percent of the informal 
investment.”113 By this method of calculation Peru possessed an immense treasury of dormant 
wealth awaiting realization as capital for microenterprise. 
However government bureaucracy had been stifling this economic potential by imposing 
unnecessarily burdensome requirements on residents aiming to acquire legal title to their lots in 
squatter settlements. The primary legislation in this area (Law 13517 passed in 1961), had 
sought to establish secure tenure for residents of squatter settlements, but did not grant full 
transferable legal title until the household had completed seven years of residence. This 
measure was intended to promote the consolidation of the settlement: assuring the resident that 
they would not be evicted would encourage them to invest their resources in their housing; 
requiring owner-occupancy would encourage an active community eager to engage in 
improvement projects, and would furthermore counteract land speculation. In sum, Law 13517 
sought to improve the housing opportunities of residents of squatter settlements, but did not 
grant them the right to profit from the real estate that they had claimed.114 According to de Soto, 
these anti-speculation measures of Law 13517 were “discriminatory”—creating a second-class 
system of ownership, “a kind of legal apartheid”115—and prevented capital accumulation via the 
real property of the self-built dwelling (even if it had originated with the invasion or extralegal 
occupation of land) was an enfringement of personal liberty. The larger public interest of anti-
speculation measures was not a concern for de Soto; in fact, the processes of generating a land 
market were precisely what should be encouraged, without any limits or constraints. 
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occupant's land from becoming subject to claims of outside creditors.” Kenneth Manaster, “The Problem 
of Urban Squatters in Developing Countries: Peru,” Wisconsin Law Review 23, no. 1 (1968): 55. 
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In general, de Soto’s rejection of the state is complemented by a renewed mystification 
of the supposed unassailable logic of the self-regulating (that is, unregulated) market. He seems 
to view the interactions of the individual and the state as a struggle between competing, 
irreconcilable interests: in his account, the “defeat” of the state by the “informals”—that is, the 
failure of Peruvian officialdom to control informal economic activity—is interpreted as a moral 
victory, proving the survival of the fittest in the marketplace, rather than simply being the 
predictable outcome when an ineffective, immature bureaucracy tries to take on a problem of 
this scale with few resources.   
In the background of de Soto’s narrative, there is a different kind of struggle—that of 
class and culture. The 1950s language of “invasion” of squatter settlements expressed the fears 
of coastal elites faced with new migrants from rural areas, who flouted the law with no 
consequences [8.35]. According to de Soto, these illegalities actually form their own system in 
self-regulating “informal” economy, representing at heart an insurgent capitalism, which may 
have an unfamiliar face but ultimately operates within a reassuringly familiar market mechanism; 
rather than lawless, uncultured “peasants in cities” (a spectre reappearing in the form of the 
Shining Path) de Soto sees a petit bourgoisie in waiting.  
Despite Mike Davis’s recent characterization of de Soto as “a John Turner for the 
1990s,”116 the real points of convergence and of difference between the two figures present a 
more complex relationship. Turner’s own view is that de Soto’s work replicates his own findings 
concerning the long-term investment that the consolidated squatter house represents, providing 
proof that a standard middle-class house can be achieved over time by the self-help method, 
despite constrained begninnings.117 However on this point both writers overemphasize the 
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speed and ease of consolidation, while minimizing the obstacles and difficulties of the process: 
in their 1987 study on Lima, Riofrío and Driant provide convincing evidence that not all 
households are able to build their way out of poverty118—a conclusion that is supported by Peter 
Ward’s research on Mexico, among many examples.119  
Both Turner and de Soto emphasize the importance of people doing things for 
themselves, but for Turner this is an exercise in community-building, not entrepreneurship or 
wealth generation or single-minded “self”-determined initiative—his is not a “capitalistic version 
of self-help” of “individual self-sufficiency”120 but grounded in the “mutual aid” ethos advocated 
by Kropotkin. Their views of the state also contrast sharply: de Soto would limit government’s 
role to facilitating titling as a stimulant to entrepreneurship, while Turner envisages a substantial 
intervention in promoting equitable access to resources; Turner believes that the state has the 
responsibility to actively reshape markets in order to facilitate individual and community 
initiative, while de Soto’s faith in the free market is absolute. 
Fundamentally, the two part ways on the question of the value of housing: of use value 
versus exchange value: of housing as an end in itself, versus housing as equity. For Turner, the 
emphasis is always on the “freedom to build” (not only building shelter, but always also building 
                                                                                                                                                       
succeed after fifteen, twenty years, to get a property, and by that time it’s usually got the services, it’s got 
the water supply, the streets are paved and so on and so forth.… The actual market value represents, on 
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community), while de Soto’s focus is on establishing the foundations for a “freedom to borrow”—
to undertake credit obligations as the basis for small-scale entrepreneurial initiatives. For de 
Soto, the architecture of the “informal” or squatter settlement “works” in a very different sense to 
Turner’s conception, literally acting as a generator of capital and an engine of economic growth 
based on self-sufficiency. However both writers fail to address the question of how exactly this 
architecture “works” and at what cost to the resident-builders themselves, while the cost to the 
state is minimized.  
On this point, sociologist Gustavo Riofrío’s response to El otro sendero—Producir la 
ciudad (popular) de los '90: Entre el mercado y el Estado (1991)—offers a very different vision 
of the respective roles of the market and the state in facilitating access to very low-cost housing. 
Riofrío’s analysis encompasses a critique of de Soto’s interpretation, methodology, and data 
(which for both the Peruvian and the US editions was not included in the book itself—on the 
grounds that this may have “discouraged readers”—but was only available as a separate 
publication, which could be obtained by writing to the ILD offices). In Riofrío’s description, from 
the perspective of a committed leftist, housing in squatter settlements existed in a highly 
particularized “market”: “A market that is protected so that it only allows access to those who are 
going to build their houses there, which they will occupy permanently … This market, called 
‘informal’ by de Soto, only gives access to those who are willing to self-urbanize [autourbanizar] 
and self-build [autoedificar].”121 In the barriada (Riofrío refuses de Soto’s coinage of 
asentamiento informal, returning to this earlier designation), even if part of the dwelling is used 
to generate rental income, it always “fundamentally has a use value, not an exchange value”; 
the logic of the restrictions on resale and on taking out mortgages is that this protects the “social 
interest” of the community as a whole, of the residents as a collective. Riofrío argues that this 
very specific kind of market —governed by its own ethos which is not reducible to pure 
                                                




exchange—should be allowed to continue functioning according to its own rules, rather than 
“destroying the existing markets and replacing them with a single free market al estilo 
norteamericano.”122 
Riofrío also takes issue with de Soto’s account of the processes of construction in the 
barriada, which does not distinguish between the construction of urban improvements 
(urbanización) and the construction of housing per se. While de Soto suggests that residents 
are primarily concerned with building the individual house, Riofrío clarifies that in fact, the usual 
pattern is that “the community will immediately begin to make large investments in order to 
provide electricity and water—as well as other services and amenities—to the settlement. The 
construction of the family dwelling is not the first ‘large’ investment of families, and happens … 
when there are minimum services in the neighbourhood.”123 Further, Riofrío argues that de Soto 
exaggerates the importance of legal title in encouraging investment and consolidation,124 
pointing out that generally establishing security of tenure alone is sufficient. 
Importantly, Riofrío closely scrutinizes de Soto’s claim concerning the monetary value of 
extralegal housing, pointing out that de Soto’s estimated valuation of $22,038 per dwelling 
(which appears to be loosely based on the valuations used to calculate property tax) assumes 
that the average house is in much better condition than would actually be the case. For 
example, it seems to assume: that all the construction would be “in a good or very good state of 
conservation”; that more than half of the dwellings “would be less than five years old”; that only 
4 percent would lack electricity, water, sewerage connections; and that 45 percent would have 
tiled bathrooms. In fact, in the 1987 survey jointly carried out by Riofrío and Driant, which 
focused on well-consolidated zones and thus above-average housing, found that less than half 
                                                
122 Riofrío, Producir la ciudad (popular) de los '90, 115. 
123 Riofrío, Producir la ciudad (popular) de los '90, 133. 
124 See in particular Riofrío’s discussion of de Soto’s comparative data on the Mariscal Castilla Alta and 
Daniel Alcides Carrión settlements. Riofrío, Producir la ciudad (popular) de los '90, 141-145.   
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of the dwellings had finished floors, windows, doors, and surfaced walls; 16 percent of home-
owners “did not have a separate room to cook”; almost all had bathrooms but 27 percent had to 
share them with tenants or lodgers.125 Riofrío concluded that this data had been shaped “in 
order to exaggerate the value of what is built by the popular sectors”126; the total investment of 
$8,319.8 million claimed by de Soto was thus essentially an empty figure, a fiction. 
Finally, presenting his own vision of the path forward, Riofrío argued that the market 
alone could not provide an adequate solution to the problem of low-cost housing. Riofrío 
conceded that de Soto and his research institute had achieved some success in lobbying to 
simplify and speed up administrative processes in relation to housing, thereby correcting some 
of the inefficiencies of the state. However the complete deregulation of the housing sector, or 
the state’s further withdrawal of responsibility was not advisable: “the state has to fulfill the 
obligation to supervise the quality of habitat.”127 In particular, the state should provide technical 
assistance in construction and better access to credit (that is, credit to build dwellings, not to 
borrow against them). It should act in a supporting role to improve existing low-cost housing 
construction; the “self-build tradition [tradición autoconstructora]” should be the starting point for 
the large-scale production of low-cost housing under the guidance of the state—an approach 
which Riofrío estimated could produce at least 20,000 dwellings per year.128  
Notwithstanding the acuity of Riofrío’s critique, de Soto’s vision of neoliberalized self-
help in The Other Path gained a wide and enthusastic readership, and the authority granted by 
the book ensured the success of de Soto’s follow-up, The Mystery of Credit (2000).129 The 
                                                
125 Riofrío, Producir la ciudad (popular) de los '90, 150. 
126 Riofrío, Producir la ciudad (popular) de los '90, 151. 
127 Riofrío, Producir la ciudad (popular) de los '90, 122. 
128 Riofrío, Producir la ciudad (popular) de los '90, 122, 123. 
129
 The onoing appeal of de Soto (for architects, at least) is evident in an interview recently featured in 
Architectural Design, which uncritically accepts his claims concerning extending the benefits of the 
“formalization” of land tenure to communally held indigenous property in the Peruvian Amazon in order to 
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appeal of de Soto—characterized by one commentator as “a highly effective transnational policy 
entrepreneur”130—largely stems from his position as “Third World” intellectual espousing 
neoliberalism, reinforcing existing arguments from an unexpected (geographical) position. On 
the policy level, the neoliberal turn represented a transfer of interest and funding from “housing” 
as physical object and as associated infrastructure, towards the granting of property title. The 
World Bank has been especially prominent in this shift. In 1993 it announced a revision of its 
policies in Housing: Enabling Markets to Work (a report co-written by Shlomo Angel, formerly of 
the Center for Environmental Structure and one of the architects involved with its PREVI 
proposal): “The Bank now expects the housing sector, both formal and informal, to contribute to 
economic growth and public revenues, rather than to be a drain on limited public resources.”131 
Accordingly, the World Bank proposed to focus on “property rights development”—with 
programs of “land tenure regularization in squatter settlements” (that is, granting formal property 
title) as well as privatizating “public housing stock, particularly in formerly centrally planned 
economies.”132 As far as the World Bank was concerned, the effectiveness of the “tenure 
regularization” approach had been proven by the example of Lima, where “the average squatter 
dwelling had a replacement value of US$22,000, and the total squatter housing stock had a 
replacement value of US$8.3 billion.”133 The appeal of de Soto’s message had transcended the 
veracity (or lack thereof) of his supporting data.  
                                                                                                                                                       
facilitate resource-extraction. Angus Laurie, “Formalisation: An Interview with Hernando de Soto,” 
Architectural Design 81, no. 3 (May-June 2011): 64-67. 
130 Bromley, “Power, Property, and Poverty,” 284. Bromley continued: “Because he primarily preaches to 
the converted—groups which abhor theories of imperialism and exploitation; which reject cooperatives, 
state enterprises, and government regulation; and which laud individualism, private property, and 
entrepreneurship—de Soto can spread his ideas widely without having to rigorously document the 
surveys and calculations that underlie them.” 
131 World Bank, Housing: Enabling the Market to Work (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993), 58. 
132 World Bank, Housing: Enabling the Market to Work, 64. 
133 World Bank, Housing: Enabling the Market to Work, 116n5, citing de Soto et al, The Other Path. 
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In 1996, President Alberto Fujimori established the Comisión de Formalización de la 
Propiedad Informal (COFOPRI, or Commission for the Official Registration of Informal Property) 
in order to facilitate the granting of property titles. The long-standing limbo of tolerated 
illegality—where unauthorized urban development was not policed or penalized—was replaced 
by active campaigns to promote the “regularization” of “informal” settlements [8.38], including 
the so-called “Law of Invasions”—a law to normalize the trangression of the law. Beginning in 
1999 the World Bank supported these initiatives through a loan of $36.12 million. The objective 
of this program was less concerned with improving the quality of housing than stimulating 
economic development, as de Soto had espoused:  
The principal benefit … would be economic: more efficient use of the property, 
thanks to market mechanisms, as a result of the greater legal certainty … [which] 
could result in increased value of the properties, more numerous and frequent 
transactions in the real estate market, and use of property as a guarantee for 
obtaining credit.134 
A report on the successes of the program noted that in five years it had registered 1.4 million 
titles deeds, affecting some 5.7 million people, and that a large number of these properties had 
subsequently changed hands through the formal real estate market.135 However, the report 
regretted that the program’s impact had been less than anticipated due to a generalized 
“ignorance of the benefits of credit”—both on the part of lenders apparently wary of former 
squatters, and on the part of the residents themselves, most of whom were “not inclined to use 
their property to guarantee a loan” since falling behind on the mortgage meant that they would 
risk losing their home, which was often their only asset.136  
Furthermore, as a second report observed, the property titles that had been granted 
covered the land, but not the dwellings themselves: in fact, since “most of these structures are 
                                                
134 David F. Varela and Jorge L. Archimbaud, “Property Rights and Land Tenancy,” in An Opportunity for 
a Different Peru: Prosperous, Equitable, and Governable (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 570.  
135 Varela and Archimbaud, “Property Rights and Land Tenancy,” 560.  
136 Varela and Archimbaud, “Property Rights and Land Tenancy,” 572. 
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self-built, they do not meet building codes so cannot be registered”—nor could they be 
mortgaged until they had been “upgraded and regularized.”137 Unable to arrange a mortgage on 
a substandard dwelling, or on the underlying land alone, “credit to these neighbourhoods will be 
limited to shorter-term, unsecured credits mostly by microfinanance institutions.”138 Thus the 
inability to access the mortgage credit promised by the World Bank program was not due to 
“ignorance” alone, but was a direct consequence of the material reality of the residents’ housing 
as housing—not as imagined equity.  
Other critiques of titling in practice have pinpointed central flaws in this approach:139 the 
limited value of property title in the absence of a market that would allow new residents to 
capitalize on their property (that is, a lack of effective demand), and the unwillingness of low-
income households to exercise their freedom to borrow, to take on substantial debt that could 
fatally compromise the security of their tenure if repayments become too burdensome. Despite 
these shortcomings, the policy has managed to maintain active support. 
On the ground, the “regularization” has been carried out without regard for the potential 
adverse impacts on urban development. With the removal of virtually all planning controls, 
pausing to assess the suitability of land for development, or the ability of residents to establish a 
viable community had become an unnecessary obstacle to legalizing—and thus capitalizing—
the squatter city. Lima is now reaching the hard limits of urban expansion, and as a result the 
land invasions have moved further and further out, or onto difficult sites on hillsides or ravines, 
with steep gradients or poor soil composition. These newer squatter settlements are territorially 
isolated and, as a consequence, often socially fragmented [8.39-8.40]. In the words of a recent 
critique: “These residents are not, as in previous decades, courageous pioneers heading off into 
                                                
137 William Britt Gwinner, “Housing,” in An Opportunity for a Different Peru: Prosperous, Equitable, and 
Governable, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 355, 353. 
138 Britt Gwinner, “Housing,” 355. 
139 See in particular Alan Gilbert, “On the Mystery of Capital and the Myths of Hernando de Soto: What 
Difference Does Legal Title Make?” International Development Planning Review 24, no. 1 (2002): 1-19. 
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the desert to found new cities.  They are families who are camping in the city.”140 The policy has 
moved a great distance from “the aim of achieving the advancement of man, family, and 
community”141 proposed by the Revolutionary Government. 
The revolutions in self-help discussed in this chapter have alternately inverted the values 
that they operate within and returned them to their original positions—cycling through the 
solutions offered by the individual, local community, state, international community, or market. 
The current outcome seems to suggest that the individual empowerment or self-realization of 
some formulations of self-help is to be validated, while the community development aspirations 
offer little that is productive to capital. Nonetheless, the fictitious communities of self-help 
housing—proposed by the Revolutionary Government, or by Turner—are perhaps still 
preferable to the negation of community by a culture of individualized ownership and “self”-
sufficiency. 
                                                
140
 Gustavo Riofrío Benavides and Daniel Ramírez Corzo N., Formalización de la propiedad y 
mejoramiento de barrios: bien legal, bien marginal (Lima: DESCO, 2006), 33, emphasis in original. 
141
 ONDEPJOV, Boletín 1, La organización para el desarrollo de los pueblos jóvenes, 5. 
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9. Conclusion: The Informal as a Projection 
 
When I began my archival research in Peru, many of the experts I met argued that aided 
self-help housing projects did not exist, and in many ways they were right. Self-help housing is a 
chimerical figure, much discussed but more rarely pinned down for analysis; much proposed 
and projected, but more rarely funded and realized. Like a chimera, self-help housing is a quasi-
mythic and unstable assemblage of elements drawn from different traditions and disciplines, 
offering a monstrous appeal, a dangerous allure to the unwary. The concept has been 
remarkably resilient, mutating to accommodate various ideological conditions: for John Turner, it 
was informed by anarchism, mutual aid, local action; for the liberal policy-makers promoting 
initiatives under the Alliance for Progress, it signified personal initiative, enterprise, economic 
growth; for the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, it embodied the principles of 
social mobilization, participation, collectivity; and for the neoliberalism of Hernando de Soto, it 
expressed the potential of entrepreneurship, a spontaneously emerging capitalist economy. 
Self-help housing has shifted between different registers of architectural production, ranging 
from Turner-esque participatory, hands-on community development, to the mass-construction of 
sites-and-services projects directed by unnamed professionals working for state agencies, or 
the auteurist conceptions proposed by the avant-garde of international modernism.  
If the informal as a “project” describes the unstable hybrid that emerges from the 
translation of self-built construction via the input of the architectural professional, then its status 
as a “projection” suggests the contingencies of this process and these practices. This 
dissertation oscillates between these two states, charting the territory between them. The 
intention of this survey is to demystify self-help housing—however sobering the resulting 
discoveries may be. 
The distance between project and projection is manifested in the slippage between the 
apparent simplicity of the concept and the complexities of implementing effective projects on the 
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ground; the slippage between the ambitions of self-help, in terms of its claimed economic and 
social benefits, and the realities of what it has achieved. In hard figures, between 1946 and 
1990 Peruvian state housing agencies built a total of 227,245 housing units nationwide (after 
which time the state had little direct involvement in housing production).1 Of this total, 42,628 
units (19 percent) were conventional construction (single-family houses or apartments), 12,241 
units (5 percent) were núcleo básico, and 172,376 units (76 percent) were in sites-and-services 
or lote tizado (chalk-drawn lot) projects.2 In very broad terms, these last two categories could be 
considered as self-help housing projects (whether aided or, more likely, unaided beyond the 
provision of the most basic services, with no technical assistance from architects). In total this 
represented 81 percent of state housing production, or 184,617 units. Assuming an average 
household size of five people, the Peruvian government had a hand in providing some form of 
minimal housing with a self-help component to roughly 920,000 of its citizens over four and a 
half decades. It is considerably more difficult to determine how many of these dwellings were 
produced with the contribution of meaningful technical assistance. For example, as noted in 
chapter six, funds from the Plan Bienal Perú-BID supported the construction of 4,106 dwellings 
using self-help in the period 1962 to 1965, but it is almost impossible to trace exactly how that 
money was spent and what kind of projects it supported. Yet even though the Perú-BID program 
was highly problematic, its 4,000-odd units probably represent the high-point of “aided” self-help 
housing in Peru.3 
                                                
1 I have compiled these figures from the information on state-built housing projects listed in the detailed 
report produced by the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano, Estudio de evaluación integral de los 
programas de vivienda ejecutados y/o promovidos por el Estado, Vol. IV, Inventario de proyectos con 
participación del Estado, 1946–1990 (Lima: INADUR, 1991). The vast majority of these projects were 
built by national agenices, with a few constructed by municipal agencies. 
2 These were listed as: sites-and-services, 35,230 units; lots, 59,970 units; lote tizado or lote básico, 
77,176 units. For some (but not all) of these projects, the list included information on specifically what 
services or amenities were provided. 
3
 I have derived these figures from a 1967 table summarizing the JNV’s building activity: “Programas 
ejecutados por la Junta Nacional de la Vivienda: 1963–1967,” in Obra de la Junta Nacional de la Vivienda 
de julio de 1963 a octubre de 1967 (Lima: JNV, 1967), CDI-MVCS.  
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On the other side of the ledger, as José Matos Mar reported, in 1955 10 percent of 
Lima’s population (120,000 people) were living in squatter settlements. By 1961 the figure was 
17.1 percent (316,420 people) and by 1981 it was 29.6 percent (243,054 households, or over 
one million people), with an additional 9.5 percent listed as living in tugurios, or degraded 
tenement housing.4 According to statistics compiled by UN-Habitat in 2001, 68 percent of Peru’s 
urban population was living in “slums” in Lima and other cities, a total of 12,906,400 people, 
roughly half the population of the country.5 By comparison, in Colombia 22 percent of the urban 
population was living in “slums” and in Brazil, 37 percent; in Latin America only Nicaragua (81 
percent) and Haiti (86 percent) posted higher rates than Peru, although the raw numbers were 
much lower since the overall population of these countries was smaller. The majority of the 
urban “slum”  households in Peru (87 percent) were judged to have a safe water source, but a 
significant number (around a quarter) did not have sufficient living space or durable housing, 
and a third did not have access to adequate sanitation. Against this, the state’s support for 
perhaps around 4,000 semi-aided self-help dwellings appears utterly ineffectual, resulting in 
limited solutions, abortive trials that disappeared almost without a trace into the improvised, 
unauthorized, “uncontrolled” city.  
Yet this dissertation makes clear that efforts to make aided self-help housing work in 
Peru were thoughtful, innovative, and committed, and did produce successes. Specifically, this 
research has contributed to an understanding of this field by: 
                                                
4 I have compiled these figures from tables in Jean-Claude Driant’s Las barriadas de Lima: historia e 
interpretación (Lima: DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, 1991), 55 (Table no. 4), 77 
(Table no. 9). 
5 UN-Habitat, “Information by Country: Statistical Overview,” 
<<http://www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=2>>. In summary, the urban populations living in 
“slums” in a range of Latin American countries were: Chile 9 percent (total population 15 million; 
1,161,000 in urban “slums”), Mexico 20 percent (100 million; 15 million), Colombia 22 percent (43 
million; 7,189,600), Argentina 33 percent (37 million; 10,744,800); Brazil 37 percent (173 million; 
52,488,200), Bolivia 61 percent (9 million; 3,458,700), Nicaragua 81 percent (5 million; 2,268,000), Haiti 
86 percent (8 million; 2,476,800). There was no statistical information listed for a number of countries, 
most notably Venezuela, where the “slum” population would likely be significant. 
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analyzing the debates between Fernando Belaúnde Terry and Pedro G. Beltrán on affordable 
housing beginning in the mid-1950s, as well as uncovering the history of Santiago Agurto’s 
“casa que crece” (growing house) project from 1954, a conceptual model that was employed in 
various forms over subsequent decades; 
undertaking a close reading of José Matos Mar’s research on barriadas, situated in the context 
of the political and practical consequences of the Ciudad de Dios invasion; 
elucidating the details of John Turner’s architectural practice in Peru, including the contributions 
of his colleagues such as Eduardo Neira, Federico Mevius, and Diego Robles, as well as 
outlining the development of his theoretical framing of self-help housing;  
explicating the underlying principles of Law 13517 and analyzing projects that tried to think 
through the implications of this new approach to managing urban growth; 
investigating the role of Father Daniel McLellan in establishing savings and loans associations 
in Peru, as well as the efforts of Hogares Peruanos to build profitable low-cost housing, 
including self-help housing schemes on a for-profit basis;    
outlining the original aims of the Plan Bienal 1962–1963 Perú-BID in the context of the Alliance 
for Progress and assessing the actual outcomes of this ambitious program, focusing on a case 
study of Perú-BID projects in Chimbote; 
delineating the process of organizing PREVI PP1 and presenting a detailed comparative 
analysis of the designs submitted by various of the architects involved, as well as surveying the 
other PREVI sub-programs, with particular attention to the framing of aided self-help in PREVI 
PP3; 
tracing the conceptual reframing of self-help housing under the Revolutionary Government of 
the Armed Forces, and analyzing the convergences and as well as the significant differences 
between John Turner and Hernando de Soto concerning the potential and the significance of 
self-help housing. 
This research also demonstrates that throughout its history conceptions of who should 
take primary responsibility in the provision of self-help housing have shifted repeatedly between 
the various actors involved—the individual builder/owner, the local community of an emerging 
self-built neighbourhood, the Peruvian state, the global community as framed by international 
development agencies, or the market extolled by neoliberalism. As the situation currently 
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stands, fostering the functioning of a free market is seen as paramount, as it is envisaged that 
individuals granted title to their improvised, self-built residences will be integrated into the 
market as property owners and credit consumers. Over recent years the Peruvian government, 
with the support of $36.12 million from the World Bank, has focused its efforts on a program to 
“formalize” property title, to the exclusion of any other solution. However the economic dividends 
of this approach have been less than anticipated, and although 1.4 million title deeds were 
issued in the first years of the program, by the mid-2000s it was unclear how this could be 
expanded, since those settlements yet to be formalized are the most physically, socially, and 
economically marginal, and thus more resistant to successful market integration.6  
This is then an opportune moment to revisit Gustavo Riofrío’s proposal made some 
twenty years ago to develop new state-supported aided self-help housing projects; if well-
conceived and adequately funded, Riofrío estimated that this approach could produce at least 
20,000 dwellings per year.7 However before embarking on any such program, it is essential to 
address the shortcomings of earlier initiatives, which faced challenges at many levels: the 
complex organizational dynamics of self-help communities, the logistics of implementation, 
shifting and unreliable political support, and—crucially—inadequate or inconsistent funding.  
On this last point, a core claim of self-help housing has been that it presents an efficient, 
effective, and economically viable solution that is able to transcend the lack of resources 
available to low-income households. In the case of Peru, this questionable claim resulted in the 
(self-defeating) requirement that such projects be financially self-supporting—an impossibility, 
given the economic situation of the majority of the population. Thus while it is clear that 
                                                
6 These settlements “have difficult access, are risk zones, or have been affected by violence. The cost 
and duration of their formalization are thus necessarily higher.” David F. Varela and Jorge L. Archimbaud, 
“Property Rights and Land Tenancy,” in An Opportunity for a Different Peru: Prosperous, Equitable, and 
Governable (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 565. 
7 Gustavo Riofrío, Producir la ciudad (popular) de los '90: Entre el mercado y el Estado (Lima: DESCO, 
1991), 122, 123. 
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residents can benefit from the technical assistance offered by aided self-help housing, it is 
equally clear that they cannot cover the costs of such projects alone. 
Assuming that outside agencies (whether national, municipal, or international) were to 
accept the responsibility of funding such programs, it is important to ask, how much would aided 
self-help cost in comparison to other potential solutions? How much would it contribute, 
comparatively, as a “productive investment” in the lives of low-income households? Specifically, 
property titling presents itself as a highly cost-effective solution: the $36.12 million invested by 
the World Bank resulted in 1.4 million title deeds; in a rough calculation, each title cost $25.80. 
However the actual cost-benefit of each title is almost impossible to ascertain—and by some 
measures may in fact be less than that of aided self-help in the form of supervised credit, for 
example. 
In revisiting the potential of aided self-help it is necessary to reconsider fundamental 
questions, such as what should aided self-help housing provide? What is it trying to build—
materially, or socially and politically? Architects drawn to aided self-help were initially driven by 
a modernist commitment to housing reform, a socially engaged practice, and a concern for 
constructing spatial order; in material terms, the housing they envisaged adhered to minimum 
standards, or at least strived to achieve them at some point in the future, as in the “growing 
house” model. For their part, residents’ focused on the fundamental struggle to improve their 
living conditions were less concerned with the material form of the dwelling than securing 
access to land and urban services. Consistently, when asked to nominate their priorities in 
receiving assistance, residents have identified infrastructure provision—water, sewerage, 
electricity, graded streets—and property title as core needs, rather than architectural input in the 
design and construction of their houses. In response, architecture needs to rethink what it can 
provide to these low-income households; what can it contribute to improving the dwelling in 
even its most basic form, at the Existenzminimum level of infrastructure. 
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No less essential is the task of clarifying the social and political stance of any revival of 
aided self-help. Throughout its history, the focus of the “self” of self-help has veered between 
the singular, and the mutual or communal. On the one hand, projects of the 1950s and 1960s 
tended to have a strong community development component, and in the 1970s the community-
building of self-help was reinterpreted as social mobilization, a kind of training for “full 
participation” in the new society proposed by the Peruvian Revolution. On the other hand, 
Father McLellan and his supporters defined the cooperative movement of the 1960s as “self”-
centred rather than communal-centred (that is, decidedly anti-communist), and more recently 
the “self” of neoliberal self-help assumes a singular individual—property owner, proto-capitalist 
entrepreneur—primarily concerned with capitalizing on the exchange value of the house. 
One side effect of recent large-scale property titling initiatives (whether intended or not) 
has been to undermine collective action to campaign for the improvement of urban amenities 
and other community needs.8 Alternative solutions envisage providing security of tenure via the 
establishment of community land trusts or the installation of communal infrastructure rather than 
granting individualized transferable title.9 In such cases, the self-help technique of “mutual aid” 
reappears as a tool to organize residents’ demands for amenities ranging from basic utilities to 
schools and public spaces, in the process constructing a kind of strategic community mobilized 
to achieve shared objectives.10 It is through such projections of self-help housing—as opposed 
to the vision of each to his own projected by neoliberalism—that alternatives to the prevailing 
individual empowerment model can begin to be imagined. 
                                                
8 Paul Dosh, “Surprising Trends in Land Invasions in Metropolitan Lima and Quito,” Latin American 
Perspectives 33, no. 6 (November 2006): 29-54. 
9 Geoffrey Payne, “Getting Ahead of the Game: A Twin-Track Approach to Improving Existing Slums and 
Reducing the Need for Future Slums,” Environment and Urbanization 17, no. 1 (2005): 135-145. 
10 This recalls the “functional contract” proposed by Herbert Read: “the anarchist replaces the social 
contract by the functional contract, and the authority of the contract only extends to the fulfilling of a 
specific function.” Herbert Read, 1941, “The Paradox of Anarchism,” in A Coat of Many Colours: Essays 
(London: Routledge & Paul, 1956), 63. Emphasis in original. 
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